Well I certainly see terrorism as a tactic, and the same with counterterrorism.
Often, when the conditions of insurgency exist, groups with too much brain and not enough brawn to try to go toe to toe with the government symmetrically, but who opt for violent tactics over non-violent tactics, will employ the tactic of terrorism to advance their cause.
Similarly, those who emerge from communities that are not experiencing conditions of insurgency significant enough to support the emergence of insurgent groups will often employ tactics of terrorism. This can be a McVeigh from the heartland of America who believes the federal government must be attacked; or perhaps a young man in Paris who's own community is not to the level of supporting insurgent groups (yet) but he acts out in support of a group he strongly affiliates that he believes is being oppressed, or that the oppression is supported, by the government he attacks.
Or it can be by a profit motivated group like a Mexican drug cartel.
Many would argue it is also a tactic employed by governments to break the will of the populaces of the states they wage war against. (Though in equal number there are those who take the position that a state cannot conduct an act of terrorism, which I find a bit self-serving. "I write the rules, so I can't break the rules")
Perhaps a bridge concept is this idea I am developing about the conditions of insurgency.
The conditions of insurgency could be quite high, but there not be any insurgent groups actively working. This could be like in Saudi Arabia where to act out is to disappear, or it could be just because that catalytic event to set things in motion has not happened yet.
So, the Act of insurgency is different than the condition of insurgency. The act may well be considered a strategy, that then in turn employ some mix of violent and non-violent tactics. But success is not from attacking the groups that emerge. Success is not from countering either the tactics or the strategy. Success is from addressing the conditions. The rest you must contend with, but the conditions are what one must understand and resolve.
Typically waging war against the organizations, strategies or tactics is counter-productive to addressing the conditions.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
This is where I disagree slightly. There are no conditions of Insurgency. There are conditions of Illegitimacy someone and it is always a someone(s) that claims to have some moral right to pass a rule/law that benefits the few at the expense of the many. When these conditions of Illegitimacy exist it will eventually lead to some type of an Insurgency/Strategy to correct the "Moral Bomb" that is about to explode.
Slap, Ok, there is no right answer, and we're both dropping rounds with effects on target. I prefer my breakdown as I have it, as I don't want to pack too much into one box. I very intentionally unpacked Justice and respect and hope as I feel it helps to assess the situation and design solutions.
If you say simply "fix legitimacy" we send in the elections team, conduct elections and then say "there, they held elections so conditions of legitmacy are establshed." Whoa nelly, not so fast... Too simple results in solutions that are too simplistic. Even with the four criteria I use I still routinely get "yes, but what do you want us to do??"
To reduce the entire complexity of insurgency to one concept is like the law student tale of the student who kept reducing his outline for his contracts class until he had it compressed from 100+ pages ultimately down to a single word nemonic. Then when he sat for the test he forgot that word... Too much compression can be a bad thing.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
But you see that is my point. That is what we would probably do but that does not make it legitimate to the population in focus. Maybe they don't want an election system that creates continuous turmoil and uncertainty,maybe they would rather have something else. There are other systems out there that are better(in the populations eyes) and we are going to learn and accept that or we will end up with a very hard road to travel.
Sir Robert Thompson said, in his book Defeating Communist Insurgency, "If the [revolutionary] organization is already established, well-trained, and disciplined., it will not be defeated by reforms designed to eliminate the cause. It will only be defeated by establishing a superior organization and applying measures to break the revolutionary organization." (For revolutionary organization we can substitute the insurgents or insurgent organization.)
Cheers
JohnT
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