Energy Security

[Surferbeetle]

My focus is more at the other end... how can people plan for and best administer a fuel shortage.
The following may be of interest as the same principle (of solidarity in burden-sharing) is a cornerstone of international response to an oil supply shortage.

Rick,

Thanks for the links and conversation. My interest in energy security was certainly energized by a tour in Iraq (sorry, couldn't resist ).

At a marco level mapping is a powerful tool to use in gaining a better of understanding the of condition, needs, and capabilities of centralized energy infrastructure. My dirty boots experience in Iraq (03-04) was counterintuitive when compared to the typical emergency response that we would mount in the west.

Decentralization was the name of the game for energy requirements in Iraq. There are of course added costs and inefficiencies for an economy as a result of decentralization, however as an Iraqi if you wanted to have water, electricity, and fuel you could not count upon the Government to deliver it.

Blackmarket activities were prevalent, gas stations were dangerous places, and 'normal' economic activities were thoroughly disrupted. If one had money one would purchase a cheap generator (often Chinese brands - Caterpillar was big money and usually only seen in government applications) and sell electricity to nearby neighbors. Some of the families I visited would head out to the nearest watermain, dig a hole in the street, shoot a hole in the pipe (cross-contamination was prevalent due to open channel conditions), run a rubber hose back to a small pump attached to a large aluminum box in the courtyard and wait for the watermain to be filled (every 7 days or so where I was at). Others would contract with a water truck entrepreneur for deliveries. Cooking was done by propane canisters delivered by huge trucks at centralized locations.

Early in my tour (generators were not yet prevalent) I visited with some farmers near the Euphrates. They had dug rectangular pits/wells down to the water table and had mudbrick wellhouses nearby for irrigation. The centralized electricity was out and we brainstormed solutions...I shared a trick I have seen which involves pulling a tire off a car rim, while the car is on blocks, and running a band between rim and pump to power the pump (run the car while its on the blocks)...

Farm applications...hmmm. Popular Mechanics has had a few articles on 'closed loop' farm systems. It's not pretty but it's definitely the type of 'get ur done' that might get one through tough times.Cows to Kilowatts: U.S. Farms Save Big Turning Manure to Energy

Holstein No. 2699 gazes warily over Shawn Saylor’s shoulder. The 39 other cows lining the stainless-steel stalls of the milking parlor at Hillcrest Saylor Dairy Farm appear unperturbed—by two strangers or by the vacuum pumps being swiftly attached to their udders. “They’re very particular,” notes Saylor, a fourth-generation dairy farmer. “Everything has got to be consistent.” No. 2699 gives one last measured look from under long lashes, lifts her tail and ejects a stream of runny, brown energy that, very soon, will help power the farm.

Most people don’t think of manure from 600 cows—18,000 gal, produced daily—as an asset; Saylor’s neighbors in Rockwood, Pa., certainly didn’t. Until two years ago, the waste was pumped to a holding pond on the property and spread on the fields every spring and fall. “You’d see a 2-ft crust floating down there that you could pretty much walk across,” Saylor says matter-of-factly. “The odor was unbelievable.”

A lot of people might not see a 50-gal drum of used cooking oil, flecked with bits of fried chicken, as a resource either. That’s why I asked my uncle, Dave Hubbard, to drive me here from West Virginia in his biodiesel Jetta TDI. Uncle Dave converts the waste oil from local taverns into fuel to run his car, a motorcycle and tractors for five farms, so I figured he and Saylor could trade tips.

Saylor, 35, is both practical and inventive—much like Uncle Dave. Above the Leatherman clipped to his belt, the sleeves of a well-worn blue work shirt are rolled up to the elbows; his face dimples from smiling even as he talks shop in the milking parlor. “There’s a recycle–flush system here,” Saylor says, activating a pump. Water recovered from other uses cascades across the floor, sweeping manure in murky streams down the length of the barn and into a tank at the mouth of an anaerobic digester.

[Rick M]

Thanks again, Surfer... interesting stuff.

The rear-axle & drive-belt idea was of course standard on the old steam tractors 100 years ago and had all sorts of applications (except the tractors came with an elevated side wheel for that purpose).

I had not seen the PM article but some progressive work in on-farm methane is being done here in eastern Ontario:
http://www.agrinewsinteractive.com/a...ticle-7716.htm

It's interesting that the pioneers over here in alt-energy and organic ag are so often of Swiss/German background... meticulous in their "attention to detail."

We need more of this, much more, but most Canadian farmers are low-income and lack the investment to undertake such projects.

Meanwhile, farmers are only 2% of the population (same in USA, I believe) and on-farm energy use is only about 10% of energy use in the agri-food sector overall. Most agri-food energy use is for transportation, processing, packaging, refrigeration, etc.

Part of the reason for the UK focus on the "localization" of emergency response is because the panic buying of fuel and food typically occurs by local people stocking up at their local pumps and supermarkets. Supplies which could & should last many days can be depleted in 48 hours, thus greatly exacerbating an already difficult situation. The prevention of hoarding and the administration of more prudent measures can best (only??) occur at the local level.

(But I will state this again: North America has not yet moved in this direction. Actually, here's a challenge for SWC participants: please phone your local and state Emergency Management Office and ask if they have a plan for fuel shortages/oil supply emergencies. They will have plans for pandemics, nuclear attacks & hazardous spills, etc, but no regime to allocate fuel to the public during a fuel crisis. They will probably also indicate their surprise at your enquiry.
Please let this forum know if anyone finds info to the contrary.)

Defence Academy is a research arm of the UK military, and one of their researchers has done an excellent job of examining the UK food supply chain, including the vulnerabilities created by energy shortages.
Here is the link to Helen Peck's excellent study:
Wrong link and refer Post 13 for actual link.

Her study is very thorough (about 170 pages) but the most relevant info to our discussion here may be found in Section 1 (the first 20 pages)... well worth reading.

[slapout9]

The centralized electricity was out and we brainstormed solutions...I shared a trick I have seen which involves pulling a tire off a car rim, while the car is on blocks, and running a band between rim and pump to power the pump (run the car while its on the blocks)...

In Alabama that is centralized electricity what's the big deal?

[Rick M]

Sorry, folks

Surferbeetle alerted me to the fact that the link which I provided in posting #11 no longer leads to Helen Peck's study.
I'm not sure why, and that is unfortunate because it provided a concise intro which people could examine before linking to the study itself.

Here is a direct link to Helen Peck's "Resilience in the Food Chain" (July 06):
http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/cds/depar...l%20report.pdf

Sorry for the confusion

rm

[Dayuhan]

Rick,

If high prices were sustained (prices would need to be sustained for at least a decade in order to achieve the following benefit) then more of the difficult oil would be brought on-stream, thus buying us some much-needed time to develop non-carbon alternatives.

I agree with this, except that if political risk issues are not addressed, even sustained high prices may not generate the necessary investment. Unfortunately there is very little anyone can do to mitigate political risks in Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq, Iran, Russia, etc. No matter how high prices go, private capital will be reluctant to invest if they see a high probability of expropriation, harassment, major security threats, or government collapse. "Difficult oil" could refer to areas where extraction is expensive and technologically challenging or to areas where the investment climate is too risky to attract the money necessary to exploit reserves. The second problem may be more severe than the first.

But your final point about “an apocalyptic peak oil scenario where the oil simply runs out” makes me wonder if you share a common misconception about peak oil, which is to equate peaking with running out.

I'm aware of the distinction... however, much of the public discourse around the "peak oil" construct does really does take this apocalyptic vein, suggesting a rapid post-peak production decline that essentially equates to "oil running out". One popular and superficially analytical website (theoildrum.com) insists that June 2008 was "the peak" and projects an extremely abrupt and continuous decline in production thereafter. That's ridiculous of course, but people believe it, and as you suggest, perception is a large part of the problem.

Some peak oil analysts argue that the peak (ie. point of maximum production/flow-rate) should coincide more or less with the half-way point. That is, production will peak when we have extracted about half of the ultimately recoverable reserves.
Personally, I see no causal link between the two, nor did Brent Fisher in his excellent study for the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).

I'm with you and Fisher here, I also see no causal link.

But the central thesis of the peak oil analysts is this: the troubles will start as we approach the apparent peak. It probably will matter little what combination of factors ‘causes’ the peak, and we could have serious difficulties simply from the perception of a peak, even if the perceived peak should later prove to have been a false alarm.

This sums up my complaint with the "peak oil" construct: we have absolutely no way of knowing whether any given peak is "the peak" or simply "a peak", which renders the discussion extremely abstract. We also have no way of knowing, at any given point, whether we are approaching an apparent peak. I'd rather look at the problem as a function of production declines (you can't have a peak without a decline), whether transient or permanent, and the problems, both practical and perception-based, associated with declines.

Just as an example, the June 2008 peak is not generating any particular trouble because it is understood by all but the hysterics to be price-related, not supply-related, and because it came at a time of moderating prices and demand. A production decline at a time of escalating demand and prices would presumably have very different consequences.

Re rationing... I suspect that there's a plan or two, probably quite detailed, buried deep in the bowels of DC. Of course no politician wants to discuss such a scenario openly: the political risk is large and there is no political gain in raising the subject.

[Rick M]

Hi again, Dayuhan
Thanks very much for your detailed response.

I should pause at this point and thank you and the others for your interest in this topic…. This sort of discussion is exactly what I had hoped for, and everything that has been said so far (including the occasional bit of disagreement) has been constructive, sensible and respectful.

On to your various points:
1. I agree with your point that high prices still may not lead to investment in volatile regions. Given the volumes of accessible oil in the Middle East, your point makes this issue all the more timely… should Saudi Arabia (for example) become destabilized (or simply suffer a successful attack on Abqaiq and/or Ras Tanura), the global oil export system and the investment climate could be seriously and rapidly affected.

2. As for apocalyptic views of peak oil, I have tried to steer clear of the doomer/survivalist perspective and have repeatedly asked the mainstream media to do the same (since they seem to have difficulty simply explaining the data and the concerns without raising the apocalyptic aspect, which is not helpful).

I have dealt primarily with Energy Bulletin rather than The Oil Drum, but more for reasons of format.
I’m not sure what you are referring to at TOD specifically…
I am usually very pleased with the level of scholarship (ie. sourcing material and providing balanced conclusions) that I’ve seen so far.
As for June 08 being the peak, we’ll have to see.
Matt Simmons, whose work I greatly respect, still argues that production of crude oil (excluding NGL and refinery gains) peaked in 2005 at just over 74 mbpd.

3. On your point about the rear-view mirror (how will we know if it’s the real peak or another false alarm?), I think that Bob Hirsch has it right: he suggests that we view the peak more as a plateau and allow for up & down wiggles.
He suggests a range of 4% up and down, and that people not get worked up one way or the other by variations which occur within that range.
I think that’s good advice.
The flip side of that is that we have been within that 4% range for several years now, so Simmons may eventually be proven correct.

4. As for your final point about the US having a plan for fuel rationing buried away somewhere, you may be right, but if so, then that is probably bad news.
As the recent UK and Australian research stresses, government authorities at any level can only do what they are authorized to do.
If they are prudent, they will not only do their legislative pre-planning well in advance of an actual emergency, but they will also communicate this to the public.
In the case of the UK, the details of their Fuel Emergency plan are secret (presumably because it identifies Essential Users, which is bound to contested by those who feel that they should have been added to the list).

But the fact that their national legislation has been completely reworked and that authority to act has now been assigned to local government authorities has been highly promoted, presumably because they want the UK public to be well aware of these changes and to reduce the likelihood of legal challenges to this change in legislative authority.

If US authorities think that they can suddenly restrict citizens’ access to fuel without being challenged in the courts (and thus risk disempowering authorities just when they need to take effective action to prevent panic buying and hoarding), then they should think again.

That is exactly the scenario that planners in the UK and Australia have worked so hard to prevent, and it does require legislative changes and ongoing communication with the public and with lower-level authorities, little of which seems to be occurring in North America.

Thanks again for your insights on this topic... they are well-founded.

[Dayuhan]

Hello again...

I should pause at this point and thank you and the others for your interest in this topic…. This sort of discussion is exactly what I had hoped for, and everything that has been said so far (including the occasional bit of disagreement) has been constructive, sensible and respectful.

The topic is interesting, though as with many interesting topics constructive, sensible, and respectful discussion is hardly the rule on the internet! Hope it stays this way...

2. As for apocalyptic views of peak oil, I have tried to steer clear of the doomer/survivalist perspective and have repeatedly asked the mainstream media to do the same

I wish you the best of luck in that quest, but it will be an uphill battle. Reasoned analysis fits poorly in a 30 second sound bite, and the apocalyptic scenario draws more attention than serious discussion.

I have dealt primarily with Energy Bulletin rather than The Oil Drum, but more for reasons of format.
I’m not sure what you are referring to at TOD specifically…
I am usually very pleased with the level of scholarship (ie. sourcing material and providing balanced conclusions) that I’ve seen so far.

I get the feeling that the material that is sourced and the processes that are applied to the data are selected with the goal of supporting a preconceived view. An example might be these charts:

http://www.theoildrum.com/tag/update

Where the data selected to provide the mean and median projections seem selected to suppport the declining curve. All very well to say that "95% of the predictions sees [sic] a production peak between 2008 and 2010", but it is worth pointing out 95% of the predictions they chose to analyze see that peak occurring. Subjecting carefully selected and less than comprehensive data to rigorous analytical processes has become a very common thing, but conclusions reached through this process remain questionable.

One thing that seems consistently missing from discussions of production is the medium to long term impact of the 90s oil glut. The glut actually went well beyond the 90s: oil was below $20 by 1986. There was a brief spike around the first phase of the Iraq war, but the rapid drop after that only served to convince many producers that price rises were likely to be transient phenomena. As late as 2002 prices were still bumping along at the $20 level. By 2004 we were into a serious escalation, but it wasn't immediately recognized. The early stages of the price spurt were marked by peaks and troughs, and the rise was not fully acknowledged to be driven by a fiundamental alteration of the supply/demand equation until 2005/2006.

What that means, to make a long story short, is that for close to 20 years prices were either too low or price increases were perceived as too transient to support comprehensive investment in exploration and production.

The production increase from 2006 on seems to me to be largely driven by short-term measures aimed at improving and maximizing existing capacity, rather than serious attempts to bring new capacity onstream.

The production decline after mid 2008 seems clearly price related to me. OPEC reduced production quotas, but there's more to it than that: major producers in the middle east had been running flat out for over a year, and when prices tanked there was an obvious incentive to pull facilities off line for badly needed maintenance work.

Will add more to this later...

[slapout9]

An opposite view about Peak Oil.....there is no such thing Stuff didn't come from dead Dinosaurs at all. Link to article by F. William Engdahl
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.p...xt=va&aid=6880