Training observations

[Red Rat]

12 years later. What would be interesting is what the ranks of the the officers with Boer War experience were at the time of the Boer War. This also for the senior NCOs.

For the officers generally Major & above. The Boer War was unique in the annals of British Imperial military history in that it had an institutional effect on the British Army, most probably because it involved most of the British Army. It would be interesting to see what % of the US Army (Active & Reserve) have participated on operations in Iraq & Afghanistan.

Bought the book on Kindle, thank you.

You are very welcome. I'm sorry to say that I don't receive commission!

It was a cock-up.

The decision to stay and get involved with 'nation building' rather than leave after the Taliban broke and ran for Pakistan with the threat to come back if AQ ever returned was a catastrophic error.

it will be interesting to see what Chilcott says on the matter. What Chilcott has revealed so far is the absence of any coherent strategic decision making apparatus. That said, the UK does generally get a Government it voted for & that reflects society at large.

It is at this 'lower tactical level' that future senior officers and senior NCOs learn their trade. The question is whether these future generals and sergeants major have been exposed to war/combat/operations sufficiently to give them the needed grounding? Or did they just have the odd 6 months tour over a number of years?

Well, in a year on operations on the Western Front in 1916 the average subaltern would spend 101 days at the front of which 2/3 would be in frontline trenches. So a FOB deployed subaltern (as most Infantry platoons were) in Afghanistan would fit in slightly more frontline time (circa 150 days) then his 1916 contemporary. The difference of course being that a subaltern in WW1 had 4 x 101 whereas in Afghanistan a subaltern in 4 years would expect to deploy only twice. I'm not aware of WW2 being significantly different in terms of ratios, but I would have to do more analysis.

How exactly does all this improve the Brit military as a fighting force?

On the plus side:
Better targeting cycles
Better ISTAR
Better medical support
Better C-IED
All Pl Sgt & Coy Comds (and above) are operationally experienced, most combat proven.

On the minus side aspects of basic field craft are down (the Afghan snake is still too prevalent) and our planning cycles remain cumbersome and tempo low. At the strategic level an emphasis on the Army has lead to a haemorrhaging of Navy capabilities which I think the UK will rue in the long term.

Whenever I hear of reorgs and reshapings I think of this quote:

“We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. Presumably the plans for our employment were being changed. I was to learn later in life that, perhaps because we are so good at organizing, we tend as a nation to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.” - Charlton Ogburn, pp. 32-33, “Merrill’s Marauders: The truth about an incredible adventure,” Harper’s Magazine, January 1957 Previously flasely attributed to Gaius Petronius Arbiter

Phew! We're only doing the one!

Well that is another self inflicted wound.

The Brit rotation was 6 months in Afghan and then 18 months sitting around doing apparently very little before the next tour.

I asked again and again (in the Afghan thread) whether the most productive use of the 18 months had been made. No satisfactory reply. I am left to assume that the Brits being financial over extended anyway that there were no respources available to continue with training in other phases/types of warfare.

It was a self-inflicted wound. But there was no political or military appetite to break the army out of shape. Britain was committed to operations in Afghanistan, the nation & the Army were not at war per se. Was it smart? IMHO no, but it suited the Army to do what it did the way it did it. The fact that no politician would sign off on anything that looked like a deeper more enduring commitment to Afghanistan is in my opinion just a happy coincidence. Conflicts reflect the nature of the societies that wage them and the UK military commitment precisely matched the UK political commitment.

I would suggest that an important statistic is rather what percentage of officers and senior NCOs with significant combat exposure are retained to be in place for the next war ... and having passed on their experience in the intervening period.

I agree, but we cannot keep them in if they do not want to stay. Many I suspect will leave because of the lack of operational opportunities.

PS: good to see you back posting. May be travelling to mud-island shortly, you around?

Long weekend! Back to the grind tomorrow. I'm around all summer; it would be good to meet up again. I'd better warn you now though, the island is not so much muddy as sunken in the bottom half!