Iraq - A Strategic Blunder?

[tequila]

It was. Exacerbate that is. Give it some thought. It was also calculated to show the collection of nations from which the threat originates that attacks on US interests world wide emanating from the ME would, contrary to previous experience, bring a disproportionate response. As Afghanistan had earlier shown that attacks on US soil would be met with even swifter and possibly more disproportionate response. Afghanistan didn't work for the ME message as it isn't in the ME.

This might have worked if the insurgency had not broken out. Instead it gave us five years of jihadist propaganda and videos of American hummvees exploding. It made for very poor intimidation if your target was the wider Middle Eastern populace. With regards to state actors, I doubt it made much of a difference. Iran certainly did not intimidate well - it was not long before they were killing Americans with far greater success and frequency than even the worst years in Lebanon. Syria's ties with Iran are tighter than ever, and Turkey as well. Certainly anti-Americanism in the region is as strong or stronger than ever before.

As for the invisible effects, I suppose it's a bit difficult to ever argue that point. Perhaps great benefits are accruing out of sight. I suppose you could say that about any policy.

[Ken White]

It made for very poor intimidation if your target was the wider Middle Eastern populace.

It was not. The "ME Street" is no more monolithic than is ours. The target was the coterie of shakers and movers that rule the various nations in the ME.

With regards to state actors, I doubt it made much of a difference.

It did, all have taken steps to clean up internally at least a bit in ways that show they received the message.

Iran certainly did not intimidate well - it was not long before they were killing Americans with far greater success and frequency than even the worst years in Lebanon.

I spent two years in Iran; they're a trip. They had a large empire -- several of them in fact -- before many others appeared. They are masters of bluff and bluster and are very aware of just how far they can push; they've been pushing to the limit (which has changed from time to time) since 1979. They simply took advantage of the fact we were busy with an 'insurgency' that was mostly our fault due to that flawed execution. I'd have expected no less from them. Still, there will be no Iaqi - Irani conflation and the Sunni Arabs and Turks in the ME are not about to let a bunch of Persians achieve any sort of hegemony; lot of long term antipathy there.

Syria's ties with Iran are tighter than ever, and Turkey as well. No worries IMO.

Syria isn't a problem -- Turkey will be a significant problem in a few years but that was going to happen with or without our Iraq adventure. It's been building since the early '50s. The real flipping issue there was the Turkish Armed forces getting cozy with and buying from the Israelis -- the religious Turks couldn't stand that so they won the vote in '03 -- been down hill ever since and going to get worse before it gets better and Iraq had and has little to do with it...

Certainly anti-Americanism in the region is as strong or stronger than ever before.

That's true and was, I believe, anticipated by us and a decision was made to accept it. Anti-Americanism has been prevalent around the world since I started traveling abroad in 1946 as a teen age military dependent. It waxes and wanes dependent upon many variables -- across the world, it's far less severe now than it wan at the height of Viet Nam.

As for the invisible effects, I suppose it's a bit difficult to ever argue that point. Perhaps great benefits are accruing out of sight. I suppose you could say that about any policy.

Except as those invisible efforts -- not effects -- become visible their effect can be ascertained and are generally visible for all to see. The greatness of benefit is in the of the beneficiary...

Not sure about policies -- I thought we were talking about actions...