...but that is purely an issue for the Policy makers. Legitimacy is an entirely political idea. The job of the military is to destroy anyone contesting that legitimacy via violence. Military action, cannot and should not have anything to do with bestowing "legitimacy." -Originally Posted by Bob's World
In US policy terms only elected officials have any legitimacy, so the "idea" is purely political. Killing those who disagree enforces the policy!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
A sticky problem indeed...
First, of course, the only source that can "bestow legitimacy" to a government is the actual populace to be governed by the same. To reinforce, I said "enable" the establishment of a legitimate government.
I am enjoying very much working closely with MG Nick Carter, the Brit officer handpicked to lead the main effort here in the south of Afghanistan. The way "General Nick" describes the mission it is the "establishment of representative government and opportunity."
A couple hundred years ago others described it as "Government of, by and for the people" and the unalianable rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
The uniqueness of Afghanistan
The thread seems to have narrowed its focus from insurgency in general to Afghanistan. I believe that Afghanistan is a bad case to study if you are seeking to construct (or argue about) a taxonomy for insurgency, because it is as close to unique as any war can be.
1. By 2002, Afghanistan was ungoverned. The occupying power (that is us) then proceeded to try and impose a central government on the population. So far, not much different than what occupying powers have done for time immemorial. But we attempted much more than just creating a national authority; we sought to construct an entire governmental structure reaching down to the district level, disenfranchising both the traditional (tribal) and organic (warlords) local power centers. Moreover, this had to be a government that could survive the withdrawal of our forces at some unspecified future date, so it had to gain a certain amount of popular support - in other words, it required 'legitimacy' beyond that afforded through the right of conquest.
2. Unfortunately, we allowed competitors to arise who were trying to fill the governance vacuum at the same time we were. The difference between 'us' and 'them' is that they have no intention of withdrawing, ever. They will be able to sustain their version of an Afghan government with their bayonets, rather than rely strictly on popular support or legitimacy.
3. Even at this late date, there are still spaces in Afghanistan that have neither insurgents nor governance. In essence, we are acting as both insurgents and counterinsurgents. In some areas, we are trying to establish cadres, recruit supporters, and extend political power into virgin territories; in others we are locked in a contest with competitors seeking to do the same; in still other areas, we are conducting classic counterinsurgency or guarding sanctuaries for a weak central government whose goals increasingly diverge from our own.
I can't think of too many historical examples paralelling what is happening to day in Afghanistan. Therefore, using it as a case study to validate or invalidate the RAND study is a bit unfair. In taxonomical terms, Afghanistan is the platypus of the insurgency world.
Good point, Eden. It's always worth remembering that in many ways each insurgency is different, and we need to be prepared to select techniques and tools based on those differences, not some perceived similarity to another historical situation.
For what it's worth, Afghanistan reminds me more of Arizona in the 1860s and 1870s than it does many other recent insurgency examples.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Good point Steve. I was wondering if you were going to bring this up. This weekend, I was thinking pre-Westphalian. I wondered how long it took many of the states outside the original 13 to consider themselves Americans and part of the US?
We didn't exactly ask Florida to join the Union. Andrew Jackson just kinda pulled them in.
v/r
Mike
For some it was quite a long time...and there were often competing issues and drives. To take the Arizona example, you had at least three or four distinct tribal groups, a recently-arrived Anglo population with divergent interests (although most were focused on mining, but there was the North-South current active along with a deep dislike for the tribal population) and a Hispanic populace that had only recently adjusted to the new arrivals. New Mexico had a similar experience, colored by the powerful presence of the Navajo peoples (prior to 1863 or 1864, at least). And as you get further north, the picture shifts to a degree.
I like to compare Arizona in some ways to Afghanistan due to the competing power centers and populations, who for some time were on an almost equal footing. The Apache and Pai peoples had been raiding and been raided by the Hispanic population for generations, and looked upon the Anglos as newcomers of uncertain disposition. The Anglos tended to view the tribal population as obstacles to the exploitation of the land's mineral resources, but they also viewed the national government (including the Army) as an obstacle to their preferred solution or unresponsive to their problem. In turn, many Army officers saw the Anglo population of Arizona as an obstacle to their preferred peaceful solutions. And to further color things, many of the Anglos were Southern sympathizers who let sectional differences color their responses to government actions or programs. Simplified picture to be sure, but I don't want to bore anyone too much with heavy details.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Possibly so, but what applicability do US definitions of legitimacy have to Afghanistan? Isn’t it the Afghans who have to decide whether or not a government is legitimate? If we decide for them and try to kill all who disagree we may find ourselves set for a whole lot of killing.
Agreed. But if you look at the first line of the Rand study:
It seems that the authors of the study consider the conclusions applicable to the current conflict. That’s what I was questioning.Insurgencies have dominated the focus of the U.S. military for the past seven years, but they have a much longer history than that and are likely to figure prominently in future U.S. military operations. Thus, the general characteristics of insurgencies and, more important, how they end are of great interest to U.S. policymakers.
Won’t a political vacuum always call up competition for the right to fill it? Maybe instead of seeing the indigenous actors that arose to try and fill that vacuum as “them” or “the competition” we could have tried to work with them… after all, as you say, they are at least indigenous and will not be withdrawing. They may well represent those local power structures that we have disenfranchised, and as such they might well enjoy as much or more popular support and legitimacy than our version of governance.
It seems that somewhere along the line our original goal in Afghanistan – drive out AQ and assure that they don’t return – was elevated to the much larger goal of constructing “an entire governmental structure reaching down to the district level”. That’s a beautiful goal, but I’m not sure that we’ve the capacity to achieve it, or that the Afghans particularly want foreigners to design and build their government.
Did we intervene to elevate one faction above others? I don’t think so. Seems to me we intervened purely in pursuit of our own interests, to remove a “government” that we disliked and assure that the subsequent government would not provide a safe haven for AQ. The faction we ended up elevating didn’t exist prior to our intervention.
The core conflict at the moment is us vs the Taliban, and I don’t see how you can call that a civil war. If we were intervening in support of a pre-existing government, yes, that would be civil war with foreign participation. That's not what we're doing. We're an occupying power trying to install a government that suits us, and our enemies not unreasonably perceive us to be their primary antagonist. If the dominant party to a conflict is a foreign occupying power, I can't see that conflict as a civil war.
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