Ukraine: military (Aug '14 to mid-June '15) closed

**AmericanPride** · 07-31-2014

Outlaw,

Also, if Russia is as you claim a rogue state with no concern or understanding of what's in it's own interests, how can you make the claim that punitive sanctions will compel the desired behavior in Russia?

**JMA** · 07-31-2014

Instead of attempting to pick holes in everything Outlaw states why not offer your opinion on the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea and now the invasion of eastern Ukraine?

Originally Posted by AmericanPride

Outlaw,

Also, if Russia is as you claim a rogue state with no concern or understanding of what's in it's own interests, how can you make the claim that punitive sanctions will compel the desired behavior in Russia?

**AmericanPride** · 07-31-2014

Originally Posted by JMA

Instead of attempting to pick holes in everything Outlaw states why not offer your opinion on the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea and now the invasion of eastern Ukraine?

Sure. I'll repeat my opinion:

Under the Putin administration, Russia has emerged from the shadow of the collapse of the USSR. Since 1991, Russia has participated in ten conflicts with a 70% success rate. Russia still has many challenges but given the reference point of the chaos of the Yeltsin administration, today's Russia is much more capable and confident than it was 20 years ago.

However - that's not the reference point for Russia's elite. The perceived height of Russia's status was in its previous incarnation as the USSR and that's what the current regime (an alliance of nationalists and realists, with some technocrats) is pursuing. Hence the risk-taking behavior (i.e. Georgia and Ukraine conflicts) to restore its former status. Sometime during the first Putin administration, the nationalists and realists finally made a break from the policies inherited from the liberals in the Yeltsin administration. Instead of democratizing Russia and transforming it into a West-phalian nation-state, they've reverted to restoring the imperial system of the USSR (and Empire).

All of this is taking place within two contexts: the escalating confrontational characteristics of the U.S.-Russian dyadic, and the shifting of the balance of international power as U.S. entered its period of retrenchment. The confrontations between U.S. and Russia really started during the Clinton years but really came to the fore under Bush - at a time when Russia was also more confident in its own capabilities. That collapse in relations untethered Russia from the last of its committments to the U.S. and its integration into the Western community (capped by its membership in the WTO). The period of U.S. retrenchment also invited opportunitist states that preceive their relative power increasing relative to the U.S. - namely China and Russia. States are more risk adverse when pursuing gains instead of defending against losses, so more aggressive behavior is an indicator of a reduction of risk (i.e. U.S. deterrence). What signals has the U.S. given to Russia between 2001 and 2014? Color revolutions, invasion of Iraq, financial crisis, response to Georgia, Yanukovych affair, ABM treaty, missile defense, withdrawal of U.S. European forces -- all of these things are signals. What message(s) do they convey about U.S. capabilities and the stability of the international system? Namely that U.S. power is in relative decline and that the norms of the international system championed by the U.S. are optional. Since 2003, U.S. credibility has been significantly damaged as a result.

The same problem exists in the U.S. What are American reference points, perceived and ascribed status? If perception exists of relative U.S. decline and Russian gain, that heightens the feeling of insecurity, even if there are worlds between U.S. and Russian capabilities.

So now we come to Ukraine. Russia perceives itself with increased capabilities and confidence, but not sufficient status. It also perceives U.S. relative decline - hence the constant calls for a multi-centered international system. The U.S., in turn, is insecure given the outcomes of the War on Terrorism and the continued political infighting that has paralyzed effective government. That hasn't changed U.S. policies - the execution of the smart power campaign to topple Yanukoyvch and install pro-Western officials fits in the tradition U.S. playbook. But Russia called our bluff; the U.S. had no back up plan (military or otherwise) hence the desperate campaign to build a coalition around sanctions. The U.S. is still operating with the frame that it is a hegemon, but it is not - Iraq, Libya, Syria, Iran, et. al proves this. It doesn't mean the U.S. is not the strongest power, it just means U.S. power relative to other states or combination of states is not as strong as originally believed.

Where does that leave us? Sanctions are a political response - (1) they require coordination and commitment from multiple parties, making them difficult to implement (where are China's sanctions on Russia?); (2) they rarely change state behavior, and (3) they are signals to U.S. allies and domestic polities that U.S. is committed to protecting its status (the commitment of which is compelled by framing the U.S. as a guarantor of European security in the first place). A military response is also ineffectual for reasons discussed above - what does a U.S. security commitment to Ukraine look like? That leaves diplomacy.

This is really a question about the balance of power within the U.S.-Russian dyadic - is Russia now a peer competitor to the U.S. or not? And if it is, the secondary question is: what are the implications for the U.S. international security system?

A strategy to address Russia must be constructed within this frame, and it must be honest about U.S. and Russian capabilities and limitations. Russia is acting the role of spoiler because the Russians are honest about their limitations - hence their 70% success rate in conflict. The Russians are confident in their capabilities but know they cannot compete directly with the U.S. - hence the participation in Iran, Syria, Ukaine, etc. Obstructing the U.S. strategy buys them time since the passage of time favors the gaining power and disfavors the declining power. Russia does not benefit for the status quo so it will actively work to change it. Spoiling is a strategy for a state that is strong enough to influence the outcome but not strong enough to dictate it.

Recognizing Russia as a spoiler also implies that there are a range of strategies for dealing with spoilers in the international system. Mainly, that is either building a collective response or of integrating the spoiler into the international system. They are both difficult for their own reasons. Ukraine is a part of this process - it's not a conflict in isolation and its outcome will have consequences for the U.S. Russian dyadic and the international community. We should not rush to failure because our passion about Ukraine's liberty compels us to act immediately.

How do we want to shape the international security environment? What kind of relationship do we want with Russia and why? What can be done to improve U.S. capabilities and credibility?

**OUTLAW 09** · 07-31-2014

Originally Posted by AmericanPride

Sure. I'll repeat my opinion:

Under the Putin administration, Russia has emerged from the shadow of the collapse of the USSR. Since 1991, Russia has participated in ten conflicts with a 70% success rate. Russia still has many challenges but given the reference point of the chaos of the Yeltsin administration, today's Russia is much more capable and confident than it was 20 years ago.

However - that's not the reference point for Russia's elite. The perceived height of Russia's status was in its previous incarnation as the USSR and that's what the current regime (an alliance of nationalists and realists, with some technocrats) is pursuing. Hence the risk-taking behavior (i.e. Georgia and Ukraine conflicts) to restore its former status. Sometime during the first Putin administration, the nationalists and realists finally made a break from the policies inherited from the liberals in the Yeltsin administration. Instead of democratizing Russia and transforming it into a West-phalian nation-state, they've reverted to restoring the imperial system of the USSR (and Empire).

All of this is taking place within two contexts: the escalating confrontational characteristics of the U.S.-Russian dyadic, and the shifting of the balance of international power as U.S. entered its period of retrenchment. The confrontations between U.S. and Russia really started during the Clinton years but really came to the fore under Bush - at a time when Russia was also more confident in its own capabilities. That collapse in relations untethered Russia from the last of its committments to the U.S. and its integration into the Western community (capped by its membership in the WTO). The period of U.S. retrenchment also invited opportunitist states that preceive their relative power increasing relative to the U.S. - namely China and Russia. States are more risk adverse when pursuing gains instead of defending against losses, so more aggressive behavior is an indicator of a reduction of risk (i.e. U.S. deterrence). What signals has the U.S. given to Russia between 2001 and 2014? Color revolutions, invasion of Iraq, financial crisis, response to Georgia, Yanukovych affair, ABM treaty, missile defense, withdrawal of U.S. European forces -- all of these things are signals. What message(s) do they convey about U.S. capabilities and the stability of the international system? Namely that U.S. power is in relative decline and that the norms of the international system championed by the U.S. are optional. Since 2003, U.S. credibility has been significantly damaged as a result.

The same problem exists in the U.S. What are American reference points, perceived and ascribed status? If perception exists of relative U.S. decline and Russian gain, that heightens the feeling of insecurity, even if there are worlds between U.S. and Russian capabilities.

So now we come to Ukraine. Russia perceives itself with increased capabilities and confidence, but not sufficient status. It also perceives U.S. relative decline - hence the constant calls for a multi-centered international system. The U.S., in turn, is insecure given the outcomes of the War on Terrorism and the continued political infighting that has paralyzed effective government. That hasn't changed U.S. policies - the execution of the smart power campaign to topple Yanukoyvch and install pro-Western officials fits in the tradition U.S. playbook. But Russia called our bluff; the U.S. had no back up plan (military or otherwise) hence the desperate campaign to build a coalition around sanctions. The U.S. is still operating with the frame that it is a hegemon, but it is not - Iraq, Libya, Syria, Iran, et. al proves this. It doesn't mean the U.S. is not the strongest power, it just means U.S. power relative to other states or combination of states is not as strong as originally believed.

Where does that leave us? Sanctions are a political response - (1) they require coordination and commitment from multiple parties, making them difficult to implement (where are China's sanctions on Russia?); (2) they rarely change state behavior, and (3) they are signals to U.S. allies and domestic polities that U.S. is committed to protecting its status (the commitment of which is compelled by framing the U.S. as a guarantor of European security in the first place). A military response is also ineffectual for reasons discussed above - what does a U.S. security commitment to Ukraine look like? That leaves diplomacy.

This is really a question about the balance of power within the U.S.-Russian dyadic - is Russia now a peer competitor to the U.S. or not? And if it is, the secondary question is: what are the implications for the U.S. international security system?

A strategy to address Russia must be constructed within this frame, and it must be honest about U.S. and Russian capabilities and limitations. Russia is acting the role of spoiler because the Russians are honest about their limitations - hence their 70% success rate in conflict. The Russians are confident in their capabilities but know they cannot compete directly with the U.S. - hence the participation in Iran, Syria, Ukaine, etc. Obstructing the U.S. strategy buys them time since the passage of time favors the gaining power and disfavors the declining power. Russia does not benefit for the status quo so it will actively work to change it. Spoiling is a strategy for a state that is strong enough to influence the outcome but not strong enough to dictate it.

Recognizing Russia as a spoiler also implies that there are a range of strategies for dealing with spoilers in the international system. Mainly, that is either building a collective response or of integrating the spoiler into the international system. They are both difficult for their own reasons. Ukraine is a part of this process - it's not a conflict in isolation and its outcome will have consequences for the U.S. Russian dyadic and the international community. We should not rush to failure because our passion about Ukraine's liberty compels us to act immediately.

How do we want to shape the international security environment? What kind of relationship do we want with Russia and why? What can be done to improve U.S. capabilities and credibility?

AP---out of all the above and it would take a book to respond---here is your ten word key statement and yet you failed to even answer it yourself.

is Russia now a peer competitor to the U.S. or not?

I will turn the ten words into a question-- is in fact Russia a peer competitor OR really a near peer competitor?

I would argue currently it is a striving near peer as I believe as you do not that while Russia is a military power and a political power---the political power is not from their military strength but rather through their nuclear weapons. Russia has no economic power to enforce/project their military and nuclear political power.

Currently they can only threaten their previous SU empire border countries and that is about it and yet when those countries were offered an alternative their ran in the direction of the EU/NATO not in the direction of Russia--wonder why?

Example--- the threats yesterday about increasing gas prices--all bluff as Russia needs the money that the EU pays--not forcing the EU to shift and become more self sufficient--and that big Chinese deal---the Chinese are using the Russians as a cheap source of oil and gas as they do the African countries for other raw resources.

Some argue that the US is in demise--but can it still project political, military and economic power anywhere in the world---yes it can. I would argue that while chasing UBL and jihadi's around the world they have via their counter threat finance group discovered in fact a fourth power---the power to monitor the flows of USDs and if needed apply legal power against those flows just as they are now applying it against Russian state owned businesses and banks. AP that is the ultimate power and they have learned very well how to use it--ask the Iranians, ask the European banks and the fines they are paying.

So let's see in about 6-8 months if the Russia economy is that of an economic superpower.

Russia is simply a developing country with two raw resources that is being used to finance a corrupt government, a corrupt ruling elite, and the oligarchs that have failed in providing an increased standard of living for the entire Russia population equal to the earnings coming from those resources since 1994.

**AmericanPride** · 07-31-2014

Originally Posted by outlaw

AP---out of all the above and it would take a book to respond---here is your ten word key statement and yet you failed to even answer it yourself.

Oh - the irony.

I would argue currently it is a striving near peer as I believe as you do not that while Russia is a military power and a political power---the political power is not from their military strength but rather through their nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are a military asset; ergo, it's a component of military power.

Russia has no economic power to enforce/project their military and nuclear political power.

You need to clarify. Are you saying that Russia does not have economic power to project or that it does not have the economic capacity to support military power projection?

Currently they can only threaten their previous SU empire border countries and that is about it and yet when those countries were offered an alternative their ran in the direction of the EU/NATO not in the direction of Russia--wonder why?

How is the 'why' relevant to Russia's capabilities?

Some argue that the US is in demise--but can it still project political, military and economic power anywhere in the world---yes it can.

Relative decline. That's an important distinction.

I would argue that while chasing UBL and jihadi's around the world they have via their counter threat finance group discovered in fact a fourth power---the power to monitor the flows of USDs and if needed apply legal power against those flows just as they are now applying it against Russian state owned businesses and banks. AP that is the ultimate power and they have learned very well how to use it--ask the Iranians, ask the European banks and the fines they are paying

In other words - sanctions. That's not new. And the historical record of the effectiveness of sanctions is mixed.

Russia is simply a developing country with two raw resources that is being used to finance a corrupt government, a corrupt ruling elite, and the oligarchs that have failed in providing an increased standard of living for the entire Russia population equal to the earnings coming from those resources since 1994.

If that's the case, what's with the hysteria about the threat Russia poses to the United States? Russia cannot simultaneously be a third-rate country and an existential threat to U.S. interests. Either Russia is a threat or it is not - if it is a threat, it's on the basis of its capabilities. If it's not a threat, why not just ignore it?

**Petkov** · 09-03-2014

So nobody wants to answer my questions but just keeps on posting anti putin bull####.

THIS IS A DIRECT challenge. TO ALL of you.

Shall we list the lies USA/NATO has said in the last 20 years yet again? Let's.

1990 babies taken out of incubators and left to die on cold hospital floor
1990-1999 Saddam working on nuclear weapons
2001 Osama engineered and did 9-11
2001-2003 Saddam has ties with Ali Queda
2001-2003 Saddam has weapons of mass distraction (Colin Powell, Bush jr, Cheney, Condy Rice, etc)
2002-2203 Saddam working on weapons of mass distraction
2002-2003 Saddam working on acquiring nuclear weapons
2001 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2001 Iran has ties with Ali Queda
2002 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2003 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2004 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2005 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2006 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2007 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2008 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2009 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2010 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2011 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2012 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2013 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2013 Assad gassed his own people (part 1)
2013 Assad gassed his own people (part 2)
2014 Iran will have nuclear bomb
2014 Assad gassed his own people (part 3)

Let's leave for now the lies USA used to start the Vietnam war, the Korean war, WWII, war againts Spain and so on. I havent listed the lies we have caught

them about Ukraine. MH17, Russia invading(3 times, etc)

Nobody wants to answer my questions about all the lies USA/NATO have said in the last 20 years and to answer to me WHY anyone would STILL believe anything USA/NATO says but you are quick to gut infractions on me.

If you think I will stop you are all sadly mistaken. Again, I ask:
After all the lies USA/NATO have said in the last 20 years why would anyone still believe anything USA/NATO says about anything? Unless one of course is either a hopeless total idiot or a shill. So .....which ones are you all?

I DEMAND an answer.

Direct challenge to Carl: answer my question please, dont try to be funny. If I don't get an answer, they I will know what you are. Somebody who cannot answer questions because he cannot.

**carl** · 09-03-2014

Originally Posted by Petkov

So nobody wants to answer my questions but just keeps on posting anti putin bull####.

Yep.

Originally Posted by Petkov

Direct challenge to Carl: answer my question please, dont try to be funny. If I don't get an answer, they I will know what you are. Somebody who cannot answer questions because he cannot.

And yep again.

**OUTLAW 09** · 07-31-2014

AP---you actually have to finally have your own opinions. You tear things about much like Dayuhan does and yet we seem to never see a total comment by you --so start by answering JMAs comments.

Your comments show you do now understand the use of power soft or hard.

If the rouge state in this case Russia has power pressure addressed towards it ie sanctions then:

1) Russia has two choices either continue down the path of total isolation and economic demise or

2) adjust it's actions and attempt to rejoin the community it claims to want to be accepted by as a superpower or equal to the G7 he tried to join for over seven years

As some say here it is their own choice and it is not being pushed on them the last time I checked---was it not the "little green men" that first Putin denied they existed--- but strangely then did admit they existed that suddenly appeared on a former piece of the Ukraine-- Crimea after annexation,

So did the West- the EU- the NATO, or the US start this game over seven months ago? Remember every thing on NATO did this or that or US did this or that is just another smoke screen he has been running since 2008.

Even his argument of no Russian troops actually inside the Ukraine has fallen completely apart by today with over ten Russian soldiers posting on Russian social media stating they were all inside the Ukraine ---who all forgot that their photos were geo tagged.

Yesterday there were comments coming out of Moscow that Putin had given his military orders to stop weapons from crossing into the Ukraine but somehow they were ignored as the 50 armored vehicles videoed today crossing the border seem to suggest the opposite just as the FSB ignored his orders to secure the border. So it begs the question is he or is he not in charge are is anything he says for real?

Putin is in his own world of perceptions but after yesterday he has now the two choices.

It is now fish or cut bait time and since he is a outdoors type he should know how---and it will be interesting to see the choice he takes.

**AmericanPride** · 07-31-2014

AP---you actually have to finally have your own opinions. You tear things about much like Dayuhan does and yet we seem to never see a total comment by you --so start by answering JMAs comments.

My opinions are scattered throughout this entire thread - they're probably buried under the mountain of comments that you have provided. Namely, my opinion from the beginning and remains that resolving the political crisis in Ukraine means having free, open, internationally monitored elections inclusive of ethnic Russians. Just because you failed to read it doesn't mean I don't have my own opinion.

Russia has two choices either continue down the path of total isolation and economic demise or

Russia is not on a "path of total isolation". It's on a path of relative isolation from the United States and Europe. Is the 'economic demise' of Russia a realistic or even rational policy? What is gained by destroying Russia?

adjust it's actions and attempt to rejoin the community it claims to want to be accepted by as a superpower

The thing about superpowers - they don't join communities. They build communities around them. That's alliance-making 101. Joining a 'community" (a regime with norms and structures) means ceding some degree of autonomy. Great powers are notoriously jealous of their autonomy so why would Russia be at all interested in joining the U.S.-led system under U.S. conditions with which it clearly disagrees?

Sanctions are going to put the U.S.-Russian relationship in the freezer for a long-time; it will harm Russian economic interests for a short time but states eventually adapt to their conditions, and so sanctions lose their utility over time. Which means we are giving the Russians another pretext to continue pursuing its role as a spoiler rather than building opportunities for engagment to resolve points of conflict.