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Thread: Who are the great generals?

  1. #141
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Custer was not overly popular with his troops, either. The 7th had one of the highest desertion rates when he was the field commander, and he faced charges at least twice for excessive discipline (and that took some doing in the Old Army). And as for the twaddle about it being the best regiment on the Frontier....the less said the better about that one.

    Custer's tactics at the Little Big Horn were the same tactics he'd always used on the Frontier. He divided his command at the Wa####a in '68 and ended up with an element cut off and destroyed (Elliott's detachment...granted there are some questions about Elliott's competence, but there is little real debate that this incident did a great deal to solidify the cliques within the 7th's officer corps...and they were among the worst in the Frontier Army). For all his romanticized scribbling about the Indians, I don't think Custer ever really understood the reality of war on the Frontier.

    And in an unrelated aside...when you're looking at the tactics of Custer's detachment I don't think you're looking at Custer's tactics. I tend to believe that Custer was either killed or incapacitated very early in the battle (he always led from the front and his first instinct was to charge). His brother would have carried him (dead or alive) to the "last stand" sight, and the Indians weren't even aware that they were fighting Custer until after the fact. His command was really quite "green," and the loss of their commander would go far toward explaining why his detachment "came apart" like it did. Clearly the Sioux and Cheyenne played a major role in that (don't get me wrong), but the assumption that Custer "fought until the very end" has always struck me as much more white man's myth than plausible reality.
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  2. #142
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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    I myself am not a big believer in the glory of last stands.
    You will never get an argument from me on that point! Remember the words of George Patton: let the other guy die. Enough human mistakes in judgment were made that day-- and the days before-- to negate the finest tactics of God.

    Steve--

    I agree with you on a couple of points: your first paragraph is absolutely correct and you are generally correct about Custer's tactics on the frontier. Division of force was an acceptable doctrine because of the way the Indians fought. Custer's understanding of the Indians led him to employ those tactics more than once. His rigidity in the employment of those tactics and that supposed understanding-- his refusal to accept any other behavior or pattern-- were his downfall.

    I do not agree with you, however, about his early demise or his brother carrying the body hither and yon. That particular scenario has brought more consternation to the study of the battle than almost any other and does not fit with either the troop dispositions or the timing involved in the battle. It also leads to-- and this is not a criticism of your ideas, so please, don't take it the wrong way-- something of a denigration of the abilities of Custer's officers, namely Keogh, Yates, Smith, and Custer's own brother.

    Also, in my estimation, the idea that the command was "green," has been overplayed. While I completely agree with you about the regiment's reputation, the unit was staffed with many fine officers and NCOs and the command that crossed the Rosebud-Little Big Horn divide on June 25, 1876, had precisely 9 men with less than 6 months service, none of whom rode with the two battalions wiped out with Custer. 51.7% of the Seventh Cavalry had between 1 and 5 years service and 30.1% more than 5 years. More than 1/3 of the men left behind at a supply depot had less than 6 months service, so in that regard, you are correct. Those men, however, never saw battle.

    The "myth" of "last stands" tends to swing into hyperbole and I believe the "They Died With Their Boots On" last stands are fiction. While this might smack our army in the face, I think there was probably more panic than "glory" as the day wore on.

    Best wishes,
    Fred.
    Last edited by Fred III; 10-11-2007 at 01:20 PM.

  3. #143
    Council Member Culpeper's Avatar
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    I was only speaking for Custer. The Battle of Little Big Horn was not a Last Stand. It was a rout for Custer and his men.
    "But suppose everybody on our side felt that way?"
    "Then I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way. Wouldn't I?"


  4. #144
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Culpeper View Post
    I was only speaking for Custer. The Battle of Little Big Horn was not a Last Stand. It was a rout for Custer and his men.
    Culpeper - Apologies if my post looked like a slam on you - it was not meant as such, as I think you meant that sentiment for Custer himself. I only intended to add that many troopers died quite unnecessary deaths because of his failings. IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.
    That is about as correct as anyone could possibly state it.

    Best wishes,
    Fred.

  6. #146
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Absolutely!

    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    ... IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.
    Mostly unforgivable incompetence...

  7. #147
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Remember what?

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post

    Originally Posted by tequila
    ... IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.
    Mostly unforgivable incompetence...
    Here is another one--and as a native Texan I will have to remain in hiding in the swamps of Acadia--William Barrett Travis and his decision to "hold" the Alamo.

    best

    Tom
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  8. #148
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.
    It is even better if you have a successful defense at Rorke's Drift to hold up as cover for your Isandlwana; have a Baden-Powell holding out in the "seige" of Mafeking to offset your Buller at Colenso; have, as with Gordon at Khartoum, some "infidel" Fuzzy Wuzzies to blame for your "fair-haired boy" leader's failure to face facts and get himself decapitated; or, as with Elphinstone at Kabul, some duplicitous Afghans who break their word after your command's very poor choice of garrison locations causes you dismay (being able to point to a well-organized withdrawal to Jellalabad by another commander like Sale also helped in this last case). Sorry to focus on British examples, but they have had many more small war disasters to cover over than America has.

    Information ops are pretty pervasive and not just for winning the hearts and minds of your opponents or those who you are trying to stabilize and support.

    I suspect that many of history's "great" generals are so simply because of a good PR campaign by someone with a vested interest.

  9. #149
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Tequila,

    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.
    Agreed totally on the Custer scenario. On Tom's Alamo analog, I'm not as sure, and on something such as Leonidas I would totally disagree. All had roughly the same immediate outcome, but fairly different long term effects and (possibly) motivations. It strikes me that in some (by no means all!) instances, the annihilation of an entire unit can have effects totally out of proportion to the combat; Thermopylae being the classic example.

    I certainly agree that romanticizing a blunder, and the idiot who made it happen, is a critical mistake, but I have to wonder if it isn't a fairly "normal" reaction to any such type of a loss?
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  10. #150
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    Hi Tequila,
    Agreed totally on the Custer scenario. On Tom's Alamo analog, I'm not as sure, and on something such as Leonidas I would totally disagree. All had roughly the same immediate outcome, but fairly different long term effects and (possibly) motivations. It strikes me that in some (by no means all!) instances, the annihilation of an entire unit can have effects totally out of proportion to the combat; Thermopylae being the classic example.

    I certainly agree that romanticizing a blunder, and the idiot who made it happen, is a critical mistake, but I have to wonder if it isn't a fairly "normal" reaction to any such type of a loss?
    Thermopylae is so far back in history and so shrouded in mythmaking that we have little real data to go on. Certainly it made no difference strategically - the Persians avenged the burning of Sardis when they occupied and burned Athens, saw their supply line sink at Salamis (the critical battle), and then withdrew their main force which could not have remained deployed in Greece proper for long anyway. The rearguard meant to create a Persian-friendly permanent base in the north beat a retreat to friendlier ground that turned into a rout when their native allies turned on them (see Elphinstone) and the local tribes united and caught up to them at Plataea.

    Thermopylae ranks as an outstanding information operation in that it held enormous propaganda value, especially for Sparta in maintaining its place at the head of the anti-Persian alliance in the face of a determined Athenian challenge.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fred III View Post
    There were a number of German WWII officers who have merely been lost to history who may deserve a higher place (you have already brought up the names of several: v. Manstein, who I consider the most brilliant general of the 20th century; Rommel, an exceptionally dynamic man; and 1 or 2 others), among them men like Gerd v. Rundstedt; Erich Marcks; Walther Model; Hans Guenther v. Kluge; Hans Valentin Hube; Hermann Geyer; and Erich Brandenberger.

    WWI produced some of the finest tacticians of the past 150 years, men like Fritz v. Lossberg (who may not have risen above colonel) and Wilhelm Balck. I also believe Erich v. Ludendorff should be considered in any list of "great." Obviously some of these men were specialists and may not fit the overall parameters, but they were all formidable in their own right.

    As for Americans, I hold a very strong belief that the finest of our generals-- post-WWII-- was William E. DePuy, and to me no list of 20th-century American soldiers is complete without him.
    Very much agreed Fred, on both the Germans and General DePuy. DePuy's papers should be recommended reading at all army staff colleges (I don't know if they are at CGSC, but I would expect that they are).

  12. #152
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Teqila,

    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    Thermopylae is so far back in history and so shrouded in mythmaking that we have little real data to go on.....

    Thermopylae ranks as an outstanding information operation in that it held enormous propaganda value, especially for Sparta in maintaining its place at the head of the anti-Persian alliance in the face of a determined Athenian challenge.
    Agreed, but hat was the point I was trying to make: you can construct a "loss" as a major symbol for motivation. There are a number of others that I could have chosen, but Thermopylae is rather outstanding (Pearl Harbour would work as well).
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
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  13. #153
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    Hi Teqila,



    Agreed, but hat was the point I was trying to make: you can construct a "loss" as a major symbol for motivation. There are a number of others that I could have chosen, but Thermopylae is rather outstanding (Pearl Harbour would work as well).
    Except I would argue that Thermopylae's principal value was as IO for Sparta in intra-Greek politics, rather than as a sort of rallying cry against Persia --- the anti-Persian alliance was already largely committed to the struggle, and Salamis proved to be a mostly Athenian affair anyways, mooting the necessity of allied Greek motivation in ultimate victory.

  14. #154
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    you can construct a "loss" as a major symbol for motivation. There are a number of others that I could have chosen, but Thermopylae is rather outstanding (Pearl Harbour would work as well).
    MarcT,
    I suspect that this really only works when you end up being the big winner.
    Some examples: Thermopylae--Greeks won in the end
    Alamo--Texans finished as winners after San Jacinto
    Pearl Harbor, Bataan/Corregidor, Kasserine Pass, Little Big
    Horn, 1st and 2nd Manasas--US ended up winning the
    whole shooting match every time.
    Crimean War and Charge of the Light Brigade--Brits
    victorious
    Consider the other side: French in Russia, 1812--big disaster, big final loss.
    Germans at Verdun in WWI
    Russians in every battle in the Russo-Japanese War.
    And then there are some where the final outcome is neither a clear cut victory nor defeat and we get mixed reviews about individual actions within them--like Task Force Smith or Frozen Chosin in Korea.

  15. #155
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Norfolk View Post
    Very much agreed Fred, on both the Germans and General DePuy. DePuy's papers should be recommended reading at all army staff colleges (I don't know if they are at CGSC, but I would expect that they are).
    Good LP on Depuy here and another good work here as well as his papers here.

    Best

    Tom

  16. #156
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi WM,

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    MarcT,
    I suspect that this really only works when you end up being the big winner.
    Hmmm, could well be. Off the top of my head, I can only think of two (possibly) counter examples: Masada and Wounded Knee. Then again, it could be argued that both of them were "re-constructed" as part of revitalization movements.

    Marc
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    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
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  17. #157
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    Default Travis vs. Santa Anna

    I think Santa Anna decision was the much bigger mistake and it wound up costing him the war, since the Texas Army under Sam Houston was able to get into a position to ultimately defeat him while he was pummeling a fortress he could have easily by passed. Patton would not have made that mistake. Travis' effort bought time that Santa Anna could not afford.

  18. #158
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    Default Thanks!

    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    Good LP on Depuy here and another good work here as well as his papers here.

    Best

    Tom
    Thanks Tom. I've got all three of them already, and I practically burn the print off the pages so to speak. I also have the article you co-authored "Transformation: Victory Rests With Small Units", and I posted a link to it a few months ago on another board (I hope that's all right with you!). Between those and an article posted in the Infantry journal about ten years ago (I recently found it again on Free Republic) written by a Canadian officer in Rwanda who witnessed a Tutsi 3-team squad attack on a Hutu squad of the same size, my understanding of infantry tactics has been completely transformed.

    General DePuy should not have been largely forgotten, or even ignored, outside of the US. The greatest Combined-Arms thinker of the last generation at least IMO. Funny, it seems the USMC has taken DePuy's teachings on infantry (especially PARFOX) closer to heart than the US Army.

  19. #159
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Between those and an article posted in the Infantry journal about ten years ago (I recently found it again on Free Republic) written by a Canadian officer in Rwanda who witnessed a Tutsi 3-team squad attack on a Hutu squad of the same size, my understanding of infantry tactics has been completely transformed.
    Hey send me that! Or post a link. Good stuff on RPA tactics is hard to find. It should not surprise anyone on here that it is often quite difficult to break through sterotypes of military incompetence (which are appropriate in many cases) when exceptions like the RPA emerge. I can only say as I did in my book that when Stan and I first crossed into Rwanda from Zaire and ran into RPA checkpoints, the differences with the FAZ were startling in a refreshing way.

    Best

    Tom

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    Quote Originally Posted by Norfolk View Post
    General DePuy should not have been largely forgotten, or even ignored, outside of the US. The greatest Combined-Arms thinker of the last generation at least IMO. Funny, it seems the USMC has taken DePuy's teachings on infantry (especially PARFOX) closer to heart than the US Army.
    On a personal note, I am delighted to see your reply. I was a bit taken aback by not having seen his name mentioned earlier; rather surprised. One of the great satisfactions of my life will always be the fact I had the good fortune to serve under him, not once, but twice. The first time as a brand-spanking new infantry 2LT when he was the CO of the 1/30 BG in Germany and he stopped an entire excercise to show me the proper way to assault an enemy position-- his way (... and quite different from what I had just been taught at Fort Benning!!!). The second time was when he placed me in charge of a company in Vietnam. When he was the CG of the 1st Infantry Division, the whole atmosphere was like a re-union. It seemed every officer and senior NCO I ran into there, I had served with in the 30th, from George Joulwan down to squad leaders.

    God!, he was a hell-bringer!

    Best wishes and thanks for the agreement,
    Fred.

    PS-- Tom Odom: if you have not read his work, you are in for some enjoyment when you do. I read the stuff even today, and his small unit movements and formations worked brilliantly. I do not know what's taught today at Benning, but if DePuy's stuff is not, that is a big mistake to me.
    FCW
    Last edited by Fred III; 10-11-2007 at 05:42 PM.

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