Winning the War in Afghanistan

[omarali50]

Only tangentially related, but i have a post about 9-11 at: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksd....html#comments

[Ray]

Will China Inherit Afghanistan’s War?

Sept. 26 – As the United States continues its preparations to exit Afghanistan, comments made by ex-U.S. forces suggest that an alternative power may have to step into their shoes. Stating recent attacks made by the mafia-styled Haqqani family, Marc Sageman, an ex-CIA officer who served in Pakistan has been quoted in the press as saying “Whoever is in power in Afghanistan will have to make a deal with the Haqqani’s. It won’t be us, we’re leaving and they know it.”

That China and Pakistan enjoy strong diplomatic and economic relations is well known, as are the certainties of a U.S. pullout. But Pakistan, facing a choice between being overrun by Taliban, giving up Afghanistan to India, or pulling in the Chinese, may only have the one viable option – major Chinese involvement, whether China likes it or not. It may also suit a war-weary United States to sit back and watch developments, including whether China can step up to the plate as a global citizen and maintainer of peace.

That China may well have to do so appears increasingly likely........

Squeezed out of the equation Pakistan may well be, and it seems likely that Sino-Iranian deals will start to become much more in favor of Tehran’s bilateral trade with China as a result, as Iran twists the key to obtain concessions from China in return for ceasing to arm militants. Only time will tell if an Iran-Pak-China military triumvirate will succeed where the United States has left an inheritance. Afghanistan could become more stable if Iran ceases its involvement, but this could be ruptured if intent towards Pakistani territory becomes apparent. This is, after all, a country that fought a seven year war with Iraq.

But should violence in Xinjiang start to increase, such support may well lead to a short cut into direct Chinese military involvement in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Chinese won’t like it. But with the United States watching from the wings, it may now only be a short time before China has to step up, get into Afghanistan, and see what it really means to limit Islamic insurgents on its own borders.
http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2...war-10219.html

A new angle to winning the war.

[Bill Moore]

This is an interesting article, but not convincing. China does have considerable interest in the region that address both economic and security concerns, but to assume China will enter Afghanistan in a major way because their dysfunctional friend Pakistan asks them to seems like a bit of a reach to me. Did China participate in Afghanistan in a major way after the Soviets left? Why would China risk its international reputation by entering Afghanistan with an Army that isn't as capable as ours? Why does the author think they don't have a choice? We all have choices, sometimes they're all bad, but we do have choices.

[Fuchs]

Why would China risk its international reputation by entering Afghanistan with an Army that isn't as capable as ours? Why does the author think they don't have a choice? We all have choices, sometimes they're all bad, but we do have choices.

In suppressing violent political opposition? Are you serious?

[Bob's World]

China will never inherit the role that the US currently plays in Afghanistan because China understands what the US does not: That their interests there can be addressed through whatever government happens to rise to power, and that they have no need to attempt to shape or preserve any particular government of Afghanistan.

The US used to see the world more as China does in this regard, but as we entered the 20th Century we strove to be like "grown up" Western powers and take on Colonial possesions of our own; and as we surpassed Western powers at the end of WWII we apparently adopted the worst aspects of French and British Colonial policies and practices in our own American approach to exercising economic and containment influence around the globe.

China, who suffered on the receiving end of Western Colonialism, shows little inclination to similarly adopt the worst practices of the West, but will certainly attempt to glean out the best practices to apply as they seek to expand their own economy and influence beyond their current borders.

[omarali50]

Robert, you are pushing the "whatever govt is in power" idea further than it can go. Lets all concede that NATO did a terrible job in Afghanistan, but what exactly is your vision of "govt in afghanistan" after they leave (if they do so without securing the current arrangement more firmly)? Here is mine:

Civil war.

And surrounding powers will pick sides. There is no other viable option. If there was, we would have had a govt in 1993. Certainly the Taliban conquered most of it by 2001, but even then the Northern Alliance survived in a small area and was starting to recover rather than going down to zero.
Shocking as it may sound, the current regime is still the best basis (best for the poor people of Afghanistan and Pakistan) for a possible (not probable, but possible) all-Afghan govt in Afghanistan...and its an awful regime. Nothing actually imaginable in the near future will be as good as this gang. Nothing. ALL alternatives are worse.
I guess a lot of these articles are ways to make the current players see the implications of some of their policies and to hopefully get them to change course while there is still a chance. It probably wont work, now that Pakistan's army is fully on board the "NATO has lost" paradigm and NATO has no consensus about what it wants. The likeliest outcome (and not a pleasant one) is that we will tread water for a year or two and then the whole place will go up with a loud bang.
Somewhere out there is a Pakistani analyst who is thinking:
" ... I might, for example, have suggested to the dinosaurs that heavy armor and great size was a sinking ship, and that they do well to convert to mammal facilities — it would not lie in my power or desire to reconvert a reluctant dinosaur. I can make my feeling very clear, Gregory, I feel like I’m on a sinking ship and I want off." (William Burroughs)
I have just enough awareness to dimly realize that you would probably feel comfortable using the quote for any American analyst...and you would probably be right too.
Its a strange world.

[Bob's World]

The current government is the best answer for the former Northern Alliance. Period.

When one is oppressed or excluded from full participation in the economic or political opportunities of their own country they will oppose that government. That aspect of the populace not represented by the Northern Alliance; those tribes removed from lucrative roles and replaced by rival tribes that jumped on the Northern Alliance band wagon as we carried them to victory provide a natural, and reasonable basis of support to insurgency in Afghanistan.

Too many focus on the negative aspects of the groups that emerge to lead the challenge to such government. There is no question, that when a government acts in such a way as to create broad conditions of insurgency among the populace as GIRoA has that there will be all manner of self-serving and opportunistic challengers who will step forward to lead (As there was when the US showed up and was looking for help in taking out the Taliban).

That is the wrong focus. The Taliban did not create insurgency in Afghanistan, GIRoA did. Pakistan did not create insurgency in Afghanistan, GIRoA did. By our blind support of GIRoA we may help them to suppress the challengers; but we are also enabling them to avoid addressing their problems as well.

Governments naturally blame insurgency on the insurgent. This is a natural, but unhelpful way of viewing and thinking about the problem. GIRoA must either cure themselves or face continued internal challenge. It is their choice, and IMO they resist change quite knowingly and willingly as the Northern Alliance is not shy about their determination to avoid once again becoming subject to Pashtun domination.

Any government that replaces a bad one through insurgency finds itself in its own insurgency the day they take office if they fall into the same bad habits of their predecessor, or if they bring their own bad habits to the fore. This is how the natural process of insurgency works. Best we let nature take its course, as by altering nature by our efforts we serve to perpetuate the instability and violence.

Is 10 years of insurgency perpetuated by the ISAF presence superior to 1 year of violent turnover of government? I think many Afghans are beginning to wonder...

[Fuchs]

That aspect of the populace not represented by the Northern Alliance; those tribes removed from lucrative roles and replaced by rival tribes that jumped on the Northern Alliance band wagon as we carried them to victory provide a natural, and reasonable basis of support to insurgency in Afghanistan.

For the less than 2% who hold power in non-NA communities; yes. They might have more wealth and power if central state jobs were redistributed.
I am under the impression that they're not the ones who do the heavy lifting for the TB, though.

So what's their motivation for insurrection?
I suspect it's not that political as you make seem it. It seems to me to be more about pay, ideology and misunderstandings.
The TB foot soldiers would be no better off if the TB had won last year. In fact, they would probably now be jobless and worse off.

[kotkinjs1]

@omarali50,
I'd tend to agree with Bob here; whatever government that would naturally evolve in Kabul is the one we can work with, one way or another, to address national interests. It doesn't matter if that government is a democratic republic, a monarchy, communist, or a theocracy. And frankly, we shouldn't care. Just like we shouldn't have cared what government was in Vietnam in 1965 or Afghanistan in 1979. The world won't end if there's a fundamental Islamic government in Afghanistan just like it was a hyped-up, miscalculated threat that the domino theory said we needed to fight Communism and install Western-leaning governments all across the globe to do so. We don't need a 'perimeter defense' to guard against the Taliban. There's definitely shades of the Kennan vs. Nitze argument here with Nitze again winning which is why we think that only a US-sponsored democracy can protect our interests (yes, I've been reading my Gaddis again lately).

Agree that China won't "have' to work with anyone, but they're politically savvy enough to know that they 'will' work with anyone based on how they think they need to (if they think they need to). The Chinese can make just as much money off a Taliban regime as they could off a Karzai regime. Probably more after all the corruption that Kabul would probably siphon off any deals now. Bottom line: we shouldn't really care who ends up in power after NATO leaves. It's an Afghan issue period. We can ensure we meet vital national interests in the region regardless of whomever's in power.

Robert, you are pushing the "whatever govt is in power" idea further than it can go. Lets all concede that NATO did a terrible job in Afghanistan, but what exactly is your vision of "govt in afghan" after they leave (if they do so without securing the current arrangement more firmly)? Here is mine:

Civil war.

And surrounding powers will pick sides. There is no other viable option. If there was, we would have had a govt in 1993. Certainly the Taliban conquered most of it by 2001, but even then the Northern Alliance survived in a small area and was starting to recover rather than going down to zero.
Shocking as it may sound, the current regime is still the best basis (best for the poor people of Afghanistan and Pakistan) for a possible (not probable, but possible) all-Afghan govt in Afghanistan...and its an awful regime. Nothing actually imaginable in the near future will be as good as this gang. Nothing. ALL alternatives are worse.
I guess a lot of these articles are ways to make the current players see the implications of some of their policies and to hopefully get them to change course while there is still a chance. It probably wont work, now that Pakistan's army is fully on board the "NATO has lost" paradigm and NATO has no consensus about what it wants. The likeliest outcome (and not a pleasant one) is that we will tread water for a year or two and then the whole place will go up with a loud bang.
Somewhere out there is a Pakistani analyst who is thinking:
" ... I might, for example, have suggested to the dinosaurs that heavy armor and great size was a sinking ship, and that they do well to convert to mammal facilities — it would not lie in my power or desire to reconvert a reluctant dinosaur. I can make my feeling very clear, Gregory, I feel like I’m on a sinking ship and I want off." (William Burroughs)
I have just enough awareness to dimly realize that you would probably feel comfortable using the quote for any American analyst...and you would probably be right too.
Its a strange world.

[Fuchs]

The world won't end if there's a fundamental Islamic government in Afghanistan (...)

That was actually already proved in the late 90's when there was such a government. The U.S. didn't really care.

[omarali50]

@omarali50,
I'd tend to agree with Bob here; whatever government that would naturally evolve in Kabul is the one we can work with, one way or another, to address national interests. It doesn't matter if that government is a democratic republic, a monarchy, communist, or a theocracy. And frankly, we shouldn't care. Just like we shouldn't have cared what government was in Vietnam in 1965 or Afghanistan in 1979. The world won't end if there's a fundamental Islamic government in Afghanistan just like it was a hyped-up, miscalculated threat that the domino theory said we needed to fight Communism and install Western-leaning governments all across the globe to do so. .

I have no problem with this argument: The US has/had no business trying to build a particular kind of broad-based modern government in Afghanistan. The US could have pressurized the taliban govt and if they failed to cooperate, subjected it to air attack, aided its enemies, even gone in to punish them...and then left..or helped an NA govt capture what it could and let the chips fall where they may. The point, in short, would have been to punish enemies and kill or capture particular people, not create idealized states or start working on unrealistic dreams of central asian oil or whatever it is that people think are the "true justifications" for this adventure.

But I do have a problem with Bob's version of this theory because it goes beyond this and imagines that the insurgency is primarily about political power in an idealized democratic republic of some sort. And because he seems to exaggerate the NA domination of Pakhtun areas to support his argument. And because he privileges a somewhat demented Pakistani "strategic consensus" to support his argument. And because he thinks we could "work with" whatever group finally wins (if any group wins...endless war is also a possibility, as it is in Somalia..sometimes Humpty Dumpty is hard to put together again). And because he thinks current Afghanistan is more violent, more oppressive and generally worse than any likely alternative Afghanistan or the one that existed before 9-11...and so on. Frequently, its a disagreement about emphasis. Such disagreements tend to be more prolonged and wordy than just being on opposite sides of an issue..

Also, I want to make it clear (again) that I am NOT saying the world will end if the US were to leave Afghanistan. I keep saying that as an American, I think we should have left yesterday. Not just Afghanistan but also a lot of the the other intervening the US does in the world (and yes, even the heavy lifting the US does on behalf of Israel, at great expense to its own reputation for fairness etc etc). Its as a Pakistani that I worry that this (poorly planned, poorly executed?) chance to reverse a dangerous course in that region (the systematic growth of the transnational jihadi complex, with some or a lot of ISI support, in the 1990s) is being lost because of various miscalculations by all sides and a poorly executed withdrawal will make things worse.. that what lies ahead for the poor people of Pakistan and Afghanistan may be worse than what came before.

[Bob's World]

The bulk of the insurgency that we actually fight in Afghanistan is not political. The rural areas are largely apolitical and self-governing. Always have been, and likely will continue to be so into the foreseeable future. That aspect of the insurgency is primarily a Resistance insurgency. The harder we push against it (with guns or butter) the harder it will push back. Such is resistance. We focus our "reintegration" efforts on this group as well, but truth be told most reintegrate every winter and rejoin the fight following the Poppy harvest.

The political aspect of the insurgency that must be resolved if GIRoA wants the fighting to end is the Revolutionary leadership that is largely in the various groups we lump as "Taliban" in Pakistan. Quetta Shura, Haqqani Network, HEK, etc. Reconciliation is indeed the key for this component of the insurgency. Not all of the key leaders per se, but certainly reconciliation of the key issues.

But that is all Afghan business; we really (as the resistance shows) make it worse for our presence. As to AQ? Their primary sanctuary is in the support of the Revolutionary leadership and their populace in Pakistan. If we want AQ evicted, the fastest route is through the Taliban, not either of the Governments of the region.

[ganulv]

The bulk of the insurgency that we actually fight in Afghanistan is not political. The rural areas are largely apolitical and self-governing. Always have been, and likely will continue to be so into the foreseeable future.

Just curious, but was there any reliable documentation of the hows of governance in rural Afghanistan during the existence of the IEA? Or any post-OEF projects attempting to reconstruct the same?

[Dayuhan]

China will never inherit the role that the US currently plays in Afghanistan because China understands what the US does not: That their interests there can be addressed through whatever government happens to rise to power, and that they have no need to attempt to shape or preserve any particular government of Afghanistan.

The US used to see the world more as China does in this regard, but as we entered the 20th Century we strove to be like "grown up" Western powers and take on Colonial possesions of our own; and as we surpassed Western powers at the end of WWII we apparently adopted the worst aspects of French and British Colonial policies and practices in our own American approach to exercising economic and containment influence around the globe.

China, who suffered on the receiving end of Western Colonialism, shows little inclination to similarly adopt the worst practices of the West, but will certainly attempt to glean out the best practices to apply as they seek to expand their own economy and influence beyond their current borders.

I'm not sure this is accurate. What China is doing in Africa today is closer to classic colonialism than anything the US got up to in the Cold War.

Like classic European colonialism, Much of China's overseas involvement is overtly about economics: access to resources and economic gain. American involvement in the Cold War had an economic side, but the primary driver was political: the perceived need to contain Communism. Many of the more egregious and destructive American Cold War excesses were in places where the US had no economic interests and no potential economic gain.

I do not think the Chinese will replace the US in Afghanistan: there's no reason why they should, economic or otherwise. I do think it entirely likely that China will eventually find itself sunk in a COIN/FID black hole, probably somewhere in Africa, defending a government that the Chinese believe is necessary to sustain their economic interests. Imagine, for example, the rise of an insurgent movement with a strong anti-Chinese slant, including demands for nationalization of Chinese investment, in, say, Angola. Not at all farfetched, and while the Chinese policy of unabashed bribery wins friends and influences people in high places, it arouses a fair bit of resentment lower down. The policy of buying up farmland and importing Chinese labor to work it seems like it could be a bit inflammatory as well.

We'll see, but I really don't think the Chinese have discovered some better way of dealing with the developing world. Their decisions are just recent enough to have not snapped back in their faces... yet.

[Dayuhan]

The political aspect of the insurgency that must be resolved if GIRoA wants the fighting to end is the Revolutionary leadership that is largely in the various groups we lump as "Taliban" in Pakistan. Quetta Shura, Haqqani Network, HEK, etc. Reconciliation is indeed the key for this component of the insurgency. Not all of the key leaders per se, but certainly reconciliation of the key issues.

I don't see how the GIRoA can pursue "reconciliation of the key issues", short of stepping down and letting the Taliban take over. The key issues aren't about participation and inclusion, they are about power. The Taliban had it, they lost it, they want it back. As Omar says, sharing is not realistically in the picture. There is going to be a winner and a loser, and the winner will oppress the loser and have to deal with the resulting insurgency. We can no more change that than Canute could reverse the tides. Worldly power has its limits.

But that is all Afghan business; we really (as the resistance shows) make it worse for our presence. As to AQ? Their primary sanctuary is in the support of the Revolutionary leadership and their populace in Pakistan. If we want AQ evicted, the fastest route is through the Taliban, not either of the Governments of the region.

Why would the Taliban cooperate with us to control AQ?

Certainly leaving Afghanistan and seeing the Taliban take over would not be the end of the world. It would be perceived, globally, as defeat for us, but we could survive that. There would likely be problems down the road with further AQ probes and provocations, likely in the form of terrorist attack, but we could survive that.

Maybe next time around our response would be smarter, who knows?

[Ken White]

Maybe next time around our response would be smarter, who knows?

One can only hope...

[omarali50]

My fear is that there will be no clean victory or even defeat. Much treasure and blood will be wasted in a muddled policy for a few more years....I am, as you can tell, not delighted by my own predictions and wish they turn out to be wrong.

[Dayuhan]

Optimist...

I've never been called that before. There's a first time for everything, I guess...

[Steve the Planner]

Just curious about all these contradictory frameworks. If Afghanistan is actually a fractured (valleys), regional, or multi-ethnic non-melting pot, what exactly drives and supports the all or nothing framework of "Taliban vs. Non-Taliban."

Why not, for example, just arm the hell out of the other minorities, then get out of the way.

Dahuyan's point about classic colonialism is strong, but why would China want the trouble or bother of managing "Afghanistan." They just want unfettered access and influence over the resources that matter to them (which are not really national, are they?).

In Africa, they are not out to control deserts or cities (no governance interest whatsoever)---just the resources.

The people, within what ever "terms of trade" allow, and protection of China's interests from harm, are free to do what ever they want culturally, socially, religiously, and politically.

We somehow have an interest in dominating an area governmentally and societally which is very bizarre, and has no obvious "resource" purposes, other than drone and landing rights.

Hard to find any other examples of this.

[Dayuhan]

Dahuyan's point about classic colonialism is strong, but why would China want the trouble or bother of managing "Afghanistan." They just want unfettered access and influence over the resources that matter to them (which are not really national, are they?).

I can't imagine the Chinese wanting to manage Afghanistan. There's nothing there they want badly enough to be anywhere nearly worth the trouble.

In Africa, they are not out to control deserts or cities (no governance interest whatsoever)---just the resources.

Resource policy and foreign investment policy are very much governance functions and governance concerns.

The people, within what ever "terms of trade" allow, and protection of China's interests from harm, are free to do what ever they want culturally, socially, religiously, and politically.

We'll see what happens when somebody wants to nationalize Chinese-owned business, or revoke a business agreement on the grounds that it was approved because of a bribe, or take back agricultural land that is being worked by Chinese companies with imported Chinese labor...

We somehow have an interest in dominating an area governmentally and societally which is very bizarre, and has no obvious "resource" purposes, other than drone and landing rights.

It is very bizarre indeed, and there's no even marginally credible economic justification or other hard interest to justify our desire to shape Afghan governance. I think a great deal of it stems from a domestic political imperative: if we're going to intervene and remove a government, we feel obligated to replace it with something our people - not necessarily theirs - will recognize as "democracy", and thus "good". Once that goal is adopted it takes on a life of its own and endures beyond reason.