Mass Atrocity Response Operations

[Tom Odom]

A friend has asked me to participate in the Mass Atrocity Response Operations Project or MARO. A joint program between Harvard University's Carr Center for Human Rights and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, MARO is decribed below:

The Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Project aims to equip the United States, other states, and regional and international actors to respond effectively to genocide and mass atrocity when directed by national leadership.

Among the menu of options—including diplomatic, informational, and economic—it is essential to prepare potential military responses. In collaboration with the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the MARO Project will harness professional military expertise to develop credible and realistic operational planning for responding to genocide and mass atrocity, when directed by National Command Authority. The MARO Project focuses on military operations to terminate and mitigate the effects of genocide and mass atrocity. When the complexities and challenges of using military force are well understood, states will be better prepared and more effective in responding to contingencies. Furthermore, greater awareness of the demands and dilemmas of military interventions should foster the development of preventive, non-military approaches, ultimately the preferable response to incipient crises.

MARO is looking for military and civilian leaders who have dealt with genocide on the ground or in planning to assist in this effort to equip the United States, other states, and regional and international actors to respond effectively to genocide and mass atrocity when directed by national leadership.

If you would like to throw your name in the hat, contact me by PM or email and I will pass your name on to the planning group.

Best

Tom

[jcustis]

Not quite ready (nor do I have the time right now) to let go of the hat, but I am curious. Please refresh this thread when significant updates hit the street.

[Rob Thornton]

Tom, will be interested what aspects of working with FSFs get covered.

Best, Rob

[Harry Phillips]

Tom,

Details are yet to be worked out on FSF. The project's current focus is designing an intervention mechanism in the form of an Annotated Planning Framework acceptable to the USG and allies. The intent is to broaden the range of participants beginning in 2009 to include US interagency and international partners. FSF considerations should come into play at that time.

Harry Phillips

[Tom Odom]

Tom,

Details are yet to be worked out on FSF. The project's current focus is designing an intervention mechanism in the form of an Annotated Planning Framework acceptable to the USG and allies. The intent is to broaden the range of participants beginning in 2009 to include US interagency and international partners. FSF considerations should come into play at that time.

Harry Phillips

Harry Welcome to the SWC. Stick around and join in.


For the Council: Harry is the friend of whom I spoke.

[selil]

MARO is looking for military and civilian leaders who have dealt with genocide on the ground or in planning to assist in this effort to equip the United States, other states, and regional and international actors to respond effectively to genocide and mass atrocity when directed by national leadership.

Luckily until shooting computers becomes genocide I get to wave from the sidelines. The scope of this problem, the political issues, what appears to be futility just makes the task seem so daunting. Wowser. I'm not sure what the product from an effort like this would be, and what would a success look like? Mucho respect to all participants future and current.

[ancien]

Intresting.
But why invent water .......?

good luck

[Harry Phillips]

I share the same questions and concerns posed above. But after my experiences in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and the Sudan and knowing how feckless the UN is in responding to such situations, I believe that doing something is better than doing nothing. Like all things of this sort, only time will tell how successful this effort is.

One other thing, I also believe in Clausewitz' admonishment to not over extend one's national resources. Collaborative work of this type may ultimately serve U.S. national and humanitarian interests somewhere down the road.

Harry

[selil]

Mr. Phillips are they looking at this as military action or disaster relief? Those two operations are pretty different though on the surface they have similarities. In a situation like Rwanda or Bosnia the you can sit on the social elements engaged in war but how do you make them stop?

I totally agree that the UN has little to offer and often makes the situations worse. Please don't take anything I said as criticism. I'm just trying to get my mind around the topic much the same way I might think about the Hadron Collider (which I'm clueless about too). I figure every situation must be different but do you want to respond early and stop depredation or can you only respond after the fact in a recovery mode? During Rwanda one of the Army Generals said something along the lines of you can let them kill each other or go try and stop them and you can kill them for trying to kill each other. Misperception on my part perhaps but like most jobs those worth doing are difficult.

[Abu Suleyman]

I am interested in this idea but have some questions, that others may share. What are you looking for? Full time employees? Forming a network or informal organization? What kind of qualifications should your candidates have?

[Harry Phillips]

I am interested in this idea but have some questions, that others may share. What are you looking for? Full time employees? Forming a network or informal organization? What kind of qualifications should your candidates have?

Immediately, we are looking for senior officers (or retired officers) to join our core planning group during a meeting scheduled for 24 & 25 September 2008 in Washington DC.

We are not looking for full time employees as the project has its full time staff. Those of us on the core planning group volunteer our time and expertise in support of the project. At some juncture we will be engaging senior level civilian officials of the U.S. interagency and the international community. Qualifications first and foremost at this juncture have to do with military planning experience and experience as an operator in the field during complex peacekeeping/humanitarian operations and warfighting.

[Harry Phillips]

...are they looking at this as military action or disaster relief?

...do you want to respond early and stop depredation or can you only respond after the fact in a recovery mode?


Thanks for your questions. And please note that I'm pretty thick skinned so no offense taken of any sort.

What the project endeavors to create is a planning tool for use by Combatant Command planners with a view towards both prevention and intervention. Nothing totally new about this, just a way of focusing the planning on genocide situations.

Following are excerpts from the annotated planning framework that has thus far been developed. Note that force composition is based on the following a. Immediate Intervention Forces, b. Sustainment and Response Forces, c. Stabilization Assistance Forces...for both prevention and intervention.

i. Prevention

a. Immediate Intervention Force (IIF) – prepared to immediately intervene in a mass atrocity
• This element might function as a small but potent symbol of intent to
intervene and stand as a flexible deterrent option for policy makers at the operational or strategic level.
• This element should be predominately infantry and range from company to
battalion-size depending on the situation, and have dedicated helicopter support.

b. Sustainment and Response Force (SRF) – designated to protect the Stabilization Assistance elements, ensure the overall security of the area and provide quick response combat reinforcements as needed.
• This element functions as a larger reserve force intent if the smaller element is insufficient, or if the situation has a higher likelihood of escalating toward a mass atrocity.
• This element must be correspondingly larger than the IIF, i.e. if the IIF FDO
is company-sized, this must be a battalion. It should have robust ground
transport and some aviation assets in order to bolster a larger presence over a broader area and occupy key terrain.

c. Stabilization Assistance Force (SAF) Sustainment – designated to provide
combat service support to all force elements and humanitarian assistance
to the population effected by the atrocity
• This element acts as an FDO focused on the humanitarian aspects of the
potential atrocity. It should be scaled and organized according to the situation, i.e. a scenario within mountainous terrain at middle latitudes will call for a different medical mix than that at sea-level in the tropics.

ii. Intervention

a. Immediate Intervention Forces (IIF) – designated to immediately
intervene in ongoing atrocities
• This element can move very quickly to the areas where the atrocities are
happening to stop/detain those doing the killing.
• Bolstered by a robust supporting arms component, the IIF can quickly
overwhelm any opponent.
• It must have a medical element to care for those wounded before and during the intervention.

b. Sustainment and Response Forces (SRF)– designated to protect the humanitarian assistance elements, ensure the overall security of the area and provide quick response combat reinforcements as needed
• Provides immediate combat support to the IIF.
• Controls movement within the area of operations.
• Ensures security of victim and refugee encampments.
• Functions as the lead coordination element between coalition political and
military agencies.

c. Stabilization Assistance Forces (SAF) – task organized to support
immediate and prioritized large-scale medical, sanitary, infrastructure
requirements
• Provides immediate treatment for wounded and injured.
• Provides sanitary and secure areas for intermediate medical facilities.
• Functions as a coordinating element between the coalition's military and
humanitarian NGOs operating in the area.

[Rex Brynen]

I totally agree that the UN has little to offer and often makes the situations worse.

It is worth remembering, that in Rwanda, the key UN member states--especially France and the US--were well aware what was unfolding, but preferred not to act. While there is much fault that can be laid at the feet of the UN (notably DPKO), it does have to be noted that the caution shown by DPKO and the SG reflected its (accurate) assessment that the UNSC was unwilling to support a more robust mission, and instead likely to leave UNAMIR to dangle.

[Harry Phillips]

National interests outweigh international interests even at the Security Council. As a legislative body, the Council's inability to stop genocide points to the inherent challenges associated with competing national interests of Council members which in turn impacts on: the timeliness (or lack thereof) of decision making; issuing a mandate to protect via Security Council resolution; identifying member states to execute the mandate; and finally the actual execution by member states in support of a mandate.

[Jedburgh]

Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook, 5 May 2010

A Collaborative Effort Between the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

A Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO) describes a contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants. The term MARO is not yet enshrined in military doctrine—but it should be. The United States does not currently recognize mass atrocities as a unique operational challenge, and there is no operational concept or doctrine that might help commanders understand the dynamics and demands of responding to mass atrocities. As a result, the US is not fully prepared to intervene effectively in a mass atrocity situation. This Military Planning Handbook is guided by the core belief that the nature of mass atrocity, and the focus of a mission to stop it, means that a MARO presents unique operational challenges requiring careful preparation and planning. This Handbook aims to create a shared understanding of the specific and even unique aspects of mass atrocities and a common military approach to addressing them.....

There is an existing thread on this subject:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5598

[Jedburgh]

Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook, 5 May 2010

A Collaborative Effort Between the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

A Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO) describes a contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants. The term MARO is not yet enshrined in military doctrine—but it should be. The United States does not currently recognize mass atrocities as a unique operational challenge, and there is no operational concept or doctrine that might help commanders understand the dynamics and demands of responding to mass atrocities. As a result, the US is not fully prepared to intervene effectively in a mass atrocity situation. This Military Planning Handbook is guided by the core belief that the nature of mass atrocity, and the focus of a mission to stop it, means that a MARO presents unique operational challenges requiring careful preparation and planning. This Handbook aims to create a shared understanding of the specific and even unique aspects of mass atrocities and a common military approach to addressing them.....

Copied to this existing thread.