How long does it take to train an Army?

[William F. Owen]

You have to have an idea first. Training is the easy bit.

The things that screw up and prevent good training and pretty easy to identify, with national culture and religion being the top of the ladder. And the top spot is probably cognitive dissonance, and traditional male culture - "Willy waving" as my wife calls it - Some "waving" is required, but it should not be the desired end state.

For anyone really interested in case study, the Palmach pretty much ticks all the boxes. The South Koreans are also worth a look.

[Ken White]

You have to have an idea first. Training is the easy bit.

I'd add not only do you have to have the idea, the nation / army / people to be trained have to accept and buy into that idea -- totally. If they do not, there will be passive resistance that can take a long time and much effort to overcome.

The things that screw up and prevent good training and pretty easy to identify, with national culture and religion being the top of the ladder. And the top spot is probably cognitive dissonance, and traditional male culture - "Willy waving" as my wife calls it - Some "waving" is required, but it should not be the desired end state.

Too true. A good example is the Iranian Army -- and the Air force. They, as opposed to the Pasdaran / IRGC were well trained, fairly disciplined and quite effective forces during the Iran/Iraq War. Khomeini had to let some of the Shah's General out of jail to prevent a disaster (as my Son reminded me last night in phone conversation about another matter).

The US Training of the Iranian Army started in WW II; it effectively took off as a real development and training mission in the late 40s. By the time I arrived there in 1969, the Army was basically operationally and tactically competent, however, the logistic and maintenance elements were still only marginal. The few remaining op / tactical problems and all the log problems were cultural (and educational, a subset of culture). While there was some effort to appoint people on the basis of merit, the class level and who one knew or was related to had far too much impact and degraded capability and even affected operations. I recall one Bde level exercise where an attack got delayed for three hours while the "honor" of which Battalion would lead was sorted out -- and social parameters of the three Bn Cdrs became the determinant, not location or capability.

An additional and very significant impactor throughout the ME (and South Asia) is that the intrinsic politeness requires that subordinates tell seniors what they want to hear, not the truth of the situation -- thus, wrong impressions led and lead to bad tactical decisions. It takes years to break that habit (if, indeed, it can be done at all).

The South Koreans are also worth a look.

True, they're good and it took them almost fifteen years to break the class and face saving habits to become effective. Those habits weren't necessarily bad or wrong but they were and are different and they do impact military performance.

A part of the problem with training of the ROK Army was that, of necessity, early training focused solely on defense, there was no offensive training as the concentration on the immediate need. Same thing occurred with the Georgians lately; all the training effort was aimed at preparing just three (out of twelve or so) Battalion combat teams for service in the COIN role; no offense / defense -- and no higher formation training at all; no log training to speak of. It is one thing to train people quickly to integrate into a functioning Army, a whole different game to grow that Army from scratch -- and the culture and willy waving (or its local equivalent) are the big problems.

The Palmach is indeed an excellent example -- and it was mostly done internally with little exterior help (unless you count Orde Wingate ).

[Fuchs]

Maybe in some cases you don't really need to train an army because a militia is all that you need?

The Afghan government can be considered as one of several powers/civil war parties in the country. Why does it need a real army if terrain has been controlled effectively by more militia-like forces in AFG in the past?

Why does nation-building need to build a Western-like nation, why not just build a region-typical nation that works?

A perfect solution can prevent a timely good solution sometimes.


I'm actually surprised that you think that a military culture can be changed in 15 years. At least in the case of present old officer/NCO corps I'd expect a generation (30 years).
But breaking old patterns and re-building to a new products isn't necessarily what I understand as advisable form of army buildup in times of war. There's probably no time for that, as the war might be lost before the training is done.
Who cares whether a unit discusses something irrelevant for three hours if its opponents aren't better?

[Ken White]

Maybe in some cases you don't really need to train an army because a militia is all that you need?

Of course -- however, real and perceived need can differ. Most Nations tend to want an Army. In every nation discussed in this thread, the real and perceived need coincided.

The Afghan government can be considered as one of several powers/civil war parties in the country. Why does it need a real army if terrain has been controlled effectively by more militia-like forces in AFG in the past?

You'd have to ask the Afghans themselves, not me. I rather suspect their answer would have something to do with British incursions (they have long memories) where the tribes were effective, the invasion by the USSR where they were also effective but took to long and too much damage was incurred and their concern for both Russian and Pakistani intentions added to the capability of modern weapons...

Why does nation-building need to build a Western-like nation, why not just build a region-typical nation that works?

I suspect the answer to that question is that everyone is not a Fuchs and they may have ideas that differ from yours. Fair rhetorical question but there is no answer.

A perfect solution can prevent a timely good solution sometimes.

Frequently. Yet another human foible.

I'm actually surprised that you think that a military culture can be changed in 15 years...

I don't. You did but now apparently don't. Here's what I said up thread:

""An army formed from virtually nothing (Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq) is not going to be effective for at least a decade. Your time frame for the training of riflemen and junior leaders is correct for western nations -- those times need to be doubled for non-westerners for a variety of reasons; to train the all important logisticians and senior leaders takes at least a decade and usually longer. That, BTW, is with a war -- in peacetime it typically takes 20 to 30 years.""

You then disagreed saying:

... A quarter century after the training started. Not impressive

Yet today you say:

At least in the case of present old officer/NCO corps I'd expect a generation (30 years).

You are priceless. As Schmedlap pointed out, you have a tendency to make an argument; have it countered and then you return and try to turn that counter argument back on the person who made the point in the first place. You really ought to look at that. Anyhow, on this topic, you need to make up your mind; is 25 years bad or is it possible, even necessary to do it in less time; you also earlier said:

The U.S. forces have failed to train foreign armies properly in time spans that were longer than the American Civil War or the First World War. That's outright failure. Such training missions should be expected to train foreign troops in a year up to junior NCO and in two years up to medium-rank officers. That's the speed of training demonstrated by national armies after mobilization.

And this:

Ten years might be OK in peacetime, but it's not OK in wartime.

If you can show me how wartime will significantly change a culture, we can agree -- until then, it looks like you're trying to have it both ways and are just arguing for the sake of arguing...

You go on today to say:

But breaking old patterns and re-building to a new products isn't necessarily what I understand as advisable form of army buildup in times of war. There's probably no time for that, as the war might be lost before the training is done.

That is true, no question -- so one does what one has to as one understands the need at the time (and the real need may nor be clear until the benefit of hindsight is attained). You also said earlier:

A track record of inability to train a new foreign army to region-typical combat effectiveness in less than four years needs to have an impact on nation-building related foreign policy planning.

I disagree that it's a track record thing; it is -- as you now seem to acknowledge -- a systemic and cultural problem.

However, I do agree that, knowing that, different policy options should be explored. That, however, is a quite different topic and thread.

Lastly:

Who cares whether a unit discusses something irrelevant for three hours if its opponents aren't better?

Probably no one; then again, if they are even a little better, that's a different thing, isn't it...

[Fuchs]

Uhmm, you realize that changing a military culture and building a new army are two different activities?
I was writing about changing how an army works/fights. That has always taken a long time because old superiors persist and retain old methods.
To build a new army is a completely different affair, obviously.
You arranged statements to create a contradiction although there was no connection.

If you can show me how wartime will significantly change a culture, we can agree -- until then, it looks like you're trying to have it both ways and are just arguing for the sake of arguing...

The thing that changes is the available time.
If "culture" prevents the quick (few years) creation of effective armed forces, then this needs to be included as argument in the original decision-making whether to start/articipate in the conflict as a foreign power. I wrote that before.
That is the key question; can it be done quickly or not. Such enterprises are usually (if not always) not acceptable if it takes 10 years.
I don't care about the difficulties. Can it be done or not? That's what the politicians and the public need to know in advance.

I see basically four possibilites:

1)
many years available (~peacetime) / training to high standards is desirable and possible
2)
few years available (~wartime or crisis) / training to high standards is desirable and possible in time, training to regional standards is possible in time
3)
few years available (~wartime or crisis) / training to high standards is not possible in time, training to regional standards is possible in time
4)
few years available (~wartime or crisis) / training to high standards is not possible in time, training to regional standards is not possible in time

Option 4 pretty much means that the costs of warfare would be extreme - if not unbearable - for a foreign power that substitutes for the indigenous armed forces.
I have an impression that option (2) was too often assumed to be true, that this assumption is the default assumption and that this has led to several failures in the past.


Ken; the basic dispute here is between your "the job needs to be done" attitude and my "looks like some decisions were wrong" attitude.
You pretty much insist that the time for mission accomplishment has to be granted.
That ignores the often excessive price that needs to be paid to buy that time, and that some missions are simply not worth that price.


Imagine this scenario:
year 2002
people argue for & against an invasion of Iraq
contra party says it would lead to an insurgency
majority is contra war now
pro party says that SWC and others have developed great strategies to defeat the insurgency
majority is pro war now
contra party says that experts think that to defeat an insurgency requires a new Iraqia rmy and ten years of training
case closed, invasion won't happen, nobody is willing to fight a 10 year war for the expected benefits

[davidbfpo]

I cannot comment as an expert, being a non-military observer; that aside my reading of a history article recently on the WW1 US Army illustrated the pain it underwent in France / Belgium. In WW1 it took a long time, at horrendous cost, for the British & Commenwealth armies in France to reach combat superiority - in which training was one factor.

In my reading on WW2 the training pre-1939 and into the war of the German Army NCO and junior officers is highly rated (see Peter White's 'With The Jocks').

Post-1945 history has plenty of examples IMHO where expatriate officered armies, or ex-colonial armies have failed or regressed to a mob, e.g. Nigerian Army when the Biafra War started.

I don't know what the mixture is for success, although I'd hazard a list: fit commanders, able staff officers, excellent battalion level officers and NCOs. Resting on a base of willing and disciplined soldiers - who mindful of Ken & Tom - who are paid, supplied and cared for.

Now back to my armchair or "bunker".

davidbfpo

[marct]

In WW1 it took a long time, at horrendous cost, for the British & Commenwealth armies in France to reach combat superiority - in which training was one factor.

Hmmm, I would have phrased that somewhat differently - it took years before enough British officers of the Old School were killed off so that we could show them at Vimy how to actually fight in that environment . Then again, I am biased .

[Ken White]

A story older than recorded history.

Uhmm, you realize that changing a military culture and building a new army are two different activities?

No, I realize that sometimes that is true but, far more often, the two actions have to go hand in hand. As I said at the start of the thread, you cannot use western norms in dealing with non-western nations. That was true in all of the examples you or I elected to use. West is west, east is east and never the twain shall meet and all that.

I was writing about changing how an army works/fights. That has always taken a long time because old superiors persist and retain old methods. To build a new army is a completely different affair, obviously.

True but every example you cited was just that, building a new Army. As I said, you can't have it both ways...

You arranged statements to create a contradiction although there was no connection.

Not so, I repeated them in sequence and in context.

The thing that changes is the available time. If "culture" prevents the quick (few years) creation of effective armed forces, then this needs to be included as argument in the original decision-making whether to start/articipate in the conflict as a foreign power. I wrote that before.

Yes you did -- and I agreed but pointed out that the policy argument is a different issue.

...I have an impression that option (2) was too often assumed to be true, that this assumption is the default assumption and that this has led to several failures in the past.

We can agree on that.

Ken; the basic dispute here is between your "the job needs to be done" attitude and my "looks like some decisions were wrong" attitude. You pretty much insist that the time for mission accomplishment has to be granted. That ignores the often excessive price that needs to be paid to buy that time, and that some missions are simply not worth that price.

Yes and no. I agree with that premise as you just stated it except I do not insist the time has to be granted -- I insist that is the time required; the decision to grant that time is a policy decision. In all cases cited, that decision was made by or for the policymakers to do so.

My point with past (and present, including Georgia) examples you cited is that the policy argument is totally immaterial; those things are history. Whether they should have been done that way or not is another issue and one that IMO is irrelevant; they happened the way they did and we cannot undo them. We have agreed, in a fashion, that the time required to train a force to include necessary culture changes should unquestionably be a consideration. Whether it will be or not remains to be seen.

Imagine this scenario:
year 2002...
. . .
case closed, invasion won't happen, nobody is willing to fight a 10 year war for the expected benefits

True, no doubt about that. That's why the issue was not discussed by the politicians and the media, most of whom did not know that -- and those who did didn't want to mention it. That's why Bill Clinton said we'd be in Bosnia (and Kosovo) for a year. Again, that's not a training time argument, that's a policy argument -- and on that we agree; it should be considered.

However, I think that means we expect rational thought from Politicians -- an unlikely event...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

The South Korean "Army" of 1950 had been trained and equipped as a para-military force to deal with the Communist guerillas that were operating in central South Korea. It was purposely not equipped with tanks in order to keep Rhee from attempting to invade the North. Also, in our political naiveté we failed to realize that the Soviets were training and arming the NKPA with heavy tanks. The South Koreans were not "routed" to the degree as some would like to think. They actually did a fairly admirable job, given the absence of tanks and anti-tank weapons, of slowing the NKPA advance, which allowed the US to build combat power on the Peninsula. Of course we took some body blows between Task Force Smith and the stabilization of the lines along the Naktong.

On top of all that the South Koreans had no significant military traditions, having been under Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945. Their only military experience during that time was in guerilla actions against the occupation. The North actually had cadres who had been trained by both the Soviets and the ChiComs. As has been mentioned the ROKs performance in Vietnam was excellent.

The South Vietnamese Army actually had to overcome their French training between partition in 1954 and 1960, when the US advisory effort began to increase. They performed very well thwarting the NVA Easter Offensive in 1972. But by 1975 we were no longer supplying the ARVN with adequate levels of supplies to stop the final invasion. Sort of the same situation the Wehrmacht was in 1945: plenty of fight but not enough fuel and ammo to keep fighting.

We trained the Thai Army and they perform rather well in COIN. Not to be left out are the Japanese.

[William F. Owen]

The Palmach is indeed an excellent example -- and it was mostly done internally with little exterior help (unless you count Orde Wingate ).

Though Palmach was originally British trained they soon worked out a lot of minor tactics stuff didn't work, and that all methods had to be adapted to their terrain and mostly importantly their culture. - so first to go was the British class system. Formed in 1941, by 1948 they end up fighting at the Theatre level on 3 fronts, out numbered, and winning - using purely Israeli doctrine. Contrast that with the fiasco of 2006!

Orde was a bit of an extreme character, a cousin of T.E. Lawrence, and a far more skilled soldier. There is a new and excellent Biography coming out by Simon Anglim, of which I have read a draft.