Tactical Jenga vs. The Strategic Stopwatch

[Gian P Gentile]

Sir,

Good point. I too am worried about ARFORGEN breaking the army, I don't know that it won't be a tipping point, that after a 4th or 5th tour the LT/CPT/SGT/SSG just says "enough, I can't take it", and we see an en-masse departure from the Army.

I also am getting extremely distressing anecdotal reports of BCT readiness upon arrival at CTC's prior to deployment - unfilled key staffs, non-CCC CPT's in many key positions, some units without a MEL4 S3/XO, etc. All manned to 90% just before the CTC rotation, and in the "crawl" phase of teambuilding. There is a large experience base from prior deployments, but it's akin to a "pro bowl" team rather than a "Super Bowl" team, which the modular BCT was supposed to solve - but can't with just-in-time manning. Makes me really worry that we have finally scraped the bottom, and may have entered a death spiral in readiness - that may result in elevated risk in deploying units. Perhaps that is behind Casey's comments?

Cavguy:

Right; I think your characterization of it is very good. I will rely on it in the future. I dont know what "breaking" or "broken" looks like either. It certainly wont look like France in early 1917 after the Nivelle offensives where some large units actually mutinied. It wont look either like the American Army in 1970 with huge drug and discipline problems. But it might just look like something you describe above and to be sure General Casey is seeing those very same things which is why I am sure he has been trying to carefully raise alarm bells. Considering Kilkullen's Jenga and tactical conditions on the ground in Iraq and the fact that the American Army has a huge role to play with those conditions, I consider this to be a worthwhile topic for this thread. Or perhaps we should start another one if others want to continue to purse the Jenga riddle.

gian