If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
Not so much urgent (as many of Wilson's interventions weren't urgent per se), although we do have a massive addition to instant gratification.... I would say that we tend to react to things that are emotional triggers and not necessarily products of calculation or long-term policy/planning. TR, for example, did avoid some interventions that he may have been emotionally or philosophically attracted to but determined that in long-term policy terms they weren't good ideas.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I’ve seen so much management by urgency that I am convinced a lot of people are confused about the concept. When I hear the word I think careening bus or CPR rather than the kind of institutional financial issue that I have been told is so urgent that I really should be good enough to postpone my reimbursement for six months. By my definition that issue can’t be urgent. But maybe there’s a reason I don’t get paid the big bucks like middle management.
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
Bob,
I don't disagree with your drum beat, I can dance to it, but too often you hijack forums that are focused on different issues. Despite the flawed strategy approach and other issues I won't address here, the one issue that we may be able to address is improving our security force assistance system.
Dayuhan, advise and assist authorities only gets you so far, so I think there needs to be some expectation management/strategic communications to clarify the limits of our support.
I don't think our time there was wasted, but agree we certainly didn't maximize our return on investment.
As for good governance, and Bob knows this, the JSOTF has actually done quite a bit to assist with good governance at the local level, and they improved helped improve the relationship between the populace and the military in many areas, but obviously southern Basilan is not one of those areas.
It frustrates the hell out me that whether it is in Afghanistan, the Philippines, or elsewhere we can't accomplish relatively simple objectives like developing effective security forces due to a number of factors, but most prevalent is a failed SC/SA system.
I have no hope of improving our overall strategy.
This is optimistic, I think. I don't think there's been any real lasting impact on local governance. People on Basilan realize that the American presence has brought additional resources and that the military and civilian leaders behave better when Americans are watching, and they appreciate that. They also know that the same people are in charge, there's been no effort to impose accountability on previous acts of corruption, collusion, and abuse, and that as soon as the Americans leave the status quo ante will return.
Realistically, I don't see any way that advice and assistance from the US military is going to have any real impact on the black hole of local governance and civil-military relations on Basilan or Jolo. It's too much to expect. On the other hand, I can see how US military advice and assistance could help the Philippine military use its existing resources more effectively, improve their small unit tactics, and develop practices that would help prevent incidents like this. That wouldn't address the root causes of the war, but realistically nothing the US does is going to address the root causes of the war.
Obviously these incidents can't be counted as failure of the US "advise and assist" mission: you can't make anyone follow advice. It does raise the question of whether maintaining the mission in the form it's taken over the last decade is going to achieve significant incremental gains. My own feeling is that we've accomplished most of what we can, and that it wouldn't be a bad idea to start packing up. I also think it would be a good idea to state, bluntly and publicly, that in our opinion we've done all we can, and that ultimately this insurgency is driven not by AQ or international extremism, but by governance issues that can only resolved by the Philippine government.
If it were up to me I'd have the local CIA station draw up a detailed report on collusion, corruption, and abuse and how they sustain the insurgency and cripple the COIN effort, naming names and giving specifics. The end recommendation would be that the US needs to withdraw, because until the Philippine government gets serious about bringing its own people within the rule of law there's nothing meaningful we can accomplish. I'd have them e-mail the thing back to the home office with a direct cc to Wikileaks.
These issues need to be addressed by the Philippine government, but as long as they can keep the issues in the shadows, the Philippine government will avoid addressing them, because they are very uncomfortable issues. The US can't address or resolve the issues, but we can put a spotlight on them and help get them out of the shadows, which I think in the long run will help a lot more than trying to paper over the cracks and pretend the system just needs a minor bit of tuning up.
Of course it's not up to me and never will be, which I admit might be a good thing
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
Posted by Dayuhan,
Two points, first I am in general agreement with your comment above as truth today; however, there were some ties to AQ (very loose) previously, and of JI played a role due to their regional ambitions.I also think it would be a good idea to state, bluntly and publicly, that in our opinion we've done all we can, and that ultimately this insurgency is driven not by AQ or international extremism, but by governance issues that can only resolved by the Philippine government.
I have to disagree with your comments that the JSOTF didn't impact good governance at the local level. By no means am I implying that corruption doesn't exist, but the relationship between the security forces and the locals have a much better relationship in many locations. That isn't true in Southern Basilan and at least one other location in the Sulu Archipelago, but it is true for many regions. Having watched that unfold over the years to me it is self evident, to others it may not be. You can argue correctly that alone isn't enough and you would be correct, but while uneven much progress has been made. I suspect we can't make much more progress with our current approach, and it is up to the Filipinos, or sadly it ups to the Government of the Philippines.
I sponsored a Philippine Marine Corps Marine for a year at a PME school, and he stated that yes, logistics and technical support (e.g. FLIR-equipped helicopters) was what the AFP needed, not the will to fight.
ETA: It seems as those violence is on the uptick, with seven soldiers reported killed on follow-on fighting/attacks.
Last edited by jcustis; 10-22-2011 at 03:09 PM.
There were ties between AQ and the ASG, but borrowing a leaf from the gospel according to Robert C Jones I'd point out that the insurgency existed long before the ASG and will probably exist long after it. The ASG is probably best understood as a failed attempt by AQ to leverage the conditions supporting insurgency and to fill the leadership void left when the MNLF leadership reached various accommodations with the government. Both AQ and JI have tried to use the pre-existing conditions to their advantage, with varying levels of success, but they're not driving the insurgency, they're riding on it.
Good governance and relations between security forces and the populace are two different things. In terms of governance, the dominant clans are still very much in control, and those leopards have not changed their spots. They may be adopting a somewhat less egregious pattern of corruption and abuse for the time being but they are still in it for themselves and they will still do what's required to keep themselves in power and in the money. I don't think there's been any change that will be sustained for any length of time.
Relations between security forces and the populace have improved to some extent. They could hardly have gotten worse. By 2001/2002 the security forces were in the awkward position of being mistrusted and resented by both sides. The Christian population was up in arms at the universally held perception that the security forces were colluding with the ASG, sharing ransoms and other profits. The Muslim populace knew, as they've known all along, that the government was the enemy. I think they still know that. They may not think it's the right time to take the enemy on, except in the rare times and places when they have the advantage, but the knowledge is still there.
Things are quieter, but these cycles have come and gone before. Whether or not this will last will only be known after we leave. I'm not at all optimistic. I don't see any evidence that there's been any fundamental or lasting changes in the aims or methods of any of the players.
I still think the Tausug/Yakan insurgency is primed to take off again. The only question is what sort of identity it will take... an MILF that learns to bridge the gap between the Maguindanao/Maranao leadership and the Tausug/Yakan populace, or a renewed, back-to-basics offshoot of the ASG, or an MNLF revival, or something completely different. Time will tell.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
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