War Adjectives

[William F. Owen]

Completely missed this!

Yes, yes and yes!

Use the wrong word and you'll see the wrong problem.

Leaders should and, in fact must, listen to these researchers and academics but they must also consider the agendas of pundits who often have the loudest voices as they push their concepts and terminology. Rarely do any of these pundits call for a reduction and simplification of terminology, doctrine, and concepts. The “new ideas” they push are frequently recycled from past doctrine or accepted historical theories and simply repackaged – Counterinsurgency doctrine being a case in point.

This fellow Maxwell is now on my "Natalie Portman and Swarfega" list of good things - as I have constantly cautioned against the "agenda monkeys" and said we should get as simple as it is useful to get! Now I don't care who gets the credit for saying it, as long as it gets said.

I don't agree with all he says, but this is a major step forward. Bravo Maxwell!

[davidbfpo]

'The real challenge is how to harness these professionals and benefit from their knowledge and experience' (pg.4 first paragraph).

Col. Maxwell writes on the US experience, I have doubts - as an outsider - that the military tolerate and encourage what maybe seen as dissident thought. In wartime that should be different, looking at the UK in WW2 some of the developments required external political support, scientific discovery and removal of obstactles. Plus in-service realisation that old methods had failed.

Today the USA is at war, so dissident / new thought can be heard and listened to. I've not read much on the Iraqi campaign, unlike many here, but it appears to be a combination of factors that led to the changes. Interestingly we appear to see now in the Afghan policy sphere a re-think on the strategy and aims.

Hopefully Col. Maxwell's test will be passed. Now back to my armchair.

davidbfpo

[Ron Humphrey]

The one slight disagreement or probably better stated concern I had with it is the fact that a key component of what those outside "Think Tanks" bring to the party that that military can't or at least do to perception shouldn't.

The bully pulpit. Institutions in the civilian sector which focus on "thinking" about issues have the opportunity to bring diverse opinions to bare in the public forum not to mention the fact that they spend inordinate amounts of money sending their members to various areas in order to gather information and perspective.

Let's say that instead we stuck to uniformed thinkers doing the heavy lifting and developing strategies.

1- Where or how should they go about proselytizing what they've discerned. Won't be conferences sponsored by Think Tanks because remember we don't need them. So are we left with media appearances. If we do that how long before public perception is that their being propagandized vs informed.

I may have mis-read the paper but this was what occurred to me during my reading.

[George L. Singleton]

..to do out loud thinking, reasoning, and have information put out there for thoughtful consideration by others, worldwide, as now via computuers (e-mail),live radio and TV, yes you can have call in VOA radio and TV programs in critical areas of the world as well as in sophisticated, well educated parts of the world.

Civilians run VOA, and while technically government employees, can be about as "free" in stimulating discussion as Public Radio and Public TV.

*I used to dislike Public TV and radio coverage of US politics until I recognized that with the change of admnistration, for now at least, Pubic Radio and TV now bring on more conservative guests to counterbalance the new liberalism in power in DC. Public Radio & TV of course did the exact opposite when Pres. Bush was in office.

Converse or reverse psychology to assure all views are thought about is good, healthy in my view. What think you?

[Bill Moore]

While I agreed with many aspects of this article, I have strong reservations about what I perceived COL Maxwell's bottom line to be.

Making the current security environment even more complex has been the introduction and adoption of many new, often overlapping and even redundant concepts and terminology.

I'm in agreement with this, but I don't think the issue is always the "new" term. The Special Forces community can't agree to a definition on unconventional warfare, and I am not sure anyone can define conventional warfare well enough to clearly delineate the diference between the two. If we can't even reasonably agree on these "old' definitions are they really that useful? I agree we need to make it simple, but simple doesn't necessarily mean clinging to Cold War terminology just because it is familiar. Too many instances of pushing a square peg through a round hole.

[QUOTE]The argument is often made that the existing concepts are insufficient for today’s security environment and therefore new concepts are required, despite the fact that in the case of SFA and FID probably 95% of the concepts are the same. If these new concepts are required then why do all these traditional security activities still exist? No one has identified these concepts as obsolete and directed that they be stricken from the doctrine and lexicon.[/QUOTE]

In a classified forum I could go on endlessly where we have failed to achieve our objectives or desired effects with our current FID doctrine and SFA authorities and processes. During a recent discussion on our drug war strategy for a particular location, I asked the briefer for his assessment on our progress. The answer, as expected, was that it is getting much worse.
The same can be said about other security related problems that would fall under the realm of FID. We have been throwing money and so called "time tested" concepts at these problems for years, and often to no avail. I'm sure we would all agree whoever wins the terminology debate is less important than who wins the war/conflict. Why do we continue to do the same thing, even though we don't achieve our desired effects? We have similiar shortcomings around the globe and the common denominators to all these problems is our terminology (it shapes how we view and define the problem, and as WILF stated if you define the problem incorrectly you will come up with the wrong solution), doctrine, and current authorities (which IMHO is a fundamental reason we do not do FID effectively, thus the SECDEF's push for SFA to transform this process).

I'm confident that WILF and COL Maxwell will respond that it isn't the terminology or doctrine that created these problems, but the incorrect application of the existing doctrine. Maybe, but the recurring challenge is how do we prepare our military to win these irregular conflicts. War is war is not a helpful answer, doing more of the same is not helpful, something is broke and that implies we need to change to fix it.

In response to the excerpt I pasted above from COL Maxwell's great article is that I would argue that some of these older terms and concepts may be invalid, and we do them simply because it is they way we have always done business. It takes a dynamic leader to force change on the military, it always has.

This debate should center on how we get better at fighting war, specifically irregular warfare. I think all agree that IW is poorly defined, but regardless of what we call it we don't have a good track record for wrestling with this beast.

[Ken White]

The Special Forces community can't agree to a definition on unconventional warfare, and I am not sure anyone can define conventional warfare well enough to clearly delineate the diference between the two.

Not to be a smart ass but could that mean that war is indeed war? As for a difference between the two, is that really important? For discussion, I mean -- as for the conduct of either type, I think most folks know it when they see it and, depending on their training, knowledge and experience levels, adapt to do the best they can with the hand they been given. Not that such is any way to run a railroad...

We have been throwing money and so called "time tested" concepts at these problems for years, and often to no avail. I'm sure we would all agree whoever wins the terminology debate is less important than who wins the war/conflict. Why do we continue to do the same thing, even though we don't achieve our desired effects?

First, I submit our problem is that we have too much money and are too ready to throw it at any problem we see -- it usually is not the answer. Secondly, I'm unsure of which time tested concepts you speak but I am real sure that we have too often stuck our nose into someone else's business and that in my observation and experience, that habit raises two problems that merit consideration; most people in the world resent our interference and 'help.' Strongly. We do not do it at all well because the Armed Forces get to be the lead agents and, unfortunately, many people in the Armed Forces have an over developed "I am in charge. Here. Now." attitude that exacerbates the first condition. We're, as a group, too arrogant and ego centric and inclined to under rate our potential problem.

That is why I contend that those who say we, the Armed forces do it by default or it won't get done are missing the point -- while that's true, it's a default setting and that needs to be changed.

Maybe, but the recurring challenge is how do we prepare our military to win these irregular conflicts. War is war is not a helpful answer, doing more of the same is not helpful, something is broke and that implies we need to change to fix it.

I suggest that one is not going to 'win' an irregular conflict so that idea needs to banished from the lexicon. You can, sometimes but not always, achieve an acceptable outcome. I also suggest that 'win' mentality is what creates the problem you cited above -- why do we keep doing the same thing. We keep trying to do something that generally cannot be done. nobody wants to lose and a bunch of highly competitive folks certainly don't want to. Put those highly competitive types to a FID situation and they will try to win -- even if that's really not the goal.

Thus, I suggest the real issue is not how do we get better at fighting a war; we can do that and we adapt pretty well -- the issue is what wars we get into and what the goals are. If the goals are not achievable...

Or known...

It takes a dynamic leader to force change on the military, it always has.

True. I agree. How do you get a dynamic leader to the true upper levels given a system that is determined to weed out such leaders before they reach those upper echelons lest they damage the institution?

This debate should center on how we get better at fighting war, specifically irregular warfare. I think all agree that IW is poorly defined, but regardless of what we call it we don't have a good track record for wrestling with this beast.

See all the above. No, we don't. Nor is the prognosis good for improvement at this point. It may get better, we'll see -- but I suggest that the best thing for the US is to avoid interfering in the squabbles of other after its too late to address it by pre conflict methods.

We don't have a good track record for wrestling because we've tried to box against wrestlers, judokas and karatekas.

The problem is not that we can't do good stuff -- the problem is that we clumsily create problems and don't intervene until it's too late and the problems have become unbelievably complex and not totally conducive to a military solution.