The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

Nevertheless, I can assure you that modern Germans would not use these words for battles like the Marne battle, except ex ante.

I think it's ex-ante use if valid. The Battle of Marne stopped the Germans surrounding Paris, as they had in 1870 - in that sense it had decisive results.

In contrast, Verdun and the Somme were far less decisive - even though decision was sought.

I have always taken CvCs point to be that you should not seek battle unless you aim to do some serious damage to the enemy, and for that damage to contribute your setting forth of policy.

[M-A Lagrange]

Maybe it's been too many months that I read Clausewitz for the last time, but I'm sure that he wrote in German. So he wasn't using the word "decisive", and that eliminates my problems with the fuzzy definition.

The German words "Entscheidung" (decision) and ("entscheidend" (supposedly "decisive") may have evolved over 170 years, adding another potential problem.

Nevertheless, I can assure you that modern Germans would not use these words for battles like the Marne battle, except ex ante.
So despite I didn't read his book recently I'm quite confident that he wouldn't have called the battle of the Marne a Entscheidungsschlacht (ex post) - except maybe ex ante (then still only being potentially entscheidend).

The same applies to the Tannenberg battle (Eastern Prussia 1914), of course.

Well, my german is little old as is my reading of CvC. And to had some complexity, I did read it in French not in English neither in German.
But my point was more that you cannot blame anyone for not having a/the decisive battle (as it goes with the comon understanding).
My example of Marne was more that what was a desperate move became a tactical victory with strategic unseen consequences. They used cars to transport troops for nearly the first time. And beat the germans in speed to rally troops. There was no plan no vision, nothing more. Let be franc. Marne is good luck.

The only decisive battle (entering in that definition of THE battle that CHANGES everything) I ever see is Stalingrad. There it is clear that it has been a strategical turn point of the whole affair. But once again, you start with a defeat and the desperate resistance of forces that have the only option of die or win.

CvC is the western guy who pointed very simple things that apply to almost every level in analysing, preparing, conducting war. The only one I see before is Sun Tzu. Makes few centuries difference. Being upset that this man is influencing all western reflection on war is misplaced. The real question to explain what happened to US since Corea is may be else where. And concerning Iraq and Afghanistan, it is certainly not in saying CvC is overused and let kill everybody that you will come with a smart answer to the question: where did it all go wrong?
In addition the whole idea of "humiliating" the ennemy... Well that is exactly why iraky and afghany are much upsed. Not talking about the whole arab world. So may be humiliating people is just good for training during classes. After, when you start to invade and geopardise the life of millions of people, may be it is not a such good idea. Let look at the issue in a smart way or at least a different way.

[Firn]

CvC is the western guy who pointed very simple things that apply to almost every level in analysing, preparing, conducting war. The only one I see before is Sun Tzu. Makes few centuries difference. Being upset that this man is influencing all western reflection on war is misplaced. The real question to explain what happened to US since Corea is may be else where. And concerning Iraq and Afghanistan, it is certainly not in saying CvC is overused and let kill everybody that you will come with a smart answer to the question: where did it all go wrong?

In addition the whole idea of "humiliating" the ennemy... Well that is exactly why iraky and afghany are much upsed. Not talking about the whole arab world. So may be humiliating people is just good for training during classes. After, when you start to invade and geopardise the life of millions of people, may be it is not a such good idea. Let look at the issue in a smart way or at least a different way.

Note the discussion in this topic.

IMHO one of the most important contribuitions of CvC is the exposure of the ambiguous nature of war. It can be seen and used as an instrument of the political forces but the unpredictable course of it can exert greatest influence on the same political forces and much more. In this sense the sheer presence of foreign troops on native soil can be reason enough to fight them. The troops, good instruments in the hand of a selfviewed good force are thus a big part of the problem by their simple existence. It might be a stupid emotional response, but it can be a very strong one, especially if reinforced by a radical system of beliefs.

This reminds me a bit on the words of a famous mountaineer. IIRC he was asked why so many humans try to climb the highest peaks despite the grave risks. His laconic answer? Because they are.


Firn

[Tukhachevskii]

The only decisive battle (entering in that definition of THE battle that CHANGES everything) I ever see is Stalingrad. There it is clear that it has been a strategical turn point of the whole affair.

This interests me personally, which is not to say that the thread sent me to sleep, but purely because I remember having a discussion about the ost front at Uni where we had to think Clausewiztically (!). Was Stalingrad really a decisive battle? and by what critieria? Calling it the strategic turning point of the whole affair (?) confuses me somewhat. Do we mean by the whole affair Operation Blau (the offensive into the Causcaus to cut off Stalin's fuel lines of communication) or do we mean by the whole affair the entire eastern front campaign or even World War II in toto? Apologies if this query is idiotic (I am after all a lowly civilian) but at Uni I personally fought (verbally of course) for Operation Typhoon being the decisive battle (for the Soviets) in that it prevented the Werhmacht from achieving its primary strategic objective for the winter (i.e., Moscow), bought the Soviet side a respite in which to reinforce and soldify its defences and reorganise the armed forces. In other words, why not Kursk? Why not D-DAY which prevented the Wehrmacht from concentrating on the east and fight the dreaded two front war (three including Italy)?

[Firn]

Well this is of course a difficult question.

Starting the war hoping to bring the rotten building of communism down with one mighty kick was of couse a major factor in the whole campaign. There were a great deal of other factors for the specific start for the specific campaign, real, immagined or perceived ones which ranged from territory to ressources and the fear of the Red threat. But I would not call the decision to start the war or the whole campaign the decisive battle, at least not when you closely follow CvC. In this regard he is more stringent.

If we are inclined to speculation we could include Dunkirk in the list of potential decisive battles. With so many british POW in German hands after such a crushing victory a diplomatic solution in the West might have been achievable. In the end every battle you listed brings us into the realm of speculation because every other outcome brings great uncertainty.


Firn

[Elric]

Here's some more details from his lecture that were missing from the OP:

1) Rationale is that the "warrior" caste has to be humbled in the eyes of its people as being unable to protect them. If the people don't perceive military capitulation insurgency will continue.

What of the mass bombings of English and German cities in WWII?

3) Centers of Gravity don't exist. Only CoG that matters is perception of the populace that submits. External actors rarely can change internal cultures much, only pacify (see US South for 120 or so years after Civil War, etc.)

CoGs do not exist, yet the perception is a CoG... Been laying off the coffee again? Perception is reality, no matter the ground truth. Where the US falls down is monitoring and responding to the word on the street. Search for "Baghdad Mosquito" for an interesting approach to it. Dedicated HUMIT would be preferred, but who has enough teams in sector to do it

[Elric]

1) Rationale is that the "warrior" caste has to be humbled in the eyes of its people as being unable to protect them. If the people don't perceive military capitulation insurgency will continue.

What of the mass bombings of English and German cities in WWII?


Is it so much military capitulation as the ability of the population to decide that the cause is not worth the effort? Its a mix of the "warrior caste" with the security apparatus. Think of the STASI and the East German Army. Without the threat of bayonets, the STASI didn't have anywhere the menace that they used to.

[slapout9]

A Parameters article from 1994 by SWC Steve Metz on CvC's funeral.


http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/P...say%20metz.pdf

[slapout9]

Apologize I couldn't sketch the arguments in more detail. The presentation lasted an hour and I wasn't taking notes as I was processing what was being said. Some of it may or may not be in his forthcoming book.

I don't think the author is insincere or anyhow prejudiced, he sincerely believes the influence of CvC and the way it was implemented has reduced the effectiveness of the US Army. I am not enough of a CvC/Jomini student yet to really rule on what CvC meant or didn't mean and whether he adequately accounts for CvC's "intent".

My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.

Niel

Cavguy do you have any class handouts or anything you can post from the class with references? I can't remember where I read it but doing WW2 there were supposedly calculations that we had to be prepared to inflict between 25% to 50% total causalities on Japan in order to get a total surrender, if that is correct the statistic may some merit to it. This is very CvC since he said the main aim is to DISARM the enemy.....if the enemy want wear unifroms but has guns and you intend to disarm them then you will have to kill a lot of so called civilians.

[Cavguy]

Cavguy do you have any class handouts or anything you can post from the class with references? I can't remember where I read it but doing WW2 there were supposedly calculations that we had to be prepared to inflict between 25% to 50% total causalities on Japan in order to get a total surrender, if that is correct the statistic may some merit to it. This is very CvC since he said the main aim is to DISARM the enemy.....if the enemy want wear unifroms but has guns and you intend to disarm them then you will have to kill a lot of so called civilians.

Book is available now, with three positive reviews on Amazon ...

http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Del...8168045&sr=8-1

[William F. Owen]

In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.

Well I'll certainly buy the book, but what is written above is pure garbage.

a.) The US did not "settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz." after Vietnam. CvC wrote about WAR, very little on "WARFARE."

b.) War is very distinct from Warfare. The "Clausewitz Delusion" is almost certainly a product of not having understood Clausewitz. - that's the problem that has afflicted 99% of his critics.

c.) To attribute the US being poor at Warfare to CvC is an argument almost impossible to make, but I'll wait and see.

[Firn]

Cavguy do you have any class handouts or anything you can post from the class with references? I can't remember where I read it but doing WW2 there were supposedly calculations that we had to be prepared to inflict between 25% to 50% total causalities on Japan in order to get a total surrender, if that is correct the statistic may some merit to it. This is very CvC since he said the main aim is to DISARM the enemy.....if the enemy want wear unifroms but has guns and you intend to disarm them then you will have to kill a lot of so called civilians.

Well if we look at both WWI and WWII we see that the death of civilians both can or might not play an important part in the surrender of the enemy. In WWI we had huge internal unrest in all four continental empires - war doesn't stop the political processes, far from it. To a bigger and a smaller degree they decided in concert with other factors the war. Civilian casualities caused by the enemy direct actions were rather small, certainly under 1% for the central empires. However the revolutions and unrests sparked a very bloody civil war in Russia and was followed by the Armenian Genocide.

But the Central Powers asked for peace because they knew that given the increasing inbalance of ressources in the mid or long term their military power would not be sufficient to avoid the destruction of their ability to defend themselves.

In WWII the Sovietunion lost over the duration of the war almost 10% of their civilian population but refused to give up. Given the huge ressources the ability to wage war was intact at every point and was even increasing. Nazi Germany refused to give up until the leader of the regime which held the society in an iron grip shot himself, even if most of the territory was overun, the cities bombed into ruins and the military situation was already hopeless two years earlier. The civilian casualities were great but even percentage wise far smaller than the Soviet ones. France even capitulated with comparable tiny civilian casualities, as did Poland.

So we can see that things depend on huge amount of factors and are impossible to predict. Frankly if the author argues with so high and fixed percentages than he seems to be very naive or not honest. Now I'm almost ready to buy the book the get proven otherwise.


Firn

[slapout9]

Now I'm almost ready to buy the book the get proven otherwise.


Firn

Probably the best answer

[Steve Blair]

It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War

This statement alone almost made me spew coffee through my nose. I wasn't aware that "making it up as we go" qualified as a method of offensive war.

[Tom Odom]

This statement alone almost made me spew coffee through my nose. I wasn't aware that "making it up as we go" qualified as a method of offensive war.

Sure...it's called extemporaneous warfare

it's built on the assumption that if you are guessing what to do next, so is the enemy

kinda like Alfred E. Neumann meets Carl von C...

[John]

Have to disagree--Clausewitz' trinity is the government/leadership, the military, and the people. In an insurgency, the Clausewitzian trinity collapses--the people become the military, or at least a subset of the people do. In conducting counter-insurgency, the leadership of the state tries to impose its will on the people (or, again, a subset of them) by means of the military. This sets the whole trinitarian construct on its head, I think. In the normal way of Clausewitzian war, I submit the leadership uses the military as a means of executing the will of the people. It may be the case that leadership may need to take extra measures to garner the support of the people for military action, but I do not think that suppression of the will of one's own people by military means is really part of the continuation of politics by other means.

WM. Interesting, thought provoking comments. However, I would question the Taliban's technique of suppressing the will of the people as, in fact, an end to a political means....arguably a religious end. I agree with your ideas of the trinity, and contend they need to be tweeked for insurgent context. Obviously religious objectives create ambiguity.

[IntelTrooper]

WM. Interesting, thought provoking comments. However, I would question the Taliban's technique of suppressing the will of the people as, in fact, an end to a political means....arguably a religious end. I agree with your ideas of the trinity, and contend they need to be tweeked for insurgent context. Obviously religious objectives create ambiguity.

I would say that on the macro level, religious motivations are indistinguishable from political ones.

[Fuchs]

Yes, knowing Bill Lind, I can attest he has read Clausewitz, yet he and I have very different understandings of what CvC wrote. 4GW flows from Van Creveld's "non-trinitarian War" thinking - so I find it hard to see how a 4GW thinker would regard Clausewitz in a good light.
Why, if you had deep understanding, or think highly of CvC would you construct 4GW? CvC deals with almost every aspect of the relevant arguments. If someone wants to tell me, that 4GW is "CvC for dummies" I'll think again.

CvC is a pool for interpretations, almost as inexhaustible as Master Tzu.
That adds considerably to a problem: The translation.


I am a German and still not sure that I can understand Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz's language because words and phrases can change their meaning and emphasis over the course of almost two centuries.

It's even worse; a German text is normally expected to be usually 25% longer than an English text of the same content. My translations of German to English are the opposite; about 25% longer English than German because it's very difficult to meet the meaning exactly and to eliminate the potential for misunderstandings. This can go up to +40% for short texts. (And even then I do only THINK, not KNOW that I wrote a good translation.)

Conclusion:
Everyone who reads "Vom Kriege" in English, French or whatever-is-not-German should not assume that he could potentially understand him through that translation by more than about 90%.

It's probably more close to 30-40% for Master Tzu's treatise on military affairs.

[William F. Owen]

CvC is a pool for interpretations, almost as inexhaustible as Master Tzu.
That adds considerably to a problem: The translation.

The translation is an issue if you take certain phrases or words in isolation. I submit it becomes far less of an issue when you consider the totality of the arguments he puts forth, and the remain coherent and valid when subject to scrutiny - see the works of HR Smith and Bridget Hauser for example.

[Bob's World]

Sadly the only possible explanation is that he never read Clausewitz, or of he did failed to understand it. The 4GW guys have never read Clausewitz either.

Almost 99% of Clausewitz critics have simply never read him, or tried to understand what he says, in an overall context. Thus they takes quotes out of context.

Sadly, 99% of Clausewitz proponents have simply never read him either.

Its just so damn hard to muddle ones way through his ramblings, and also to sort out what is an early thought on a topic, and what is his final assessment.

Is there any good, highly abridged with insightful commentary (both pro and con) version of CvC? Such a product would go a long way to clearing the air, and be far more helpful than tossing a 5 lb tome to a LT and asking him to read and understand what it ultimately means.