Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

I know Frank Hoffman very well so I'm going to have to get on to him about this. I suspect it's the price you have to pay when writing for people like "Institutes".

How is calling a "War", "Hybrid" helpful? The US Army/USMC can't get it's head around COIN v War, or like folks here, see COIN as discrete and distinct, so why say "Hybrid."

If there is all the discussion about COIN emphasis degrading "good ole" warfighting skills, then Hybrid is really going to cause panic.

If you are any sort of professional Army you have to deal with any form of armed conflict. It's all finite and well understood. There is no mystery. Why all the agonising?

[Adam L]

I know Frank Hoffman very well so I'm going to have to get on to him about this. I suspect it's the price you have to pay when writing for people like "Institutes".

How is calling a "War", "Hybrid" helpful? The US Army/USMC can't get it's head around COIN v War, or like folks here, see COIN as discrete and distinct, so why say "Hybrid."

If there is all the discussion about COIN emphasis degrading "good ole" warfighting skills, then Hybrid is really going to cause panic.

If you are any sort of professional Army you have to deal with any form of armed conflict. It's all finite and well understood. There is no mystery. Why all the agonising?

Good question! If I may be so bold, I would like to point out that if we spent less time arguing the definitions of all of these terms and deciding whether war is "hybrid" or whatever we might avoid a good 40-70% of this malarkey. What does it matter if a war is "hybrid" or where COIN fits into the big picture. They are all conflicts of one sort or another and that is what is important (as William F Owen pointed out.) This obsession with categorization is inhibiting progress. This is not to say that it is not important for us to have definitions for terms, but we should not put form over substance.

Adam L

[Rob Thornton]

I think there is some utility in doing what Frank Hoffman has done - thinking about war is an endeavor to understand it - it gives us a basis to contemplate ideas and consider their implications. I'm not apt to get wrapped up in the term - he could have called it blended, mixed, etc vs. the term he chose - being blended. I think there is an interesting thing at work here though - "3 block war" had a linear feel to it - I never felt that was right, but neither could I come up with something I liked better to explain or discuss to others what was going on. "Hybrid" as a term may be closer to the mark - at least it starts to get at the idea of simultaneity.

More important is the thinking that goes on with explaining what he's getting at when he uses "hybrid" - the form in this case is just the wrapping for the function - which is to contemplate the nature of the wars we are seeing. While there may not be much new - again generals such as Slim, Wellington, Marion, Grant, Scipio Africanus, etc. have probably had to contend with some of the same types of conditions in their own campaigns and eras (I'd also add that they may have had to contend with some that we no longer have to, and possibly becuse of culture, technology, or other internal and external influences may not have had to contemplate some of those we now face) - however, we still have to do the nug work to consider how those things apply within the context of the conditions we see or anticipate to really appreciate what they mean.

There is also a question of the audience - not all the folks are going to have a very good frame of reference for understanding military operations - in fact they may never have served at all - however, they may be the ones making the policy choices which lead (or don't lead) to the use of military force to achieve a political objective. Its hard enough to get uniformed personnel to read complex theory or even good history on military affairs - let alone civilians. We sometimes must put things in writing in a manner that creates discussion, but can be digestible for both the professional and non- professional.

I plan on reading the full body tomorrow - I'm just too tired to do it tonight. What I'll try to do when I read it is what I've learned to do with all thoughts people have put down to be read - figure out what the author is trying to get across, and evaluate if I think he's right or wrong, why I think that, and what does it mean to me.

I've not met MR. Hoffman, but I've read a few things he's wrote, from what I've seen he's on a similar journey like many of us to better understand war, and benefit both himself, and what he believes in by doing so. We're not always going to come up with the right terms or definitions - and in some cases there might just not be any - the idea might just be too big to box, however, if you are going to have a discussion based largely on content - meaning through the written word - where animate, interactive discussion is hard or impossible - you have to get some kind of term or definition down - no matter how limited it may be - just to move the ball forward.

I'll comment more tomorrow after I've read it fully - after a good night's sleep.

Best, Rob

[William F. Owen]

- figure out what the author is trying to get across, and evaluate if I think he's right or wrong, why I think that, and what does it mean to me.

I don't think Frank is wrong, but I think it might not be useful, because he has not couched the idea of "Hybrid" conflict in a reality that can built upon in terms of doctrine.

EG: You have COIN, Hybrid, and War Fighting.

These are premised as being separate, discrete activities, that are part of a spectrum. - (Yes I know that makes no sense, yet that is what is conventionally suggested. Hybrid assumes a mix of two or more separate and discrete entities.)

Why not just suggest that as a professional army, you will have to fight many different types of enemies, with many differing aims and means. All the fundamentals stay the same.

Its hard enough to get uniformed personnel to read complex theory or even good history on military affairs - let alone civilians. We sometimes must put things in writing in a manner that creates discussion, but can be digestible for both the professional and non- professional.

Good point, but this must be held to rigour in the same way other professions, such as medicine, or engineering. Because we don't we end up with 4GW, EBO and other clown-like "concepts" all claiming to shiny new better ways of doing stuff.

[Ron Humphrey]

I don't think Frank is wrong, but I think it might not be useful, because he has not couched the idea of "Hybrid" conflict in a reality that can built upon in terms of doctrine.

EG: You have COIN, Hybrid, and War Fighting.

These are premised as being separate, discrete activities, that are part of a spectrum. - (Yes I know that makes no sense, yet that is what is conventionally suggested. Hybrid assumes a mix of two or more separate and discrete entities.)

Why not just suggest that as a professional army, you will have to fight many different types of enemies, with many differing aims and means. All the fundamentals stay the same.



Good point, but this must be held to rigour in the same way other professions, such as medicine, or engineering. Because we don't we end up with 4GW, EBO and other clown-like "concepts" all claiming to shiny new better ways of doing stuff.

Does anything think the whole new and shiny sales pitch and different terms all stems from the fact that in western culture we have taken the whole premise of how to get buy-in from superiors too far.

Almost everyone has those times when they recognize something that has been dealt with before and they learned about it but the only way they can get it across is to figure out a way for their leaders to make the idea their own.

How do you get change to take place or at least be understood without reshaping, renaming, or repackaging it in one form or another.

Just thinking about it

[William F. Owen]

Does anything think the whole new and shiny sales pitch and different terms all stems from the fact that in western culture we have taken the whole premise of how to get buy-in from superiors too far.

Almost everyone has those times when they recognize something that has been dealt with before and they learned about it but the only way they can get it across is to figure out a way for their leaders to make the idea their own.

How do you get change to take place or at least be understood without reshaping, renaming, or repackaging it in one form or another.

Just thinking about it

Excellent points. Again, this is a major problem area for me, because in my understanding, albeit limited, I am not aware that you see the same thing in Philosophy for example. There, all the serious practioners have a very good understanding of all the serious work. In military thought,

a.) a minute amount of people have a good and clear understanding of the core works. EG: I doubt my own understanding of Clausewitz because I have had to study him in isolation. This means my understanding of Foch is not as clear as perhaps it should be, though I'd argue that with anyone on the planet, bar Robert Leonhard!

b.) There is no general or widespread acceptance of which core works and thinkers are or were useful. EG, you go from the Genius of Carl Von C, to the idioacy of Liddell-Hart, and end up with the irrelevance of Boyd.

c.) I am not aware (and there maybe, just I don't know it) of any academic of valid Military institute that actaully teaches classes or courses on Military Thought. Therefore, because it is not studied, the playing field is open to the concetp designers to play as they please.

[Maximus]

I'm a believer that "war" is "war" is "war" and that all talk of counterinsurgency, hybrid, multi-modal, etc. should be unnecessary. However, I see all too often that many in the U.S. military think of "war" only as Gettysburg, the Battle of the Bulge, the seige at Khe Sanh, Desert Storm, initial push during OIF-I, etc. We all know that "war" involves much more. This is why I'm often a fan of using terms like "3 or 4 block war", COIN, "hybrid" war, etc. Much good comes out of the discussions and debates about the validity of these terms and thus forces many in the military to truly think about the characteristics of the wars we've fought and those that we'll fight in the future.

Semper Fi,
Scott

[slapout9]

Why not just suggest that as a professional army, you will have to fight many different types of enemies, with many differing aims and means. All the fundamentals stay the same.

Hi Wilf, I think this is a very important point. It is not different types of wars but different types of enemies. An enemies cultural backround will heavily influence his methods of war but it is the person that is different not the war.

[William F. Owen]

Hi Wilf, I think this is a very important point. It is not different types of wars but different types of enemies. An enemies cultural backround will heavily influence his methods of war but it is the person that is different not the war.

Well COIN is counter-insurgency, and that is the fighting against insurgents. What always confuses me is that people think it is a type of conflict.

No enemy, no military action. - which is why I think the idea of the military action being only 20% of the solution is an aphorism based on a deep lack of understanding.

I think the most useful thing we can say about Hybrid Wars is drop the word "hybrid" and then we have a useful term on which to discuss ideas.

[slapout9]

No enemy, no military action. - which is why I think the idea of the military action being only 20% of the solution is an aphorism based on a deep lack of understanding.

EXACTLY!!! that is why I say this Balderdash that Strategy is Ends,Ways and Means will get us killed if we don't change it. Enemies are People. This why I say Strategy is best understood as Motives, Methods and Opportunities.