And Libya goes on...

[CrowBat]

I'm actually intrigued by the general lack of discussion on the Libyan situation here... as opposed, to, say, the Egyptian revolt at its peak.

Sorry, was busy monitoring the air warfare in Libya....and there is a lot of it.

The Libyans appear to fly less than they used to before the outbreak of the unrest, and their pilots behave...well, kind of weird. At least it is quite clear that there are two kinds of pilots there: Libyans and...well, "non-Libyans". Nobody knows who are the latter for sure. And the best the Libyans do have appears not to be around, or at least rather busy keeping their "peace of mind". Their actions certainly have nothing to do with their levels of professionalism.

Losses are quite heavy too. It's not only that two Su-22-crews ejected out of entirely intact aircraft (total of three pilots; one of whom was subsequently arrested by the rebels because he actually did not want to eject), or that two freshly-overhauled Mirage F.1ED fighter-bombers were flown to Malta, but it seems a Su-24 was shot down just a few hours ago. Helicopter losses should be even heavier, and might include one of brand-new, Italian-supplied, Agusta A.109s of the Police - shot down by small-arms fire over downtown Tripoli.

Anyway, that with the "NFZs"...Isn't there a very strange situation: my understanding is that the West - and the US public in particular - is actually fed up with foreign interventions. Yet, all of a sudden everybody seems to be thinking that the US, Brits and everybody else should intervene - so that, should things go wrong, everyone can also be critic...? ;-)

At least pull one of those antiseptic, "air alone" wars (which are a bit more messy for those on the receiving end, of course).

Now, like every normal person, I also love the smell of napalm in the morning - as long as somebody else is being bombed, of course. And it would be kind of "sexy" if the US would simply go in and wipe out the entire Libyan Air Force, wouldn't it?

But, at least as importantly... well, at least in my humble opinion...the majority of the Libyans I heard from prefer not to have any kind of foreigners "helping" them. They want to finish what they started. Even those in az-Zawiya, where Qaddaffi's thugs are in these hours doing their best to match the performance of Syrian "security" services from Hamah.

That aside, the rebels in the East are currently following the best traditions of their predecessors (sure, they replaced camels with Toyotas, Hyundays and KIAs), and are exploiting the ongoing desert storm for a very rapid advance towards the West. If everything goes well, they might reach Syrte this evening. And, from what one can hear from there, in-fighting between the Qaddafa and another tribe is already going inside that place.

Perhaps a very discrete air attack on the three of regime's brigades concentrated near az-Zawiya might not be a bad idea. Say, send a pair of B-2s and splash their tanks with a combo of something like 160 JDAMS. But, actually, the situation there is playing into hands of the rebels. Then, even though the locals are likely to lose their stand there and end massacred to the last one, they are causing heavy losses to the "crack" units of the regime too, and keeping them busy while those form the East can complete their part of the job.

So, I think it might be worth considering that the Libyans are capable of sorting out this one on their own too...?

One nice day, when Q's and cadavers of most of his family are going to hang from some laterns in downtown Tripoli, drying in the sun Mussolini-style (that is, provided the rebels left them intact once they get them into their hands), the Libyans will not only have something to be proud about, but also something that's always going to remind them what are they capable of achieving, if they all pull on the same string.

[Pete]

Isn't there a very strange situation: my understanding is that the West - and the US public in particular - is actually fed up with foreign interventions.

The U.S. faced a similar policy dilemma during the uprisings in Hungary in 1956. If the last decade has reminded us of anything at it's that wars are a lot easier to get into than they are to get out of.

[Pete]

The U.S. faced a similar policy dilemma during the uprisings in Hungary in 1956. If the last decade has reminded us of anything at all it's that wars are a lot easier to get into than they are to get out of.

I believe I was the first one to mention Hungary in this thread and that was more than a month ago. "Defending Freedom" in the abstract and starting World War III are two different kettles of fish entirely. After Hungary the Eisenhower administration and the Dulles brothers considerably toned down the bold rhetoric about "rolling back Communism."

[Entropy]

I believe I was the first one to mention Hungary in this thread and that was more than a month ago. "Defending Freedom" in the abstract and starting World War III are two different kettles of fish entirely. After Hungary the Eisenhower administration and the Dulles brothers considerably toned down the bold rhetoric about "rolling back Communism."

They were obviously dithering pant-wetters.

Europe knows they can't trust the US government. What Europe, especially France and Britain who jumped into this first, are concerned about is that the US will jump ship when the going gets tough and they will be left holding the baby (so to speak)... which appears to be in the process of happening.

Which explains why we bailed out of Iraq in 2007, Vietnam in 1968, Afghanistan in 2005, Korea in August 1950 - oh wait....

If anything, the US has the opposite problem. Besides, the Europeans are more than capable of taking out Qaddafi if they want to bad enough. Why should we do it for them? Britian, France and many other countries have qualified JTAC and combat controllers who could embed with the rebels to really enable air-based fire support. Why haven't they done so?

[Fuchs]

Libyans and...well, "non-Libyans". Nobody knows who are the latter for sure.

IIRC Ghaddafi used Pakistani mercenary pilots in the past.

[CrowBat]

IIRC Ghaddafi used Pakistani mercenary pilots in the past.

Pakistanis used to train Egyptian and Libyan pilots on Mirage 5s of the Libyan Arab Republic Air Force, in Libya, back in the early 1970s (before and during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War).

They might have acted as instructors when LARAF purchased Mirage F.1ADs and F.1EDs, in the late 1970s, again, but that remains unconfirmed. Eventually, the Pakistani connection functioned until 2004 or so, when the Pakistani Air Force bought all the remaining Mirage 5Ds and 5DDs (two-seat conversion trainers).

The Yugoslavs have constructed the entire Air Academy at Misurata, supplied more than 100 G-2 Galebs and J-21 Jastrebs for it (Italians then sold over 260 SIAI-Marchetti SF.260 basic trainers), and subsequently helped in maintenance of the same aircraft, as well as of MiG-21s - partially in Libya, but foremost in Yugoslavia. Large numbers of Libyan (as well as Palestinian) pilots were trained in Yugoslavia too.

Syrians manned two complete MiG-23 units through the 1980s, and - together with Iranians - maintained the LARAF Su-24 fleet during the 1990s (that's why some used to call the LARAF the "Syrian Air Force West" at those times). The Iranians were also maintaining the Libyan fleet of CH-47 helicopters during the 1990s.

The Soviets mainly acted as advisors at air base/wing level, during the 1980s, since the quality of work provided by their instructors (for MiG-23s, for example), was found insufficient and most of these were kicked out already by 1977.

But, that's all "past tense".

Most authoritative reports from recent times indicate the presence of Belarussian, Ukrainian and/or Serbian mercenaries. Sadly, my sources simply can't recognize the language they use while flying.

BTW, a Su-24MK was shot down by the rebels near Ras Lanoof, yesterday. The crew of two was killed in the crash. A Sudanese ID was found at one of them...

[Steve the Planner]

I don't get it about all this no fly and military stuff.

Do the math. Two million or so folks in Tripoli, a large metropolitan city which has no indigenous food/water supply.

Two million people need how much food, water, medical supplies, on a daily basis, to be happy and productive?

If ports are open in the east (where the oil is anyway) and closed in the west due to instability (and increasing lack of oil to operate things), how long does it take for events to play out?

International assets are already frozen, and could, for example, be earmarked for humanitarian relief to the east (but not to the west), so trade, and especially new weapons, will be chaotic at best, begging the question of whether even a naval blockade is critical. If no access to global credit, what shipments need to be intercepted?

At the same time, a limited, but well distributed, supply of hand-held devices (and IEDs) can stop the biggest of armies/air forces in its tracks, as we know. Chasing adequately armed, but highly dispersed, local opponents can break the back of any army not highly motivated, equipped and civilian-supported.

Didn't we learn all this stuff already?

Where are the main water/waste water supply systems feeding Tripoli?

Game, set, match.

[CrowBat]

If ports are open in the east (where the oil is anyway) and closed in the west due to instability (and increasing lack of oil to operate things), how long does it take for events to play out?

Obviously, this is the crucial question (i.e. how long can the regime hold out at the current rate of fighting).

Usually, countries have anything between 6 and 12 months of strategic reserve in fuels, something like 6 months in ammo and spares etc. But, here we're talking about Libya. Following the 1973 War, they were buying a lot more arms, equipment and spares than they could need in years.

Just one example: they purchased a total of 110 Mirage 5s in the early 1970s. Although a large number of these was sent to Egypt during the 1973 War with Israel (where at least a handful was shot down), and they saw plenty of fighting not only against Egypt in 1977, but also in Chad, from 1981 until 1988, etc., there were still no less but 54 of them in 1st class condition, with less than 1000hrs on their clocks when Pakistan decided to buy them, in 2004 (together with a significant reserve of spares, including some 50 spare engines). The Libyans never operated more than four squadrons of these fighters, and at least one third of the fleet was always kept in stored condition. They would regularly replace used aircraft with stored examples, and so on. Thus, none of the aircraft became "spent" even after 40 years in service.

Another example: at the start of the uprising in Libya, on 17 February, a transport loaded with 2,000 rifles and US$18 Million in cash arrived in Kufra. These weapons and money were destined to arm and pay the locals so they would fight for the regime. The locals "captured" (i.e. grounded) that plane, armed themselves with rifles, deposited the money at the local bank, and said "no thanks" to the regime.

Overall, there is really plenty of armament stored around various parts of Libya. Much can be found in a number of depots around Benghazi (like the one that flew to the Mars, two nights ago), but particularly so in the area between Syrte and al-Jufra, in central Libya, and then again around Tripoli.

Provided it can get enough fighters, the regime is likely to be able to go on like this for several years.

IMHO, only two things would make sense for the international community to do in this situation:
- saturated and permanent jamming of all means of communication in the hands of the regime (also cutting off all of its sat comms);
- total blockade of aerial traffic to and from Libya (impossible until last foreigners are out, and there are currently still more than 1 Million of them there).

[Fuchs]

I doubt that hardware is of much relevance in this conflict.
Determination (loyalty to your side, combat morale) are going to be more important in the next weeks.

He's no going to stay in power if only the equivalent of an effective light brigade sides with him.

[Steve the Planner]

Crow:

I think you are starting to draw the bead.

Of those fighters and stores, how many are in Tripoli and under control?

In that whole scenario, what are the critical points than can be targeted?

You hit one---communications. But even that can be highly targeted, with jamming at minimal key points, and knocking out specific towers, all by low-tech rebels with hand-held or SUV-deployed arsenals.

The one thing that is overwhelming from Small Wars is how, under so many scenarios short of Big Army to Big Army, the vulnerabilities can be simply exploited in an environment without strong popular support in areas immediately surrounding critical facilities.

[carl]

IMHO, only two things would make sense for the international community to do in this situation:
- saturated and permanent jamming of all means of communication in the hands of the regime (also cutting off all of its sat comms);
- total blockade of aerial traffic to and from Libya (impossible until last foreigners are out, and there are currently still more than 1 Million of them there).

What do you think about adding small groups of people equipped with SA-18s who would co-operate with the rebels? The people could come from any number of organizations from any number of countries. Probably enough Arabic speakers are available. The SA-18s could come from any number of friendly countries who have them. That way you could establish a "no fly zone" for tactical jets and helos over the only place it really mattered, whatever was passing for the front line, without a big spectacle.

[CrowBat]

What do you think about adding small groups of people equipped with SA-18s who would co-operate with the rebels? The people could come from any number of organizations from any number of countries. Probably enough Arabic speakers are available. The SA-18s could come from any number of friendly countries who have them. That way you could establish a "no fly zone" for tactical jets and helos over the only place it really mattered, whatever was passing for the front line, without a big spectacle.

Depends on the troops that would operate these SA-18s: if they can cope with plenty of people who have quite a few very personal "bills" to pay back, bunches of youngsters firing their AKs - or ZPU-4s - into the air any time they are bored because of all the waiting (and a few other, smaller bunches of youngsters that smoke hashish when there is nothing better to do)... I think they would do well.

Just, somehow... I doubt one might find such troops in the West.

[Rex Brynen]

What do you think about adding small groups of people equipped with SA-18s who would co-operate with the rebels? The people could come from any number of organizations from any number of countries. Probably enough Arabic speakers are available. The SA-18s could come from any number of friendly countries who have them. That way you could establish a "no fly zone" for tactical jets and helos over the only place it really mattered, whatever was passing for the front line, without a big spectacle.

The would stick out like a sore thumb, so don't assume any sort of plausible deniability. And they would have to maintain very close custody of the SA-18s, given how much harm a modern MANPADS on the open market can do.

The recent SAS experience near Benghazi is a useful lesson in getting too clever by half on the special forces front.

On top of that, so far the LAF hasn't been a decisive factor.