All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread)

[Cavguy]

While youre point is appreciated, I don't think its related to my question. I'm trying to understand a comparison of the training and tactics of the two forces.

To discuss strategy would be like two guys talking about fire arms in WWII, and somebody else entering the conversation with a bunch of guff on the atomic bomb.

But to take your bait, was the Rhodesian Strategy really failed? I think its one thing to say your strategy is failed, when you have the best funded military in the world making little progress, but its something else to say an isolated country in an underdeveloped part of the world had a failed strategy, with almost zero trade partners, and borrowed or stolen equipment.

To take up Wilf's earlier point - you haven't articulated a thesis, you've articulated a topic. You still have to do that before we can truly critique you. Also, for an academic paper, you seem starting with a conclusion and looking backwards for evidence to justify it rather than observing the evidence and drawing a conclusion.

Yes, their tactical performance with little resources was brilliant, but it also didn't matter. What Steve and I are saying is that we get obsessed as a military with tactical innovation while ignoring our deficit in strategic thinking.

[Ken White]

Yes, their tactical performance with little resources was brilliant, but it also didn't matter. What Steve and I are saying is that we get obsessed as a military with tactical innovation while ignoring our deficit in strategic thinking.

Totally true on all counts.The Rhodesians showed great tactical competence in an existential war, a really rather common occurrence.

In our last existential war, 1942-45, the US showed tactical competence. I have little doubt we will again when needed -- right now for most people, it simply is not needed, adequate will suffice. That's unfair to the guys and gals on the ground now but that's the way it has always been and is likely to stay. Democracies will not invest in really good and hard training short of existential wars -- the Mothers get too upset at the 2-5% casualty rate caused by rigorous training. So does Congress, it's expensive to pay those folks for the damage to their little bods thus incurred and in a tight recruiting market, unnecessary (in the eyes of the budgeteers and politicians) losses are frowned upon.

All the lessons from Rhodesia are readily available and have been studied, some are applicable, some are not. Those that have applicability have already been adopted. Ever notice how the US Troopie carries a weapon now versus say 15 years ago? That may be why some of us cannot understand what you're trying to do.

In any event, the tactical side isn't a problem, the politics of restraint, risk avoidance and getting out of Dodge are the problem. Regrettably, the Rhodesian tactical lessons don't cover that. Their strategic error let down all those great tactical moves. Ours looks about to repeat the flaw...

If you do not get the strategy right, you are not going to succeed tactically even though there will be (and are, in Afghanistan; were in Iraq...) a number of great tactical ploys, moves and operations. The TTPs aren't the problem, the politics are.

[JMA]

Totally true on all counts.The Rhodesians showed great tactical competence in an existential war, a really rather common occurrence.

Yes in that it was indeed an existential war. Remind me of some other existential wars?

In our last existential war, 1942-45, the US showed tactical competence. I have little doubt we will again when needed -- right now for most people, it simply is not needed, adequate will suffice. That's unfair to the guys and gals on the ground now but that's the way it has always been and is likely to stay. Democracies will not invest in really good and hard training short of existential wars -- the Mothers get too upset at the 2-5% casualty rate caused by rigorous training. So does Congress, it's expensive to pay those folks for the damage to their little bods thus incurred and in a tight recruiting market, unnecessary (in the eyes of the budgeteers and politicians) losses are frowned upon.

Maybe

All the lessons from Rhodesia are readily available and have been studied, some are applicable, some are not. Those that have applicability have already been adopted. Ever notice how the US Troopie carries a weapon now versus say 15 years ago? That may be why some of us cannot understand what you're trying to do.

Studied by whom?

Carries his weapon? Hanging a weapon on a sling around your neck (hands free) is called carrying a weapon?

In any event, the tactical side isn't a problem, the politics of restraint, risk avoidance and getting out of Dodge are the problem. Regrettably, the Rhodesian tactical lessons don't cover that. Their strategic error let down all those great tactical moves. Ours looks about to repeat the flaw...

Every aspect deserves study as competence is required at every level. Regardless of Carter's success in defeating Rhodesia politically any tactical lessons as there may be still stand.

If you do not get the strategy right, you are not going to succeed tactically even though there will be (and are, in Afghanistan; were in Iraq...) a number of great tactical ploys, moves and operations. The TTPs aren't the problem, the politics are.

"Tactically" means what happens at tactical level. Success there like "they never lost a battle" is meaningful (even if not fully true) regardless of what the politicians foulded up or they could not withstand in terms of international pressure.

[Ken White]

Studied by whom?

Many in the US. Not least the Infantry School and RAND (as Jslade0 mentioned).You miss that?

Carries his weapon? Hanging a weapon on a sling around your neck (hands free) is called carrying a weapon?

No. That's called hanging your weapon around your neck (hands free). The pictures below shows the new and the old carry. The Recruiting Poster is from whence we learned it. You miss that, too?

"Tactically" means what happens at tactical level. Success there like "they never lost a battle" is meaningful (even if not fully true) regardless of what the politicians foulded up or they could not withstand in terms of international pressure.

It's meaningful to those who fought those battles -- to others, not so much. And as you say, even if not fully true. Add that if, in the end, for whatever reason if the tactics were great and Rhodesia is no more, then the strategy was flawed. Rightly or wrongly, the actions of the US , UK and moist of the Europeans were fairly predictable -- as were those of Russia and China.

You guys did good because you had to, that lends an impetus missing today. That simple.

[JMA]

Many in the US. Not least the Infantry School and RAND (as Jslade0 mentioned).You miss that?

Must have.

You see I am researching for a book on the RLI right now and have found there are very few published sources on this topic. I should be forgiven for asking what source documents they are using for this study?

No. That's called hanging your weapon around your neck (hands free). The pictures below shows the new and the old carry. The Recruiting Poster is from whence we learned it. You miss that, too?

Well what you may have missed was that when I arrived in Rhodesia in 1973 most weapons were carried on the shoulder (hunting style) and the RLI operated in shorts and t-shirts with no camo cream. Once the war got hotter and the casualty rate increased and the dots were connected we moved into full camo with all exposed skin camo'd. There were some hold outs who insisted on wearing shorts and Tshirts and camo'd their legs and arms.

And of course the weapons moved to the ready at all times. (Daily "pokey drill" was done when in camp to strengthen the required muscles in this regard.)

It's meaningful to those who fought those battles -- to others, not so much. And as you say, even if not fully true. Add that if, in the end, for whatever reason if the tactics were great and Rhodesia is no more, then the strategy was flawed. Rightly or wrongly, the actions of the US , UK and moist of the Europeans were fairly predictable -- as were those of Russia and China.

Competence at every level is meaningful. For the private soldier skill at arms and combat competence are the most important thing for him and his mates. All armies should provide the training at that (and all levels) which will allow their soldiers to have the skill at arms edge over the enemy of the day.

That said the political issues may be a whole lot more complicated and problematic but that does not diminish the personal skill of the soldiers nor the combat effectiveness of fire teams/sections/platoons.companies/battalions when viewed separately and specifically.

I will leave the comment on the geopolitics as the Rhodesian military can be studied with only limited reference to the political mistakes and who screwed who...

You guys did good because you had to, that lends an impetus missing today. That simple.

There was a wide variation in quality between the regular units, the national service (conscripts), the Territorial units (reserves), the police and the various militias. Everyone can carry a weapon but not everyone makes a good fighting soldier. Yes, when going the extra mile is directly motivated by keeping families, wives, children and the lot safe (when they live an hour or twos drive from the "operational area") it is not too difficult to get the troops up for that.

Having a low grade enemy also helped.

[Ken White]

Competence at every level is meaningful. For the private soldier skill at arms and combat competence are the most important thing for him and his mates. All armies should provide the training at that (and all levels) which will allow their soldiers to have the skill at arms edge over the enemy of the day.

That said the political issues may be a whole lot more complicated and problematic but that does not diminish the personal skill of the soldiers nor the combat effectiveness of fire teams/sections/platoons.companies/battalions when viewed separately and specifically.

Totally agree on both counts. That we -- the US -- do not really provide such competence in peacetime is to an extent an indictment of the politicians and senior military leadership who preclude better training. In their defense, the anti-military tradition in the anglosphere generally is huge part of that problem. That is likely not going away.

Your comment on the political issues not taking away from the performance of the troops is spot on.

On the topic of what sources were used in the study of Rhodesion tactics and methods, the RAND study (LINK / .pdf) has a bibliography. You may have already seen the report or parts of it. The bibliography cites Cilliers, Cocks, Moorcraft, Venter, Reid-Daly and Stiff. As for the US Army and the Infantry school, a combination of FAOs, Defense Attaches from RSA and other neighboring nations and probably dispatched observers at the time. While paying attention to events there was not politically correct at the time, the Army's been known to cheat on policies emanating from D.C. Serving in the US Army at the time, I can recall great interest in what was being done and how you were operating at all levels. Mostly, reliance at the time was on media reports, though I can recall seeing a Benning printed copy of a manual purporting to be, IIRC, the Rhodesian Forces Counterinsurgency and Anti-Terrorist Operations (or something like that) shortly before I retired in '77. You've probably seen and may recall these LINK, LINK / .pdf. They came later but the interest at the time was significant. Still is...

[JMA]

Totally agree on both counts. That we -- the US -- do not really provide such competence in peacetime is to an extent an indictment of the politicians and senior military leadership who preclude better training. In their defense, the anti-military tradition in the anglosphere generally is huge part of that problem. That is likely not going away.

Glad we agree on this.

I can only hope that the US can somehow maintain a core cadre of competent NCOs to pass on the skill at arms until this is once again needed on a grand scale.

Your comment on the political issues not taking away from the performance of the troops is spot on.

I got bitten twice (Rhodesia and South Africa) and promised myself I would never trust a politician - any politician - again. How many times in the average military career do US servicemen get bitten by the politicians? Must be damn infuriating.

On the topic of what sources were used in the study of Rhodesion tactics and methods, the RAND study (LINK / .pdf) has a bibliography. You may have already seen the report or parts of it. The bibliography cites Cilliers, Cocks, Moorcraft, Venter, Reid-Daly and Stiff. As for the US Army and the Infantry school, a combination of FAOs, Defense Attaches from RSA and other neighboring nations and probably dispatched observers at the time. While paying attention to events there was not politically correct at the time, the Army's been known to cheat on policies emanating from D.C. Serving in the US Army at the time, I can recall great interest in what was being done and how you were operating at all levels. Mostly, reliance at the time was on media reports, though I can recall seeing a Benning printed copy of a manual purporting to be, IIRC, the Rhodesian Forces Counterinsurgency and Anti-Terrorist Operations (or something like that) shortly before I retired in '77. You've probably seen and may recall these LINK, LINK / .pdf. They came later but the interest at the time was significant. Still is...

Thank you. The first pdf I had not yet seen. Am reading at this moment. The other two I have seen and also the references you mention.

Likewise I tried to read as much stuff out of Vietnam as I could. Too much happened there for a soundbite comment.

Good heavens... been retired for 32 years! What did you do with all that time?