SFA capability is rooted in Individual Talent (part 1)

[Bob's World]

Unfortunately, the Army has no systemic method of ensuring the right person gets to the right job, we continue mostly as interchangeable cogs in the HRC machine.

It’s called "Special Forces Assessment and Selection."

This is not to say that there are not many great service members across the force with the mental ability, aptitude, and experience to conduct FID effectively; or the physical ability to be in SF; or both; that are not in SF. Clearly there are.

But you raise a great point, and that is that the big army sees this as one more mission that it tasks down to a BCT (or AAB) to execute, and that the standard promotion and assignment process will produce the right people in the right jobs to go out and do this just like they do every other mission.

My experience, however, is that the big army's approach to training of others tends to fall into the category of "there are two ways to do things the US army way per (name the reg); and the wrong way." Then, instead of seeking to understand why your training audience can't seem to perform "to standard" they tend to cop a "I'm better than you" attitude and then instead of changing your approach to fit the target audience, they simple keep trying to pound the square peg into the round hole.

Short war story: I did a lot of FID in my short tenure as an ODA Commander in 5th SFG, both with foreign troops in a combat environment, and with US law enforcement in an interagency environment. I made mistakes sure, but learned a lot about going into someone else's backyard to help them do their jobs more effectively.

Then I left the Regular force to go to law school, and joined the 41st "Enhanced Infantry Brigade" in the Oregon Guard. A great unit with a great heritage, but they had all of the problems inherent in being a closed gene pool of personnel that don't cross pollinate TTPs in general and have very little time to train to any standard beyond basics. As one of 15 "Enhanced" Brigades they received special funding above other Guard units, and therefore received special focus from the Active Force. Two teams of advisors were created, and I saw them all from start to finish.

One team was your good buddies who lived in the community and had office space at your armories. Though they often equated to being the same size as the full-time guard staff, they could only offer advice but specifically could not lend a hand in actually doing anything. So they would sit in their office and read the paper, and wander into the training officer's office 2-3 times a day to offer advice, and then go back to doing their homework for the college classes they were taking, etc. Good Cop.

The other team was based at Fort Lewis, and they were trainers and evaluators. Their job was to set up training lanes and evaluate units and staffs IAW the Mission Training Plans (MTPs). Once it was determined that Enhanced Brigades would get CTC rotations ("denying" an AC unit/commander of the same) it got ugly. The evaluators made it their duty to prove that the Guard units were not prepared. In fact, they applied "special" standards to the guard. MTPs have unit tasks, leader tasks and critical tasks. Army standard is that a number of unit/leader tasks can be failed and achieve a go. Missing one Critical task meant failure. The COL (Armor, I forget his name, but he probably remembers mine...) in command proclaimed that for the Guard, "since aren't all leader tasks critical?" that for our evaluations all leader tasks would carry the same effect as a critical task. Needless to say, compiling the higher standard with less experience and training resulted in an extremely high failure rate. Bad Cops

Guard units had to literally expand their BN and BDE TOCs to be three times the normal size in order to accommodate the platoon of "advisors" and "evaluators" that roared into your training site, 1-2 per GSA SUV, for every training event. One guy would tell you three ways to do your job, and the other guy would tell you three reasons why you suck. Evaluators at company level would countermand orders from battalion if it interfered with what they wanted the company to do. Tactical Platoon night movements to contact would be stopped in mid movement for AARs, complete with Gas lanterns blazing and easels and flipcharts of the standards.

I could go on and on. These guys were conducting FID/SFA, and they absolutely, for all of their expertise at the tasks they were attempting to impart, SUCKED at FID. And to a man, and I know a lot of great officers and NCOs who participated in this grand AC/RC operation, can tell you in great detail about all the ways the Guard soldiers and units failed to meet standards; but are clueless about how equally abysmal they were at FID/SFA.


I share this only to make a point, and the point is this: This is a mission that is about far more that providing advice and training assistance. Conventional units can play a major and important role in this; but this is best applied in a supporting role, so that they can focus on what they are really good at, and let others focus on what they are equally and uniquely selected and trained to do.

[Cavguy]

I share this only to make a point, and the point is this: This is a mission that is about far more that providing advice and training assistance. Conventional units can play a major and important role in this; but this is best applied in a supporting role, so that they can focus on what they are really good at, and let others focus on what they are equally and uniquely selected and trained to do.

Sir,

Great post highlighting the challenges in training and mindset, and the failure of the AC/RC guys to build rapport and advise.

I think we are saying the same thing, except from my view the last few years, I have not seen SF actively seeking to shape the GPF advisory mission. We were forced to assign GPF soldiers as advisers in OIF and OEF because there aren't enough specifically trained and selected guys in your branch to do so.

So the Army's first attempt was "Well, let's deploy the USAR Training Divisions as advisers, since it's a training mission." That was a disaster, as these great individuals were prepared to run basic training for US kids, not mentor Iraqi battalions. Then we created Ft. Riley, taking an Armored BDE (!) to run advisory training. Where was SWC? Hell if I know. It would seem a no brainer that if SF couldn't fill the adviser demand, they should have at least run the training, since it's been the core competency of SF for the last three decades or so. But we didn't for whatever reasons. Same story for recent doctrine.

In the two years I have worked at CAC as the ops officer for COIN, I have seen little interest from the US Army SF community in GPF efforts to get better at this. I can count on one hand the number of times anyone working for USASOC (excepting COL Maxwell/USASOC G3) has contacted the COIN center here about anything we are doing. Sure they attend the occasional conference, but mostly I have received the impression that most in SF just wished we would go away, usually muttering comments about "amateurs". People are doing the best they can with imperfect resources and less background to make this work. As a very personal observation, SF seems to have schadenfreude over the whole GPF circus with building TT's. My perception is that they haven't been a big part of the solution.

SOCOM is a different story though, so is JSOU. They have been actively plugged into what has been developing. Just interesting to me.

There's a big study coming up about SOF/GPF integration. I hope it produces something.

So in a way, the SF have failed to advise/influence the GPF. Kind of reverse of what happened with your AC/RC experience.

[Bob's World]

Sir,

Great post highlighting the challenges in training and mindset, and the failure of the AC/RC guys to build rapport and advise.

I think we are saying the same thing, except from my view the last few years, I have not seen SF actively seeking to shape the GPF advisory mission. We were forced to assign GPF soldiers as advisers in OIF and OEF because there aren't enough specifically trained and selected guys in your branch to do so.

So the Army's first attempt was "Well, let's deploy the USAR Training Divisions as advisers, since it's a training mission." That was a disaster, as these great individuals were prepared to run basic training for US kids, not mentor Iraqi battalions. Then we created Ft. Riley, taking an Armored BDE (!) to run advisory training. Where was SWC? Hell if I know. It would seem a no brainer that if SF couldn't fill the adviser demand, they should have at least run the training, since it's been the core competency of SF for the last three decades or so. But we didn't for whatever reasons. Same story for recent doctrine.

In the two years I have worked at CAC as the ops officer for COIN, I have seen little interest from the US Army SF community in GPF efforts to get better at this. I can count on one hand the number of times anyone working for USASOC (excepting COL Maxwell/USASOC G3) has contacted the COIN center here about anything we are doing. Sure they attend the occasional conference, but mostly I have received the impression that most in SF just wished we would go away, usually muttering comments about "amateurs". People are doing the best they can with imperfect resources and less background to make this work. As a very personal observation, SF seems to have schadenfreude over the whole GPF circus with building TT's. My perception is that they haven't been a big part of the solution.

SOCOM is a different story though, so is JSOU. They have been actively plugged into what has been developing. Just interesting to me.

There's a big study coming up about SOF/GPF integration. I hope it produces something.

So in a way, the SF have failed to advise/influence the GPF. Kind of reverse of what happened with your AC/RC experience.

You are spot-on that USSOCOM has not shaped the development of the conventional force as it has ventured into what has traditionally been SF territory. SOCOM is not the Executive Agent for COIN, as an example, and as a rather small HQ with a rather large mission, has been reasonably reluctant to take on full proponency for several DOD-wide programs with strong SOF roots. We should have taken on a tailored level of proponency, and shaped the portion of the doctrine that defined the context and spirit of these operations, allowing the conventional force to pick up from there.

Similarly, after being "burdened" with a couple of rotations of raising and training the Afghan National Army, SF escaped that mission and SOF forces in theater all headed out to focus on sexier roles. In retrospect, the mission essential tasks in Afghanistan were not on the border with Pakistan, they were in mentoring the development of the governance of the country. There should have been a more appropriate balancing between what was important, and what was sexy. No one wants to be back at a school house or Gov't office when his brothers are out running combat operations.

Point being, that SOCOM absolutely does not have a corner on "smart" and has made as many mistakes in approaching this conflict as any other HQ.


But we start this war from where we are right now. How we got here is interesting, but not worth agonizing over. We need to, in my opinion, have two main priorities in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

1. Enhance HN governance legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, and work equally hard to stop any activity or policy that tends to create a perception of US legitimacy over the same.

2. Focus on enabling "goodness" of governance over creating "effectiveness" of governance. (the first being rooted in the perception of the populace, the latter being something measured by us outsiders).

This new focus would drive a very different perspective for the employment of all elements of US power in both AORs. A return of true and full authority to the HN (I.e., We only do what they ask us to do or approve, all detainees are HN detainees, and if asked to leave we leave); no US unilateral operations; etc.

Bottom-line: In order to achieve true and positive change, we must first relinquish control. The problem is that Cold War strategy was rooted in controlling others, so it has become our paradigm. Time to move on.

[reed11b]

I agree with Rob, that having a method to allow the BCT's to provide organic SFA support is beneficial, and that the means he is looking at is the right track to go. Yes Bob, the SF are better at it, but how big a push, from within the SOF community no less, have you seen for more DA missions for SF? In remote conditions and limited support missions, or in training for CT missions, then yes SF is the only way to go, but for our current endeavors and in likely future missions then SFA needs to be shared with the GP forces. This is due to both the size of the mission and the nature of training required. Are the SF really good at teaching how to do combined arms missions, or are they good at primarily light infantry and commando ops?
So Niel, why does the Army insist in over specializing units (My guard unit has switched from infantry to a BfSB; can anybody tell what exactly the need or mission for a BfSB is, because I have no clue?) and insisting that soldiers can do everything well. The Army makes mortars a separate MOS instead of a basic infantry skill (mortars, at 10 level, is NOT complicated) but make operating and maintaining a complex armored vehicle (Bradley) an infantry skill instead of a separate MOS as it should be. Sometimes I think I should just beat myself with the stupid stick so that I will stop questioning why and accept all that the Army tries to sell me.
Reed

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Reed, first I'd ask if you remember the "Never give up" sketch (attached)?

You made a great point with -

This is due to both the size of the mission and the nature of training required. Are the SF really good at teaching how to do combined arms missions, or are they good at primarily light infantry and commando ops?

. You can't stop with just combined Arms either, it might be DIV or Corps C2 processes, ministerial development, the establishment of a NCO or officer academy, the establishment of a CTC like capability, or any number of things that go on within a partner's defense establishment. This does not even include the other components of a partner's security sector which might have to be filled by DoD simply because the preferred USG or MNP is unavailable or unwilling.

Ultimately there is a question of capacity - how much Schlitz is in the cooler, and there is a question of providing the right capabilities given conditions and objectives - Bob's World mentioned outdated paradigms - I'd say that with respect to the range of possible conditions you must be able to call on capabilities throughout the total force. This means that sometimes GPF will be supporting and some times they will be the supported, and the same with SOF. Largely I'd say the issue of who supports who is irrelevant - the conditions and objectives should be the determining factor in that decision. However, unless the capability is available, you are stuck with going with what you have - even if it is inadequate in capability and capacity. That is not an answer we should be satisfied with.

While Bob is right there is more to it than just OTERA (Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Advise), I also think that it is a statement relative to the operating environment, and as such trying to source SFA as a force employment concept from any one source will leave operational commanders coming up short. As a result we may put the policy objective at risk. All I have to go off of is what I read, hear and can consider, but I’d say that we’re not close to finished in Iraq as I just saw a thread on starting up an Iraqi Marine Corps, I saw in the news we’re selling them ARHs, significant FW capability and Armor, they live in a rough neighborhood and still face a significant internal threat. It would appear we are just getting started in Afghanistan, and even when we turn the corner there, supporting the development of their security forces will feel like an enduring mission, there are plenty of SFA related activities globally, with more on the horizon.

I think capacity of any variety is going to be in short supply for a long time – as such it’s a total force ball game – we can either acknowledge it and prepare for it, or we can stick our heads in the sand and keep doing like we have – can anybody tell me what the total number of augmentees currently in theater is – and exactly what they are doing (vs. what the tasking they were requested under?) My point with that question is we are compromising our effectiveness and our efficiencies and moreover we are putting the burden on operational commanders to disassemble one capability and reassemble another – and the evidence is we’ve been doing it for awhile, so why can’t we send them what they need?
Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Marc -

For me, I define "talent" as an inborn, hardwired (aka genetic) propensity to find performing some action or operation more easily than other people.

I use the term "skill" to refer, regardless of any talent, to the ability of an individual to perform the actions and operations associated with that skill.

Now, these definitions have some implications that are both a) pretty obvious to anyone with two neurons to rub together, and b) anathema to the PC crowd, since they assume an innate, genetic difference between people.

I think this is an important observation and others have made this with respect to command. Interestingly there is a move afoot to see how some of this can be modeled. Could you for example take the 5 block model and make some qualifications about what education, experience and training constitute them? Could you then quantify this in a mathematical expression? Could you then use that to compare probability of success of one individual with a given combination over another dependent upon conditions and objectives?

It seems that until you can put these capabilities into a model and simulate it in a way which provides justification for making programmatic decisions, relevant anecdotal information by itself will not move the ball forward (much). *Note - this says allot about our bureaucratic culture that we are far more comfortable with a false reality of mean time between failure (MTBF) and probability of kill (PK) ratios (which are themselves based on observation and historical averages) then we are with trusting our senses and intuition (based on our own experiences) simply because we've found a way to mathematically express one and not the other. The equation of how you know a tank BN of X will destroy a tank BDE of Y does not match perfectly to the anecdote of sometimes you are the bug and sometimes you are the windshield.

Again, I'd refer anyone interested in the issue of how our perception of reality influences our judgment to Marc T's excellent website.

Best, Rob

[marct]

Hi Rob,

I think this is an important observation and others have made this with respect to command. Interestingly there is a move afoot to see how some of this can be modeled.

1. Could you for example take the 5 block model and make some qualifications about what education, experience and training constitute them?
2. Could you then quantify this in a mathematical expression?
3. Could you then use that to compare probability of success of one individual with a given combination over another dependent upon conditions and objectives?

I changed your questions to a numbered format just for ease, but the short (and totally infuriating) answer is "Yes" with a whole slew of caveats.

1. Some of what is listed in the 5 block model is definitely simple to convert to mathematical languages (hey, that's all math is... a collection of languages!). Where we start running in to problems with the conversion is where the "folk psychology" terms do not match biological reality. Let's look at the specific skills listed:



(sorry, my laptop with my graphics editing program is in the shop....)

Okay, I am going to assume that there are reasonably meaningful metrics available for MOS skills, so I won't really touch on them at all.

Experience is quite problematic since it is an outcome of a learning opportunity. In other words, a metric such as time in grade don't mean jack. Some of the best, as in they have some bearing on reality, measures of experience are available using things like a 360 degree evaluation schema.

I'm going to avoid Box 2, 'cause those are categories of skills. What you might think about doing, if you really wanted to follow down the metrics track, is to pull out exact skill sets, in terms of tasks etc. to the point where they can be measured in observable reality. For example, "Marksmanship" is useless as a skill unless it can be circumscribed pretty heavily (hey, I'm pretty good with a throwing knife at 30 feet, or a 303 at 50 yards, but I suck with a pistol!). The other thing about Box 2 is that you are conflating skill sets (actions and outcomes) with perceptual mindsets (especially that "Warrior" stuff).

Understanding Human Nature is unmeasurable. Actually, that's not quite true, but the two key terms are pretty general ("understanding" - in what sense? and "human nature", depends on your cultural / philosophical / ideological models...). Honestly, the best "testing" mechanism I have ever come across was to take a person, grab all their ID, cash, cards, etc. and drop them down in a city they didn't know with $5 for a long weekend (sort of an urban, solo survival trip).

Influencing really depends on a core ability which can loosely be called "empathy", but really refers to the ability to perceive another persons "buttons" and then manipulate them. Use some of the industry tests on sales ability as a metric here.

Negotiating. This is a very frustrating example of a naive folk construct. The concept of "negotiation": implies the existence of agreed upon logics and outcomes which are culturally defined, so I would split this into two skills - "reading" cultural logics and manipulating cultural logics.

Building Rapport. Simplest way to test this is similar to the comments on understanding human nature. The core technique that seems to work the best is "mirroring", i.e. feeding back what the person you are talking to is saying. If you want the folk wisdom version of it, "God gave us 2 ears and one mouth. Think about it!". Regardless, the skill set has been analyzed like crazy in Psychology and, also, by groups that use interogation (I'm sure Jedburgh has some great links...).

Working through an interpreter. Hmm, tricky, but it really comes down to two, seperate skill sets. The first is body language (reading and sending) and the second is building rapport.

Box 4 is, obviously, the key one. On the Teaching skill, I would say, having taught for too long , that the core "skill" is the ability to a) focus communications on the correct sensory channel / learnbing style for your student, and b) knwoing as much as you can about the topic while being extremely open to being wrong.

Coaching is somewaht different since there is an element of control in the matter (i.e. we are coaching you to work with US forces), while Advising, at least in my highly biased view, is actually about enabling your students to become what they can be. Another way of looking at it is that Teaching is training, Coaching is education, and Advising is enabling (skills, education and wisdom respectively).

Culture. Hell, drop em down in the environment with $5 and see how they do. That's the best test available for whether or not you can "understand" the local culture.

Language. There are a lot of metrics out for this, so i won't bother to comment except to note that there is a serious differences between language-for-use and formal language. For example, I can't speak German, but I get along fine in Germany .

It seems that until you can put these capabilities into a model and simulate it in a way which provides justification for making programmatic decisions, relevant anecdotal information by itself will not move the ball forward (much). *Note - this says allot about our bureaucratic culture...

Unfortunate, but true. I hate to say it, but it's a corollary of the scientization of society.

Again, I'd refer anyone interested in the issue of how our perception of reality influences our judgment to Marc T's excellent website.

Thanks for the plug, Rob !

[Ken White]

I think there's a skill set (and / or a talent... ) block missing; Five blocks are cool but I think the third one might be shown as a hopefully existing and embedded set of skills that may need slight -- and only slight, very slight -- remodeling to be move on to the fourth block and be effective as an advisor.

All Officers and NCOs are responsible for leading and training subordinates and use -- or should use -- the skills I placed in Block 3 below, translating those skills to an advisory rather than a command or leadership position will take some adjustment but that should be slight. No need to make it more difficult than it is...

Herewith is plan B:

[shfranke]

Greetings to ALCON in this interesting thread in SWJ.

Ref CavGuy's good comment (pasted below this note for reference).

Like CavGuy, I am also surprised (well, a tad astounded) that USAJFKSWCS has not grasped the mission to train US Army personnel -- those who are sourced from Big Army [non-SOF] units -- who are outbound for duty as foreign military advisors, or otherwise provided the DA-designated proponent elsewhere (FRKS/FPLA) with the SWC's rich lode of its institutional archives and SME input applicable to the pre-deployment ["quasi-MOSQ?"] training of MiTTs/ETTs, et al.

Separate from the current staff and faculty running resident classes at USAJFKSWCS, the Marquat Memorial Library there has a repository of valuable, if not unique, and now-unclassified materials on TTPs, LLs, and AARs about SFA-related topics, including MTTs, NETTs, FID, SFA, MTT, NETTs, "persuasion & influence operations" (for lack of a more-elegant descriptor), and related bilateral people-to-people activities conducted within, and across, cultures and their operating environments.

Re using SF units to assume the lead in providing MiTTs: I have the impression that SF units (both AC & RC) units are decisively engaged in DA & SR missions (a few may be doing FID and SFA-type missions outside the OEF and OIF AOs, but they all are still very busy, in any case).

I also concur with CavGuy's observation about the mixed benefit of the initial recourse to use a USAR Training Division to set up and conduct the early round of MiTT training at Camp Funston. (As I recall, elements of that same training division later were deployed to Iraq to support BCT of the "new" Iraqi Army, but I don't know what was the track record or final results of that enterprise.)

Still curious about where and how JCISFA fits into the scheme of things in terms of the content for training MiTTs, as different from its good job in developing concepts and guidance.

My mind boggles at the recent trend to tack on some augmentees -- without MiTT training (but maybe with some MiTT experience [?]) -- to the staffs of deploying BCTs so they can "advise & assist" the BCT- Augmented (aka "BCT-A") when that unit wedges the parallel "advise & assist" mission with its HN FSF counterpart along with its TOE mission. (By inference -- and realizing that I may misinformed or under-informed at this point -- the MiTT POI at FPLA will wind down, if not disappear?)

Has Tom Odom returned to SWJ since his deployment to Iraq a month or so back?

Hope this helps.

Regards,

Stephen H. Franke
LTC, MI (FAO/SOF/SFA)
USAR (Retired)
San Pedro, California


-------------------- BEGIN PASTE ----------------------

Sir,

Great post highlighting the challenges in training and mindset, and the failure of the AC/RC guys to build rapport and advise.

I think we are saying the same thing, except from my view over the last few years, I have not seen SF actively seeking to shape the GPF advisory mission. We were forced to assign GPF soldiers as advisers in OIF and OEF because there aren't enough specifically-trained and -selected guys in your branch to do so.

So the Army's first attempt was "Well, let's deploy the USAR Training Divisions as advisers, since it's a training mission." That was a disaster, as these great individuals were prepared to run basic training for US kids, not mentor Iraqi battalions. Then we created Ft. Riley, taking an Armored BDE (!) to run advisory training. Where was SWC? Hell if I know. It would seem a no-brainer that if SF couldn't fill the adviser demand, they should have at least run the training, since it's been the core competency of SF for the last three decades or so. But we didn't for whatever reasons. Same story for recent doctrine.

In the two years I have worked at CAC as the ops officer for COIN, I have seen little interest from the US Army SF community in GPF efforts to get better at this. I can count on one hand the number of times anyone working for USASOC (excepting COL Maxwell/USASOC G3) has contacted the COIN center here about anything we are doing. Sure, they attend the occasional conference, but mostly, I have received the impression that most in SF just wished we would go away, usually muttering comments about "amateurs". People are doing the best they can with imperfect resources and less background to make this work. As a very-personal observation, SF seems to have schadenfreude over the whole GPF circus with building TTs. My perception is that they haven't been a big part of the solution.

SOCOM is a different story, though; so is JSOU. They have been actively plugged into what has been developing. Just interesting to me.

There's a big study coming up about SOF/GPF integration. I hope it produces something. So in a way, the SF have failed to advise/influence the GPF. Kind of reverse of what happened with your AC/RC experience.

[/QUOTE]


---------------------- END PASTE ----------------------

[shfranke]

Greetings to ALCON in this interesting thread in SWJ.

Ref CavGuy's good comment (pasted below this note for reference).

Like CavGuy, I am also surprised (well, a tad astounded) that USAJFKSWCS has not grasped the mission to train US Army personnel -- those who are sourced from Big Army [non-SOF] units -- who are outbound for duty as foreign military advisors, or otherwise provided the DA-designated proponent elsewhere (FRKS/FPLA) with the SWC's rich lode of its institutional archives and SME input applicable to the pre-deployment ["quasi-MOSQ?"] training of MiTTs/ETTs, et al.

Separate from the current staff and faculty running resident classes at USAJFKSWCS, the Marquat Memorial Library there has a repository of valuable, if not unique, and now-unclassified materials on TTPs, LLs, and AARs about SFA-related topics, including MTTs, NETTs, FID, SFA, MTT, NETTs, "persuasion & influence operations" (for lack of a more-elegant descriptor), and related bilateral people-to-people activities conducted within, and across, cultures and their operating environments.

Re using SF units to assume the lead in providing MiTTs: I have the impression that SF units (both AC & RC) units are decisively engaged in DA & SR missions (a few may be doing FID and SFA-type missions outside the OEF and OIF AOs, but they all are still very busy, in any case).

I also concur with CavGuy's observation about the mixed benefit of the initial recourse to use a USAR Training Division to set up and conduct the early round of MiTT training at Camp Funston. (As I recall, elements of that same training division later were deployed to Iraq to support BCT of the "new" Iraqi Army, but I don't know what was the track record or final results of that enterprise.)

Still curious about where and how JCISFA fits into the scheme of things in terms of the content for training MiTTs, as different from its good job in developing concepts and guidance.

My mind boggles at the recent trend to tack on some augmentees -- without MiTT training (but maybe with some MiTT experience [?]) -- to the staffs of deploying BCTs so they can "advise & assist" the BCT- Augmented (aka "BCT-A") when that unit wedges the parallel "advise & assist" mission with its HN FSF counterpart along with its TOE mission. (By inference -- and realizing that I may be misinformed or under-informed at this point -- the MiTT POI at FPLA will wind down, if not disappear?)

Has Tom Odom returned to SWJ since his deployment to Iraq a month or so back?

Hope this helps.

Regards,

Stephen H. Franke
LTC, MI (FAO/SOF/SFA)
USAR (Retired)
San Pedro, California


-------------------- BEGIN PASTE ----------------------

Sir,

Great post highlighting the challenges in training and mindset, and the failure of the AC/RC guys to build rapport and advise.

I think we are saying the same thing, except from my view over the last few years, I have not seen SF actively seeking to shape the GPF advisory mission. We were forced to assign GPF soldiers as advisers in OIF and OEF because there aren't enough specifically-trained and -selected guys in your branch to do so.

So the Army's first attempt was "Well, let's deploy the USAR Training Divisions as advisers, since it's a training mission." That was a disaster, as these great individuals were prepared to run basic training for US kids, not mentor Iraqi battalions. Then we created Ft. Riley, taking an Armored BDE (!) to run advisory training. Where was SWC? Hell if I know. It would seem a no-brainer that if SF couldn't fill the adviser demand, they should have at least run the training, since it's been the core competency of SF for the last three decades or so. But we didn't for whatever reasons. Same story for recent doctrine.

In the two years I have worked at CAC as the ops officer for COIN, I have seen little interest from the US Army SF community in GPF efforts to get better at this. I can count on one hand the number of times anyone working for USASOC (excepting COL Maxwell/USASOC G3) has contacted the COIN center here about anything we are doing. Sure, they attend the occasional conference, but mostly, I have received the impression that most in SF just wished we would go away, usually muttering comments about "amateurs". People are doing the best they can with imperfect resources and less background to make this work. As a very-personal observation, SF seems to have schadenfreude over the whole GPF circus with building TTs. My perception is that they haven't been a big part of the solution.

SOCOM is a different story, though; so is JSOU. They have been actively plugged into what has been developing. Just interesting to me.

There's a big study coming up about SOF/GPF integration. I hope it produces something. So in a way, the SF have failed to advise/influence the GPF. Kind of reverse of what happened with your AC/RC experience.

[/QUOTE]


---------------------- END PASTE ----------------------

[Rob Thornton]

Steve,
Welcome aboard - good to have you. I thought I try and answer your querry:

Still curious about where and how JCISFA fits into the scheme of things in terms of the content for training MiTTs, as different from its good job in developing concepts and guidance.

JCISFA was chartered to instituionalize best practices across DoD and provide operational support (the idea that the two areas would be reinforcing to each other). The latter has taken multiple forms - and has resulted in working experimentation, concepts and implications. The former we provide with a Tactics Branch that works with the various centers to capture lessons learned and best practices and support their dissemination across the force where applicable. We've hosted several advisory working groups and play a role in linking people up. We're in a good place to catch returning advisors given ILE (CGSC) is here at FT LVN, and often are able to make use of them while they await classes. We also coordinate with the various institutions that support SFA education and leader development.

Hope that helps - you can get to our public homepage here.

Hope that helps.

Best, Rob