Re-structuring the BCT

[Fuchs]

OK, then a bit German MilHistory here.

The German army had several military motor sports events (air forces had them as well) during the 30's. One of these events happened in 1938; expert drivers (often test drivers from the factories) were driving very agile, light (300 ccm) motorcycles and triumphed.
The army bought such light motorcycles and heavier ones (500ccm) - the heavier ones were necessary for sidecars anyway. The picture looked rosy in peacetime.

The war in Poland happened and motorcycles proved to be OK. The war in France happened (a few weeks longer, but better roads) and again motorcycles were OK.

Then came Barbarossa, and within a few months the motorcycle inventory crashed (as did the inventory of captured civilian trucks from France and almost all Czech design trucks). The light models were completely unsuitable and many models (even 500ccm) were simply not durable enough.
750ccm motorcycles arrived, but their price was comparable to a Type 82 Kübelwagen (lighter jeep equivalent), so their inefficiency was obvious. Some types of 500ccm and the later 750ccm motorcycles proved to be irreplacable in the war for couriers, but their other roles were diminished.

Then came the 50's Bundeswehr, and the first motorcycles bought were very, very light ones; nobody expected a long WW3 (at least not for Germans) and we (Westerners) also expected to fight in Central Europe with its fine road network.

The enduro type appeared, and some medium enduros were introduced during the Cold War (and a newer model after the CW) - the power output had to be reduced in order to make the engines more durable (typical with post-WW2 military motorcycles).

The increasing confidence in radios (and satcom) and increasing personnel budget pressures have even led to a 80% reduction in motorcycle strength in the Bundeswehr.


Could motorcycles be used as specialty vehicles, just in case? Maybe. I guess it doesn't happen because of their many limitations.


Motorcycles have a moderate efficiency as transportation vehicle.
Vyou cannot leave one man behind who could move transport vehicles for 10 men into safety if necessary - unlike with a truck.
They're loud.
They don't stand a good annual training rate (and mistreatment by drivers who do not own the bike) well.
Very few of them can drink diesel or JP8.
The chains require maintenance and oil and do not tolerate mud and dust well. Cardan shaft models have often gearbox durability issues.
Some roads eat up motorcycle tyres as if they were designed for this purpose (Belgian highways can ruin a motorcycle tyre in 200 km!).
There's no way how motorcycle troops could transport spare wheels without sidecars (~ATV then) and run flats don't work properly on a motorcycle.
Motorcycle tyres are never compatible with car or truck tyres (even ATVs use different ones).
Motorcycles exhaust their drivers in off-road driving quite quickly, especially the heavy ones (and everything beyond 400ccm is quite heavy).
Motorcycles have almost always inferior road ranges in comparison to cars.
Motorcycles do not offer protection against adverse weather.
All-wheel drive is very rare among motorcycles (practical examples appeared only a few ears ago; only up to 17% of power on front wheel) despite being able to reduce the skill requirements for the driver very much.
You need a helmet which provides good crash protection for riding a motorcycle, especially if you're a bit tired (as soldiers are quite often in wartime). There are few motorbike helmet designs which double as ballistic protection.
...
(There are more problems, but I'm too tired at this time.)

[SJPONeill]

OK...you could have just said that you know nothing about the topic and left that space for perhaps someone who does...have you ever ridden a motorcycle in a military context? From that diatribe, unlikely and even then you still didn't get the question...I have a good handle of general use of military motorcycles from my own experiences, frozen extremities, missing skin, bruised muscles -...never managed to break a bone though but not through lack of trying...I asked a question about a specific use of military motorbikes...

[TAH]

Armored (Heavy), Infantry (Light) and Airborne Infantry (Light) Bdes need a Cav Sqn plus a third maneuver Bn. What's also needed are true Armored Cavalry Regiments (NOT Stryker units).

If we're going to have a total of an arbitrary (on affordability grounds) 60 Bdes, AC/RC, the IMO we should aim for:

10/20 Armored or Heavy
10/5 Infantry or Light
5/5 ACR
5/0 Abn Inf (aka Light)

The design of the Bns that comprise those Brigades is largely totally immaterial as long as they are anywhere near current or historic US norms and allow Commanders to rapidly tailor AND constantly adjust their force for METT-TC parameters *. Forcing them to do so would be even better until we improve our training...

If we temporarily have more Bdes, plus up the Infantry and ACRs only on a 1/1 ratio. For the Stryker fans, three to five of the Armored or Heavy Bdes could be Strykerized if one insists. While the stryker has merit, it is not adequately survivable of maneuverable for MCO. The 'medium ' role should be filled by the TRACK vehicle mounted ACRs, one of the best economy of force designs yet to appear. I'd personally go for more ACRs but the Inf / Armor communities would then squabble.

The Cav Sqn and ACR -- particularly the 1945-70 variants were the only organizations that offered true combined arms training to all members and young Cav LTs were versatile and flexible Dudes who could and would delegate...

For those who say Airborne units are unnecessary and obsolete, I totally agree BUT we have not developed, deliberately or inadvertently, the capability of otherwise moving and inserting a Bn or larger sized force 10,000 or so miles and getting it on the ground, a useful strategic capability. Until we do, that capability is better maintained than discarded. I'm aware of the traffic bump jokes. I'm equally aware of the damage LGOP (LINK) can wreak on Armor. The last three lines of the Rules are particularly to be noted. With perhaps emphasis on lines 5 and 8...

A better mix AC to RC is 36 AC to 20 RC support their respective deployment cycles of 1 by 3 for AC and 1 by 5 for RC.

HBCT 12 AC 5 RC
IBCT 12 AC 10 RC
SCR 6 AC 5 RC
IBCT (ABN) 6 AC 0 RC


A re-org'ed SBCT could become a Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR) of three squadron.

Each Squadron has:
three Stryker Cav Troops converted from Stryker Infantry Companies
2 platoons of 6 RVs + 2 platoons of 3 MGS + 2 120mm SP Mortars
one Stryker Infantry Company (Stryker Dragoon Troop)
one Heavy Troop (Tank Company of 10-14 tanks)

Provides scouts in lightly armed/armored platforms (RVs) supported by light armor (MGS) backed-up with infantry (Dagoons) and tanks (heavy troop).

Still lacks right amount of Arty and any aviation. Still working the math on those

Three companies of 30-42 tanks will require 135 to 195 additional soldiers per SCR, might be able to get some from a re-org'ed Support Squadron.

Using Strykers as the base vehicle reduces the SCT over-all weight and support footprints. Fewer fuel trucks, fewer mechanics, fewer/lighter parts etc.

I'm not emotional about the whole wheel versus track thing but would be interested in swapping some/all of the Stryker RVs with Canadian Coyotes or Aussie ASLAVs with 25mm with thermal but no ATGM (guys in the back are carrying Javalins).

[SJPONeill]

I'm not emotional about the whole wheel versus track thing but would be interested in swapping some/all of the Stryker RVs with Canadian Coyotes or Aussie ASLAVs with 25mm with thermal but no ATGM (guys in the back are carrying Javalins).

Might be better off going for LAVIII over ASLAV as its chassis is essentially the same as Stryker so you have better commonality of parts, training, maintenance etc...ASLAV is based on the smaller LAV-25 but is amphibious if that was a useful addition to organic capability...

[Ken White]

A better mix AC to RC is 36 AC to 20 RC support their respective deployment cycles of 1 by 3 for AC and 1 by 5 for RC.

HBCT 12 AC 5 RC
IBCT 12 AC 10 RC
SCR 6 AC 5 RC
IBCT (ABN) 6 AC 0 RC

Don't agree with designing a total force for what is now occurring and may not be in two to five years -- it'll take six to eight years to get ANY major reorganization embedded in both components. I also think the USAR should still have combat units but that's another thread. I also think the strategic reserve (small 'r') should be at least the size of the AC. Design a force base on 15 to20 years out, not today. It takes that long, in peacetime, to get the force up and operational.

A re-org'ed SBCT could become a Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR) of three squadron...

You can do that; someone probably will -- after all, some squirrel wanted to put Strykers on Oahu.

Part of the 'rationale' for that was that they would be good in the jungle. Obviously, that person hadn't spent much time in anyone's jungle...

Provides scouts in lightly armed/armored platforms (RVs) supported by light armor (MGS) backed-up with infantry (Dagoons) and tanks (heavy troop).

The Stryker will be with us for a while but it was IMO a poor purchase decision. It is not terribly mobile (12.50x20 tires???) and is inadequate for heavy combat. It's okay if you cannot afford something better -- we can.

I do agree with Scouts being lightly armed and armor for them is okay provided is does not constrain vehicle mobility and agility. The old 1/4 ton was a good Scout vehicle, you could get it most anywhere and it wasn't armored so it kept the Scouts honest, they didn't take dumb chances 'cause they were Armored (HMMWV is too big).

Using Strykers as the base vehicle reduces the SCT over-all weight and support footprints. Fewer fuel trucks, fewer mechanics, fewer/lighter parts etc.

Brings to mind the old quote "You get what you pay for..." And you always pay, one way or another.

I'm not emotional about the whole wheel versus track thing but would be interested in swapping some/all of the Stryker RVs with Canadian Coyotes or Aussie ASLAVs with 25mm with thermal but no ATGM (guys in the back are carrying Javalins).

I get emotional about it because I don't want to see people killed unnecessarily. Wheeled Armored Vehicles are either immobile (MRAPS) or easy targets (Strykers, Armored HMMWVs and such). Agility saves lives, armor can also do that but it takes tracks to move it in combat.

I'm not a 25mm fan, nor of ATGM mounted on lightly armored vehicles (I include the Bradley in that); it tends to make people think they have a light tank and often to act accordingly. The .50 Cal is adequate for any infantry carrier.

Armor and excessive armament are dangerous, the Armor can make troops develop Cocoonitis, overweaponing can make 'em think they're unstoppable. A few days heavy combat will cure that but you'll kill a lot of folks needlessly in the interim.

[B.Smitty]

The Stryker will be with us for a while but it was IMO a poor purchase decision. It is not terribly mobile (12.50x20 tires???) and is inadequate for heavy combat. It's okay if you cannot afford something better -- we can.

At the time, what would've been better? It was supposed to be an "interim", medium-weight vehicle. Everything would've been a compromise. Anything much heavier would push it into Bradley territory. FCS was supposed to be the objective system.

The C-130 restriction was misplaced. But, IMHO, Stryker is a reasonable balance. Better than an armored HMMWV, but not a Bradley.

[Ken White]

At the time, what would've been better? It was supposed to be an "interim", medium-weight vehicle. Everything would've been a compromise. Anything much heavier would push it into Bradley territory. FCS was supposed to be the objective system.

IMO, nothing would've been better. Literally.

What is the war fighting rationale for the Stryker and its cousins?

Essentially that they are cheaper, cheaper to operate (that old "you get what you pay for" thing again...) and are lighter, thus more transportable by air. Well maybe...

The C-130 restriction was misplaced. But, IMHO, Stryker is a reasonable balance. Better than an armored HMMWV, but not a Bradley.

Most anything is better than an Armored HMMWV and I'm not a Bradley fan either -- it too was and is a compromise. All compromises are just that, effectiveness compromised for something else. We make too many politically oriented and acceptable purchases and both those vehicles -- and MRAPs -- are examples of that.

The basic problem with the Stryker and most wheeled combat vehicles (those that are truly agile being the exceptions) is that they cannot operate in the face of a reasonably competent, moderately well armed opponent. They are a peace time, look tough piece of equipment. They are doing good work in the current fights but they aren't really suitable for contested entries or sustained hard combat.

Stryker's have fans, as do ASLAVs, Coyotes and similar vehicles. All are compromise vehicles; none are really survivable in heavy combat. Many say that's not a problem, we are unlikely to have such combat in the near term. I agree we are unlikely to have to do that, I do not agree that adopting lightly armored, marginally cross country mobile vehicles is acceptable in the interim. That for a variety of reasons including training (of all concerned...). Add in the procurement cycle and yet again we could -- hopefully won't but could -- enter another major war with an inadequate vehicle like the M2/M3 tanks in WW II or the M4A3E8s in Korea. Not really good planning. Not that anyone at DA is concerned with my opinion -- and I know that many disagree with me and that's okay.

[SJPONeill]

The basic problem with the Stryker and most wheeled combat vehicles (those that are truly agile being the exceptions) is that they cannot operate in the face of a reasonably competent, moderately well armed opponent. They are a peace time, look tough piece of equipment. They are doing good work in the current fights but they aren't really suitable for contested entries or sustained hard combat.

Maybe the key part of this is "...They are doing good work in the current fights..." And the indications seem to be that the nature of those 'current fights' may be more common in the near future than it was pre-2000 so there is probably a useful role for these vehicles and their units...more so when the heavies like Bradley, Abrams, Challenger, etc may not be as suitable for the environments in which those fights are being fought...

As I understand it, the US, UK, Canada, Australia are still maintaining heavy armour forces with no intention to do away with them so it is not like it is an either/or choice between vehicles like Stryker/LAVIII and heavy armour; nor is anyone proposing the Stryker/LAVIII units would be expected to hold their own on the leading edge of a conventional Fulda Gap style conflict.

Out of the US model, Stryker/LAVIII is a better choice for those smaller nations that do have to 'pick one' than either LAV-25, Armoured Humvee, or an MBT that they probably couldn't afford to run enough to meeting training needs...

[Pete]

I thought the main impetus for the Stryker was the strategic deployability thing, it had to be transportable by the C-130. When I was doing Army Medical Department consulting work around 2001 medics got into this thing as well, the surgical ward in an expandable ISO shelter had to fit inside a C-130. Then 9/11 happened and our attention became focused on more urgent things.

The same thing happened years ago in '83 when my old unit the 7th Infantry Division went to the light TO&E. The division had to be transportable by a certain number of C-141 sorties, 600 if I recall correctly. That's all well and good, but what happens to them once they get there and start fighting? What we need is the ability to plus-up these austere TO&Es with attached units. During WW II straight-leg triangular infantry divisions had attached armor battalions. My first TO&E assignment was in a Corps artillery unit, 175mm SPs.

[SJPONeill]

I went to a brief by a guy who'd been with the first SBCT to go to Iraq...he felt that the whole C-130 thing was a big red herring as the C-130 didn't have the legs to transport Stryker between theatres and that once they started operating in Iraq, the mobility of Stryker allowed to to drive most places and achieve surprise that way by turning up at dawn someplace 100s of km from where they seemed to have laagered up the previous night...

[Infanteer]

They are doing good work in the current fights but they aren't really suitable for contested entries or sustained hard combat.

Stryker's have fans, as do ASLAVs, Coyotes and similar vehicles. All are compromise vehicles; none are really survivable in heavy combat. Many say that's not a problem, we are unlikely to have such combat in the near term.

What are we supposed to use in combat than? Guys have went in lesser vehicles in "big wars" and won. We've had LAVs take 7 RPG hits and drive away.

It may be a compromise, but it's only a compromise between getting something like a Namer. I don't think all heavy combat involves driving into the teeth of tanks and dug in AT missile systems. In fact, I'd argue that doing that (while necessary at times) is foolish.

[Infanteer]

I went to a brief by a guy who'd been with the first SBCT to go to Iraq...he felt that the whole C-130 thing was a big red herring as the C-130 didn't have the legs to transport Stryker between theatres and that once they started operating in Iraq, the mobility of Stryker allowed to to drive most places and achieve surprise that way by turning up at dawn someplace 100s of km from where they seemed to have laagered up the previous night...

I'm too lazy to look up the link to the Rand Report on this issue. It says that the amount of C-130s to move a Stryker Brigade mooted the point.

[Fuchs]

OK...you could have just said that you know nothing about the topic and left that space for perhaps someone who does...have you ever ridden a motorcycle in a military context? From that diatribe, unlikely and even then you still didn't get the question...I have a good handle of general use of military motorcycles from my own experiences, frozen extremities, missing skin, bruised muscles -...never managed to break a bone though but not through lack of trying...I asked a question about a specific use of military motorbikes...

Ahh, you get personal, thus you do most likely know no real arguments and are thin-skinned.

Most importantly, you don't seem to get that a dislike for a tool in general application usually affects the readiness to accept a tool for a specific application. Nor do you seem to appraise the logistical reasons.

Oh, and I forgot; you provided no real reason for the pro case.
Why should any team carry 150 kg of dead weight on their truck most of the time? Wouldn't two spare tires be a better deal?

[Fuchs]

What are we supposed to use in combat than? Guys have went in lesser vehicles in "big wars" and won. We've had LAVs take 7 RPG hits and drive away.

There are two good armour 'thicknesses' against RPGs:

1) 'Thick' enough to keep explosion and copper jet out (this includes cages if the crew is lucky).

2) 'Thick' enough to keep the explosion out, 'thin' enough to not offer much material for secondary fragmentation due to the copper jet penetration and baked up by an spall liner to limit the copper jet and fragments effects to a ~10° cone.


This explains why many thinly armoured vehicles are surprisingly survivable against HEAT-type weapons (the portable ones, not the huge warheads from 125mm guns which smash a lightly armoured vehicle with their explosion). All it takes is a bit luck (of the crew) in regard to hit placement and vector.

[TAH]

Might be better off going for LAVIII over ASLAV as its chassis is essentially the same as Stryker so you have better commonality of parts, training, maintenance etc...ASLAV is based on the smaller LAV-25 but is amphibious if that was a useful addition to organic capability...

My Bad:

Commonality is best.

The "Iron Mountain" that has to deploy to support the "tip of the Spear" needs to be as small as possible. Common parts help.

[TAH]

Don't agree with designing a total force for what is now occurring and may not be in two to five years -- it'll take six to eight years to get ANY major reorganization embedded in both components. I also think the USAR should still have combat units but that's another thread. I also think the strategic reserve (small 'r') should be at least the size of the AC. Design a force base on 15 to20 years out, not today. It takes that long, in peacetime, to get the force up and operational.You can do that; someone probably will -- after all, some squirrel wanted to put Strykers on Oahu.

Part of the 'rationale' for that was that they would be good in the jungle. Obviously, that person hadn't spent much time in anyone's jungle...The Stryker will be with us for a while but it was IMO a poor purchase decision. It is not terribly mobile (12.50x20 tires???) and is inadequate for heavy combat. It's okay if you cannot afford something better -- we can.

I do agree with Scouts being lightly armed and armor for them is okay provided is does not constrain vehicle mobility and agility. The old 1/4 ton was a good Scout vehicle, you could get it most anywhere and it wasn't armored so it kept the Scouts honest, they didn't take dumb chances 'cause they were Armored (HMMWV is too big).Brings to mind the old quote "You get what you pay for..." And you always pay, one way or another.I get emotional about it because I don't want to see people killed unnecessarily. Wheeled Armored Vehicles are either immobile (MRAPS) or easy targets (Strykers, Armored HMMWVs and such). Agility saves lives, armor can also do that but it takes tracks to move it in combat.

I'm not a 25mm fan, nor of ATGM mounted on lightly armored vehicles (I include the Bradley in that); it tends to make people think they have a light tank and often to act accordingly. The .50 Cal is adequate for any infantry carrier.

Armor and excessive armament are dangerous, the Armor can make troops develop Cocoonitis, overweaponing can make 'em think they're unstoppable. A few days heavy combat will cure that but you'll kill a lot of folks needlessly in the interim.

Styker = bad
Bradley = bad
HMMWV = bad
MRAP = bad
Jeeps = Good

As a serving member of the RC, we have made the shift as an institution from Strategic Reserve to Operational Force (on a rotating basis). There are issues, but they are not tactical or technical, they are administrative.

A 50/50 spilt is possible but Make the Math work for you.

AC rotates on a 1 by 3 cycle. RC is using 1 by 5. So each sides number should be divisible by those numbers.

[TAH]

I thought the main impetus for the Stryker was the strategic deployability thing, it had to be transportable by the C-130. When I was doing Army Medical Department consulting work around 2001 medics got into this thing as well, the surgical ward in an expandable ISO shelter had to fit inside a C-130. Then 9/11 happened and our attention became focused on more urgent things.

The same thing happened years ago in '83 when my old unit the 7th Infantry Division went to the light TO&E. The division had to be transportable by a certain number of C-141 sorties, 600 if I recall correctly. That's all well and good, but what happens to them once they get there and start fighting? What we need is the ability to plus-up these austere TO&Es with attached units. During WW II straight-leg triangular infantry divisions had attached armor battalions. My first TO&E assignment was in a Corps artillery unit, 175mm SPs.

The C-130 issue was a fallacy, but was picked as the most numerous Intra-theater lift A/C.

Lots of techincal issues getting 15-18 tons of stuff inside a C-130, getting the A/C off the ground, flying a reasonable distance, landing with that much weight and then taking-off.

MOG (Maximum on Ground) is what feeling kicks butt. MOG is the total number of A/C that can be on the ground at the same local. Its a space to move around, taxi etc thing.

Built up time was measured in days not hours.

[TAH]

What are we supposed to use in combat than? Guys have went in lesser vehicles in "big wars" and won. We've had LAVs take 7 RPG hits and drive away.

It may be a compromise, but it's only a compromise between getting something like a Namer. I don't think all heavy combat involves driving into the teeth of tanks and dug in AT missile systems. In fact, I'd argue that doing that (while necessary at times) is foolish.

If heavy combat means lost of heavy ATGMs and tanks, then any light or medium vehicle loses.

Our infantry carrier needs to be reasonably protected against man-portable RPG-type weapons (but RPG-29 can kill tanks) and mendium ATGMs.

IEDs are probably here to stay but for combat vehicle with good x-country mobility, get off the road and you avoind most/all IEDs. So naybe the V-shaped hulls and added belly armor are not really as important.

Good study out years ago about x-country mobility. Up to about 12 tons wheels with 3 or 4 axels have comparable capabilty to tracks in most terrain sets. Deep sand, snow and heavy mud tracks still do better but cab still get stuck.

Maybe part of this discussion should include a timeframe. How soon do we want/need a "new" set of BCTs? 3-6 years = dance who you came with (what we have now). 6-10 years whatever is currently in production or at least off the drawing board. 10+ years allows us to start with a clean slate.

All my comments are focused short term and seek to solve the issue within current limits. I want to do better with the same.

[Ken White]

...indications seem to be that the nature of those 'current fights' may be more common in the near future than it was pre-2000 so there is probably a useful role for these vehicles and their units...

I agree that the indications are that. However, I strongly believe those indications should be changed and I believe they will be. The question is whether that change will be forced on the west after considerable waste or will be made early by not playing the opponents game on his pitch...

Western Armed forces who desire or at least do not object to such operations are making a bad mistake. Equipment influences policy; if you have a certain piece of kit, there is pressure to use it. Ponder that for a bit...

Out of the US model, Stryker/LAVIII is a better choice for those smaller nations that do have to 'pick one' than either LAV-25, Armoured Humvee, or an MBT that they probably couldn't afford to run enough to meeting training needs...

I agree and said as much.

the whole C-130 thing was a big red herring as the C-130 didn't have the legs to transport Stryker between theatres.

True. It was a politically oriented purchase and not a particularly smart one.

Infanteer:

What are we supposed to use in combat than?

METT-TC. As I said it works in the current kind of combat. My counter question is why would you want to engage in this kind of combat? There are other options.

Guys have went in lesser vehicles in "big wars" and won.

At what cost in those lesser vehicles? Also, many of those lesser vehicles weren't really lesser, most were smaller and far more agile -- most also were 'successfully' used in Northwest Europe. You guys had a lot of problems with the Staghound in Italy with a far poorer road net...

None were used in the Jungles and their success in Mountainous terrain was marginal. METT-TC...

We've had LAVs take 7 RPG hits and drive away.

How many hit with even a Sagger, a Kornet, a 76mm, much less a 120mm or 125mm...

It may be a compromise, but it's only a compromise between getting something like a Namer. I don't think all heavy combat involves driving into the teeth of tanks and dug in AT missile systems. In fact, I'd argue that doing that (while necessary at times) is foolish.

I doubt anyone would advocate that. I certainly don't.

The Piranha class of vehicles has uses, no question. It's a good, even great, vehicle for Paramilitary use. My dislike of the vehicle revolves around it's lack of capability for major combat -- and the fact that, as I remarked to SJPO'Neill above; if you have a piece of equipment, the pressure to use it is significant.

Thus I ask if we're engaging in wars of choice because we have a capability or do we need the capability because we must engage in wars of choice? I suggest the answer is the former and that it is unwise -- and I fully realize that such engagement is effectively a political and not a military decision. An LAV type vehicle is a policy decision, not an equipment decision. It may be driven by economic factors in less wealthy nations -- but neither the US or Canada have to buy it...

TAH:

Styker = bad
Bradley = bad
HMMWV = bad
MRAP = bad
Jeeps = Good

In order:

Yes, period -- as a COMBAT vehicle against any reasonably well armed and trained opponent.
Yes in the sense that was a poor political compromise between the the then Chiefs of Armor and Infantry and really satisfied neither branches requirements; too small for the Inf, too large for Armor -- and the "Light Tank" issue.
The HMMWV is excessively large and heavy for most of its roles and is too small for others; it resulted from the Army's fetish for GP items, trying to make one size fit all instead of buying purpose designed equipment that's truly fit for the job it's supposed to do.
Yes, absolutely; it cocoons Joe nad he's reluctant to get out of it; it is big has low mobility and guys currently in Afghanistan tell me that the 'MRAP mentality' is definitely impeding operational success.

Jeeps are good for what they were designed to do -- be a small, light, unarmored utility car. They are not good trucks. The HMMWV was designed to be part car and part truck and it does neither job well. It was armored due to plitical pressure. I mentioned the jeep as a Scout Vehicle. Actually, we really need and have long needed a purpose designed light, agile scout vehicle -- I prefer unarmored because that keeps your Scouts honest; they don't begin to think they're immortal but Armored is okay as long as it's small and agile.

As a serving member of the RC, we have made the shift as an institution from Strategic Reserve to Operational Force (on a rotating basis). There are issues, but they are not tactical or technical, they are administrative.

I think they're more than administrative but that's another thread. The question I ask is: Is that current policy wise and was it necessary? My answer is No to both; YMMV.

A 50/50 spilt is possible but Make the Math work for you.

Whether it works for me is immaterial; what's best for the Nation -- not the Guard or the AC or any State(s) but the Nation -- is the point.

AC rotates on a 1 by 3 cycle. RC is using 1 by 5. So each sides number should be divisible by those numbers.

That's designing a military force to cope with a domestic political problem. You may think that is necessary and / or wise and / or necessary or unavoidable. I think it is none of those, it's just taking the easy route. We can do better.

Policies can be changed easily and quickly -- sometimes by unforeseen events (think 25 June 1950 or 11 Sep 2001) -- Force structure changes are far more difficult, expensive and time consuming. I say again, do not design a force for here and now; ideally we'd design for five to ten years out but we're so bureaucratically sclerotic that we need to look almost 20 years out...

If heavy combat means lost of heavy ATGMs and tanks, then any light or medium vehicle loses.

Umm. yes, that was my point. I'd add that agility can decrease losses and that in some othercases, losses must be accepted. I would like to keep that latter number low by using the best vehicle for the job.

Our infantry carrier needs to be reasonably protected against man-portable RPG-type weapons (but RPG-29 can kill tanks) and mendium ATGMs.

I'd go heavier, Namer-like -- and fewer.

IEDs are probably here to stay but for combat vehicle with good x-country mobility, get off the road and you avoind most/all IEDs. So naybe the V-shaped hulls and added belly armor are not really as important.

So called IEDs have been a feature of most combat since the late 19th century, they are the poor mans artillery. So I agree with you, get off the roads, use unexpected routes -- and do NOT fight poor people on their turf...

Good study out years ago about x-country mobility. Up to about 12 tons wheels with 3 or 4 axels have comparable capabilty to tracks in most terrain sets. Deep sand, snow and heavy mud tracks still do better but cab still get stuck.

Anything can get stuck if you don't use it right and go dumb places -- that's a training issue and we do not do that well. I'm aware of a number of such studies. I'm also aware that the GM XM1 outperformed the Chrysler XM1 on all counts but that we bought Chrysler to help them avoid their first impending bankruptcy...

Good, specially selected and trained or experienced drivers can put wheels most places one can put a track -- problem is that new, poorly trained or just poor drivers can put tracks many places poor drivers cannot put wheels...

Maybe part of this discussion should include a timeframe...10+ years allows us to start with a clean slate...All my comments are focused short term and seek to solve the issue within current limits. I want to do better with the same.

Understood but, no slam intended, you're in effect putting Bandaids ® on the problem. That's the Army way -- and that's why we are we are. My point is that is probably not where we should, could or can be. There's never enough time or money to fix it right -- but there's always enough to do it over. And over...

[Fuchs]

I was under the impression that the whole Stryker "interim" vehicle thing was a result of Shinseki and most army leadership panicking.

1999. They lost the "race" against the BTR-riding Russians which drove from Bosnia to Kosovo. They were unable to deploy a brigade-sized element to Albania and get it operational in time. Air forces (and naval air) had just won the first hot armed conflict which saw no ground or naval action.
There were panicky articles about how the army was threatened to become "irrelevant" around 1999- 9/11.

They panicked badly and sought some brigades which could
- be flown into theatre in days
- become operational in days
- move hundreds of km in a day without tank transporters and without many vehicle breakdowns.

The panicked generals didn't understand that the air force was unlikely to support the whole fantasy and it didn't understand that these medium brigades would lack an armoured combat vehicle or two despite all those RMA promises.


Now if you call this "political" - OK. I do -obviously- emphasize the "panic" aspect rather than the "politics" aspect.