Security and Stability in Afghanistan

[SWJED]

9 January Washington Times Op-Ed - Stabilizing Afghanistan .

...Assessments of troop levels will continue to be what the Defense Department calls "conditions based" and will be flexible and responsive. U.S. presence in Afghanistan has been so effective because we have tailored forces to respond to changing needs. During war, U.S. forces must occasionally be repositioned for contingency missions. Meanwhile, U.S. special-operations forces will ruthlessly continue the hunt for al Qaeda and Taliban holdouts and will be prepared for intelligence and other covert operations throughout the battle area...

Pentagon officials are heartened by NATO's continued willingness to participate in the mission of Operation Enduring Freedom...

The slow transition from combat to stability operations, along with increased multinational presence, is good for Afghanistan and good for America. For decades all over the world -- in Germany, Japan, South Korea and other places -- we have drawn down forces and turned operations over to local authorities when the situation became stable. This transition encourages optimism because it is a strong affirmation of the ability of Afghanistan to stand on its own with a freely elected, democratic government. As the legitimacy of the Karzai government improves, Afghanistan moves from the dark, isolated days of the medieval Taliban into the modern community of nations...

What is occurring in Afghanistan is a template of sorts -- given the caveat that there are major differences in the two situations -- for what Pentagon officials anticipate happening eventually in Iraq. As local Iraqi forces increase in capability -- and with some outside augmentation -- then the U.S. forces will draw down and reposition over time. It must not be a panicked, humiliating retreat, as some defeatists advocate, but a timed, phased, well-considered approach that turns power over to the local people and allows them to take charge of their destiny...

[Jedburgh]

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 30 Jan 07:

...Gentlemen I hope you can help us understand the way forward. This will be the first of several hearings we will hold on Afghanistan in coming months and you will help us set the stage. What are the key challenges facing the U.S. and coalition military operations, the Afghan government and security forces, and counter-narcotics and reconstruction efforts? And how should these challenges be addressed?

I am pleased to have with us an exceptionally qualified panel of experts. We have Ambassador James Dobbins, who served as the President’s first envoy to Afghanistan following the 9-11 attacks. We have Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, who handled matters involving Afghanistan as the Assistant Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001. We have the Honorable Ali A. Jalali, Afghanistan’s Interior Minister until 2005. And we have Doctor Anthony Cordesman with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who is another one of the country’s top experts on Afghanistan. ...

Amb. James Dobbins, Dir. International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND

Amb. Karl F. Inderfurth, Prof. Practice of International Affairs, GWU

Ali A. Jalali, Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies, NDU

Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS

[davidbfpo]

Found this short article by a lady American aid / development officer, who was in Helmand Province, till October 2006, worth reading:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...020201474.html

The Road to Helmand
I went to Afghanistan to help rebuild people's lives. But I learned the hard way that good intentions aren't enough. By Holly Barnes Higgins

Even has her email for comments: hehiggins@yahoo.com

Davidbfpo

[SWJED]

Found this short article by a lady American aid / development officer, who was in Helmand Province, till October 2006, worth reading:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...020201474.html

The Road to Helmand
I went to Afghanistan to help rebuild people's lives. But I learned the hard way that good intentions aren't enough. By Holly Barnes Higgins

Even has her email for comments: hehiggins@yahoo.com

Davidbfpo

I think jcustis was going to invite Ms. Higgins to the Council - will check.

[Jedburgh]

Found this short article by a lady American aid / development officer, who was in Helmand Province, till October 2006, worth reading...

Good article. Thanks.

...But because of mismanagement at multiple levels, personnel turnover, lack of initiative and concerns about personal security, progress simply isn't forthcoming...

The only other critical negative factor from the "friendly" side she left out was careerism.

[jcustis]

I suspect that the email addy may be missing a critical letter. I'm going to try a "b" instead of an "e".

Or perhaps the Washington Post editor who happens to drift in here will see this and vet the SWC as being a really good group of people.

[davidbfpo]

The link is to Zeeshan Hashmi's recent article in The Times (London) and his brother Jabron Hashmi was killed last July in Afghanistan - the first British Muslim soldier to die there.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/com...cle1336519.ece

I've read many American soldiers thoughts on war, here is a quite different one.

Davidbfpo

[BRUZ_LEE]

I just came across the new SENLIS Council Report on AFGHANISTAN.
At first glance it looks like they got it right. In the appendices they even discuss on COIN theory and give excerpts of the new US COIN manual in order to stress the simple fact, that we don't stick to our own doctrine.
Very sadly that especially the UK troops in AFG recurr to sweep operations and bombing campaigns despite their huge COIN experience.
The Canadians who are right now blaming the Germans of not joining the fight in the South of AFG should rethink.

Highly recommended read. You find the report at:
http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/Full_CI_Report

More discussions on it and more (older) reports at the homepage:
http://www.senliscouncil.net

[Jedburgh]

...Highly recommended read. You find the report at: Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies

Thanks, Bruz - good read.

....and here's more testimony on Afghanistan, this time in front of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 15 Feb 07:

Congressman Mark Kirk - Afghanistan: The Rise of the Narco-Taliban

LTG (R) David Barno - Afghanistan on the Brink: Where Do We Go From Here?

Peter Bergen - Afghanistan 2007: Problems, Opportunities, and Possible Solutions

Anthony Cordesman - Winning in Afghanistan: The Challenges and the Response

[SWJED]

18 February Associated Press - AP Enterprise: Afghan Army Progress Slow by Jason Straziuso.

The Afghan army is struggling with old weaponry, low pay and desertions, yet performs better than the troubled Iraqi army and could defend Afghanistan without U.S. and NATO support in 10 years or less, military officials and analysts say.

The fledgling force's success is viewed as critical to the Western-backed mission of stabilizing Afghanistan, which faced a record number of insurgent attacks last year. Renewed violence expected this spring threatens President Hamid Karzai's government.

Recruitment for the Afghan National Army is being accelerated, and $8.6 billion in new American funding for Afghan security needs will help equip the 32,000-strong force, which U.S. military officials say is proving increasingly resilient in battle.

Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak told The Associated Press that a goal of 70,000 Afghan soldiers has been pushed forward to December 2008 from 2011, and it is hoped to have 46,000 in place by April...

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 23 Feb 07: Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan

Executive Summary

The current study is a follow-up to the 2005 baseline report In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan. The report’s conclusions are based on 1,000 structured conversations that took place in half of Afghanistan’s provinces; 13 surveys, polls, and focus groups; 200 expert interviews; and the daily monitoring of 70 media sources and 182 organizations. Three of the report’s main findings are:

- Afghans are losing trust in their government because of an escalation in violence;

- Public expectations are neither being met nor managed;

- Conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated in all key areas targeted for
development, except for the economy and women’s rights.

The general assessment of the five key pillars is as follows:

Security Afghans are more insecure today than they were in 2005. This is due largely to the violence surrounding the insurgency and counter-insurgency campaigns, and the inability of security forces to combat warlords and drug traffickers. State security institutions have increased their operational capacity and have trained more personnel, but they - particularly the Afghan National Police - have had problems with retention, staff effectiveness, corruption, and general oversight.

Governance and Participation The central government’s institutional and human capacity has improved, but its legitimacy has deteriorated. Sub-national government structures still lack capacity. In their place, militia commanders and local mafias have filled the void, undermining local governance, democratic rights, and service delivery.

Justice and Accountability Traditional, informal judicial structures continue to fill the gap in justice for many Afghans, while the formal justice sector remains inaccessible and corrupt, and is unable to confront impunity, adjudicate land disputes, unravel criminal networks, or protect the rights of citizens.

Economic Conditions High economic growth and a more open business environment have improved the general health of the Afghan economy, yet these benefits have not translated into sufficient employment and income generating activities for the ordinary citizen.

Social Services and Infrastructure Although reconstruction investments by the international community have enhanced social services and infrastructure, deteriorating security conditions, a scarcity of competent personnel and low quality has limited access and its benefits for many Afghans.

Full 118 page report at the link.

[Mondor]

Nothing new here I am afraid. If the government is perceived as not holding up its end of the social contract (providing basic security and other services that the population expects) then the populace will find someone who will. Vigilantism in the US Wild West came about because the state and territorial governments were unable, or unwilling, to provide security. Once the government became responsive to the needs of the local population the vigilantes faded away. Though it took a long time and we still have "local" difficulties that date from that era.

Kabul, or any government for that matter, needs to meet the minimum expectations of its population or it will lose legitimacy and any nominal authority it now has. Once that is gone then the people will find it somewhere else. This is of course how the Taliban came to be. They filled a power vacuum, and provided security and stability when no one else was able too.

[Jedburgh]

29 Mar 07 update of the CSIS 23 Feb 07 report linked in an earlier post in this thread:

Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan

Full 137 page report at the link.

[tequila]

R&S as in Reconstruction and Stabilization Aid. A good article in MR summarizing the reconstruction challenges in Afghanistan and the crucial need to strengthen these areas to meet the challenge of a resurgent Taliban.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 18 May 07: The Uncertain Metrics of Afghanistan

...Afghanistan raises the same broad issues regarding what metrics to use in judging progress in Afghanistan that exists in Iraq. Like Iraq, the answers are complex and involve analysis and judgment down to the local level rather than bean counts at the national level:

• Measuring the nature and intensity of the fighting: Counts of the level and type of attack are still useful, particularly if they cover the full range of attacks by type, are broken out at least down to the province level, and are tied to the level of enemy progress or defeat in controlling the countryside. Overt violence, however, is always an uncertain measure of insurgent activity and success....

• “Mapping” control of the population and area: Last year, the Taliban won in terms of population and area even though it lost virtually every tactical encounter. This year, it is still too early to tell, at least from unclassified reporting...

• The governance and services test: A related metric that is critical in armed nation building is to analyze and map whom actually governs where and what services do they provide. In broad terms, in a conflict like this, every area where the government does not actually govern or provide key services at best is vulnerable and often should be counted as lost. This is particularly true in Afghanistan, where central government has always tended to be distant, ineffective and corrupt...

• Aid coverage, aid activity, and actual useful help: This raises a critical failing in both Afghanistan and Iraq: The almost total lack of honest and meaningful metrics and reporting by USAID, the Corps of Engineer, and similar actions by allied countries. Spending has never been a meaningful metric. Neither has reporting on projects completed without breakouts of the level of services provided by region relative to need...

• Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and Afghan National Auxiliary Police development and presence: There are several different elements involved. As is the case in Iraq, the least important metric is how many people in each service have been trained and equipped. This effort is a vital means to an end, but success consists of having actual forces active in the field. In general, whenever the US government or Coalition authorities issue estimates of the number of people who should be there, this is really a confession of failure...

• The local authority and militia test: That said, the Afghan government is at least 3-5 years away from a mix of governance, military, and police capabilities that can bring authority and security force? Is it really effective? Is it really friendly?...

• Local perceptions: Polls are only one metric, but they are a critical one. If properly conducted, they show local loyalties and concerns. They correct the tendency to assume that enemies like the Taliban do not have strong popular followings in some areas, that NATO military action is not seen as hostile or a threat, and that people support a government that is not active simply because it was elected...

• NATO effort by NATO country by region affected: No set of metrics is more useless in counterinsurgency and nation building than national totals and national averages. This is particularly true in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, where regional and local differences are critical, and Coalition partners take different approaches to fighting and aid...

• Losing by Winning Metrics: There are several additional areas where the US and NATO need to be far more sensitive to the negative impacts of their own operations and carefully measure such impacts through field reporting, public opinion polls, and other tests that are not linked to those actually planning and lementing such operations...

[Jedburgh]

RAND Review, Summer 07:

Afghanistan on the Edge
A World at Risk of Winning the Urban Battle, Losing the Rural War, Abandoning the Regional Solution

....In Afghanistan, Jones sees distinct nation-building timelines for the south, east, north, west, center, and areas in between. In the south and east, where most of the fighting has occurred, “we’re closer to years one or two than five or six.” In the north, home to the Northern Alliance that helped rout the Taliban in 2001, “we certainly would be in year five or six. The security situation is relatively benign. Reconstruction is actually possible. International organizations can take money, build infrastructure, and train staff at hospitals in the north.”

In the west, there has been faltering progress. “A year ago, the west was on par with the north. That clock’s begun to slow down a little bit” because of the spreading insurgency in areas such as Shindand in Herat Province. Likewise, the center was holding until recently. “Kabul was on track for progress until 2006. That’s slowed down, too.” He cited a May 2006 U.S. military convoy traffic accident, which killed at least one Afghan civilian and sparked mass rioting, as the turning point in the capital.

Then there are the remote villages scattered about the country. “If you were to travel from Kabul to Herat by foot, you’d see areas that haven’t been touched and have probably seen literally nobody come through. Pockets of the country where there’s been no assistance or international presence or funding at all are in year zero or have even gone back in time.”....

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 7 Nov 07: Armed Nation Building: The Real Challenge in Afghanistan

The Real Nature of the War

- Armed nation building, not counterinsurgency.

- Struggle for control of ideology, people, and territory --not fight between opposing military forces.

- War of attrition that can last 15 or more years. Enemy can win if can outlast NATO and Afghan government.

- Controlling political and economic space more more important than tactical victory.

- Political and military victory must be ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and “local.”

- Key to success is not NATO, but creating effective Afghan governance, Afghan forces, and Afghan economy.

- Can’t win in one country. Regional, not national struggle.

This isn't a paper, but a 103 slide PPT presentation with lots of charts, graphs and maps converted to a pdf file.

[Tom Odom]

OxFam has come out with a report critical of PRTs; I respect OxFam and it's work. They usually are quite factual and non-political in such matters.

I should also say that NATO is very much in a learning curve when it comes to COIN and COIN-related initiatives like PRTs.

Tom

Financial Times
November 20, 2007

Afghan Revival Work Failing, Says Oxfam

By Jon Boone, Kabul

The use of international forces in Afghanistan to spearhead reconstruction work has created development projects that are “unsuitable, unused or targeted by militants”, says a leading aid agency.

Oxfam International says the 25 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) run by soldiers from 13 countries have concentrated on short-term projects that have done nothing to stem rising violence in the country.

In a wide-ranging critique of international efforts in Afghanistan, prepared for a British parliamentary overseas development committee, the UK-based aid agency says that the Nato-led PRTs have gone far beyond their security mandate and have crowded out local initiatives.

“Given the historic suspicion of foreign intervention, such efforts to win ‘hearts and minds’ are naive,” says the report. “It is unsurprising that the huge expansion of PRT activities has not prevented the deterioration of security.

“The development process needs to be owned and led by Afghan communities, which is essential for sustainability.”

[davidbfpo]

The Senlis Council have just published a report on Afghanistan (I seem to recall some criticism of them on SWJ before). The (London) Daily Telegraph refers to it:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main...taliban122.xml

The actual report (2.0mb) is on the Senlis Council website:

http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules...n_on_the_brink

I've not yet had time to review it, perhaps later? Is it a coincidence Oxfam have also just published?

davidbfpo

[Rex Brynen]

The Senlis Council have just published a report on Afghanistan (I seem to recall some criticism of them on SWJ before).

On a quick read through, there's lots of interest in the report.

I'm very doubtful about one central recommendation, regarding the transfer of aid responsibilities to the military, however.

The report is, it must be said, a bit vague on what this would entail. Moreover, in the case of Canada, I do not think--whatever the weaknesses of CIDA--that DND have the capability to do it any better, and due to inexperience could even do it worse. In the case of the UK, DFID is perhaps the single most sophisticated conflict/post-conflict donor around, and again I'm not sure that the MoD could do a better job.

Part of the problem is that I've yet to see a single detailed account of what the problems have been in the aid effort in the south. Complaining (rightly so) that Afghans have yet to see adequate improvement in their living conditions doesn't tell you why that is (poor programme design or project selection, staff shortages, poor skill set, disbursement delays, coordination problems, local bottlenecks, limited counterpart capacities, corruption, political interference, and a host of other potential challenges). Addressing this properly requires that someone look in detail at why things haven't happened to the degree that we might hope.

If what is being proposed is a different sort of aid agency/military model, then that might work well. Again, it requires teasing out what is broken and how it might be fixed.