Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Bill Moore]

No, the easiest thing to do is deal with the government. If there are lots of groups there are lots more chances you can find some pretty good people to work with. But it would take work, imagination, insight, Arabic language skills and it would be dangerous and uncertain.

It would be the most rational choice if your unstated objective was to make your life and career progression easier. But if your actual objective was the good of the USA and you took the easy route, you would have to admit to yourself that you weren't worth much.

There are two assumptions in your argument, one is flat out wrong. First you're logic implies the U.S. not doing anything (wrong, we did things, so you obviously meant not enough) is why Syria ended up the way it is. Syria ended the way it is due to a host of local and regional factors that had nothing to do with the U.S.. When you embrace American Hubris views, then of course you view the world as though we're the center of all, and we are the cause and effect of all, but that has little to do with reality.

The other assumption is if we intervened to a greater extent there would be a different outcome. That may or may not be true. If we killed Assad and greatly neutered his military it is probable his regime would have fallen, but we have no clue what would have happened after that, but we sure as heck would own the problem at that point, and to what end?

But if your actual objective was the good of the USA and you took the easy route, you would have to admit to yourself that you weren't worth much.

This argument assumes that getting the U.S. involved in a regional quagmire would somehow be in our interest? Why isn't it in our interest to see both of our adversaries (Sunni extremists and Iran and their proxies) fight one another, and for once strain their economies instead of ours? Why can't we wait until there is an opportunity to actually achieve something that is in our interests? Removing Malaki would be one example, the situation was managed to great effect in that aspect, but who knows what the new government will do.

Since I'm not sure of the extent of support we're providing and to whom, I can't make an argument on whether we need to increase it our not, but I haven't see a good argument yet on why we should intervene, or should have, intervened, militarily in Syria. Everyone is making a lot of wild guesses made on sensational news reporting instead of facts, because the facts are not available the public.

We had our so called expert on Syria, and his/her expertise was due to tweeting back and forth to "one" person he/she knew in Syria. The first casualty of any conflict is the truth, but I would hope most people who visit SWJ have enough experience to realize that and try to look beyond the headlines.

In the end those clamoring for U.S. military involvement should provide a theory of change and identify a condition that we can feasibly obtain. None provided to date other than criticism for the U.S. policy wonks, and trust me I like to criticize them as much as any body else, but at the end of the day if we can't provide a sound strategy that is our interest, not one that merely satisfies our emotional craving to do something, then recognize the complaints for they really are, just background noise from frustrated people.

[CrowBat]

There are two assumptions in your argument, one is flat out wrong. First you're logic implies the U.S. not doing anything (wrong, we did things, so you obviously meant not enough) is why Syria ended up the way it is...

Bill,
I'm the first to say that, a) 'no, the USA is no centre of the World'; b) 'no, the USA would not go killing Assad' even if WH decided to 'do something' about Syria; and c) there is no certainty about the outcome of a possible US intervention in that country.

BUT...

- A matter of fact is that this 'war on terror' against specific extremists is de-facto one of priorities in the foreign policy of the USA. It doesn't matter whether you like this fact or not, or whether you want to fight that war or not: you're 'Target No.1' on targeting lists of extremists in question.

- This results in conclusion that

a) whenever the USA fails to act, and especially when the USA fails to act preventively, extremists are going to exploit the situation to their advantage;

b) whenever the USA fails to act, majority (if not all) of the West is failing to act too;

c) whenever the USA fails to act and drags the West with it, most of pro-West actors around the World fail to act too, and

d) this is precisely what happened in Syria.

So, perhaps doing nothing in Syria was in 'best interest of the USA' - supposedly because 'getting USA involved in a regional quagmire is not in interest of the USA'. Fine. But, it resulted in nobody else - except extremists and their supporters, of course - doing anything at all. And that has made space for extremists. Worse yet: doing nothing in Syria resulted in massive frustrations for various of US friends in the Middle East, because it resulted in a direct threat for their security and simultaneous 'success' of their enemies.

Therefore: in this case, lack of US action resulted in an outright catastrophe - in Syria, and in Iraq.

If you think that's 'bolstering US interests in the Middle East'... well, perhaps you should go back to checking that with 2+2=4, too.

Furthermore:

This argument assumes that getting the U.S. involved in a regional quagmire would somehow be in our interest?

You - the USA - are eyebrows-deep in that quagmire since at least 1942 (start of cooperation with Sauds and thus Wahhabists), indirectly since 1919 (King-Crane Comission), and very directly ever since, so where is the problem?

On the contrary, if you argument/think in this fashion, then the question is rather: why everywhere else (in the Middle East) but only not in Syria? Where's the logic in that?

Why isn't it in our interest to see both of our adversaries (Sunni extremists and Iran and their proxies) fight one another, and for once strain their economies instead of ours?

Because whichever of them 'wins' (all provided that conflict is 'winnable' for one of involved belligerents) they remain your (US) enemies.

Means: whichever party wins there, it's only going to be reinforced by success.

Is this in US interest?

Why can't we wait until there is an opportunity to actually achieve something that is in our interests?

Oh, no problem. You can repeat the exercise from the 1990s, and wait until another airplane crashes into some skyscraper - or something else of that kind happens.

It's your choice, really. You can ignore the fact that, in military terms, the ISIS is far more sophisticated than the AQ ever was. You can further prefer to offer them more time so they can get even better, too. No problem: just wait and see.

Removing Malaki would be one example, the situation was managed to great effect in that aspect, but who knows what the new government will do.

That was near-pointless, and came much too late.

But, don't let yourself get disturbed by such observations....

Since I'm not sure of the extent of support we're providing and to whom, I can't make an argument on whether we need to increase it our not, but I haven't see a good argument yet on why we should intervene, or should have, intervened, militarily in Syria.

In essence, official USA are not providing any kind of serious help to anybody (in Syria). There is simply no trace of evidence for that.

The WH is meddling (in particularly idiotic fashion) through attempting to condition provision of aid by third parties (Saudi Arabia, Turkey etc.) to specific groups of genuine Syrian insurgents, and/but - foremost - through attempting to steer specific groups of (genuine) Syrian insurgents (not Jihadists) from 'operational rooms' in Jordan and Turkey. This meddling is usually to be seen in stoppage of all flow of aid provided by other players whenever this is needed the most (like when the regime is on offensive). Which in turn is usually resulting in Syrian insurgents getting only more frustrated by the lack of US support, then in defections of the same to the side of Islamists etc., etc., etc.

Except for this, the WH has only permitted specific private, US-based organizations to provide non-lethal aid (cars, food, clothes etc.) to hand-picked groups of Syrian insurgents.

Is that of any help?

Everyone is making a lot of wild guesses made on sensational news reporting instead of facts, because the facts are not available the public.

That depends on what facts do you want to get, and especially: what do you prefer to hear (or ignore), I would say.

From my POV, 'sensational news' were all those declaring the uprising and insurgency in Syria for 'al-Qaida' right from the start, which was a mountain of nonsense and BS. Tragically enough, that had the 'desired' effect - between others of keeping the USA (and West) out of this affair - and now a group worse than AQ advancing there too.

In the end those clamoring for U.S. military involvement should provide a theory of change and identify a condition that we can feasibly obtain.

While I'm not 'pro-US intervention', I offered plenty of 'theories' that have proven to 'work' over the time. For example, an 'investment' of little more than 50, perhaps 100 million into right groups, back in summer 2012, could have prevented Syria from going down the sink. Various people high above circles you or me are frequenting have suggested very much the same.

So, perhaps some (re-)reading (?) of older posts might be of help here.

While yes, it's terribly frustrating to see what became of the country and people (who were quite effectively frustrated away from the West by the lack of support), it's really not my fault if you (and quite a few of others) prefer to look the other way and consider this for, 'just background noise from frustrated people'.

[Dayuhan]

It's your choice, really. You can ignore the fact that, in military terms, the ISIS is far more sophisticated than the AQ ever was. You can further prefer to offer them more time so they can get even better, too. No problem: just wait and see.

That's probably true, but since the threat from AQ was never military action, it's also of limited relevance.

While I'm not 'pro-US intervention', I offered plenty of 'theories' that have proven to 'work' over the time. For example, an 'investment' of little more than 50, perhaps 100 million into right groups, back in summer 2012, could have prevented Syria from going down the sink. Various people high above circles you or me are frequenting have suggested very much the same.

Yes, I recall these theories. They were quite extraordinarily theoretical, and based on sweeping assumptions with little evidence presented to substantiate them. They dealt with possibilities that were extensively evaluated, and for excellent reasons rejected, back in the day.

[Bill Moore]

Crowbat

A matter of fact is that this 'war on terror' against specific extremists is de-facto one of priorities in the foreign policy of the USA. It doesn't matter whether you like this fact or not, or whether you want to fight that war or not: you're 'Target No.1' on targeting lists of extremists in question.

While I don't agree with many of our leaders' decisions, it is dead wrong to assume we don't recognize the threat from terrorists and we're not acting upon those threats. Just because you didn't see it in the media doesn't mean we're not disrupting this threat. Approaches can be argued, and I don't think it is the U.S. approved approach, but I see an advantage when our adversaries are killing each other. They're expending limited resources and exposing to the world what they represent, and I think the world needed a reminder to stiffen their resolve.

As for spending a few million dollars, we have certainly done that. Furthermore, several Arab nations have provided millions in support to different groups. While money is important, it is of relative importance since others are providing it. If we want a specific group or groups to win I think we would have to provide direct military assistance like we did in Libya, but I don't think those groups would be able to stabilize the country after Assad fell if we did that. Do you? If you do, how do you see that happening?

[CrowBat]

..As for spending a few million dollars, we have certainly done that.

I'm sorry, but I haven't seen a single dollar of any kind of official US aid (except relief supplies for refugees) reaching insurgents.

All I've seen is plenty of babbling in the media, sure, but there are no bucks, and thus no 'Buck Rogers'.

Yes, the WH is telling Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Qataris, Turks and whoever else, 'do it yourself' - but then meddling through 'interventions from highest points' (WH) whenever things develop the way 'USA' (WH, again) don't like them.

Furthermore, several Arab nations have provided millions in support to different groups. While money is important, it is of relative importance since others are providing it.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, it's rather something like few billions - most of it meanwhile squandered because of Qatari 'interventions' (usually either ignored, or wholeheartedly supported by the WH).

If we want a specific group or groups to win I think we would have to provide direct military assistance like we did in Libya, but I don't think those groups would be able to stabilize the country after Assad fell if we did that. Do you? If you do, how do you see that happening?

Sigh... again: Syria is so piss-poor, that any money is making difference. Saudis had it easy to build up the IF: sure, from the US standpoint, that organization has 'wrong' religion, and seems not the least curious to make any promises about 'peace with Israel'; but hell, one can't really expect the Syrian Sunnis to convert to Christianity as 'thanks', can one? And expecting anybody in Syria to make promises about some sort of future peace with Israel... come on... that's fantasy.

Anyway, even few Syrian private businessmen found it relatively easy to build up the SF and SRF, which are presently major recipients of Saudi aid.

The problem in all these cases is always the same: lack of management skills, which results in plenty of money (and other 'stuff') ending in wrong hands and being squandered for no profit in return. And even more so: Qatari interventions through 'direct donations' to specific commanders (usually those that eventually sided with the JAN or the ISIS), which in turn caused quarrels and then loss of influence of major politico-military alliances, like the FSyA and then the SNC.

A strict control and relatively simple disciplinary measures - plus a 'muzzle' over Qatari noses, of course - could've been imposed. One could've followed the Pakistani example from dealing with 'seven parties' of Mujaheddin in Afghanistan of the 1980s and say, 'bring me a video showing you've used what I've provided; no video, no beans, bullets and gas'.

Not only ironically, but 'idiotically', the US-run 'control rooms' never acted in that fashion. If they moved at all, then to stop the flow of supplies to insurgent groups during specific of regime's offensives. Obviously, this did little to 'bolster' Saudi or Emirati influence.

So, investing into 2-3 groups (the Farouq Brigade and various of its franchises that began emerging in 2012 and 2013 would be one of good examples; ever since, the once powerful and influential Farouq was largely destroyed by a combination of regime's and ISIS' attacks), and thus provoking a 'snowball' effect in sense of 'others' seeing that these 2-3 groups are 'flourishing' and 'well-supplied', was one of very promising ideas.

For those who are now going to say, 'But Tom, you can't possibly predict the future or know what would have happened', all I can say is 'shut up, that's precisely how the Islamists and then the ISIS did it too'.

Namely, when one asks them, major reason why various insurgent groups began joining Islamists, and then even Jihadists, was a) disappointment over lack of support from the West, and especially b) they saw that these (Islamists and Jihadists) are better supplied and thus better organized too.

They had the money, beans and bullets; moderates not. And so, gradually, after 'winning' enough people to their side - or killing anybody opposing them (or letting the regime kill the people in question) - the ISIS was left to spread in Syria.

Guess, that's 'evidence' that my ideas in this case wouldn't work, right?

[Bill Moore]

Guess, that's 'evidence' that my ideas in this case wouldn't work, right?

My evidence to support my assumptions is that there are over 100 different groups (probably way more than that) in Syria. No leader is able to consolidate power through his ideology and vision.

While no group has the winning narrative, the Islamists have narrative that resonates more with young men because the Islamists demonstrate both military capability and a vision that appeals to young men who don't have the capacity yet to use history to inform their thinking to anticipate what the repercussions will be if the Islamists actually win.

If we removed Assad, and we probably should have after he used chemical weapons, it would be a free for all for king of the hill that would result in continued bloodshed, perhaps worse than it is now, with no foreseeable end. The most likely winner in the long run would be the Islamists unless external powers intervene, but the Islamists wouldn't be able to control the entire country, so the war would continue and it would destabilize the region as a whole.

I'll now argue against myself, the region is becoming destabilized anyway, neither Assad, al-Nusra, ISIS, or the minority moderates can win at this point, so to bring this to a head the region needs to intervene militarily to either:

A. Greatly reduce the strength of ISIS, which in turn empowers al-Nusra (AQ) and Assad.

B. Remove Assad, which may free up al-Nusra and other groups to direct their power towards ISIS.

C. Put LH and Iran in checkmate, but I don't know how we would.

D. Support Assad and return the status quo which is morally reprehensible after he gassed his people.

Of course morality changes with time. We certainly had no qualms deliberately attacking civilians in WWII in both Germany and Japan with fire bombs to compel the nation to stop fighting and surrender non-conditionally. Assad is doing the same, but in 2014 we don't find that acceptable. I agree it isn't acceptable, but it isn't entirely irrational either.

[CrowBat]

My evidence to support my assumptions is that there are over 100 different groups (probably way more than that) in Syria. No leader is able to consolidate power through his ideology and vision.

So what? Why is it 'always' necessary to have 'one' leader and unity?

There are no 100, but about 1000 different Syrian insurgent groups. Yes, some work together excellently in the north of the country, and fight each other in the south etc. But, generally, most of them are working together rather well. Foremost: main reason for quarrels between them - and the main reason for all of their 'lost battles' are supplies. So, if one provides supplies, there's no reason to fight.

On the contrary, and as you can read in these two very detailed articles by another chap from ACIG, describing some of recent insurgent ops (note: made by two French authors, so English is a lil' bit 'jumpy'), whenever there are supplies, they come together and fight joint battles against the regime:

- Rebels attack the military base of Hamadiyah (Idlib province), July 2014

- Lift the blockade of Mleha (August 3, 2014)

While no group has the winning narrative, the Islamists have narrative that resonates more with young men...

What Islamists there have such a narrative?

None. Get yourself some contacts in Syria, ask whoever you like. It's not about narratives but about food, ammo and organization.

... because the Islamists...

You ought to define 'Islamists' here too: do you mean the IF, which is friendly to the JAN, but at odds with the ISIS? Or the JAN, which is friendly to the IF and often cooperating with moderates in one part of the country, while fighting both of these in other part of the country, and is generally at odds with the ISIS?

Or do you mean the ISIS - which is neither Syrian, nor 'rebels/insurgents', nor can be can be considered 'Islamic', but only 'mental illness'?

Or any other of so many 'Islamist' groups there?

And generally: only the IF and the ISIS are demonstrating any kind of military skills. The JAN was so much weakened by the ISIS, that is meanwhile primarily used to provide suicide bombers for delivering coup de main at the start of specific attacks.

If we removed Assad, and we probably should have after he used chemical weapons, it would be a free for all for king of the hill that would result in continued bloodshed, perhaps worse than it is now, with no foreseeable end.

...but there was none of that so far and an end to this conflict is foreseeable now?

On the contrary, removal of Assad would've:
- removed the credence of 'legal' regime in Damascus;
- thrown ranks of Alawites into disarray (traditionally, Alawites were seldom a solid block, and there are all the time minor uprisings and unrests against the regime between already since October 2012)
- removed the credence of Iranian involvement, which weakened native insurgency to a degree where this became unable to fight the ISIS and lost all of NE Syria to it.

With other words: such an action could've at least limited the spread of the ISIS inside Syria (if not prevented it), in turn denying it a base from which it launched the offensive into Iraq.

While, as the situation is right now, the regime is not only responsible for helping the ISIS establish itself in Syria, but reporting about its 'fight' against the ISIS and flying air strikes against their bases for PR purposes, while actually buying nearly 50% of its fuel from them (i.e. de-facto financing the ISIS); and Iranians - who were near bankrupt just two months ago - are now yielding immense political and monetary profits from the ISIS, because they're now 'good' and 'useful' - for their support for that failed government in Baghdad, and for their support for Kurds too. And that's not to talk about the Hezbollah and other, similar 'factors'...

Sorry, but if the policy of even considering cooperation with all of these jerks is not failed to doom.... then I don't know what else is.

The most likely winner in the long run would be the Islamists unless external powers intervene, but the Islamists wouldn't be able to control the entire country, so the war would continue and it would destabilize the region as a whole.

'Islamists' are going to win this war, sooner or later. We all have to cope and live with that. That's so because dominant majority of the Syrian population are Sunni Moslems. Question is just: what 'Islamists'.

Here is a point where I can only conclude: as usually, the longer the war goes on, the more extremist sort of Islamists.

Therefore: the policy of protracting the war - which is what the WH is pursuing since 2012 - is an idiotic one.

[Dayuhan]

A strict control and relatively simple disciplinary measures - plus a 'muzzle' over Qatari noses, of course - could've been imposed.

How exactly would you have proposed to "muzzle" the Qataris? They do not take instructions from the US.

So, investing into 2-3 groups (the Farouq Brigade and various of its franchises that began emerging in 2012 and 2013 would be one of good examples; ever since, the once powerful and influential Farouq was largely destroyed by a combination of regime's and ISIS' attacks), and thus provoking a 'snowball' effect in sense of 'others' seeing that these 2-3 groups are 'flourishing' and 'well-supplied', was one of very promising ideas.

Promising if you assume that money is the only variable, but we all know that money is not the only variable.

What you're not acknowledging is that choosing a proxy, especially in a fight with no clear and realistic desired end state and no compelling US interest at stake, is a blind two-footed jump onto the mother of all slippery slopes. What do you do when your proxy doesn't win? Do you write it off, or double down, or triple down, a course that inexorably points toward direct involvement?

Of course it's easy to say that the proxy would win if only the US did whatever you suggest, but in all of these fights there's always a pack of people claiming that it'll all be right if only a few tens of millions get thrown at whoever they like. What they say and what happens are two very different things.

[carl]

Since I'm not sure of the extent of support we're providing and to whom, I can't make an argument on whether we need to increase it our not, but I haven't see a good argument yet on why we should intervene, or should have, intervened, militarily in Syria. Everyone is making a lot of wild guesses made on sensational news reporting instead of facts, because the facts are not available the public.

Crowbat argued the case better than I can but I want to address this particular point.

To me your argument in the paragraph above boils down to "Trust us we know what we are doing and you don't need to know...and by the way if you did you would see how good we were but we won't let you know so trust us."

After L. Paul Bremer, Rumsfeld, the spectacle of us paying the Pak Army/ISI to kill us and all the other things that have happened over these many years, I don't trust those with the facts not available to the public not to be anything but hammer headed stupid.

[Bill Moore]

Crowbat argued the case better than I can but I want to address this particular point.

To me your argument in the paragraph above boils down to "Trust us we know what we are doing and you don't need to know...and by the way if you did you would see how good we were but we won't let you know so trust us."

After L. Paul Bremer, Rumsfeld, the spectacle of us paying the Pak Army/ISI to kill us and all the other things that have happened over these many years, I don't trust those with the facts not available to the public not to be anything but hammer headed stupid.

Carl,

A of lot truth in that argument and there is the rub. A lot of our covert and clandestine efforts are conducted by idiots who don't have a clue and their work is concealed from critics, so they have a degree of free play that won't be exposed until it is a tragic failure. On the other hand, covert and clandestine operations don't work if they're exposed, so obviously there is a tension here that can't be resolved unless we take covert and clan ops off the options list. I don't think we want to do that. There has been talk for years on pushing these paramilitary ops from the CIA to the military. I think there are pros and cons for doing that and I'm not prepared to present an informed opinion on keeping the same or switching DOD to the lead. Like you said, we have already seen what the likes of Rumfield and Wolfowitz did as DOD leaders, imagine giving them the lead for the nation's covert and clan capabilities for paramilitary operations. It really comes down to picking the right people to lead these I think more than picking the right organization.

We work best when we're not trusted and are forced to demonstrate we don't have our head up our butts. My point to Crowbat is I suspect, I certainly don't know in my current position, we're doing more than meets the public eye. A large of part I suspect is due to partners in the region not wanting their roles publicized. Is it enough? Is it the right thing? Are our objective right? I don't know.

[carl]

It really comes down to picking the right people to lead these I think more than picking the right organization.

I ask your personal opinion. Is the US military capable of selecting and putting the right people in charge, or is the personnel system so strong that that is impossible?

Same question for the spook community, are they capable of that? Can either group overcome their bureaucracies in order to accomplish the mission?

[Bill Moore]

I ask your personal opinion. Is the US military capable of selecting and putting the right people in charge, or is the personnel system so strong that that is impossible?

Same question for the spook community, are they capable of that? Can either group overcome their bureaucracies in order to accomplish the mission?

I can' answer for the spook community. For the military if it was considered important they would carefully select commanders, at least initially much like they do for certain elite SOF units. If it wasn't considered important, then you get what you get from the bureaucracy.

[ganulv]

A of lot truth in that argument and there is the rub. A lot of our covert and clandestine efforts are conducted by idiots who don't have a clue and their work is concealed from critics, so they have a degree of free play that won't be exposed until it is a tragic failure. On the other hand, covert and clandestine operations don't work if they're exposed, so obviously there is a tension here that can't be resolved unless we take covert and clan ops off the options list. I don't think we want to do that. There has been talk for years on pushing these paramilitary ops from the CIA to the military. I think there are pros and cons for doing that and I'm not prepared to present an informed opinion on keeping the same or switching DOD to the lead. Like you said, we have already seen what the likes of Rumfield and Wolfowitz did as DOD leaders, imagine giving them the lead for the nation's covert and clan capabilities for paramilitary operations. It really comes down to picking the right people to lead these I think more than picking the right organization.

The military is already involved in Title 50 operations, though, isn’t it?

[davidbfpo]

A long, multi-sourced and linked article - the full title being 'Provocation and the Islamic State: Why Assad Strengthened the Jihadists' and from an author who is an observer or student of the Syrian Civil War: http://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2...the-jihadists/

His argument is that Assad has consistently followed a strategy of provocation, which is cited as:

simply means taking control of your enemies in secret and encouraging them to do things that discredit them and help you

[Bill Moore]

A long, multi-sourced and linked article - the full title being 'Provocation and the Islamic State: Why Assad Strengthened the Jihadists' and from an author who is an observer or student of the Syrian Civil War: http://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2...the-jihadists/

His argument is that Assad has consistently followed a strategy of provocation, which is cited as:

I suspect some of these claims are true, but it is also true that the first casualty of war is the truth. We're to the point now, especially in the social media era, where everyone simply quotes their so called experts creating a cesspool of opinion and propaganda attempting to shape the views of various audiences. We won't have access to what our intelligence community knows, but we're to the point that we have to rely on the professionals (not the retired loud mouths from the military and CIA who are making money has talking heads), because the truth has been too distorted in the public realm.

The strategy of provocation sounds logical in hindsight, and may in fact have been Assad's strategy, but it is also a strategy that the state would have had little control over once implemented. Other reasons could explain what is happening, such as the government may be forced to buy oil from ISIS based on economic realities. As for protecting ISIS to prevent the other groups from gaining strength, maybe, but it could also be that ISIS is located in the areas that Assad's forces are not capable of defending (to far away from Damascus). Seems like government has never had good control of eastern Syria.

The counterfactual argument that "if" support was provided to the moderates earlier the extremists wouldn't be as strong is simply pure speculation. First off quite a bit of support was provided to the moderates from a lot of different countries, but we like to ignore that. The moderates simply don't appear to be that strong, which goes back to the former article you posted that they're not that united.

We want to believe so badly that this rebellion is all about moderates seeking to overthrow an illegitimate government that we tend to grasp at straws when they are presented if we think they support our world view. No doubt there are many moderates in Syria who have a vision for the country that is more aligned with what the U.S. considers universal values, but is also true many do not. While most potential outcomes are possible in a conflict, it is hard to envision how various groups of moderates who are not united could effectively control the stronger extremist groups if the moderates actually ousted Assad. First they would have to consolidate power among themselves, and this period of chaos would create a window of opportunity for ISIS and al-Nusra and others who seem to be better organized. We all know this isn't a simple conflict between extremists and moderates and Assad. There are many actors within and external to the country that are interacting in ways that results in an unpredictable situation. In the end, those of us on the outside, and even most in the inside, are stuck viewing this conflict through opinion of others, not expert opinion, just opinion. Those that argue that someday the stock market will crash are probably right, but if they can't tell you when it isn't overly helpful. Those that tell us this conflict is all about poor governance may be right, but again it is trite and not helpful. Those that argue it would be better if the moderates win seem to be right also, but they don't provide realistic strategies on they could.

All the background noise is important, but ultimately we have to determine what, if anything, actually threatens our interests and deal with it. Ideally in a way that doesn't strengthen Iran, Assad, AQ, or other groups that our contrary to our interests. However, we don't live in an ideal world, and waiting to develop the perfect strategy could put us in a position in disadvantage. We may have to choose from the least bad of several bad options.

[CrowBat]

....perhaps David posted that precisely because there're so mufh insisting on 'the first casualty of war is the truth'...while the idea of sticking heads into sand and searching for excuses is usually proving the worst one...?

Furthermore:

- It doesn't matter - not the least - what the US IC knows. What matters is what the WH decides (and what Israel tells the WH and State Department they should think) and that are Problems No.1 thru 99 in the case of US policy for Syria.

- And from the standpoint of the WH (and everybody gathering around it or searching for excuses 'to do nothing there'), every excuse is good just NOT to cooperate with what is left of the insurgency: either (or earlier) it is (or was) 'better' because insurgents are not united and nobody knows what would happen if they win; then it was 'better' because everybody was explaining that the insurgency = Islamist extremists, and 'Assadists = fighting against Islamist extremists', although neither of this was (or is) truth; and lately it's 'better'.... well, because anything is better but to cooperate with or support anti-Assadist insurgents...

...and all of this, of course, because it's so 'impossible to predict' what would've happened in Syria if one would have provided support to insurgency.

(Where's that bamboozled smiley....?)

Makes me wonder: if that's so impossible to predict, but it's so easy to predict what is going to happen if Assadists are left in power... then how to hell comes that nobody predicted the emergence of the ISIS, first and foremost?

- Yeah, it's so pity the insurgency was so very much weakened by a simultaneous attacks from Iran- and Russia-supported regime and the ISIS from the other side. But, what can one do now? 'Nothing'. Back then when the insurgency was near-destroyed through cooperation of the regime and the ISIS, one didn't find that at least worth reporting, not to talk 'understanding'. So, why doing anything else now, when 'moderates simply don't appear to be that strong' any more...?

- Has the gov had good control of eastern Syria? Well, think whatever you like, but the fact is that the original cadre of idiots that established the ISIL in Syria has entered Syria and passed government-controlled territory with help of a bribe of local regime's functionaries. Barely three months later, they were already in control of specific oilfields and 'exporting' oil to the regime in Damascus (via the pipeline in Homs).

So, if the gov was 'not in control', then how comes these idiots had to pay a bribe for a safe passage through gov-controlled territory?

We want to believe so badly that this rebellion is all about moderates seeking to overthrow an illegitimate government that we tend to grasp at straws when they are presented if we think they support our world view. No doubt there are many moderates in Syria who have a vision for the country that is more aligned with what the U.S. considers universal values, but is also true many do not.

This is so right, you wouldn't believe. After nearly four years of insistent ignorance - or at least downplaying - of moderates in Syria, there are hardly any moderates left. And even the few that are left are certainly not going to start cheering any kind of US/Western help any more. That train is away, long, long ago - just like the Iraqi 'pro-US-train' was away in 1991, and in 2003 there was hardly anybody left greeting the US invasion.

But, why learn from such historical lessons? It's so much more easier to explain that there are too few moderates left and nobody can be sure about what would they do if...well, if... erm... if what happens?

... Those that tell us this conflict is all about poor governance may be right, but again it is trite and not helpful. Those that argue it would be better if the moderates win seem to be right also, but they don't provide realistic strategies on they could.

....yeah, and that's a reason more to keep on protracting this war through letting others to provide only enough help for the insurgency to survive, but not to win...

...However, we don't live in an ideal world, and waiting to develop the perfect strategy could put us in a position in disadvantage. We may have to choose from the least bad of several bad options.

Yeah, that's why it's better to go on with Assadists, because the longer the war lasts the more extremist is everybody getting - and because the USA are 'not meddling' since that is not in 'higher US interests'...?

Sigh...

Bill, frankly, while the sarcast in me has big fun reading and commenting it, this logic is this short >><< of confusing even me.

[carl]

We won't have access to what our intelligence community knows, but we're to the point that we have to rely on the professionals (not the retired loud mouths from the military and CIA who are making money has talking heads), because the truth has been too distorted in the public realm.

Given the history of the last 25 or so years relying upon "the professionals" for almost anything is a sure fire recipe for disaster.