Suppressive Fire

[Ken White]

rapid -- not necessarily automatic weapon -- fire in some ambush counteraction or surprise situation. However, in my observation, there's no 'rule of thumb' as to when and where to use the technique. Each situation and terrain set poses variables. For example, in a jungle setting, a turn into the ambush positions and rapid semi-aimed (never spray and pray -- so jcustis is also right IMO) and an assault will often be beneficial. If, however, you have a really competent enemy, they will have anticipated that if your forces use it as a technique of choice and will have mined or otherwise prepared to prove that's not always a smart choice.

Won't work too well in urban combat. Or in some cases in the mountains. Equally obviously, trying that in the desert or any open terrain -- or in deep snow -- will put you at some risk...

Immediate Suppression by Artillery can be still used, it isn't necessarily for ATGM crews alone. Conducting a good aerial, ground or just a map reconnaissance and establishing targets at likely enemy positions along a your movement route long predates ATGMs. It is really effective, particularly in those big open areas and the Arctic or heavy snow though not so much in Cities, Jungle or dense woods...

METT-TC...

[Kiwigrunt]

Not sure if it is still the case, but for our recon platoons it was SOP for the first man in a contact to empty a mag on full auto in the general direction, after that everyone went to semi.

A few excerpts from “Sleeping with your ears open” by Gary Mckay, about Australian SAS in Nam.

Page 43:

The amount of ammunition carried by the SAS on patrol in Bornea was far less than they carried in Viet Nam, as the threat of enemy contact was far greater in the Viet Nam campaign. Because there was little chance of resupply once a contact started, the troopers used to carry whatever they thought they would need to get out of trouble.

It goes on to say that a 5 man patrol would typically have one 203/M16 and perhaps two more M16s. At least two guys would carry a select fire SLR with 30 shot mags. These

gave a very good initial burst of fire in a contact and gave the SAS patrol considerable firepower for a five-man group. An SAS contact drill often sounded like a 30-man platoon in contact when they opened fire instead of just five men.

One member mentions 240 to 250 rounds carried for the SLR and some 400 for the M16.

Page 97 (just thought I’d add this bit)
One member says:

The SLR was actually designed with a holding open device so that on the last shot of the magazine it held open and so you could carry out an immediate action drill really easy, but that’s no good for a parade ground, you can’t have people messing around on the parade ground like this. So, the hierarchy of the Australian army [and the NZ and I think also the UK] said remove the pin. Our armourers put a pin where it was supposed to be..

Page 187:

The expression that ‘bull#### baffles brains’ is very true in the SAS notion of throwing as much lead at the enemy to get him to keep his head down while the patrol took off. The other thing that also helped was the reports from the weapons. The 7.62 SLR was a noisy beast which didn’t go bang, it went boom! […] when you get these beasts firing on automatic and in unison, the noise level was dramatic.

As one member recalls:

…and if you had those bloody SLRs on fully automatic, firing a 30-round magazine, and if the flash eliminator was taken off it, you would think, ‘####! What have I hit here?’ Because it sounded heavy, and fast, and automatic, and it would just make old Charlie think, ‘####, I’ve hit something big here’ and it would stop them, rather than race in and try to take you out. Because they think they have hit so much firepower, it’s at least a bloody company, and by that time we’ve got ourselves on a back bearing and ####ed off out of there. But, once that first magazine was gone, from then on that was our rules, you fired well aimed, single shots.” “…if you’ve got three SLRs on fully automatic with a 30–round magazine, s##t flies everywhere.

I’d say that this would work well in very close terrain, at very short range. Beyond that it would probably be a waste of ammo for rifles.

I have linked this article some time ago and do it again because I think it makes for an interesting read. Its ‘Bang on target’ on page 139.
Also note the ‘role of the infantry’ early on. Hehehe.

[Blah]

I have linked this article some time ago and do it again because I think it makes for an interesting read. Its ‘Bang on target’ on page 139.
Also note the ‘role of the infantry’ early on. Hehehe.

It certainly was an interesting read, as I've heard much more disapproval over full-auto in an M16 than praise for it.

I personally think that a 7.62x51 rifle would be better for jungle fighting, although I suspect I'm in the minority. My rationale is that the 7.62 will penetrate dense vegetation better than the 5.56, and would thus provide a greater killing/suppressive effect.

[Ken White]

It certainly was an interesting read, as I've heard much more disapproval over full-auto in an M16 than praise for it.

As a Reconnaissance Platoon Sergeant in 1966, I enforced a firm no automatic fire rule for that reason. No problems once I bounced a Steel Helmet off one guys back in a firefight because he violated the rule...

I personally think that a 7.62x51 rifle would be better for jungle fighting, although I suspect I'm in the minority. My rationale is that the 7.62 will penetrate dense vegetation better than the 5.56, and would thus provide a greater killing/suppressive effect.

I very much agree but would note that the 7.62 was a big problem for the little Viet Namese. For most western troops, the 7.62 would be a better pick in heavy vegetation for the reason you mention.

Would you guys disapprove or approve the use of full-auto in rifles during Vietnam? Considering that that article quoted above states that the line of sight was often not much more than 5 meters in front of them, and that many engagements were around 15 meters.

First, I would disapprove -- full auto fire is only rarely effective and therefor rarely beneficial. Techniques always have to be adjusted to operating modes and METT-TC. That adjustment must be constant, you've got to assess each day and change modes when appropriate..

Secondly, the linked article must be analyzed with caution. The Australian Area of Operations was unique in several respects and the Australian and US Armies had differing operating philosophies.. Note that most of their contact were in ambushes or reactions to them -- negligible 'hot LZs.' Most American units had different experiences, more helicopter assaults, fewer ambushes and more meeting engagements.

I read that article last year and I understand what they say -- but I have reservations about their conclusion. Strong reservations. Much depends on the enemy and the terrain / vegetation but as a general rule, massive volume fire in several varieties of all that are in my observation rarely as effective as a smaller volume of accurate fire -- accurate not being one shot, one kill but fire directed very near the proper target. One problem with the high volume of fire folks is that most of that fire will go in places where no opponent is located. It's wasted. If it's automatic, about 2/3 of it will be high...

[JMA]

First, I would disapprove -- full auto fire is only rarely effective and therefor rarely beneficial. Techniques always have to be adjusted to operating modes and METT-TC. That adjustment must be constant, you've got to assess each day and change modes when appropriate..

I once fired one magazine on automatic (2LTs do the craziest things). Learnt enough from that never to do it again ... nor to allow any of my troops to do that either. We carried the FN MAG on a ratio of 1:4 so we really got all the firepower we needed from that baby. The riflemen were fillers, always (at least) one facing backwards and unlike the conventional training where the machine gun was deployed on the higher ground flank we pushed it right up front to be there and operating in those first critical seconds when contact is made.

So how does the gunner fire? - bursts of 2-3 rounds in a controlled fashion.

So how did the riflemen fire? - single rounds or at most double taps in a controlled fashion.

Secondly, the linked article must be analyzed with caution. The Australian Area of Operations was unique in several respects and the Australian and US Armies had differing operating philosophies.. Note that most of their contact were in ambushes or reactions to them -- negligible 'hot LZs.' Most American units had different experiences, more helicopter assaults, fewer ambushes and more meeting engagements.

With caution indeed. I have a massive problem with averaging the number of rounds fired per kill achieved. Not sure what the point is as every contact is unique and different in one way or tuther enough to question the value of the finding.

I read that article last year and I understand what they say -- but I have reservations about their conclusion. Strong reservations. Much depends on the enemy and the terrain / vegetation but as a general rule, massive volume fire in several varieties of all that are in my observation rarely as effective as a smaller volume of accurate fire -- accurate not being one shot, one kill but fire directed very near the proper target. One problem with the high volume of fire folks is that most of that fire will go in places where no opponent is located. It's wasted. If it's automatic, about 2/3 of it will be high...

I would add that for raw unexperienced troops the noise of battle can be intimidating. However, combat experienced troops know and are able to differentiate between the odd stray round and really close stuff. One just needs to watch the difference in reaction to battlefield "bangs" between new guys and the old soldiers.

In a fire force setting where one could be close to a contact but not personally and physically involved the last thing you needed was troopies ducking and flinching every time a high miss or ricochet passed overhead. We needed to upgrade the battle inoculation part of our training.

Simply put find a piece of bush which will pass for a range. Get the troopies to lie (section at a time) on the firing point. Get your sergeant to fire over their heads high and close so that they can differentiate between stray shots and the real deal. (The Health and Safety Gestapo will never allow this - so that is why I suggest you just disappear into the bush somewhere.) Let the distances vary from 100-150m to 10m. And close is as close as possible.

Also use different weapons (theirs and ours) so that they learn to ID the various weapons at various ranges.

The need result is that you realise when you can clearly hear the shots they are probably not aimed at you but when the noise (of the crack) turns into a "sensation" then you know he wants to convert you into a notch on his buttstock.

[Fuchs]

I actually took price at the fact that on the firing range I was able to put four to five rounds into a kneeling target at 30 m with my G3 on full auto. The first impact was usually low left (hip), the last one in the opposite shoulder.

Such a burst coupled with the quality of the German 7.62NATO bullet ends every doubt about "stopping power".

[JMA]

I actually took price at the fact that on the firing range I was able to put four to five rounds into a kneeling target at 30 m with my G3 on full auto. The first impact was usually low left (hip), the last one in the opposite shoulder.

Such a burst coupled with the quality of the German 7.62NATO bullet ends every doubt about "stopping power".

There are different people with different skills. The fact that a small minority of soldiers are capable of the controlled, accurate and discriminate use of automatic rifle fire should not open the door for the indiscriminate use of automatic fire in panic or otherwise by soldiers who find themselves in difficult circumstances.

It is rather when the crunch comes that the quality of the training should come out.

If you want to know what can go wrong read the Wanat study

A few quotes:

... Bogar had fired about 600 rounds at the cyclic rate of fire when his “SAW jammed, basically it just got way overheated because he opened the feed tray cover and I remember him trying to get it open and it just looked like the bolt had welded itself inside the chamber. His barrel was just white hot.”

and

McKaig began to experience problems with his M4. “My weapon was overheating. I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn’t charge my weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and threw my weapon down.”

Soldiers should train as they intend to fight. If you believe that automatic fire is OK then make the additional ammo available for training. No training on auto, use of it on ops... end of story.

Lets get back to the hotdog posers who insist on using an AK-47. I would suggest that they pony up the cost of 1,000 rounds of the ammo and pass a shooting table and weapon handling (stoppage drills etc) then their request can be considered.

The stopping power of the NATO 7.62 is undisputed. Can't think what the Americans were thinking when they introduced that pea-shooter firing 5.56?

[Markus]

As a Reconnaissance Platoon Sergeant in 1966, I enforced a firm no automatic fire rule for that reason. No problems once I bounced a Steel Helmet off one guys back in a firefight because he violated the rule...

What do you think about the idea of issuing semi-only rifles to the troops, or to the new troops? Would you support it?

[Ken White]

What do you think about the idea of issuing semi-only rifles to the troops, or to the new troops? Would you support it?

One could go semi-auto only without too great a penalty but there is a need for very, very rare full auto fire. Some ambush situations, breaking contact, CQB in buildings and the like. Not always in those examples but sometimes...

For combat, better to have a capability that one may use rarely than to not have it when one might need it. In this case, given little additional complexity, small to no weight increase (other than ammo usage...) ease of manufacture and such, there is no significant burden attached to the weapon. The training requirement is increased but only slightly.

Using semi-auto only weapons is essentially a technological cover for inadequate training. The full-auto problems of lack of accuracy and excessive ammo expenditure are obviated by better training. Thus the weapon should not be the issue, training should be. All things considered, best to keep the capability and train better.

[JMA]

One could go semi-auto only without too great a penalty but there is a need for very, very rare full auto fire. Some ambush situations, breaking contact, CQB in buildings and the like. Not always in those examples but sometimes...

For combat, better to have a capability that one may use rarely than to not have it when one might need it. In this case, given little additional complexity, small to no weight increase (other than ammo usage...) ease of manufacture and such, there is no significant burden attached to the weapon. The training requirement is increased but only slightly.

Using semi-auto only weapons is essentially a technological cover for inadequate training. The full-auto problems of lack of accuracy and excessive ammo expenditure are obviated by better training. Thus the weapon should not be the issue, training should be. All things considered, best to keep the capability and train better.

The one issue that relates to the weapon and its design is the sequence of the change lever switching. For example the AK goes Safe-Auto-Single, while the FAL FN goes Safe-Single-Auto. This has an impact with (as you say) undertrained troops.

[JMA]

Not sure if it is still the case, but for our recon platoons it was SOP for the first man in a contact to empty a mag on full auto in the general direction, after that everyone went to semi.

A few excerpts from “Sleeping with your ears open” by Gary Mckay, about Australian SAS in Nam.

I suggest that one needs to be aware of the difference between "small team" recce work and standard infantry patrolling (even for line infantry battalion recce platoons).

There is a real danger that line infantry try to emulate SF and this leads to their missing the boat.

I will try to stay within a response to what you quoted.

Page 43: The amount of ammunition carried by the SAS on patrol in Bornea was far less than they carried in Viet Nam, as the threat of enemy contact was far greater in the Viet Nam campaign. Because there was little chance of resupply once a contact started, the troopers used to carry whatever they thought they would need to get out of trouble.

The troopers personally decide how much ammo to carry? Like we hear that they should be able to decide what weapon they want to carry?

Ridiculous. The patrol commander must dictate the ammo load each man carries.

The second is the attitude (probably correct for a SAS 5 man recce patrol deep in Indian territory) that having a contact represents "trouble". For the majority of line infantry patrols that is what the purpose of the patrol is (or at least should be) and presents the opportunity to close with and kill the enemy.

... [These wepaons] gave a very good initial burst of fire in a contact and gave the SAS patrol considerable firepower for a five-man group. An SAS contact drill often sounded like a 30-man platoon in contact when they opened fire instead of just five men.

The intention was [for the 5 man team] to break contact so spray and pray was the order of the day. Even if the formation did not allow for each of the 5 men to fire in the direction of the enemy the drill was probably to empty a magazine or whatever and break contact and start to withdraw.

A line infantry patrol would not select a formation suitable for a shoot and scoot breaking of contact but rather one which will allow them to best follow up with the required offensive action. I have mentioned before that with the kind of low level enemies we see these days the initial exchange of fire is critical to 1) win the fire fight, and 2) to get some kills before they can get away. That is why machine guns should be positioned and distributed among the formation to apply an accurate volume of fire in the opening seconds of the contact (for the purposes mentioned and not in order to break contact like an SAS patrol typically would).

Page 97: The SLR was actually designed with a holding open device so that on the last shot of the magazine it held open and so you could carry out an immediate action drill really easy, but that’s no good for a parade ground, you can’t have people messing around on the parade ground like this. So, the hierarchy of the Australian army [and the NZ and I think also the UK] said remove the pin. Our armourers put a pin where it was supposed to be..

I don't know what the point of this is? Troopies (even in the mighty SAS) should be made/trained to count their rounds. If you start with recruits and sustain the requirement with trained soldiers it works. Actually peer pressure
takes over and sustains it. The troopie who is seen to "flinch" on the trigger of an empty weapon was subjected to merciless ribbing from the other troopies - nothing a troopie likes less than being called a *#@$*#@ wanker by his mates. So don't alter the weapon... train the soldiers.

Page 187: The expression that ‘bull#### baffles brains’ is very true in the SAS notion of throwing as much lead at the enemy to get him to keep his head down while the patrol took off. The other thing that also helped was the reports from the weapons. The 7.62 SLR was a noisy beast which didn’t go bang, it went boom! […] when you get these beasts firing on automatic and in unison, the noise level was dramatic.

On automatic? Maybe good for a SAS 5 man recce team when they desperately need to break contact but for the line infantry? This is not something line infantry should try to emulate.

…and if you had those bloody SLRs on fully automatic, firing a 30-round magazine, and if the flash eliminator was taken off it, you would think, ‘####! What have I hit here?’ Because it sounded heavy, and fast, and automatic, and it would just make old Charlie think, ‘####, I’ve hit something big here’ and it would stop them, rather than race in and try to take you out. Because they think they have hit so much firepower, it’s at least a bloody company, and by that time we’ve got ourselves on a back bearing and ####ed off out of there. But, once that first magazine was gone, from then on that was our rules, you fired well aimed, single shots.” “…if you’ve got three SLRs on fully automatic with a 30–round magazine, s##t flies everywhere.

That sounds like what they would like to believe the enemy are thinking. The problem always is that if you don't kill the enemy involved in the contact they learn from it too. They may be saying OK if you contact the SAS they wildly and blindly fire a magazine each then pull back down their line of approach. Give then a couple of such contacts and even low grade enemy will figure out a counter measure.

But again this is not a feasible tactic for line infantry patrols of section and platoon strength (METT-TC considered of course). That said if the drill is (for line infantry) to break contact with the Taliban rather than press home an attack then that development and emasculation of the infantry is a good enough reason to pack up and go home.

In summary then. What is/was good tacticlly for 5 man SAS recce patrols is unlikely to be good for a standard line infantry patrol. Different roles and missions require different tactics.

[JMA]

rapid -- not necessarily automatic weapon -- fire in some ambush counteraction or surprise situation. However, in my observation, there's no 'rule of thumb' as to when and where to use the technique. Each situation and terrain set poses variables. For example, in a jungle setting, a turn into the ambush positions and rapid semi-aimed (never spray and pray -- so jcustis is also right IMO) and an assault will often be beneficial.

Yes in the main but... IMHO you can't leave it to commanders down to fire team level to figure it all out in the heat of the battle.

For guidance we look to the Brits:

From Land Operations Part 2 - Jungle (code 70736 - part 2) we get:

Immediate Action Drills Troops moving through close country are likely to encounter the enemy very suddenly at very short range. To ensure that they react immediately and sensibly and to give the commander time to carry out a quick battle appreciation, immediate action drills must be laid down to allow for contact with the enemy from any direction. The drills must be:

a. Simple So that they can be clearly understood by every man and carried out automatically without any further orders.

b. Immediate So that the enemy is caught off balance and the the initiative is regained or exploited.

c. Aggressive In order to inflict the maximum casualties and retain or gain the initiative.

Working from this base the Rhodesians formulated/developed/refined Encounter Actions as follows:

The Encounter Actions

1. It is important to note that although encounter actions are usually taught on a section basis, they can be adopted for use by a platoon. These actions are applicable to the varied forms of terrain and in all cases normal infantry minor tactics or section and platoon battle drills usually apply after the initial contact. These encounter actions are a sound framework on which leaders at all levels should build as their experience dictates. it should be remembered, however, that no action, drill or order will achieve success unless the leader and men have practiced them to a stage of instinctive action, reflex and immediate reaction to firm and confident initiative on the part of the leader.

2. If a patrol is accompanied by persons who have little or no knowledge of encounter actions, e.g., guides, informers, surrendered terrorists, etc., the patrol leader should keep them strictly under control and in his view. These persons should be briefed as thoroughly as possible before the patrol starts. It may prove as well to rehearse encounter actions for these persons or even for inexperienced troops before a patrol moves out on operations.

3. Encounters with enemy could fall under one of the following headings:

Situation A. The initiative is with the military forces (terrorists seen first). Reaction: Immediate ambush.

Situation B. The initiative is split between the military forces and the enemy (simultaneous sighting). Reaction: Immediate offensive action.

Situation C. The initiative is with the terrorist (military forces are fired on with small arms or are ambushed). Reaction: Immediate offensive action to an enemy ambush.

Read more here

With (combat) experience commanders can develop and refine this drills to suit local conditions (enemy and terrain). And by experience I mean experience and not only having been on the receiving end of the odd angry shot.