Popular rebellion, state response and our failure to date: a debate

[Fuchs]

I respectfully disagree. I think, since the end of WWII we have entered into an era where popular rebellions can be (or have been) sustained by ideas, not organizations.

Europe has a history of hundreds of years of rebellions based on ideas (even as simple as the idea that you have hunger), not organisations. We certainly didn't enter anything like that.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Europe has a history of hundreds of years of rebellions based on ideas (even as simple as the idea that you have hunger), not organisations. We certainly didn't enter anything like that.

At the risk of discussing areas of agreement, I agree that Europe, in particular, has a longer history of ideas being central to rebellions and revolutions (although to me, hunger is a lot more than an idea, or at least it is an idea with a much higher likelihood to motivate people to take risks to satiate it). However, in the good old days the king of England was probably not going to call for the ouster of the King of France because he decided to torture, kill off or banish all the Huguenots. Today, with the idea that legitimacy comes from the people it has become harder (although certainly not impossible) for a dictator to take repressive action against his people to suppress an idea.

[Fuchs]

The religious wars of the 16th and 17th century delegitimised the princes as well - in the eyes of those who chose the other faith. The whole 30 years war was about princes waging war against each other in denial of the other's attempt to set the faith for his realm.

China also has a huge history of rebellions that did not necessarily rest on organisations.

Decolonialisation rebellions were also often rather based on the idea of sovereignty than on organisations.


It was never easily tolerated when rulers killed off troves of dissenters. That's now a new thing. Today we bother more about it because of the media (nobody cared about Japanese imprisoning Koreans in 1920, but now we care about the gulags of the North Korean regime).
The people in the country themselves don't need mass media to learn about what happens with their neighbours, of course.


In the end, rebellions succeed when a regime is ripe for failure. I'm not even sure organisations are helpful against such regimes because organisations are usually badly infiltrated and can be destroyed much more easily than ideas.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Yeah, but you didn't see this kind of thing happening during the 30 year war.

Libya: ICC prosecutor seeks warrant for Gaddafi
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13408931

It just aint as easy to treat your population like subjects instead of citizens as it used to be...

.. although, not impossible (ala Saudi Arabia and Bahrain).

Interesting to see the rift begin to form between the new Arab "republics" and the old Arab monarchies.

[Fuchs]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Rebellion_of_1857

[davidbfpo]

Moderator adds:

We appear to be in historical mode with FDR and Empire's dissolution. Later today I will start a new thread on that theme, in the history arena; meantime please keep Empire matters on hold.

Update

New thread started 'End of Empires: who was responsible?' (post WW2) and a few posts relocated. See:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=13335

[outletclock]

This post from the The Monkey Cage, entitled "Cracking Down," might be of interest.

http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2011/0...ing_down/#more

Some choice lines:

There are two basic strategies states use to combat urban uprisings: urban annihilation and coercive governance...Leaving aside the important question of the origins, cohesion, and organization of the opposition, it pays to focus on the political interests of state elites, not just their capacity, and in particular the interests of militaries.

First... it’s not necessarily how much state capacity you have, but instead what you do with it. The creation and deployment of state power are often endogenous to political interests and strategies...

Second, militaries are especially crucial because they are best able to carry out full-bore urban annihilation strategies. When the police falter, the internal paramilitaries break, and the party workers go home, regimes look to serried ranks of tanks and bayonets...

Research on the politics of crackdowns and military politics can help us make some sense of the daily headlines.

Regards,
OC

[motorfirebox]

As others have said, we really can't--and shouldn't--be trying to deal with mobs. The mob in Libya seems about as organized as a herd of schizoid cats; we're only trying to deal with them because we don't like Gaddafi.

[TheCurmudgeon]

As others have said, we really can't--and shouldn't--be trying to deal with mobs. The mob in Libya seems about as organized as a herd of schizoid cats; we're only trying to deal with them because we don't like Gaddafi.

But therein lies the problem.

First, our interests are aligned, so we have a reason to want to see them defeat Gaddafi. Second, they are a mob, so what do you do? At this point it becomes a bifurcated issue. First, there is the military side of the house, how do we help them win. We used to have people trained for that. Second, there is the political side of the house. That is much more complicated but no less important (unless the ultimate plan is simply to install a military dictator, in which case prong one handles everything). Seems to me that, the sooner we get on the ground the more likely we are to both make friends and influence people (or, more correctly, influence their future foreign policy towards us). I think the question is still valid - how do we do this?

Finally, there is the issue of who else is trying to influence the outcome of the rebellion and what are their interests versus ours? I am sure China would love to have access to the oil. What are the likely consequences of inaction?