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  1. #1
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default Control comes before Collaboration

    The boys (and girls) over at Inkspots are getting after it in trying to peel back the causal relationships of governance, legitimacy, and aid in these post-colonial small wars.

    Gulliver's post on Plans for Afghanistan aid and getting it backwards addresses the complexities of the art and science in our own theories and practice.

    Aid is a vital part of counterinsurgency, right? Development projects help back up improvements in security and win over support from the local population for the counterinsurgent and the legitimate government, so goes the thinking. We ought not be surprised, then, with this:

    The White House is developing “clear targets” for both the Afghan and Pakistani
    governments, possibly with specific timelines, as a way to signal that the American military presence will not last indefinitely, American officials said. It is not yet clear what the administration is willing to do if the targets are not met.

    Among other things, the officials said, the administration will insist that Afghanistan fight corruption, speed up troop training and retention, and funnel development assistance to areas the Taliban dominate.

    Emphasis in the above is mine. Only problem with the latter bit is that it's precisely the opposite of what we ought to be doing to help stabilize and legitimize the Karzai government. (A case can be made, too, that rapid expansion of the ANSF is similarly counterproductive to this aim.)

    So why is it wrong? Well, it's pretty simple: pouring money and development assistance into areas dominated by the Taliban means that 1) everything we do will be much more expensive, 2) the prospects of failure are much higher, imperiling the government's overall legitimacy and control over areas previously deemed "quiet" and "safe," and 3) the enemy will gain from our efforts to the extent that any of them are successful in delivering benefits to insurgent-controlled (or insurgent-influenced) areas.

    Control comes before collaboration. The support of individuals and groups is contested by the insurgent and the counterinsurgent through the provision of services and the suggestion of legitimacy, sure, but that only happens after one party is able to largely prevent the other from contesting territory and/or a subject population through force and security. The Taliban doesn't run sharia courts for the local nationals who work at Bagram; why? Because it's senseless to spend resources pitching a guy who cannot plausibly shift his support to the group that's unable to access or protect him. Pouring money and bridges and wells and so on into places that coalition or government forces cannot consistently and safely access decouples those resources from the counterinsurgent's most important tool: presence.

    Kilcullen's been on this point lately, too: why spend all our resources in "red areas" when we've got a lot of light green areas we could be shoring up with those efforts? Why contest the hardest spots first? (And further, why work on connecting more of the population to a government that as yet doesn't seem to be competent enough to reap any benefit in legitimacy or support from being more closely connected to more of its citizens?)

    There's a whole lot more to say about this -- it speaks to the "ink spots strategy" issues that Bernard and Christian have recently highlighted, and to which I've yet to respond -- and I hope to cover a lot more ground in a comprehensive Afghanistan "path-forward" post in the coming days.

  2. #2
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Dorronsoro and Stewart have also hit on this in a big way. Dorronsoro explicitly relates this to the resourcing of PRTs, which control a lot of aid spending in OEF.

    Dorronsoro points to this report by Matt Waldman of Oxfam: "Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan."

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    tequila -- Agree that the Dorronsoro paper is excellent; I just read it yesterday. Working up something a little more extensive that draws heavily on his arguments.

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    Default Gulliver, welcome to SWC

    I'm positing that you are the Gulliver here ?

    Regards

    Mike

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    I'm positing that you are the Gulliver here ?

    Regards

    Mike
    Yeah, how about you introduce yourself here? Not to threaten you, but don't make me unfriend you from Facebook.

    Mike

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    jmm -- You posit correctly.

    I've been around SWC for a couple of years, but tend to lurk more than post (and when I did post, it was under my real name; this was before I had professional justifications for anonymity, I suppose).

    Mike -- This, of course, is the problem with my thin veil of anonymity: I'm not on Facebook as "Gulliver"!

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    Default The incumbant's strategic base areas

    I suggest going back a few decades and have a look at John McCuen's The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (available as a reprint from Hailer Publishing at $29.95). The blurb does not convey the point I want to make.

    In any event, one of McCuen's major points, which runs through the book, is the necessity for the incumbant to secure its strategic base areas, even at the cost of giving up large areas of the country. McCuen saw one of the greatest failings of incumbants as being reaction to the brushfires, without having first secured its own bases - whatever geography they might happen to be in the context. In short, trying to be strong everywhere results in not being strong anywhere.

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