Personal Security Teams for BN COs

[Cavguy]

Now I know LTC Nagl got out quite a bit, as do many other LTCs and SGMs...but do they all? I'm not pointing fingers, nor casting aspersions on anyone's bravery, but speculating on what are organizational realities.

I'll state that in the course of two tours and 29 months in Iraq, all maneuver commanders up to BDE level were out almost daily, maybe taking 1 day off a week. This applies under under 1AD, 2ACR, 101st ABN(AA), 172d Stryker, 1 MEF, and 2 MEF.

I have never seen the "helicopter commanders" of 'Nam lore or anything else. My OIF 1 commander patrolled twice daily and was at the forefront of every fight against the Sadr Militia in April-June 2004. My OIF 05-07 commander was out daily and lived in the same compound with his IA BDE CDR and town mayor in Tal Afar. I lived an outpost in the Tal Afar Granary with my IA BN CDR.

I never saw any other units where the commander could be described as a fobbit. The logistics CO's didn't get out as much, but I know they took convoys as well. They also didn't have responsibilities for terrain outside the wire. Log units may be different, but almost every combat arms commander I have seen is out there in his sector almost daily up to BDE Level. Even the Division GO's were flying and accompanying patrols several times a week. BG Neller, 1 MEF ADC, was constantly on the road in Anbar with his PSD. BG Oates in the 101st was the same.

I just haven't seen it. Maybe there are a few "fobbit" maneuver commanders out there, but it's by far not the norm.

Rob, RTK, and other soldiers may want to chime in with their experiences.

[Steve Blair]

Always good to get as many perspectives in as possible. Like I said, I wasn't pointing fingers but rather probing for posts like yours. My contention has always been that the Army (at least at the sharp edge of things) is learning MUCH faster this time around than they have during any other conflict in their history, and it's good to see field-side experiences backing this idea up.

[Cavguy]

Always good to get as many perspectives in as possible. Like I said, I wasn't pointing fingers but rather probing for posts like yours. My contention has always been that the Army (at least at the sharp edge of things) is learning MUCH faster this time around than they have during any other conflict in their history, and it's good to see field-side experiences backing this idea up.

I heard the lore of the helicopter CO's from ROTC forward, and I think it was beaten into the post-Vietnam generation to lead from the front as one of the carryovers from the frustrated junior commanders in Nam.

[RTK]

Rob, RTK, and other soldiers may want to chime in with their experiences.

Both OIF I and OIF III I saw the Squadron and Regimental commanders and CSms in the populace daily. Very seldom were they not "outside the wire." They led from the front, engaged the populace, got blown up quite a bit, and did their jobs as commanders and Soldiers. I'd follow them anywhere because of it.

[Ken White]

but were very much point of time in the war, unit and type organization peculiar. Many of those who tried to scuttle to the rear were not so much multiple tour types but WW II and Korean veterans who had been there and done that in a prior war -- and who were old, out of shape and were tactically rusty because they had been hiding out in homesteading jobs in the odd nooks and crannies of the Army for years. In short, most line units were better off without them. The Army is over-ranked in any event (IMO).

Their numbers are also overstated. Senior officers and NCOs hugging the Fire Bases and Base Camps or seeking rear area jobs was a minor issue but it was virtually non-existent in 65-66 and got only slightly worse as each succeeding rotation came in and the Army dipped further in the pool of RC unit advisers, multi year Recruiting tour types and others who had been away from TOE units for many years and who were considerably older than the norm and than is true today. Even so, many of those old guys got out with great frequency. Far more myths in the 'history' books about Viet Nam than there should be...

Phone calls and e-mails from my son when deployed to both the 'Stan and Iraq the last five years agree with RTK. Most Commanders and senior NCOs were getting out a great deal and generally not in the interfering mode. The few that did not are again a unit personality / individual proclivity problem.

To corroborate another thing Steve said, as a long time observer of the scene, post Viet Nam there were accessions in the 70s of what would eventually be senior NCOs in the 90s that were of less than stellar quality. Most of them are now gone but a few are still in. They got promoted due to keeping their nose clean and doing little but surviving long enough to get time in grade and get relatively easy promotions. Their successors, recruited in the 80s and 90s are a different kettle of fish entirely. Most are sharp and go-getters.

Still, there will always those who believe as did Eisenhower's Army Service Force Commander at the end of WW II; "Now we can get back to real soldiering" or Grand Duke Constantine Petrovich Romanov; "I detest war, it spoils armies." They like the neatness and order of peacetime 'soldiering' and of a large conventional opponent they can talk about and not have to fight. COIN is messy and everyone is not really flexible enough to cope. Usually those types get spotted and forced to behave properly but a few will always slip through.

They just need to get nailed by Commanders and other Senior NCOs.

[Dennis]

I will echo Cavguy and RTK, from my view during OEF IV and OIF III, CDRs and CSMs were out on a regular basis. Leading from the front as they should.

DWF

[Cavguy]

Still, there will always those who believe as did Eisenhower's Army Service Force Commander at the end of WW II; "Now we can get back to real soldiering" or Grand Duke Constantine Petrovich Romanov; "I detest war, it spoils armies."

Can you point me to a book source for these quotes - google has failed me. I want to use them in a paper.

[Ken White]

Can you point me to a book source for these quotes - google has failed me. I want to use them in a paper.

The War Between the Generals (Irving). Unfortunately, I gave my copy to one of my sons and I can't give you the page number. Irving has been discredited as a holocaust denier and he's sort of anti UK /US in tone but that book came out long before he went off the deep end and while some of it has been refuted, most agree his anecdotes are probably correct because that was his specialty as an amateur historian; gossip. I should have said "or words to that effect," as well -- my quote was accurate in intent but it's been a while, 25 years or so, since I read the book so it's probably not verbatim. That recollection, like the source of the other is good enough for a forum but not for a paper.

The Grand Duke Constantine quote is from Strategy Page (LINK). Hutchinson gets wild now and then but he does do a lot of research, I suspect it's probably true. Like you, I had no luck on Google but I did turn up this LINK to a paper that suggests he might well have said that and more...

The Wikipedia article would seem to bear that out... LINK. Not much help and I'm sure you saw both.

If I can get hold of the kid, I'll get him to check the book and I'll also look for more on the Romanov quote.

[Ken White]

Kid is on a short deployment and I haven't had a chance to hit the book store to check out the "We can get back to real soldiering" quote. Did go to dinner a couple of nights ago with an old - old friend who recalled the quote and said he was pretty sure it was alleged to have been said by this guy:

LINK.

Will keep looking.

[SGTMILLS]

I can only speak from the two tours I have done in Iraq, so here it goes...
1. Our BDE CSM is an OUTSTANDING leader. Like I said in an earlier post, he was constantly on missions.
2. Our CO went on missions a bunch of times, but only at his convenience. (rightfully so)
3. Our First SGT went on a total of 3 missions, but everyone knew he wasn't up for the task, he was just doing his time. The reality of this is that we knew that going in. Our PLT SGTs made up for it. The lower ranks caught on about half way through the last tour. We explained it away and kept the lowers off the subject.
Our CO did NOT have a PSD, but our mission was not heavily laden with tasks requiring him to be on the forefront. The only reason the CSM had one is because he had troops in 3-4 different AO's.
To sum up my explination...i can see how some first timers, or newbies can get fed up with poor leaders, but the "poor leaders" are few and far between. The fix? Strive to be a better soldier than those leaders. Hell, strive to be a better leader than the good ones. Every soldier can take notes from good leaders on how to, and from poor leaders on how NOT to.

[Uboat509]

I am confused. What were your 1SG and CSM doing on missions? I could see if it was a company mission having the 1SG but other than that he should not be there. 1SG and CSM are administrative positions. THe PSGs shouldn't be making up for the 1SG. It is their job to lead their platoons, not the 1SG. Personally we can't stand it when the company SGM or BN CSM come on missions with us. They are a distractor. For that matter the Company Commander should be staying out it unless it is a company mission. If it is a platoon mission, the platoon already has a leader, one who does not need his boss standing over his shoulder. I can understand going out once in a while just to check on things but more than that and they are in the way. Look at it this way. When the company commander goes out with a platoon he no longer can focus as effectively on the company mission, he is focused on the platoon he is with and a commander's job is to be where he can have the greatest effect on his entire AO.

SFC W

[Stan]

To corroborate another thing Steve said, as a long time observer of the scene, post Viet Nam there were accessions in the 70s of what would eventually be senior NCOs in the 90s that were of less than stellar quality. Most of them are now gone but a few are still in. They got promoted due to keeping their nose clean and doing little but surviving long enough to get time in grade and get relatively easy promotions. Their successors, recruited in the 80s and 90s are a different kettle of fish entirely. Most are sharp and go-getters.

Hey Ken, Great detailed post !
Ya know, those would be some real crusty ol' folks now, if they were senior NCOs in the 90s

Are they allowed to still be around 25 years later

Jokes aside, you hit the nail on the head. The senior NCOs from my days in the early 70s were a sad case for the Army as well as for me in an ADA Battery.

The caliber of people we have today will not stand for Os and Es hangin' around watching the others work - as it should be today.

Regards, Stan