New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[William F. Owen]

What if the political objective of the insurgent is reasonable, and they adopted violence in the first place because they were excluded from any peaceful means of resolution?

I do not know. What is reasonable? If they took up arms, then it suggests that their demands were unreasonable to the Government. Why were they excluded?
You only get fighting when one of the parties cannot be convinced that a peaceful achievement of their policy is either necessary or possible.

The purpose of fighting is to force peace. The conditions for that are many and varied, but my basic premise is that a primary objective in "COIN" should be to force the enemy to give up violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal.

[Dayuhan]

I do not know. What is reasonable? If they took up arms, then it suggests that their demands were unreasonable to the Government. Why were they excluded?
You only get fighting when one of the parties cannot be convinced that a peaceful achievement of their policy is either necessary or possible.

The purpose of fighting is to force peace. The conditions for that are many and varied, but my basic premise is that a primary objective in "COIN" should be to force the enemy to give up violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal.

This assumes that the governments we support are reasonable and responsive to their citizenry, which has not always been the case. I've seen people join insurgencies because their Governments were forcing them out of their homes to make way for dams, plantations, etc. When they tried to protest peacefully they were shot, by government soldiers - and this was a government that the US considered an ally. The people in question were not consulted, and had no opportunity to vote. In cases like this, do we need to force the insurgents to give up "violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal" or do we need to force the government to stop stepping on its people?

Here's a scenario, and I don't think it an unreasonable one:

Tribe A represents a majority of the population in a given jurisdiction. They get their people elected to key positions, and use Government resources in an effort to force tribe B, a traditional rival, off lands that have been in dispute. Insurgents, aware of the conflict, offer aid to tribe B.

As the leader of an outside force, you have tribe A, allied to the Government, and you have tribe B, allied to the insurgents. Do you necessarily want to take the side of tribe A, because you are nominally on the side of the Government and so are they? Or do you want to position yourself as a neutral broker and try to resolve the dispute that led tribe B to ally with the insurgents in the first place? Or do you simply see "insurgents" and "government" and not even look deeply enough to notice the original conflict?

[William F. Owen]

As the leader of an outside force, you have tribe A, allied to the Government, and you have tribe B, allied to the insurgents. Do you necessarily want to take the side of tribe A, because you are nominally on the side of the Government and so are they? Or do you want to position yourself as a neutral broker and try to resolve the dispute that led tribe B to ally with the insurgents in the first place? Or do you simply see "insurgents" and "government" and not even look deeply enough to notice the original conflict?

I assume you are asking me a soldier? I am an instrument of Policy. What Policy am I there to enforce? The source of the discontent may not be open to negotiation and/or subject to conditions of sovereignty that make my interference a bad thing.
It's not my problem to solve. Best I can do is report my impression through my chain of command. It's a problem for my Policy maker.

Now, I may want to "de-escalate" the situation and try and keep peace, but that depends on brokering a cease fire with the insurgents. Will both the indigenous and my own Government allow me to do that? Dunno!

My feeling is that this strikes to the heart of the issue here on SWC.
Soldiers are instruments of policy. Warfare is instrumental. There seems to be a constant desire here to effect Policy. Policy is Political. As a soldier your are absolutely limited to understanding the effects of your action on THE Policy. - not changing the Policy to better match your strategy.

[Dayuhan]

Best I can do is report my impression through my chain of command. It's a problem for my Policy maker.

Yes, I'd agree that as a soldier that would be all you could do... and one would hope that the policy maker would understand the possibility that a simplistic approach might very well strengthen the overall position of the insurgent.

Of course in order to report that situation you would first have to be aware of it, and if you enter the area with the assumption that your job is simply to kill as many insurgents as possible there's a good chance that you might not become aware of it. All I'm saying is that before we start killing insurgents it might be useful to find out why the specific insurgents in a given local theater are fighting, and see what options exist for removing or mitigating local causes of conflict.

[William F. Owen]

All I'm saying is that before we start killing insurgents it might be useful to find out why the specific insurgents in a given local theater are fighting, and see what options exist for removing or mitigating local causes of conflict.

I have no problem with that. My focus on irregular warfare begins once the policy is to prevent the "Insurgent" from gaining his goal using violence. If he wants to use the Ballot box, or dialogue, then good luck.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan

In my part of the world, and I suspect elsewhere, Americans in particular have a reputation for being very easy to manipulate. One piece of advice I'd give anyone who is bringing resources (military, financial, whatever) into a chaotic situation is to be very, very wary of anyone who agrees with everything you say, tells you just what you want to hear, and wants to be your loyal ally. An alliance that falls in your lap without hard work on your part is more than likely an attempt to manipulate you and use the resources you have in pursuit of an objective that likely has nothing to do with yours.

Dayuhan makes an important point that I hope isn't simply glossed over. I have seen this too many times. Some local befriends a senior American officer or other official and all the sudden this person speaks for all indigenous personnel in the area, because it what we want to hear. Anyone saying anything contrary to the party line is obviously a minority. I seem to recall we were dubbed by a couple of key manipulaters during the build up to invading Iraq. Later the Kurds dubbed us repeatedly to achieve their objectives, and amateurs fell for it hook, line and sinker. Just two examples of how dangerous this trait this, and it probably due to arrogance and an excessively rosey outlook of the world where we mistakenly assume everyone wants to be like us and shares our values.