Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
The "us versus everybody else" comment really hit home. This is our primary national security challenge in my opinion, because it limits our ability to effectively apply our elements of national power. It is a problem throughout the government, not just within Defense. It will require a substantial culture change to fix it, and the change have forced upon legacy organizations by the right leaders.
True and well said. I also agree with the rest and would suggest that this
"... Now we have SF NCOs and officers who have seen nothing else (than a lot of DA), so our next generation of SF leaders may continue to pull SF into DA/SR/CT fold. Like everything else SF does, they'll do it well, but who is going to do COIN/UW well?
Good question -- REALLY good question...

Having had a great deal of fun (well, more often than not...) doing both missions in various environments with varied opposition, I am firmly convinced that the two missions are not compatible. There is no question that some people can switch between the two and do both equally well (not me, too impatient for a good FID worker) nor is there any question the Groups have done that over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.

Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...

And those kinds of impacts can have inadvertent and bad strategic effects...