Future Peer Competitor?

[Bill Moore]

Our technological advantage gives us an asymmetrical advantage that I would hate to lose. The fact that our Navy and Air Force can dominate the seas and the sky provides a superb level of protection from the more conventional types of attacks, which are still possible. Russia, China, North Korea, and emerging countries in our own hemisphere provide potential examples of possible conventional conflicts. I think States will have to go to war over precious resources whether it be oil or water within the next 20 years, and we'll probably get drug into the conflict, and having a dominating Navy and Air Force puts the Army in a better position to complete its task.

Of course the threat dujour is unconventional/irregular, and it will be around for the forseeable future, but that isn't the only threat. The problem is if you quit making those F22s, fast ships, etc., you lose the industry base, because those workers (high tech, high skill) will migrate to where the money is. The Companies will regear their machines to make something else (commercial not military), etc. and we run the risk 50 years down the road of losing that edge.

All that said, the investment right now needs to be weighted towards the ground forces and strategic lift to get them to the fight.

[120mm]

Let me be the first to surprise everyone by saying that, "Yes, Virginia, we need the F-22." Precisely because that airframe was designed to fight an unlikely war scenario, we need at least a few of them "as insurance". When we get surprised by an irrational state actor in the future, it will give us the time/space necessary to turn this rig around and face the threat.

But what we ALSO need is for the Air Force to acknowledge the actual, ongoing threat and support it with their heart and soul, and not just treat it as a distraction.

A big +1 for LawVol's pointing out the FCS.

[Steve Blair]

Let me be the first to surprise everyone by saying that, "Yes, Virginia, we need the F-22." Precisely because that airframe was designed to fight an unlikely war scenario, we need at least a few of them "as insurance". When we get surprised by an irrational state actor in the future, it will give us the time/space necessary to turn this rig around and face the threat.

But what we ALSO need is for the Air Force to acknowledge the actual, ongoing threat and support it with their heart and soul, and not just treat it as a distraction.

A big +1 for LawVol's pointing out the FCS.

I've always through the FCS was a waste of money, at least once the decision was made to turn it into something other than a test case. There's no harm in developing a few systems to see if they work, to push tech forward, and so on...but there needs to be a limit and an understanding that we can't bank the entire force on platforms that take 20 years to develop (that's where in my view the AF is constantly shooting itself in the foot).

Technology isn't always an answer. In fact, it can become a major weakness if taken to extremes. What happens when all your batteries die? How many do you need to lug into the field to remain effective? What would have happened if the flaw in the F-22's nav system hadn't been found during peacetime? Much as I like the idea of the Osprey, is it really worth saddling troops with a helicopter that has had problems since its introduction into service in the early 1960s (the CH-47/46 family) while we wait for the silver bullet to finish development?

I really think that 4% of the GDP is sufficient for defense...provided that the waste is actually CUT and not shifted to other black budgets or areas that don't come under review. Given DoD's poor record in this area, I think the question would be turned to "why SHOULD it be more than 4%?"

Rob makes good points regarding the longer-term benefits of being able to "do" COIN. You would have thought we'd learned our lesson about putting all our strategic option eggs in one basket during the era of Massive Retaliation, but perhaps we didn't.

[LawVol]

I really think that 4% of the GDP is sufficient for defense...provided that the waste is actually CUT and not shifted to other black budgets or areas that don't come under review. Given DoD's poor record in this area, I think the question would be turned to "why SHOULD it be more than 4%?"

I agree that DoD needs better oversight when it comes to spending money. I'm new to the acquisitions area and I'm constantly surprised by the fact that programs are constantly undervalued when it comes to bidding. It's almost like abait and switch routine. However, this problem does not eliminate the need for new technology. The pols are going to spend money anyway (have you heard some of the promises the prez candidates are making?), so it might as well be on something that could ensure our national security rather than millions for a bridge that 100 people and a few moose are going to use. Maybe defense contractors simply need to diversify their plants when it comes to location (more locations=more votes in congress; sad but true).

BUt I'm digressing again. My point is that I simply do not believe that the overall strategy of increasing our technological advantage is wrong. WHile specific programs, and possibly timing, may be at issue we simply cannot afford to let out potential competitors gain ground. The stakes are way too high.

Maybe we should have two air forces. One could be like the old Army Air Corps, focus on COIN, and work in tandem with the Army (i.e. the Army doesn;t get control, but gets a bigger say) while the other could focus on the big war. I'm sure costs would rule this out, but maybe it's worht considering?

[Steve Blair]

In terms of the two air component discussion, I'd think we'd do better to either increase Marine or Navy air assets to fill the COIN role. By chopping A-10s to Marine Air, and increasing the amount of medium and light lift aircraft they can operate (airframes of C-130 and smaller size) I think you'd hit a good balance. You could do the same with Navy air, although it would have to be land-based (which would cause a different set of problems to be sure). Giving the Army an increased medium to light lift capability would help, and also free up AF project funds for their own uses.

My fear with splitting the AF in that way is that you'd see the SAC vs. TAC mentality all over again, with MAC left out in the cold to get by with what was left over. If the AF doesn't want to deal with COIN now (and I have yet to be convinced that the majority of the service really DOES want to deal with it...there are of course exceptions), I can't see how splitting the funding between two "branches" of the AF would improve the situation. Keep the AF ready for major conflicts (as in more conventional engagements) and strip some of their small wars capability away and chop it to services (or branches) that have it as a day-to-day concern.

We may have to agree to disagree on some of these points, because I still do think that some of the AF's problems when it comes to airframe age and the like are of their own making (banking the future of the force on high-tech that takes decades to come down the pipeline and is subject to silver bullet design theories...an issue that in all fairness does impact the other services as well...like the Osprey, FCS, and other programs).

[FascistLibertarian]

There is no reason the US Navy has to be as big as it is. The concept that it must be able to fight two wars at the same time is just there to justify military spending.
The American M.I.C. is big government spending to prop up the economy. I agree America must stay ahead of its rivals but right now there is not arms race.
It makes no sense that the Army is funded less than the Navy and the Air Force when its being asked to do the most.
Think how many infantry could be trained and equiped for one f22.
In general the US M.I.C. needs more oversight, goals, and less pork.
just my 2 cents.

[LawVol]

I agree America must stay ahead of its rivals but right now there is not arms race.
It makes no sense that the Army is funded less than the Navy and the Air Force when its being asked to do the most.
Think how many infantry could be trained and equiped for one f22.
In general the US M.I.C. needs more oversight, goals, and less pork.
just my 2 cents.

I'm not so sure I buy into your statement that there isn't an arms race. Certainly it is not in the same vein as during the Cold War, but China has increased its military spending dramatically. Recently studies I've read indicate that China is looking beyond a Tiawan scenario. Whether this is global or only regional, it still presents a problem for us. They've increased their ballistic missle capability, are looking into a true blue water navy, and are now seeking to challenge us in space. Now some of this is really years down the road, but I don't really want to give them a head start. However, in the space realm, the anti-satellite shot is a significant development. They've destroyed a satellite with a moblie launcher. Imagine a non-state actor with that capability (it can be sold). Whether in a COIN environment or a big war, knocking out one of our comm or GPS satellites would cause significant problems. The AF is looking into ways to develop mini-satellites that can be more quickly launched to replace destroyed or damaged ones, but guess what it takes? That's right, money. You might have a fully trained division, but what are they going to do with no comm and no GPS?

I don't know how much it takes to train up a division (or what an F-22 costs for that matter) but let's assume they're equal for the moment. What's the shelf life of your division? My F-22 will last about 25-30 years. Sure this really isn't an equal basis argument but it makes my point. Your division requires an influx of new people that need new training. Yes, the F-22 will require upgrades, but in the long run I think we make out quite well. Besides, how many F-22s are you willing to trade? Our F-15s are already approaching the 30 year mark and the Chinese have a new J-10 and something on the way. If we do fight them, do you want to trust air superiority to a 30 year old plane? How effective is your division going to be without that?

And now to the "do the most" comment. While I certainly agree that kicking down doors has much more risk than fueling or maintaining a jet (and my old grunt side has much respect for those guys), let's not lose sight of the fact that everyone has a different job. Quite frackly, I do not want avionics mechanic tapped to an Army line unit. Its a wasted talent. This mechanic, and alot more like him, are needed to keep our aircraft flying. The same aircraft that provides top cover, airlift, ISR, etc.--all the stuff groundpounders tend to take for granted (I did). BTW, alot of these same guys were maintaining the same aircraft back in Desert Storm. Alot of folks like to forget that the AF has been fighting in Iraq since 1991. Sure it wasn't the same as it is now, but our aircraft don't know the difference between flying a routine patrol or actually dropping bombs. Flying is flying and it all provides wear and tear. I don't recall hearing AF guys saying anything about the Army not "doing the most" from 1992-2001. They simply understood that deploying to support no-fly zones was their duty.

As for oversight, goals, and less pork, I couldn't agree more.

[Ski]

Agree with Steve - DoD cannot even be audited at this point, so the comparison can (and has been widely) made that it's just throwing more money into a very deep if not bottomless pit.

Personally, I like simplicity and easy maintenance in equipment. I see millions of lines of code in new procurement programs and I shudder. I hear first hand reports of the difficulty in sustaining qualified people on some of the ABCS equipment and I get worried. I see hundreds of private contractors working as maintenance techs on certain pieces of equipment, and I start to wonder if we can sustain a fighting force in a high intensity war. I look at the time it takes to bring new equipment into the line units (especially major end items), and the lack of facilities and factories that actually create the equipment, and I understand why we have backlogs at the few depots that are up and running.

But the bottom line is that if I was to wargame the United States, the absolute last thing I'd do would be to fight us conventionally. You'd have to be a stone cold moron to do that when there is a proven record of success or at least a draw when someone fights the US in a counterinsurgency since the 1960's.

But again, what is a peer competitor?

[Rob Thornton]

From Facsist Libertarian:

There is no reason the US Navy has to be as big as it is. The concept that it must be able to fight two wars at the same time is just there to justify military spending.

Why don't you think the US Navy needs to be the size it is? There are plenty of arguments that our ship building capability is in danger, and that there are not enough ships and subs to do the work we ask them to do.

The Navy tends to be a bit more low key in their role in GWOT - although the CBGs in the Persian Gulf keeping it from being anything else but a designation for that body of water are related. Their humanitarian role in the Tsunami may have garnered us more positive IO then anything else we've done lately. Their EW and intercept use, their role as a secure base for C2 of operations, their ability to offer bases of operations when the neighborhood is tricky, their role in NEOs whne there are no friendly bases around, many people are still building and buying SSNs and will probably buy/build SSBNs - since everybody wants a nuke. Firing a cruise missile is a handy option for policy. It seems to me the Navy has a strong case for growth with all the foreign policy challenges we have.

Any Navy folks out there want to share their thoughts - certainly from a historic perspective they have played a large role in America's Small Wars. If anybody can do a ship to task list that indicates we need a Jeffersonian Navy - I'd be happy to hear it. Guarenteeing a Sea LOC is available when you need it (and we do allot of shipping) is pretty important for a capitalist economy.

[Granite_State]

Agree with Steve - DoD cannot even be audited at this point, so the comparison can (and has been widely) made that it's just throwing more money into a very deep if not bottomless pit.

Personally, I like simplicity and easy maintenance in equipment. I see millions of lines of code in new procurement programs and I shudder. I hear first hand reports of the difficulty in sustaining qualified people on some of the ABCS equipment and I get worried. I see hundreds of private contractors working as maintenance techs on certain pieces of equipment, and I start to wonder if we can sustain a fighting force in a high intensity war. I look at the time it takes to bring new equipment into the line units (especially major end items), and the lack of facilities and factories that actually create the equipment, and I understand why we have backlogs at the few depots that are up and running.

But the bottom line is that if I was to wargame the United States, the absolute last thing I'd do would be to fight us conventionally. You'd have to be a stone cold moron to do that when there is a proven record of success or at least a draw when someone fights the US in a counterinsurgency since the 1960's.

But again, what is a peer competitor?

I like Rob's definition. I'd basically say a peer is someone who is, maybe not an existential challenge, in the sense that I think invading the U.S. is virtually impossible, but someone who can fight you on your level, in terms of both technology and military size and effectiveness. I don't see how anyone is getting to that level anytime soon, and even if they do, I agree with Van Creveld that the advent of nuclear weapons has fundamentally changed the rules of the game. You don't see great power wars anymore, because the stakes are too high.

[Granite_State]

Our technological advantage gives us an asymmetrical advantage that I would hate to lose. The fact that our Navy and Air Force can dominate the seas and the sky provides a superb level of protection from the more conventional types of attacks, which are still possible. Russia, China, North Korea, and emerging countries in our own hemisphere provide potential examples of possible conventional conflicts. I think States will have to go to war over precious resources whether it be oil or water within the next 20 years, and we'll probably get drug into the conflict, and having a dominating Navy and Air Force puts the Army in a better position to complete its task.

Of course the threat dujour is unconventional/irregular, and it will be around for the forseeable future, but that isn't the only threat. The problem is if you quit making those F22s, fast ships, etc., you lose the industry base, because those workers (high tech, high skill) will migrate to where the money is. The Companies will regear their machines to make something else (commercial not military), etc. and we run the risk 50 years down the road of losing that edge.

Agree with you about the industrial base, and some brief research I did on the subject a couple of years back said they're already facing a significant brain drain as the class of 60s era engineers and scientists retires.

I didn't mean to turn this into an F-22 thread, though my sympathies are with SWJED and the rest of the skeptics. We'll probably face conventional war again in the near future, as you noted, but will it be a peer competitor? Whether it's China, Russia, Iran, North Korea...none of these countries can match us in terms of technology and ordnance delivery. Being able to defeat them strikes me as being vastly different from devoting the majority of our procurement budget, and maybe the majority of the defense budget period, to arming for some Pacific showdown with the Chinese. Can anyone provide a halfway plausible peer competitor within 20-30 years?

[Ski]

Define peer competitor first. Then a comparison, if any, can be made.

Agree with you about the industrial base, and some brief research I did on the subject a couple of years back said they're already facing a significant brain drain as the class of 60s era engineers and scientists retires.

I didn't mean to turn this into an F-22 thread, though my sympathies are with SWJED and the rest of the skeptics. We'll probably face conventional war again in the near future, as you noted, but will it be a peer competitor? Whether it's China, Russia, Iran, North Korea...none of these countries can match us in terms of technology and ordnance delivery. Being able to defeat them strikes me as being vastly different from devoting the majority of our procurement budget, and maybe the majority of the defense budget period, to arming for some Pacific showdown with the Chinese. Can anyone provide a halfway plausible peer competitor within 20-30 years?

[Rob Thornton]

I thought about this last night since I think this is a much bigger question then on of F-22s or new riflemen – I believe it gets to the question of technology vs. people. Its not that this is an either or, but is a question of how much you invest into one vs. the other to meet our security needs now and for the future (for the sake of defining the future, lets stay inside the 2025 time frame).

Before considering that question though let’s consider the way in which military (and if you want to, you can include diplomacy and economics) force is applied toward policy ends. If you are a state (& I think these days we can include non-state) there are three agreed upon uses for behavior modification of people we can’t get along with, or whose own policy or goals are at odds with your own – you can deter, you can coerce, and you can compel. We’ll define deter by saying you have taken actions which portray your strength and indicate that your interests will support your willingness to cross from passive to active. Coerce is more difficult because for me it floats between deter and compel – but these are actions that can be rescinded more easily but still hold the potential that you are willing to compel behavior. In my mind air and sea power are great tools for coercion. Compelling someone has to offer the threat of physically removing them – this is where I’d argue that to compel requires a robust land component capability. Some will take issue with the definitions – that’s healthy, and certainly different advocates & acolytes may put their services’ capabilities in all three blocks – but I believe in order to take and hold ground indefinitely requires physical occupation of it – not with a sensor and not the airspace above it. Put simpler my physical size can deter, my anger might coerce, but to compel I need to lay hands on somebody.

Now let’s consider Iraq, Iran, small wars & big wars. Personally if we have to have wars then I prefer small wars as an alternative to big wars – there is historical evidence that big wars kill more people and destroy more stuff then small wars. So limited wars with limited means kill less people. This is not to say they don’t have big consequences, especially for the people involved.

Is it coincidence that the White House is exploring the possibility of reducing troops as early as 2008? I’d submit that while Senator Reid is willing to call it a political victory brought about by Democratic pressure, it is probably more of a national security concern. I’ll come back to this at the end.

By our own writings on this site, writings in the press by retired and active duty military professionals and civilian security experts, our land component (and the other components in supporting them) capabilities are stretched to a great degree in their policy role (compelling the insurgents, terrorists and our enemies) in Iraq, Afghanistan and other places around the globe. We can go back to the decision to request more troops and the request and subsequent decision to increase the size of the Army and Marines to acknowledge that. I’d propose that our enemies and friends can read and come to their own conclusions, and that our ability to compel is constrained at the moment by our policy objectives in Iraq (I use Iraq since sustaining significant troop levels there raises OPTEMPO and induces strain on every aspect of our means & will to compel). Our current object of policy – a stable Iraq that is U.S. friendly and can ease the strain on global energy needs by both producing and not destabilizing the Persian Gulf region is worth the effort in terms of preventing larger security concerns in the future. It also speaks to the moral aspect of war and our commitment to our ideals – an ally that is not willing to see it through is kind of a self-interested fair weather friend.

So, what are the tools available currently to deter, coerce or compel the Iranians from realizing and employing a nuclear weapon (or acting through a third party like Hezbollah), other states seeking advantages, or even non-state organizations seeking to exploit the current situation? If we look at Iran, which components would we rely on right now to move from deter to coerce? Is it a ground component that is sprinting to maintain its current commitments? Or, is it the USAF and USN who we’d task to conduct limited strikes against targets deep within Iran in order to signify our intolerance for their goals?

Following that line – don’t you think Iran knows that? What has been one of their largest investments in military acquisition recently (we are speaking conventionally, not nuclear)? The answer is, front line, state of the art (by anybody’s technological standards but perhaps our own) Anti-Aircraft technology in massive amounts and phased throughout the country enroute to their dispersed nuclear sites to deter us from that option (I'd add that they include curring favor through trade benefits with powerful states, cooperation on Iraq, and an immense IO campaign for the will of the U.S. Public by denying their true reason for pursuing nuclear power). They understand that in order to get to their sites we’d have to invest an awful lot of something to make it credible. They understand that as we weigh that out, it may not be worth it for us – all they have to do is show us the stakes to make it a difficult decision. To remove the ADA threat will require massive amounts of sorties by survivable A/C to first neutralize the ADA threat – to that end the Iranians are also investing in other capabilities. To know for sure if the ADA is neutralized I think you’d have to occupy the ground for SAM sites surrounding the Air LOCs with ground forces to (something we’d be hard pressed to do right now without changing the scope of our commitment to Iraq). I think DoD understood that when they were pursuing the use of ICBMs with conventional war-heads as a deterrent – its hard to defeat an ICBM – but that has its own problems – how do you know what’s inside if you are say Russia, China or India trying to decide on a reaction?

Given that line of thought – and the likelihood that we are going to be caught up in small wars, COIN & COIN like activities in order to prevent extremism and other Non-State threats which are also national security issues of prime importance, then the USAF and USN require the best technology to mitigate the lack of being able to commit a credible ground component to that action. In my view having to compensate for lack of fully rounded capability with technology is a tough row to hoe, but at least it is an option. On the other hand, ignoring the use of technology to gain an advantage by solely investing in a large ground component is also very dangerous – go back to comparing armor in WWII, or how we deterred the Soviet numbers in the Cold War.

This is not an easy question, but we do have to look beyond the moment and consider how we employ military force and to what ends in order to decide what capabilities to invest in. We have competing requirements – mass and technology. As I’ve said before, I believe the best investment is in quality people because without them you get a mass of automatons and technology that is unusable. Without quality people the reason we use military force is subject to being lost for want of a nail. What we need to do is look for innovation where possible and feasible, and uses that adapt existing materials and technologies in ways that offers us advantages and cost less then pursuing a totally new line of thought. It is not always the case – you can only adapt on old idea so far, but in many cases it is possible. This provides us options where we can pursue other technologies or COAs at a more affordable rate. To use a great planning cliché, perfect is often the enemy of good enough.

[tequila]

Of note: Annual Pentagon report - Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007.

[LawVol]

Whether it's China, Russia, Iran, North Korea...none of these countries can match us in terms of technology and ordnance delivery.

They can't match us now, but they continually invest in this technology. If we don't stay ahead of them, they will match or beat us in 20-30 years.

Rob makes good points. If we don't invest now, the technology will go elsewhere. The point is that our enemies have not only adapted their strategies (think COIN and China's "total war" concepts), but they are also trying to catch us in the technology realm. Why do you think China keeps trying to steal our information? If we ignore this, then we may one day be playing catch up in the conventional war sense like we are now in the COIN sense. Only when it comes to conventional war, we may be risking our very existence (or at least the world as we know it).

Perhaps the problem is that DoD needs a bigger piece of pie? I think funding is under 4% of GDP, why couldn't it be higher?

[Rob Thornton]

Hey there LV,

Perhaps the problem is that DoD needs a bigger piece of pie? I think funding is under 4% of GDP, why couldn't it be higher?

Great question. Your back to two concrete options - cut from somewhere else to raise the %, or increase taxes - both of which have side effects.

Here is something else to chew on - if COIN and COIN like functions/operations are going to be required (I beleive they are), then they are going to consume resources. Does COIN/and like operations fit into a strategy of detering unwanted behaviour by demonstrating our commitment and resolve - i.e. we have successfully done this before and are willing to risk the consequences of having to do it again - so the threat of regime change is an expensive, but viable option/consequence. We are dabbling in the strategic OODA here.

I'd also say many of the functions found in COIN can be used in conflict prevention - such as identifying the causes of conflict and applying TTPs and operational concepts to resolve the problems that cause people/states to go to war.