Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

[Schmedlap]

Anecdotal experience...

In 2005, we avoided and countered the IED threat by emplacing fire teams in covert positions throughout the AO. They were inserted usually at night, by way of dismounted patrols from our patrol base. Once curfew was lifted, the IED emplacers would come out. Anyone seen emplacing an IED was killed on sight. Suddenly, people were less enthusiastic about emplacing IEDs. The psychological impact was significant upon potential adversaries (most said, "screw that") and upon the populace (when lots of IED emplacers are shot in the chest from a single gunshot that comes out of nowhere - at least once per day - there is a sense that the Americans are now in control of security and the insurgents are dead men walking). Fewer IEDs improved our mobility, which made it easier to emplace fire teams in a wider variety of positions and continue to spread paranoia among our adversaries and reassurance among the populace.

[Doofous]

And there's a parallel with the value of vertical envelopment. In Vietnam, the shock value of airmobile tactics was compromised by two factors: telegraphing the arrival sites and times, and essentially utilizing the Hueys as aerial taxis to bring troops in and then have them simply walk around on random search-and-destroy missions that were based on a feeling that the enemy would be where we land -- classic military projection of your wishful thinking onto an enemy's likely decisions -- and a plausible explanation for why we were less effective than we could have been. We took a lot of casualties on LZs to booby traps (that's how I got mine) and snipers.

[Infanteer]

Flying to work, like driving to work, is part of the "commuting" problem.

If you try to avoid getting IED'd in your vehicles and switch to moving on foot, the bad guy will simply target dismounts.

No form of technology is going to eliminate the IED threat - good TTPs and alert soldiers will mitigate it as best as possible....

[Tracker275]

If you try to avoid getting IED'd in your vehicles and switch to moving on foot, the bad guy will simply target dismounts.

No form of technology is going to eliminate the IED threat - good TTPs and alert soldiers will mitigate it as best as possible....

Very accurate statement. What most folks seem to forget is that what may be the most technologically advanced military in the world is being bogged down by folks that operate more fluid and in an asymetrical descentralized operations strategy. The more we rely on technology, the more they will identify the weaknesses with far less money than it took for us to develop and defeat what they have thrown at us.

Every week, I arrive on a scene where a simple device was built to defeat either the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, or United States Forces (USF). I am never ceased to be amazed at how simple, yet complex the devices are, and most of the components could have been purchased at Walmart, Ace Hardware, and Radio Shack to produce what we are seeing.

The common theme I see in most of the posts found in this thread is that the concept, collectively, is that of a reactive measure vs. a proactive measure. Instead of focusing a majority of our efforts on how we defeat devices through defense, let us focus on finding out where they are being made and stopping that prior to them being placed somewhere. Obviously, defensive measures are essential, however in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the appearance is that of not going after the "bad guy", but getting hit and trying to find out how to survive a strike...Then limp away.

Rarely do I see efforts here in Iraq where the focus is on identifying where the devices are made, but more where they have been emplaced. I look at briefing after briefing that reflects hot spots of detonations, however I have yet to look at one that identifies where exactly the optimum location for them to be made is.

What it comes down to in a nutshell is that no matter how you cut it, the faster lighter, and more adaptable force has proven to never win the battle, but win the war. This has been proven against the United States since the 1960's. The concept of "Light Infantry" has been destroyed by the modern day rucksack and the technological gadgets that we are forced to take with us onto the battlefield. Why is it that the RTO has to carry a 40lbs radio with spare battery and kit only to maintain commo sometimes spotty at best, and the insurgent uses a satphone that fits in his pocket and gets common 100% of the time?

You can't fight an unconventional war with conventional tactics. That is a proven fact. As I have previously stated, you will win the battle, but you will never win the war. If our ultimate focus is on staying on the roads most of the time, then you have set yourself up for failure in that you now channeling your forces into a choke point that is miles long. The balance between armor and mobility are a very tricky balance, and if the focus is entirely on defensive postures, then we have lost the best defense, which is a good offense. TTP's change constantly, however the US military does not move as fast as the battlefield. What always remains a constant about an IED, is that someone has to place it somewhere and it has to wait for someone to go by it. Personally, I have yet to hear of a foot patrol in who knows how long get attacked by an IED (I'm not talking about a foot patrol being dismounts either) here in Iraq, but I regularly go to scenes where vehicles have been hit. The one thing that we all laugh about here is that the Iraqi insurgents can't shoot.

So, if that is the case, why do we place ourselves in situations that they really do know how to do, and that is setup an IED?

Granted, this is my first post here, but this is my $0.02 on this subject for what it is worth.

[zealot66]

Thanks for that last post. It seems that light and mobile and good soldiering is the way to go. Any military that garrisons itself either thru heavy equipment or literal garrison without going outside the wire is outmanuevered by enemy. When contact occurs, the pursuit should ensue. I realize with IED's this isnt going to happen all the time but an idea of lightinfantry tactics to seek out and meet the enemy is better in the long run than riding around waiting.

[Xenophon]

There are other ways to mitigate the IED threat. Probably the best one is the one Schmedlap posted. Another is to decrease the size of A.O.s so that mounted patrols are not so necessary, but this is not always feasible and requires a larger amount of troops. The other is to stay off the roads by conducting dismounted patrols or, conducting old school mounted patrols via horse/donkey/camel (the original All Terrain Vehicle). But the other problem is re-supply. Small-scale re-supply in the future should be conducted with some kind of supply drop-ship UAV (one of the few times you'll hear me advocate a technological solution) but for large scale logistics I think the loggies are still going to be provisional route clearance for a long time.

[Rifleman]

But the other problem is re-supply. Small-scale re-supply in the future should be conducted with some kind of supply drop-ship UAV

In Vietnam, I believe the Mobile Guerilla Forces (Blackjack Projects) sometimes resupplied with fast movers dropping canisters. Basically like a bombing run. So I think your UAV idea for resupply has merit.

[motorfirebox]

Every week, I arrive on a scene where a simple device was built to defeat either the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, or United States Forces (USF). I am never ceased to be amazed at how simple, yet complex the devices are, and most of the components could have been purchased at Walmart, Ace Hardware, and Radio Shack to produce what we are seeing.

The common theme I see in most of the posts found in this thread is that the concept, collectively, is that of a reactive measure vs. a proactive measure. Instead of focusing a majority of our efforts on how we defeat devices through defense, let us focus on finding out where they are being made and stopping that prior to them being placed somewhere. Obviously, defensive measures are essential, however in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the appearance is that of not going after the "bad guy", but getting hit and trying to find out how to survive a strike...Then limp away.

Rarely do I see efforts here in Iraq where the focus is on identifying where the devices are made, but more where they have been emplaced. I look at briefing after briefing that reflects hot spots of detonations, however I have yet to look at one that identifies where exactly the optimum location for them to be made is.

How much does location matter? What sorts of tools/equipment are necessary for creating these devices? The reason I ask is, if the requirements for building these devices are low, then hunting for locations may not be the best way to go about it. If all you have to do is assembly and some spot welding, for instance, then trying to find the location will be almost as difficult as searching for the devices themselves.

[qp4]

Anecdotal experience...

In 2005, we avoided and countered the IED threat by emplacing fire teams in covert positions throughout the AO. They were inserted usually at night, by way of dismounted patrols from our patrol base....

Also in 2005 we did the exact same thing. We had a COP about 12km from our main FOB that had only three roads in, so naturally these chokepoints became one of the most contested areas in our OE. After three months of dedicated SKTs and observation by tanks, we were down to one road that stayed red and two roads that were black. The AO continued to deteriorate for the next three years (that COP was the home of both DUSTWUN events in Iraq).

It got so bad that helicopters were being used as a transport rather than ride the roads. And as John points out:

Having been attacked with IEDs, I am not an advocate of just driving down roads in hopes you are not blown up. However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.

And that AO that got so bad? It started to get better when we started walking everywhere.

v/r,
qp4

[zealot66]

Im still here. You all have alot more experience in debating this issue that I do. My question came as a result of studying wars in southern africa and the measures they took to overcome the landmine issue. I think that terrain, strategy and even a landmine vs an IED demand differences in employment of troops. It is just a sick feeling to watch our casualties from IED's knowing that they werent even the result of a contact just some kid with a remote control. Keep going. I look at this board everyday and consider it an education.

I find the above posts about landing patrols away from the target and walking to a target very interesting and in though the terrain in afghanistan might prohibit some of this, The issue still remains are we using the choppers to their fullest and are there enough ?

[Ken White]

The issue still remains are we using the choppers to their fullest and are there enough ?

The factors of Mission, Enemy, Troops available, Terrain, Time and local Civilians will affect every operation and those factors are infinitely variable. That essentially means that we are sometimes, perhaps even often, using them to their fullest. As for enough; depends on your viewpoint. In all cases, they have to be purchased, equipped, supplied and refueled and rearmed -- it boils down to what can be afforded. I'm sure most ground commanders believe there are never enough, the aviators from all nations do the best they can with what they have and believe the ground guys do not use their air assets as well as they should. The truth as usual lies somewhere in between.

As for setting down away from the objective, terrain is generally not an obstacle to dismounted troops (and if it is an impediment, it affects the bad guys as much as own troops) -- weather is always a factor and time becomes the issue and the (often presumed...) prohibition...

[davidbfpo]

Zealot66,

I know a few here will interested in the end product of:

My question came as a result of studying wars in southern africa and the measures they took to overcome the landmine issue.

I recall some Rhodesian annoyance - after 1980 - to find that the South Africans (SADF) had developed their anti-mining equipment and had not shared this with them. The SADF deployed their kit in Angola and SWAfrica - where I expect ex-Rhodesians, now in the SADF noticed. IIRC Peter Stiff authored a book on the Rhodesian counter-IED programme.

[jcustis]

The objective area vs. Walk in issue was the exact issueI looked at in a MC Gazette article a ways back that analysed Fire Force. We can technically do it, BUT I don't think we are doctrinally organized to do it.

[Pete]

Wait a minute, Mr. Custis, you wrote that article on the Rhodesian Fire Force concept in Marine Corps Gazette. Was the reluctance to walk to the objective mainly to enhance the speed of execution?

[Stan]

My question came as a result of studying wars in southern africa and the measures they took to overcome the landmine issue.

One of the minor setbacks we discovered in Afghanistan was many suspected hazardous areas were found not to be contaminated with land mines and the other side of that is the misconception that WE share the international community's goal of a mine-free end state. Just a tad un-realistic, as well as not in keeping with our current approach to mine clearance - we actually hope for a mine impact-free end state.

The assumption is that our plans are effectively designed and managed .