Civilian Casualties, Religion, and COIN Operations

[rborum]

William - you noted "The population can only share your political aim. They can't share your military aim." That's a useful point, though distinguishing among them, I suppose can be a bit tricky.

I understand the arguments for cultural sensitivity and against promiscuous killing. I am trying to understand, though, whether - and if so how - the "utility of force" (as Clausewitz puts it) is variable not only across conflicts, but also across different COIN campaigns as well.

Stephen Biddle insightfully (I think) observes that the character of Maoist-type "wars of the people" may differ from conflicts where the counterinsurgency is driven by a third party nation. Rupert Smith describes many post-Cold War conflicts as "Wars amongst the people."

Is the reason for disagreement about the proper role/degree/utility of force in Afghanistan, for example, because of differences in how we view the nature of the conflict? Differences in how we view the nature of the adversary? Differences in how we view our role as counterinsurgents? Some combination of the above?

[William F. Owen]

William - you noted "The population can only share your political aim. They can't share your military aim." That's a useful point, though distinguishing among them, I suppose can be a bit tricky.

The political aim is the outcome as in who will be in authority over them. The French didn't worry too much about the 1,000's of French civilians killed by the Allies, because it meant a French Government.

I understand the arguments for cultural sensitivity and against promiscuous killing. I am trying to understand, though, whether - and if so how - the "utility of force" (as Clausewitz puts it) is variable not only across conflicts, but also across different COIN campaigns as well.

What's the difference between conflicts and COIN? None as far as I can tell.

Stephen Biddle insightfully (I think) observes that the character of Maoist-type "wars of the people" may differ from conflicts where the counterinsurgency is driven by a third party nation. Rupert Smith describes many post-Cold War conflicts as "Wars amongst the people."

Much as I like him personally, Rupert Smith is not on my reading list. Again, forget the "war amongst the people." That's just a condition, which may or may not be present. It's nothing to do with the end state.

Is the reason for disagreement about the proper role/degree/utility of force in Afghanistan, for example, because of differences in how we view the nature of the conflict? Differences in how we view the nature of the adversary? Differences in how we view our role as counterinsurgents? Some combination of the above?

In my opinion the disagreements are because we don't agree on how to apply military force to gain a political objective.

[rborum]

What's the difference between conflicts and COIN? None as far as I can tell.

My point here was not really to argue that conflicts are different than counterinsurgencies, but to clarify my interest in learning what factors would make the "utility of force" vary in different COIN campaigns (as well as perhaps in different non-COIN conflicts).

In my opinion the disagreements are because we don't agree on how to apply military force to gain a political objective.

That's insightful, I think. So if I understand your point - there is consensus that the political objective in any COIN campaign is to establish the control by the counterinsurgent's government (CG). But some think the only/best way to to establish CG control is to overwhelm the resistance with devastating force - and that overdoing is unlikely to significantly interfere with establishing and sustaining the CG control. CG control - in this model - is a function of coercive power, not political legitimacy.

While other believe that the only/best way to establish CG control is to use force selectively so as not to risk alienating the population. CG control - in this model - is a function of political legitimacy.

Does that fairly characterize the positions or am I off base?

[Ken White]

My point here was not really to argue that conflicts are different than counterinsurgencies, but to clarify my interest in learning what factors would make the "utility of force" vary in different COIN campaigns (as well as perhaps in different non-COIN conflicts).

Wilf can of course answer for himself but to me, the simplistic answer -- which is not at all simple -- is 'the adversary' and, of course, one's goal. Either of those can be a thread unto themselves. Goes back to Bob's World's analogy; Slugging a stranger; your neighbor; or your son all mean different types of adversaries and probably different goals on your part as well as differing reasons for the provocation on their part. Wars vary as widely as people.

there is consensus that the political objective in any COIN campaign is to establish the control by the counterinsurgent's government (CG).

That is possibly true, perhaps even probably so but it is not universal. In Afghanistan for example, some of the Talibs want that, others do not, the AQ and foreign fighters there mostly are just desirous of fighting Americans and / or Westerners. Few wars are simple.

But some think the only/best way to to establish CG control is to overwhelm the resistance with devastating force - and that overdoing is unlikely to significantly interfere with establishing and sustaining the CG control. CG control - in this model - is a function of coercive power, not political legitimacy.

I think very few military people would espouse that view other than in the very rare circumstances where that might be a viable option. Kenya in the mid 50s come close, the Boer Wars are perhaps a better example. Both would be proscribed due to popular opinion today. Thus, there are likely few occasions where anyone could or would seriously consider that approach.

While other believe that the only/best way to establish CG control is to use force selectively so as not to risk alienating the population. CG control - in this model - is a function of political legitimacy...Does that fairly characterize the positions or am I off base?

That view is correct, I think, I'd only throw in the caveat that CG control may not be an issue.

I do not believe the 'devastating force' option is subscribed to by many. The issue is the degree of force that constitutes 'minimal' or 'selectively' and the determining factor on that for most is own casualties. Some believe those must be accepted for the greater good or 'accomplishing the mission.' Others believe they should be minimized for own good or there will be public clamor leading tor no troops to complete the mission. The issue becomes far more significant when the forces involved are third parties -- e.g. the US and UK as well as other in either Afghanistan or Iraq (or Viet Nam, Malaya, Algeria...). Third party nation citizens can and will strongly question the merit of a 'softly' approach if it increases their casualties. They tend, mostly, to be less concerned with other casualties.

[rborum]

Ken - That's helpful. Thanks. I don't disagree with your analogy point:

"Slugging a stranger; your neighbor; or your son all mean different types of adversaries and probably different goals on your part as well as differing reasons for the provocation on their part. Wars vary as widely as people."

I had not been thinking of the COIN problem in quite that way. That seems to focus on the question of force, working backward to deconstruct and understand why/how it was applied to achieve some objective. I was focusing more on the objective - CG control, e.g. - , and working forward to understand why/how force might facilitate or impede it. But, again, not disagreeing with the general point.

The notion that the "adversary" is what would determine nature/degree/utility of force raises some potentially interesting questions for COIN Ops because insurgent forces often feel less constrained by international norms or by the explicit and implicit rules of engagement. I suppose, though, that adversary-driven force strategy doesn't necessarily mean doing unto others as they do unto us.

Thinking how this relates to the motivations or tolerance for civilian (non-US) casualties, I was really struck by some comments Lyall & Wilson made in their recent study of 286 insurgencies. Kinetic selectivity really seems to be a major driving force in determining whether a population will perceive the third-party counterinsurgent as protectors or threatening invaders. Lack of selectivity seems to embolden insurgent recruitment. They comment that: "With the innocent and guilty equally likely to be punished, rational individuals will seek security and predictability with insurgent groups" (p.77).

Thanks again for your insights.

[jmm99]

"Afghanistan ROE Change" (9 pages) for a discussion of the military, political and legal issues in the specific context of Astan civilian casualties - good case study.

PS: I don't see where or how religious considerations enter into our (US) developmemt of ROE/RUFs, and other military law issues.

With respect to AQ, their merger of religion and law has had an impact on their view of non-combatant casualties. See, 2008 SWJ, "The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda" - abstract:

Since its inception, al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition from Phase One’s complete respect for noncombatants to Phase Five’s intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. More recently, however, al Qaeda appears to be taking stock of the harm that targeting noncombatants is having on its cause. This paper will provide a phased analysis of how al Qaeda’s provision of noncombatant immunity disintegrated over time and why it may be returning today. This progression of thought and action concerning noncombatants serves as a roadmap by which to understand how and why al Qaeda made these ideological leaps.

Good article, which I don't think I've discussed at any length.

[Ken White]

That seems to focus on the question of force, working backward to deconstruct and understand why/how it was applied to achieve some objective. I was focusing more on the objective - CG control, e.g. - , and working forward to understand why/how force might facilitate or impede it. But, again, not disagreeing with the general point.

It focuses on the adversary -- he or it should be the determinant on the degree, type and methodology of force -- if any. Force is simply a tool, nothing more. Like any tool it must be used sensibly or you'll damage something you didn't mean to harm. Adversaries do not always require force for containment. In fact, I believe most do not; prompt and early response without force or with very minimal force can stop many such internal conflicts before they escalate to major confrontations.

The point is, once you commit any military elements to the effort, you are committing to use force or will be perceived as being prepared to do so; sometimes the same thing in the minds of many.

... insurgent forces often feel less constrained by international norms or by the explicit and implicit rules of engagement. I suppose, though, that adversary-driven force strategy doesn't necessarily mean doing unto others as they do unto us.

It should not since frequently the primary purpose of insurgents ignoring Mao's rules and antagonizing the populace is to get their opponents to do the same things and thus turn the populace against the nominal counterinsurgents. Most people know this, a few tend to forget it when angry or driven by inane directives or orders from people in faraway places.

...Lyall & Wilson made in their recent study of 286 insurgencies. Kinetic selectivity really seems to be a major driving force in determining whether a population will perceive the third-party counterinsurgent as protectors or threatening invaders. Lack of selectivity seems to embolden insurgent recruitment. They comment that: "With the innocent and guilty equally likely to be punished, rational individuals will seek security and predictability with insurgent groups" (p.77).

I'm dubious -- and that supposition BTW long precedes their study. It is true when force is applied indiscriminately but that rarely occurs. What more often occurs is that force is applied selectively and innocents are caught in the fight. Most people understand the difference and rarely go flocking to either side after such an event. They really just want both sides to go away and leave them alone.

Either way, unmeant or unnecessary killings and woundings will drive some -- but not most or even many -- to the insurgents and of those that go, other than a small number for whom the episode was particularly searing, most will drift away soon as time does its healing magic and the tough life of an insurgent takes its toll.

There are no easy solutions and no pat answers -- if there were, they'd have been found long ago. You cannot codify human responses and develop a matrix for 'what to do.'

[rborum]

Force is simply a tool, nothing more.

Understood. I concur.

the primary purpose of insurgents ignoring Mao's rules and antagonizing the populace is to get their opponents to do the same things and thus turn the populace against the nominal counterinsurgents.

Right. That's what I understand to be the conventional wisdom.

that supposition BTW long precedes their study.

You're right, of course. It is always of interest to me, however, to see data - even with all it's caveats and limitations - that addresses (whether findings support or refute) the suppositions that guide our policies.

There are no easy solutions and no pat answers -- if there were, they'd have been found long ago. You cannot codify human responses and develop a matrix for 'what to do.'

Concur. The notion of "matrix" never even blipped on my radar. Though as a social/behavioral scientist, I quite often bump up against the "matrix mentality" among my engineering colleagues. I know there is no cookie cutter approach to the strategy of kinetic force in COIN, but I hope there are dynamic factors that are (or could be) systematically considered in strategic planning and ongoing assessments of the mission. There is no matrix, but it seems - though perhaps this is naive on my part - that it might be useful to have some method to guide that dimension of decisionmaking. I'm not asking for one here, just wondering aloud about what the foundations or contours of such a method or decision framework might look like.

Thanks again.

[William F. Owen]

That's insightful, I think.

Thanks, but that's Clausewitz!

But some think the only/best way to to establish CG control is to overwhelm the resistance with devastating force - and that overdoing is unlikely to significantly interfere with establishing and sustaining the CG control. CG control - in this model - is a function of coercive power, not political legitimacy.

The "Nouveau COIN," guys like to call the Neo-Classical and/or "Neo-Orthodox" tendency "threat centric." It's true. We are!

...but as Ken very well explains, you focus on the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of violence against those who deserve it, because doing so has political benefit. Military force must serve the political aim.

As fare as I can tell the Nouveau COIN guys want military force to explicitly serve a social-moral aim, which in reality has no relevance without the political context.

[Ron Humphrey]

Thanks, but that's Clausewitz!


The "Nouveau COIN," guys like to call the Neo-Classical and/or "Neo-Orthodox" tendency "threat centric." It's true. We are!

...but as Ken very well explains, you focus on the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of violence against those who deserve it, because doing so has political benefit. Military force must serve the political aim.

As fare as I can tell the Nouveau COIN guys want military force to explicitly serve a social-moral aim, which in reality has no relevance without the political context.

Some Nouveau COIN guys just might, that said It might be that although they might not be completely right they are probably not much further from the truth then those who feel that "any" given political aim is going to be sustained for any reasonable period of time(decades/centuries) sans some sort of social-moral aims without persistent and rather messy enforcement of those political non-social aims.

Then again I could be mistaken. Wouldn't be the first time nor likely to be the last

[Ken White]

"You cannot legislate morality."

I believe that to be true -- and proven. Whether one believes that or not, the simple thought prompts questions.

Should one enforce morality at gunpoint? Should one even try to attempt that? What is the probability of succeeding in doing that? How long should one be prepared to point the weapon?

I'd also suggest that if "any" given political aim has to be sustained for any reasonable period of time (decades/centuries) with attendant social-moral aims by persistent and rather messy enforcement of those social-moral aims, then one is probably attempting to do something one probably shouldn't have contemplated, much less be attempting.

Napoleon is alleged to have said "Old soldiers and old Priests have much in common, they have seen mankind at its worst." Probably an accurate thought regardless of who coined it. That's really about all they'd have in common though. Soldiers break things, that's what they're for. They can do it sensibly and avoid excessive damage, they can and do perform with good judgment and compassion and they can help make room for the spread of sweetness and light, they can clear a path for the social and moral improvement in an area but the actual social / moral effort is not their job. That's the job of the Priest and / or his allies and fellow believers in the goodness of man.

Generally pays to use the right tool for the job. Use the wrong tool for that effort and you'll risk destroying the tool and the population you tried to morally improve. Not a great plan to do more harm than good...

[Ron Humphrey]

It may be worth ensuring the difference between what you said and I said is well delineated. Don't want any major confusion or misconceptions on the part of casual or skim readers.

"You cannot legislate morality."

I believe that to be true -- and proven. Whether one believes that or not, the simple thought prompts questions.

Should one enforce morality at gunpoint? Should one even try to attempt that? What is the probability of succeeding in doing that? How long should one be prepared to point the weapon?

I'd also suggest that if "any" given political aim has to be sustained for any reasonable period of time (decades/centuries) with attendant social-moral aims by persistent and rather messy enforcement of those social-moral aims, then one is probably attempting to do something one probably shouldn't have contemplated, much less be attempting.

It might be that although they might not be completely right they are probably not much further from the truth then those who feel that "any" given political aim is going to be sustained for any reasonable period of time(decades/centuries) sans some sort of social-moral aims without persistent and rather messy enforcement of those political non-social aims

I was rather clumsily trying to make the point that in any given conflict which seeks as its end state to leave a standing, stable form of political governance upon whom the requirement will be placed to maintain said end state; it seems only wise that we recognize the fact that human beings and thus societies as a whole absolutely do not exist sans some sort of standards (be they Moral/judicious/social-norms, etc). This to me is why trying to approach how to's on any given conflict without taking into account and accepting that whatever those standards are they can and most certainly will affect how things work out would seem to be asking for a major @#$% kicking.


I would probably liken this to when CVC was giving feedback to several officers trying to develop strategy in relation to possible enemy actions.
To para-phrase anyone who seeks to develop strategy without acknowledging that the political aims and or strengths/weaknesses of both parties isn't gonna get it right.
(well aware it ain't perfect but I'll try to look it up to get the wording more accurately, still pretty sure the point remains valid)

Napoleon is alleged to have said "Old soldiers and old Priests have much in common, they have seen mankind at its worst." Probably an accurate thought regardless of who coined it. That's really about all they'd have in common though. Soldiers break things, that's what they're for. They can do it sensibly and avoid excessive damage, they can and do perform with good judgment and compassion and they can help make room for the spread of sweetness and light, they can clear a path for the social and moral improvement in an area but the actual social / moral effort is not their job. That's the job of the Priest and / or his allies and fellow believers in the goodness of man.[/QUOTE]

Absolutely, that statement however does leave out the reality that regardless of the missions non-sociality these are still soldiers who represent a given standard of social (values). (Read Army/Navy/Marines/AF Values).
Can these be left out of planning without effecting the expectations for actions?

Generally pays to use the right tool for the job. Use the wrong tool for that effort and you'll risk destroying the tool and the population you tried to morally improve. Not a great plan to do more harm than good...

Could not be more in agreement.

I can do most the same things with a sledge hammer, a mallet, or a regular hammer. I guess I just figure I might want to be aware of what I'm building before I decide which one to use

[Ken White]

It may be worth ensuring the difference between what you said and I said is well delineated. Don't want any major confusion or misconceptions on the part of casual or skim readers.

and I can prove that. I still do not fully understand your point as stated in the paragraph of yours that you and I quoted. Still, leaving that aside and going to this:

This to me is why trying to approach how to's on any given conflict without taking into account and accepting that whatever those standards are they can and most certainly will affect how things work out would seem to be asking for a major @#$% kicking.

Agreed.

To para-phrase anyone who seeks to develop strategy without acknowledging that the political aims and or strengths/weaknesses of both parties isn't gonna get it right.

Agreed.

Absolutely, that statement however does leave out the reality that regardless of the missions non-sociality these are still soldiers who represent a given standard of social (values). (Read Army/Navy/Marines/AF Values).
Can these be left out of planning without effecting the expectations for actions?

They should not be but often are because the egos of the planners cannot visualize that the affected States may not be like nor want to be like said Planners.

I can do most the same things with a sledge hammer, a mallet, or a regular hammer. I guess I just figure I might want to be aware of what I'm building before I decide which one to use

Agreed -- that was sort my point with the added fillip that anyone who expects Soldiers to do morality or social norms might not like what they get. So by all means, we should decide what we're building before we start pounding nails -- we should also be willing in addition to the hammer(s) to use a drill and some screws to avoid excessive pounding that might weaken parts of the structure...

[Michael C]

Mr. Borum,

As for your first question, about whether we should avoid civilian casualties, in my experience avoiding civilian casualties was always the best option. We would be having great success in our AO as a battalion, and as soon as we had civilian casualties, across the AO intelligence reporting would plummet and our Key Leader Engagements would grind to halts and we would gain nothing. This was Afghanistan and the death of one innocent seemed roughly proportional to the death of several dozen "bad guys."

I don't know enough about Islam to answer my thoughts on your questions about whether Islam is engaged through non-kinetic means. I know it isn't really in Afghanistan, just respected and allowed to be. Whether or not we should address Islam more explicitly I cannot speak to because I do not know enough.

The "Nouveau COIN," guys like to call the Neo-Classical and/or "Neo-Orthodox" tendency "threat centric." It's true. We are!

...but as Ken very well explains, you focus on the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of violence against those who deserve it, because doing so has political benefit. Military force must serve the political aim.

As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.

[William F. Owen]

As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.

For practical examples, read history or look at current operational analysis. You are spoilt for choice.

Obviously you use the tactics, techniques and procedures that have proved themselves as being effective. As a serving officer you are more than aware of those. ( If you really are on a "battlefield" then kill those trying to kill you, and within the constraints of ROE. )

More generally it's mainly down to good intelligence performing the FIND function within the Core functions. How that is done comes down to how well your operations function as a whole and how effective your various practices and supporting agencies are. Context is critical.

... and let's differentiate between the general and the particular. Given a specific circumstance, we can discuss specific guidance, but do you really want advice as to how to find the bad guys in 100 x 100km patch of jungle, and/or 10,000 person town somewhere in the Middle East? I think not!

I'm sure FM3-24 can provide guidance.... or maybe not.

[Michael C]

Obviously you use the tactics, techniques and procedures that have proved themselves as being effective. As a serving officer you are more than aware of those. ( If you really are on a "battlefield" then kill those trying to kill you, and within the constraints of ROE. )

More generally it's mainly down to good intelligence performing the FIND function within the Core functions. How that is done comes down to how well your operations function as a whole and how effective your various practices and supporting agencies are. Context is critical.

It seems that there is a huge movement on the SWJ forums (as opposed to the journal and blog) to get rid of yucky "population-centric COIN" that "wants to win hearts and minds." The biggest critique seems to be that population-centric COIN hides behind catch phrases and offers no real solutions to our modern fight.

I am no longer in the warzone. When I was, trust me we shot at the enemy when we could get PID. Trust me, we designed missions to catch the enemy and kill him. We also did constant hearts and minds. What I want to know is, where are the resources to get intelligence from the population without doing population-centric COIN? If the British Army has manuals or recommendations on gathering intelligence, finding and identifying the enemy and operations to kill them, what are they? It seems like the whole of the military has disregarded the approach, both the UK and the US.

As for a scenario, take the Helmand Province and the current Marine operation there. What is the better option then avoiding civilian casualties as they are right now? Without trying to give support to the population, how do we get intelligence to kill the Taliban, HiG and AQ groups there?

[Ken White]

As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.

My "You're kidding" was because I suspect you know the answer to the question. It is a fair question. What follows is not snark or smart aleck comment but my best if overlong answer to your question:

[1] In my experience, anyone who fired at me is in what we can call Category 1.

[2] Anyone who did not but seemed likely to fire given a chance is in Category 2A. Anyone who did not and might not was suspect until proven not a potential threat (Category 2B). Anyone who offers cooperation is accepted conditionally and cautiously until some proof of their intent is shown (Category 2C). Anyone who does cooperate, seems unlikely to shoot at me is in Category 2D.

[3] Anyone who fights with me is in category 3A. Anyone who has fought with me on multiple occasions and thus has proven some loyalty or appreciation of the benefits of a mutually rewarding relationship is in category 3B.

[4] Fellow members of my own or closely allied units are in category 4.

As I'm sure you already know Category 1 persons are easily identified on the battlefield and should be killed.

Categories 2-4 persons should not be killed if possible. However, they bear considerable watching and due to necessary action ([1] above), Category 2 persons may be accidentally killed on a sliding scale of A to D with A being of small consequence and B being avoided if at all possible, C being avoided in most cases while killing D is to be avoided even at some cost *.

Category 3 persons should not be killed but 3A persons must be closely watched unless and until they move to Category 3B. Those in 3B must still be loosely watched...

Category 4 persons should not be killed unless they are engaged in wrongdoing. Unfortunately, even some of them bear watching...

As for TTP, METT-TC applies ( * As it does for the asterisked item above) . For distinguishing between categories of persons on the battle field, my experience was that Cat 1, Cat 3 and Cat 4 were easy while for Cat 2, the majority of people to be seen on any FID battlefield, it was difficult if not impossible to diffrentiate. Thus one had to watch them closely, even suspiciously -- all of them -- but also avoid killing them if possible. That possibility must be weighed in your mind at each encounter and the decision must be made based, again, on METT-TC. I suspect you knew and know that, all I can do is affirm it.

As you also know, that unfortunately allows the Cat 2A person to have a chance at becoming a Cat 1 person. This is a disconcerting, even disheartening to some, aspect. It should not be, it just is part of the job, like rain or snow or heat or an 80 pound Ruck.

IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary -- and please remember this:

That is true not only in an FID or COIN operation but in all combat to include major combat operations against a peer force in a war of movement.

If that equates to a platitude, my regrets -- it's reality. FWIW, I suspect Wilf knows as I do that you have a difficult job and are searching for answers. He's likely to provide you a better answer than I did. If he does, I doubt either answer will make a hard job one bit easier, you have to feel your way through it. You'll make mistakes, you'll do some things very well, some days will just be bad days. We all did or do those things and experienced the bad days. Goes with the job. There is no easy way. That's why it's a tough job and a lot of people don't want to do it.