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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default Toward Sustainable Security in Iraq and the Endgame

    I've been reading the discussion on our SOFA negotiations with Iraq, and thinking about what the means for Security Force Assistance. I did not start out to write a long post, it just came out that way as I got deeper into the what I htought "sustainable security" meant with regard to Iraq. Anyway, I thought it might be worth discussing so here it is:

    Greater stability in Iraq is a supporting policy goal of our desire for greater stability in the Middle East. Iraq has the potential to add to greater ME stability, or to detract from it. Key to greater stability in Iraq is sustainable security of the sort that accounts for its ability to defend itself against all enemies foreign and domestic. To do this a state requires a security sector that has accountability and oversight and is resistant to the abuse of power. It needs to assist the political leadership in considering the threats to its sovereignty and support the development of the ends, ways and means required to realize its domestic and foreign policy objectives. The security sector must fit the political, economic and cultural environment in which it is to operate. It must develop systems and processes which not only meet the requirements of the moment, but help set the course for meeting enduring requirements.

    There is much in the news about our future security negotiations with Iraq, and whether our positions are impinging on their sovereignty, or impeding their ability to govern, etc. Maybe we need to discuss where we are in the movie with regard to sustainable security of the type that could facilitate more stability. I think there are several questions that might be useful in considering how our SFA (security force assistance) efforts (from advising to IMET, and from internal to external defense) can best help them achieve sustainable security. These are the same types of questions we go through ourselves when drafting our strategic security documents. Maybe it is worthwhile to try and consider Iraq’s pursuit of its security as if we were faced with their security issues. I am not saying impose our U.S. values on Iraq – I mean just given some of the geo-political issues they face.

    1) What are Iraq’s interests & supporting objectives (short and enduring)?
    2) Who would oppose those interests and why?
    3) Of those who would oppose their objectives, why would they?
    4) What do their enemies see at risk with regard to their own interests and objectives? Why?
    5) How would they oppose Iraq’s interests? Would they oppose Iraq in a competitive, non violent (meaning everything short of violence), or would they oppose them through war (everything from IW to conventional)?
    6) What does Iraq have in terms of resources, access, etc. that potential enemies might see of sufficient value as to go to war to obtain it (resources, security, access or denial of access, etc.)?
    7) Who can be counted among Iraq’s allies? Why? What do they bring to the table?
    8) Are their potential allies with like interests who remain formally uncommitted? Why?
    9) What are the gaps in Iraq’s ends/ways/means equation that prevent Iraq from achieving its own goals of sustainable security while preventing others from achieving those goals which threaten it?

    Question 10 is one that might concern us with regard to our own interests, objectives and SFA efforts, and how they match up with Iraq’s.

    10) How do our current and future actions and efforts better enable Iraq to achieve its security goals while satisfying our own interests and objectives?

    How best do our objectives and those of Iraq reflect something satisfactory for the U.S., Iraq, and the broader regional and international states and actors who have legitimate interests in Iraq’s future,? We need to consider it from multiple perspectives in terms of suitability & feasibility for the most relevant participants to get sustainable security. One of the things that I’ve been thinking about is the difference between securing yourself against four categories of threats: internal domestic; internal but foreign supported; external but domestic supported; and purely external threats. The four categories represent different combinations of threats and require different things from a state’s security sector. It is not meant to be along the specificity of the U.S QDR quad chart – this is meant to be more generic.

    For the last few years the immediate threat has arguably come from the first two categories (internal domestic; internal foreign supported), our military efforts in support of Iraq have been geared toward combating those forces directly and in building Iraqi security forces in capabilities and capacities that can take over that effort (our by, with and through efforts). We have also been engaged in the Iraqi security sector in terms of the development and reform of those ministries and supporting institutions which provide accountability and oversight toward sustainable security. We have also assisted Iraq in development & reform of the economic and political sectors (reform should not be seen here as imposition of our values – just the reformation of things with the purpose of congruence in the objective environment as negotiated between Iraq and the United States). These efforts have become part of our FID & COIN operations, and our broader strategy.

    But what about as we look down the road? The second category (internal but foreign supported) has been altered to include Iranian support, intimidation and interference, and because the interest have become more contested they have become linked to the third category (external but domestic supported). Linked in terms of how others see Iraq connected to their own interests and objectives. We continue to make progress in assisting Iraq with resisting this category through our development of the security, economic and political sectors – our BPC efforts. Between Iraq, and its allies (the U.S. and broader coalition) and there is evidence that sustainable internal domestic security is achievable. I’m not saying it’s a done deal, in fact I’d argue that it is reversible if we withdrew our support in a manner that did not fully consider the consequences of the action and did not account for the range of effects such an action would have.

    One of the issues we must help Iraq consider is how to transition their security sector in a manner and at a time that allows them to address all four categories with assistance that meets their needs while not impairing their sovereignty. What direction and scope should our SFA activities take as we move from a focus on FID to one focused on deterring regional aggression and ultimately to one of fostering security cooperation between partners with like interests? Questions such as how soon can the Iraqis (with our assistance) develop committed, competent, capable, and confident police and other domestic services so that the military and supporting intelligence services can better assume those roles the state requires to defend it from external aggression? With the establishment of events that marks the ability to transition the Iraqi Military, the question arises of what type of SFA activities best support those Iraqi and U.S. policies with regard to not only Iraq, but the region, and how do we implement them with an eye toward sustainability? For our own requirements, what type of demand signal does the send in terms of SFA? And will we have the resident capabilities and capacity to assist Iraq? If we don’t do we develop them, or do we turn to another partner with interests coincide with ours and Iraq’s, and who now at a time where Iraq’s operating environment may be more politically accommodating is willing and capable of providing SFA? Are their other alternatives which meet both Iraq’s interests and ours?

    continued..

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default Toward Sustainable Security in Iraq and the Endgame (Continued)

    Secretary Gates has repeatedly mentioned the risk of losing of the endgame. While there is the ongoing discussion about the level and type of continued support to the government of Iraq with regards to the first three categories, what about the fourth category (external)? What are the external threats to Iraq’s sovereignty? As a consequence of those threats how are our own interests at risk? How can our security force assistance plans account for the fourth category and help Iraq reach its own strategic objectives? Our approach to securing the endgame must account for sustainable security in Iraq that looks beyond those security issues that we see most visibly right now, and consider the competitive environment in which Iraq must exist further down the road. As a region we know the Middle East will be competitive from both within and without for reasons that range from human security to regional intolerance and fear, to global energy consumption. These issues are often intertwined and overlayed with one another and/or masked by other out growth issues. The SOFA and SFA (Strategic Framework Agreement) negotiations set not only the tone of military cooperation, but also much of our future political and economic cooperation. A successful negotiation that both Iraq and the United States see as supportive of their interests and policies support both sustainable security and the securing of the endgame.

    Our endgame with regard to Iraq is greater stability of the type that by its nature resists extremism and supports regional access and openness. It is underpinned through sustainable security. The development of committed, competent, capable, and confident security forces that are rooted in accountability and oversight are operational objectives. They must be in tune with regard to Iraq’s geo-political environment, and they must be in tune with Iraq’s political, economic and cultural realities. The endgame may not represent the “end” so much as it represents a point where the policy goals we share with Iraq are for most purposes irreversible and require what we might think of as the type of routine SFA interactions we have with other partners and allies for opportunities that strengthen interoperability and open the door for other areas of cooperation via increased familiarity and trust.


    Best, Rob

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    Rob, sounds like you're doing a little Operational Design Process.

    Let me suggest that many of the things we're concerned about are caused by our distrust of Iran and not the needs of the Iraqi state.

    Any prime minister who can get Ahmadinejad on line 1 and Bush on line 2 probably isn't that concerned about finding allies in the event of external attack. Secondly, there was no security agreement with Kuwait in 91 and everything worked out OK.

    Top down attacks on the enemy - "command and control centric" - didn't work in Iraq. Top down "inside the green zone" politics hasn't achieved much. Top-down economic development efforts haven't done anything. In fact, economic development organizations around the world have moved away from the top-down approach. Instead of building massive infrastructure, they give local entrepreneurs $50 loans.

    Top down security arrangements aren't very important or useful. Take a look at the recent conflict between Maliki and Sadr. There was no capacity building. There was no joint police force. There was no signed document. We built a fence around Sadr City. The fence will stay until the Sadrists learn to play nice with others. The end.

    Strategy should be simple. IMO, we need a one page document that lets us fence in every community in Iraq. Then, don't let them out until they agree to play nice together. It doesn't matter what they agree to as long as they're happy with it. We do COIN. They build their own nation. (With a little luck, they'll find a "Reagan" who won't try to interfere with the process.)

    Oh, and we need need an agreement that says you guys won't ever need to go on trial in Iraq for doing your jobs. I'd rather "surrender" - to use a McCain term - than see one of you guys arrested by the people you're trying to help.
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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Hi RA- good comments,

    I think you are correct in that Iran does influence our negotiations, that seems natural given our interests and those of our partners and allies. I also think it influences Iraq's in multiple ways as well - they have to live there, share many bonds at different levels, and also fought a brutal, exhausting war that left its imprint on many Iraqi leaders and soldiers I know.

    I disagree though if you mean Iraq's security needs do not concern us. Here are a few reasons why:

    1) A successful or unsuccessful Iraq has consequences beyond the ME in terms of U.S. influence. It certainly has consequences within the ME for future agreements. Its a "brand name" issue, if Iraq rises from the ashes so to speak (and I believe it can given its people and resources), the early international perceptions of U.S. involvement become tempered. Its security is paramount to its ability to do so. Our friends and enemies are and will be watching to see how Iraq does, and if we remain committed to honoring any agreements we make, or in more general terms, how our involvement worked out. In that regard it is in our interests that Iraq succeed.

    2) Iraq's success or failure affects us domestically in political and economic ways beyond our foreign policy goals. I'm not just talking about the election of political leadership - although that can be an effect derived from it. It has something to do with the way we ascribe value to ourselves and to others - I know that is pretty subjective, maybe that is one for MarcT

    3) Iraq's ability to secure itself does more then just affect Iran's ability to spread influence. It may also affect its other neighbors in positive ways. If Iraq can over time extend control over its borders it influences Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait in other ways. From the way trade and people flow, to positively influencing events that are destabilizing to those states Iraq's ability to secure its self matters. Many of these issues provide additional animosities and stresses upon which political leaders in some of those states either must contend with in the domestic and international community, or in some cases use as rational to impose policies to which their populations might not otherwise agree. These states are also important to us both in terms of our bilateral relations and in terms of how their broader relations with their neighbors and the international community - they count in our foreign policy and Iraq's security affects them.

    4) Economically Iraq matters - and so its security matters. Its not just the oil and natural gas with regard to the global energy market, historically (going way back) - Iraq's geography and culture have played a key role in regional and (for western world at the time) international economics. It may have more to offer in terms of natural resources and agriculture production then any of its neighbors. It also has significant human capital - given sustainable security, and development - those people may bring forward advances in many areas - political, technology, religious, cultural, etc. Without sustainable security though the benefits of civilization remain elusive.

    You also had a good point about top down vs. bottom up. I think its a little of both. Significant things which make agreements or legislation at the top are made sustainable by the base of support that is seen at the bottom. It could be the perception of that base, or it could be the actual base. Generally I see them worked from both ends at the same time - with pyramids we have to contend with physics, with people its different.

    Its the same thing I see with the Inter-Agency reform - while there are calls for a GN II, the reality is the workers are already finding ways to make it happen because of the need - any formal codification will hopefully make it better - but alone codification neither sustains it, nor makes it a fact - it only makes it more possible. Codification lacking the will to make it happen right - can be empty, can be obfuscated, can be ignored to some degree, or could be misconstrued.

    Best, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 06-12-2008 at 01:16 PM. Reason: added to point 3

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Rob,
    Successful national restoration in Iraq is a double edged sword (or is that a scimitar?). Having it join Barnett's "have"/"functioning core" nations may not be as wonderful a thing as many seem to think--especially since America does not seem to have that simple strategy and view of the desired endstate for our involvement with Iraq that RA alluded to with his link.
    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    1) A successful or unsuccessful Iraq has consequences beyond the ME in terms of U.S. influence. It certainly has consequences within the ME for future agreements. Its a "brand name" issue, if Iraq rises from the ashes so to speak (and I believe it can given its people and resources), the early international perceptions of U.S. involvement become tempered. Its security is paramount to its ability to do so. Our friends and enemies are and will be watching to see how Iraq does, and if we remain committed to honoring any agreements we make, or in more general terms, how our involvement worked out. In that regard it is in our interests that Iraq succeed.
    An important consideration here is the view taken as to the means by which Iraq succeeds. By this I mean how is Iraqi success at rebuilding itself viewed. Is the success understood to have occurred despite US involvement or because of US involvement? If the former, I think Iraq earns more respect in the region. If the later, then Iraq likely is viewed as little more than an American lackey. I doubt the nations of world will like us better because we helped Iraq rise from the ashes that many view us as having put it into.
    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    2) Iraq's success or failure affects us domestically in political and economic ways beyond our foreign policy goals. I'm not just talking about the election of political leadership - although that can be an effect derived from it. It has something to do with the way we ascribe value to ourselves and to others - I know that is pretty subjective, maybe that is one for MarcT
    Same applies to how the Iraqis view themselves. My point above applies here as well I think.
    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    3) Iraq's ability to secure itself does more then just affect Iran's ability to spread influence. It may also affect its other neighbors in positive ways. If Iraq can over time extend control over its borders it influences Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait in other ways. From the way trade and people flow, to positively influencing events that are destabilizing to those states Iraq's ability to secure its self matters. Many of these issues provide additional animosities and stresses upon which political leaders in some of those states either must contend with in the domestic and international community, or in some cases use as rational to impose policies to which their populations might not otherwise agree. These states are also important to us both in terms of our bilateral relations and in terms of how their broader relations with their neighbors and the international community - they count in our foreign policy and Iraq's security affects them.
    I am more concerned about the downside of Iraq appearing as a regional power. Seems to me we've already seen the kind of conflict that can arise when a couple of ME nations vie to be the regional hegemons (Iran v. Irag for 10 years or so in the 1980s, for example and of course there was that little event between Iraq and Kuwait that provoked DS/DS--could also look at more ancient history of the region).

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    4) Economically Iraq matters - and so its security matters. Its not just the oil and natural gas with regard to the global energy market, historically (going way back) - Iraq's geography and culture have played a key role in regional and (for western world at the time) international economics. It may have more to offer in terms of natural resources and agriculture production then any of its neighbors. It also has significant human capital - given sustainable security, and development - those people may bring forward advances in many areas - political, technology, religious, cultural, etc. Without sustainable security though the benefits of civilization remain elusive.
    I seem to remember that Iraq once provided a haven for many Palestinians who were unabe to find meaningful employment in Israel/occupied territories--sort of a gastarbeiter presence similar to Turks in W. Germany in the 70s and 80s. But this is another double edged sword not unlike the illegal alien workforce that is doing America's yardwork (among other "menial" tasks).
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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Wayne,
    There all good points. I'll try and adress them.

    An important consideration here is the view taken as to the means by which Iraq succeeds. By this I mean how is Iraqi success at rebuilding itself viewed. Is the success understood to have occurred despite US involvement or because of US involvement? If the former, I think Iraq earns more respect in the region. If the later, then Iraq likely is viewed as little more than an American lackey. I doubt the nations of world will like us better because we helped Iraq rise from the ashes that many view us as having put it into.
    I'm not sure "liking us" is what matters. I think "respecting us", and having transparency in terms of how we approach both foreign policy investments and war is what matters. If Iraq sits back and lets somebody do all the work for them, that would be viewed differently then say if Iraq continued to do what it could, and as it could do more it did so until a point where it assumed full responsibility. Its in both their interests and ours for them to recover as quickly as possible. I think the issue of being viewed as an American lackey comes into play based on who is doing the labeleing and why, and whether or not Iraq has the fortitude and latitude to stand on its on. My estimate is they will both because they are not afraid to act in their interests, acknowledge but reject our advice and becuase they have the resources to do so over time.

    I am more concerned about the downside of Iraq appearing as a regional power. Seems to me we've already seen the kind of conflict that can arise when a couple of ME nations vie to be the regional hegemons (Iran v. Irag for 10 years or so in the 1980s, for example and of course there was that little event between Iraq and Kuwait that provoked DS/DS--could also look at more ancient history of the region).
    It is a risk. Of course many view U.S. power as a risk. Nigeria is a regional hegemon is W. Africa. China and India play increasingly important roles in their regions. States with more resources, drive and energy may become more influential then their neighbors. The issue is how they use their influence, i.e. do their actions engender stability or instability, do their actions match their narrative? How Iraq integrates into the broader ME is something of an open question - however its recent experiences will shape some of that. Its one of the reasons why our involvment remains a requirment in this moment - our assistance in shaping their institutions matters. Did you know we've assisted them in building in an IG like function in MoD and IGFC? I both know the advisors who assited them in building it and understanding its value as well as having experienced its value first hand (another thread for sure - but it worked in helping them get some accountability and oversight into the MoD). I bring it up because we are assisting them in builidng in accountability and oversight into their instituitions - accountability and oversight is key to sustainability.

    Do we want Iraq to go it alone or is it in our intrests to assist them in integrating into the regional framework? Would we want them put in a position where their best alternative was to turn to Iran for support because they could not sustain their security yet? Somebody is going to make use of Iraq's resources - should it be a responsible government of Iraq, or a neighbor who opposes our vital interests openly? The decisions we and the broader regional and international communities' make now will help set the tune on how Iraq relates to the rest of the world in the future.

    I seem to remember that Iraq once provided a haven for many Palestinians who were unabe to find meaningful employment in Israel/occupied territories--sort of a gastarbeiter presence similar to Turks in W. Germany in the 70s and 80s. But this is another double edged sword not unlike the illegal alien workforce that is doing America's yardwork (among other "menial" tasks).
    There are at least two cosndierations here. One is a political willingness to do something - a choice. This choice is based on political willingess reflected in its domestic and foreign policies which are shaped by how it sees its interests best preserved and advanced. What are the advantages and risks with adopting policies - not only with regard to how it relates to others, but the danger to its own citizens as potentially destabilizing influences are encouraged, allowed or illegally make their way in.

    The second part is the states ability to secure its borders and points of entry, and respond to destabilizing influences within. A security sector that integrates border and domestic security with its intelligence sector for the purpose of protecting its legitimate citizens is both part of a state's obligation to its population and the means to secure its sovereignty. It allows it to regulate and tax trade, preserve order, etc.. The capability to do so does not mean it must keep everyone out, but without the capability it could not do so if it chose to.

    Like you brought up both of these are issues we contend with in our own domestic and foreign policy debates - as does almost every other state that has more to offer the person or groups leaving one place for another.

    I think your concerns are legitmate in that they should shape how we view our involvment with regard to our other policy goals and how we conduct our relations with Iraq's neighbors. However, I still think our own foreing policy goals are better preserved and advanced by assiting Iraq in its recovery and integrating it into the region. I think key to this is Iraq's achieving sustainable secuirty.

    Best, Rob

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    Default Economic Surge

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post

    Greater stability in Iraq is a supporting policy goal of our desire for greater stability in the Middle East. Iraq has the potential to add to greater ME stability, or to detract from it. Key to greater stability in Iraq is sustainable security of the sort that accounts for its ability to defend itself against all enemies foreign and domestic.
    Rob,

    I agree with your base assessment that stability in Iraq will lead to greater stability in the Middle East. This increased stability is in the Worlds interest as well as that of the United States, however to date we have had great difficulty expressing this both to the Regional and the World Communities. Perhaps it is time to change our tactics and use a 'new marketing plan' to advertise this change in emphasis.

    The definition of security bears closer examination. My 1997 Webster’s Dictionary defines Secure as “a. Free from care, anxiety, fear; safe; fixed; stable; in close custody; certain; confident.“ Iraq is currently at a tipping point while all involved hold their breath and wait for America’s future Foreign Policy to coalesce and take shape following our elections. My thesis is that successfully isolating the civilian populace of Iraq from the insurgency has a significant economic component that has eclipsed the security component at this point. Though it may be politically painful for the current administration to consider, it is time for an Economic Surge.

    The December 2006 issue of FM 3-24 advises us, in paragraph 1-124, that insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support and goes on to say “Dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly. Skillful counterinsurgents must thus cut off the sources of that recuperative power. Some sources can be reduced by redressing the social, political, and economic grievances that fuel the insurgency.” Dr. Nathan Toronto’s article, Forty Years of Coin, in the 3rd Quarter 2008 issue of Joint Force Quarterly briefly discusses how an $800,000 dollar investment after the Six Day War led to a $48 million dollar increase in Palestinian agricultural production in just three years with an associated measurable increase in security. It has been my personal observation that in Iraq a significant proportion of the population is unemployed, and that of these unemployed workers a significant portion is involved in agriculture. USAID, in their Iraq Transition Strategy Plan 2006-2008, presents as their second strategic objective “Expand Private Sector Opportunities”. This report notes that the agricultural sector is Iraq’s largest employer.

    The Commanders Emergency Response Program provides an opportunity for Maneuver Commanders to build upon security successes, capitalize upon indecision inside of Iraq resulting from our upcoming election cycle and execute an Economic Surge in order to further separate the insurgents from the populace.

    How can our Maneuver Commanders rapidly and accurately infuse an Economic Surge (Money is indeed a Weapon) into Iraq? Having significant funding (using a ratio of 1 dollar per x dinars in order to ensure both sides have skin in the game) and numerous (nine per BCT?) credentialed arabic speaking Subject Matter Expert Teams (i.e. local Iraqis) using a Public-Private-Partnership model targeted at the local, tactical level (bottom up) with easily measurable results (such as harvest quotas) may be a way forward.

    “We need to put the angry young men to work. One of the key hindrances to us establishing stability in Iraq is the failure to get the economy going. A relatively small decrease in unemployment would have a very serious effect on the level of sectarian killing going on. ...For a very small amount of investment, we can put a very large number of jobs in place, long-lasting jobs that will produce goods and services that are wanted by people in Iraq and outside of Iraq.”

    Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, United States Army
    Former Commanding General, Multi-National Corps – Iraq
    “We do believe that reviving the sectors of agriculture, services and industry will develop the Iraqi economy. The government is still the biggest investor because we don’t have an active private sector and huge foreign investments.”

    Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh
    Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq
    *** More to follow in a subsequent post***

    Regards,

    Steve
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 06-14-2008 at 06:28 AM.
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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Default On Consistent Policy and Speed of Change

    The nature of bureaucracy is such that it supports consistency at the price of agility, flexibility,and speed of change. The counterweight to the bureaucracy is the rotating work force reprsented by the politcal appointees. Politcal appointees represent the new blood that brings new ideas; but they demand quick implementations in order to make their mark in the short(er) time they occupy their positions. In order for the system to work well, it needs an equilibrium between these two groups. Sometimes one side or the other seems to acquire more power, which tips the system out of balance. Buy it usually ends up correcting itself. America is currently at a watershed of shorts as baby boomer bureaucrats are exiting government jobs and retire in droves.

    By the way, I suspect that military members observing and/or getting involved in the process tend to get rather frustrated because they, due to the rotational nature of their assignments and the "up or out" promotion policies that are carried out through centralized selection boards, need to make their mark in each assignment rather more quickly (sort of like a first-term President elected on a reform platform) than is common in the slow incremental change process that distinguishes the realm of government policy.

    America could probably do this a different way. However, if we opted for a speedier process, I fear the US would be much more like certain Latin American countries in terms of the turbulence in its national leadership. Or, the US could end up taking as long as the UN or EU to implement watered down policies that really do nothing for any one.

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default The ways in which we think about security

    Steve,

    Perhaps it is time to change our tactics and use a 'new marketing plan' to advertise this change in emphasis......

    My thesis is that successfully isolating the civilian populace of Iraq from the insurgency has a significant economic component that has eclipsed the security component at this point. Though it may be politically painful for the current administration to consider, it is time for an Economic Surge.
    Steve,
    Great post and I think gets to the real heart of ow what security can mean outside of its physical context.

    What really makes a population resistant to radicalization? or put in another way, what keeps violent competing ideologies from being attractive, taking hold and becoming a movement? What keeps terrorism on the margins - attractive only to the most extreme of the population? What keeps criminal activities from defining the norm? What builds faith in the leadership that they will provide the conditions in which the population can meet its needs?

    Sustainable security in this sense does not exclude the people I think, it is contingent upon them. They must understand the stakes, but to do so they must perceive they have a stake. What makes a state viable? As we start looking at complex social systems we're starting to understand that progress in one area is often contingent on development or reform in another.

    Iraq is starting to develop the monies it will need to develop an economy that could go beyond the hydro-carbon industry. While undoubtedly that will be a chief export (and much of the foundation on which the rest is built), stability probably resides in economic diversity. There is the potential for other mineral industries in the North, agricultural industries, banking, trade, and a history in many cases of a textile industry. Getting physical security to a point where economic development takes hold, and political development to a point where economic development is sustainable and encouraging to more development is the point where Iraq will succeed long term I think.

    Key to realizing a development strategy I think is understanding the how systems interact with one another - and insuring that just because an area is not the concern of the moment, it does not get neglected, but is developed more in tandem with other areas so that one system does not grow so fast that is either unsustainable, or its growth crushes, over shadows, or unbalances the whole system. The challenge may be in understanding that although an immediate challenge may require a disproportionate amount of energy in one system, sustainability eventually comes from greater equilibrium - aka stability. This would seem to be the most important thing we should require from any leader - knowing when to take action (set or change course), and when not to act (remain on course) - this comes from understanding what problems are really problems and what are symptoms, and being able to resist the pressures of the moment, and our own biases - the second may be the leader's ability to set and manage expectations - which is in effect demonstrating the strength to lead.


    Best, Rob

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    Default Public Private Partnerships

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post

    Key to realizing a development strategy I think is understanding the how systems interact with one another - and insuring that just because an area is not the concern of the moment, it does not get neglected, but is developed more in tandem with other areas so that one system does not grow so fast that is either unsustainable, or its growth crushes, over shadows, or unbalances the whole system. The challenge may be in understanding that although an immediate challenge may require a disproportionate amount of energy in one system, sustainability eventually comes from greater equilibrium - aka stability. This would seem to be the most important thing we should require from any leader - knowing when to take action (set or change course), and when not to act (remain on course) - this comes from understanding what problems are really problems and what are symptoms, and being able to resist the pressures of the moment, and our own biases - the second may be the leader's ability to set and manage expectations - which is in effect demonstrating the strength to lead.
    Rob,

    I appreciate the opportunity to think about and discuss this important issue with you (looking at this sentence construction makes me realize it sounds a bit stilted but there it is).

    Understanding the area of operations culturally and tactically is vital to ensuring that we do not experience a Buddy the Elf tries to hug the Raccoon moment while attempting to share the love.

    Business Theory is built upon employing and continually measuring the performance of manageably sized Business Units in order to achieve profitability. This is a good start point for a discussion about ‘how-to’ accomplish sustainability at the local level.

    Witold Rybczynski, in Chapter 14 of his book Last Harvest (ISBN 978-07432-3597-6), discusses how community associations in US neighborhoods have taken on municipal responsibilities such as local security, street cleaning, trash removal, park maintenance, and water and sewage treatment. He notes that 30 million Americans currently belong to such associations.

    The Congressional Research Service (Claudia Copeland) in their February 21, 2007 Report Water Infrastructure Financing: History of EPA Appropriations note that of the $51.3 billion dollars the EPA has used for water infrastructure programs since 1986 average grant sizes have shrunk from $18.1 million in 1995 to approximately $3 million today and are typically as designated special purpose grants rather than for regional projects.

    Since privatization appears to work at the local level it is natural to ask if it works at the national level. Chancelor Adenauer of Germany is remembered for the privatization of Volkswagen, Britain’s Prime Minister Thatcher for the privatization of British Telecom, France’s President Jospin for the privatization of France Telecom, and Japan has (mostly) privatized Nippon Telegraph and Telephone. It is interesting to note that all of these examples come from countries, which enforce a ‘rule of law’.

    Chile privatized Telefonos de Chile and Brazil has privatized Telebras, however we currently see a general backlash in much of Latin America against Privatization of State Owned Enterprises. Both Venezuela and Mexico do not support privatization of their Oil Industries (nor does Russia for that matter).

    Privatization of State Owned Enterprises failed in Iraq, and I would submit that this was due to a number of reasons to include failing to implement a local network to sustain the populace prior to privatization attempts.

    Jeffrey Sachs provides a stunning tour of ‘Why Some Countries Fail to Thrive and On The Ground Solutions’ in his book The End of Poverty (ISBN 0-14-303658-0). The Rand Corporation, in their Monograph # MG 557 The Beginners Guide to Nation Building, throws pearls when it notes, “Establishing workable financial controls without a banking system and in the absence of communications is a tall order. However, simple but robust financial controls can limit corruption. First, every school, clinic, police station, or other operating unit needs a budget.”

    My experience in Iraq was that, on the whole, we favored high priced foreign talent and a top down funding process to our detriment. I was fortunate to be able to operate in an AO in which we had access to a significant amount of CERP funds and force ratios with one maneuver unit and later operate within the same AO with decreased CERP funds and decreased force ratios. It was a painful yet positive learning experience.

    My AAR is that we that must successfully use the energies and desires of local people to develop local solutions to local problems in order to achieve a sustainable security solution in Iraq. Enabling our BCT’s with consistent local SME teams (trained and organized by Civil Affairs Teams, SF Teams, and MTT’s), expert comptroller teams, significant baseline CERP funding and the capacity to surge CERP funding as deemed necessary by the maneuver commander would go a long way towards developing sustainable security solutions. Long term the local maneuver commander will have to transition to the local power structure be it sheik, mukhtar, or group. We need to ensure this person or group is able to receive, manage, and be held accountable for the accounting stream that is the lifeblood of the AO. This is not a simple task as we all know well.

    Regards,

    Steve
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 06-14-2008 at 10:00 PM.
    Sapere Aude

  11. #11
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default

    Steve,
    Have you heard of any units (of any type) partnering with small businesses on this end and linking them up with like businesses on the other end? Have you heard of any types of economic partnering/pairing?

    I've got a friend who worked the Econ LLOO for the Ninewa PRT - I recently did his interview for the Case Study I'm working on - I'm looking to show the relationships between the various types of operations and assistance. What are your thoughts on how to get the most out of these relationships with regards to a grass roots approach? How do we ensure efforts are not in contest with one another, and how do we assist in the coordination of those things which are better from the bottom up with those things that might only happen with top down assistance?

    Thanks, Rob

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    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Supply Chain Management

    Rob,

    I will send you an ako later today. During my tour my 'portfolio' was engineering & construction but I quickly learned that business (and there are many many facets to this simple word) makes the world go round in Iraq.

    For the board, I would like to talk a little about supply chain management. In my opinion land and air bridges are vital to getting materials in and out of Iraq in order to facilitate commerce between the west and Iraq. Costs, tariffs, and regulatory hurdles are large and adapting to a just in time philosophy (inshallah meets fedex/ups/dhl) currently make this a 1000 meter target for most of Iraq. There is a potential to employ Knowledge Workers (Mosul University is strong but not really disposed to Americans) if someone who was interested would be able to navigate the telecommunications backbone and personal contacts issues and have the financial resources to absorb 'start up and maintenance fees' not normally encountered in the west.

    Kurdistan is another subject entirely that I will cover in a later post.

    Trade with Syria, Turkey, and Iran was robust in my area. Turkey was a powerhouse and from this one country Iraqi's faced significant competition in the arenas of agricultural products, day to day consumer products, and construction products.

    Developing and maintaining a Common Operational Picture for a maneuver commander is tough, but there are some solutions that we (DOD & Interagency) can raid from the business world that we have not availed ourselves to...I use some of these unclassified COTS software products in my day job and I am simply stunned that we have not trained up our folks and made use of them in our day to day across the board operations. Credit card purchases, 30 day classes, and JRTC/NTC/Hoehnfels practice would get us further down the road and provide quantifiable results with these business tested products.

    Long term, we need to help our young soldiers get associates degrees in business, geographic information systems, etc. The cost benefit ratio on this is definitely in our favor.

    Regards,

    Steve
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 06-15-2008 at 03:24 PM.
    Sapere Aude

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