Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Bill Moore]

AP,

I'll take a look at the recommended reading, thanks.

What I meant by historically grounded, is that there is some evidence this theory will work, versus just being another good idea that isn't feasible. Obviously new ideas have to be tested, and I'm not opposed to that, but it isn't a theory by my definition until it has been tested and proven to be effective. It is an idea or concept, and while being open to new ideas we should probably go in with the assumption that is only an idea, so we should be prepared for it to fail and have contingencies in our hip pocket.

If the State budget was at all comparable to the DoD budget, there would probably be a significant change of direction in U.S. policies and strategies vis-a-vis conflict. What are U.S. priorities and who makes (and how do they make) those determinations?

It is unrealistic to think that DOS's budget should be comparable to DODs based simply on the amount of money it costs us to purchase and maintain our various systems, conduct major exercises, daily training, etc., but your point is taken. By interaction with the State Department has been mixed. There are some true heroes who have strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries, and there are a fair amount of bubble heads who have no clue how the world works, as demonstrated by the State Department rep who foolishly posted a twitter photo stating the U.S. stands behind the opposition with the Syrian Resistance. Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts. The problem from the outside looking in is it doesn't appear leaders in the State Department are held accountable, unlike a General or Admiral who does something stupid or has demonstrated incompetence is likely to be relieved.

Finally, when DOS took over the security assistance mission from DOD and used it more as a form of diplomacy than building real capacity the U.S. has wasted billions of dollar pursuing inept efforts to build partner nation capacity because it is led by State reps who have limited expertise in the field. I understand why it went under State, but they need to be augmented with sufficient DOD and law enforcement expertise to put together effective capacity building efforts that will more likely ensure that Americans will see a return on their investment of tax dollars. These are areas State out of necessity, or by choice, under resources, so if more money could help address some of these shortfalls.

[AmericanPride]

What I meant by historically grounded, is that there is some evidence this theory will work, versus just being another good idea that isn't feasible.

I agree - my point is that whereas military study has many decades (and centuries) behind it, the field of 'peace studies' has existed for only the last several decades. That we are just now coming around to investigating the nuances of conflict resolution and peace-building, however, does not mean that there are not numerous historical examples of this in practice. As far as developing working theory, you're right, that takes time and there's been a significant amount of work done in that regard. But how many years was it between Sun Tzu and Thucydides, and Thucydides and Machiavelli, and Machiavelli and Clausewitz? And how many more years before someone brought all of their thoughts together in a cohesive 'theory' (and there are still numerous competing theories)? And at the end of the day, I'm sure you'll agree, whether the theory is about war or peace, it's just an idea and events have a way of overtaking them at the ground level.

By interaction with the State Department has been mixed. There are some true heroes who have strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries, and there are a fair amount of bubble heads who have no clue how the world works, as demonstrated by the State Department rep who foolishly posted a twitter photo stating the U.S. stands behind the opposition with the Syrian Resistance. Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts. The problem from the outside looking in is it doesn't appear leaders in the State Department are held accountable, unlike a General or Admiral who does something stupid or has demonstrated incompetence is likely to be relieved.

My experiences have been mixed too - and I would say there are 'true heroes' and 'bubble heads who have no clue' in the military as well. And I would dispute your last statement if we are to use the outcomes of Iraq and Afghanistan as measurements of competence. Anyway, I think a significant problem for the U.S. is the the process of inter-agency cooperation. Each department is fairly effective at their own tasks, but not so much at understanding the tasks of others. In some fields - like joint military operations and interagency cooperation on counter-terrorism - there have been significant improvements but this isn't true across the whole of the government or the full range of its responsibilities. Maybe there needs to be some bureaucratic reform as well as emphasis on 'jointness' at the department level. But I think the U.S. sub-par performance is less an indicator that 'peacebuilding' doesn't work and more that the U.S. is just a bad practitioner of politics other than war.

[Dayuhan]

By interaction with the State Department has been mixed. There are some true heroes who have strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries, and there are a fair amount of bubble heads who have no clue how the world works, as demonstrated by the State Department rep who foolishly posted a twitter photo stating the U.S. stands behind the opposition with the Syrian Resistance. Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts.

Very few DoS people spend enough time in one country (let alone enough time outside the embassy/bubble) to offer realistic "strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries".

DoS is set up to manage relationships between and among states, not to deal with the internal problems of other countries: even AID is less about promoting development than about using aid as a lever to advance perceived US interests. It's tempting to say that the US should have more capacity to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, but I have doubts: not really our business, we don't do it well, and the potential for adverse unintended consequences is high.

I understand that some people find pleasure in imagining that the US has the capacity to dictate policy to other countries and then castigating the US for failing to use that imaginary capacity, but it doesn't seem a particularly productive pastime to me.

[Bill Moore]

Dayuhan,

I agree with your overall assessment, so where does that leave us when we state our means to project national power include diplomacy, information, military and economic power? What other credible tools do we have in the toolbox beyond the military?

A lot of folks tend to believe if we just threw more money at State and AID a lot of our issues would magically disappear. I see little evidence of that being true. On the other hand, I think we're over militarizing a number of issues, so we're between the proverbial rock and a hard place.

[Dayuhan]

I agree with your overall assessment, so where does that leave us when we state our means to project national power include diplomacy, information, military and economic power? What other credible tools do we have in the toolbox beyond the military?

The tools are pretty much what they've always been, we just have to be more realistic about what we can expect to accomplish with them, particularly when it comes to meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. The illusion that we can settle another countrys internal disputes or persuade people to accept a government they detest just by spreading aid money around may be attractive, but it's illusory. The idea that we can persuade or compel bitter enemies to sit down and accept "inclusive government" because we want them to is attractive, but illusory. The idea that we can compel governments of other countries to govern as we think they should is attractive, but illusory, as is the idea that we know best how other countries should be governed.

There's a tendency among disengaged observers to overrate American influence and assume that the US has more ability to control others than it actually does. The world is a much more multipolar place than it once was, and whatever another country needs, be it arms, technology, or credit, the US is not the only place to get it. That limits the carrots, just as domestic politics limits the sticks: using threats to force others to do our will is always an appealing prospect to those fond of bluster, but there's no assurance at all that it will work, especially when the electorate is in no mood to back the threats up.

It's easy to claim that, for example, the Saudis depend on the US for their survival, but saying it doesn't make it so. They don't depend on us for their survival, and they have as much leverage over us as we have over them, as they rather pointedly made clear recently by pushing a $3 billion arms deal with France, a deal that the US defense industry would have much rather seen on US shores. File that under mild reprimands, but the point is that we don't just dictate any more, if we ever did.

I think we're over militarizing a number of issues, so we're between the proverbial rock and a hard place.

That's true, and I think it often comes down to taking on goals that we have no realistic or practical means to accomplish ("nation building", among others), then dumping them on the military for want of other options. Hopefully we've learned a thing or two about that.

[CrowBat]

...Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts....

Come on, Bill: as if it is the DOS that's determining US foreign policy...

The DOS neither has the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 55th, 99th, nor the last word in this regards - and there is rarely such a brilliant example for this fact, but Syria.

Especially when it comes to the Middle East, if you demand - and expect - specific type of actions from the DOS, the US should better follow my advice (see one of posts some 4-5 pages back), and save plenty of tax-payer's money by disbanding it.

[Bill Moore]

Come on, Bill: as if it is the DOS that's determining US foreign policy...

The DOS neither has the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 55th, 99th, nor the last word in this regards - and there is rarely such a brilliant example for this fact, but Syria.

Especially when it comes to the Middle East, if you demand - and expect - specific type of actions from the DOS, the US should better follow my advice (see one of posts some 4-5 pages back), and save plenty of tax-payer's money by disbanding it.

The Department of State is the principal producer of most foreign policies, many of which are rubber stamped. Not all foreign policies are rubber stamped and there will be a number of actors involved.

http://www.state.gov/s/p/

The Policy Planning Staff''s mission is to take a longer term, strategic view of global trends and frame recommendations for the Secretary of State to advance U.S. interests and American values.

http://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do

The Secretary of State, the ranking member of the Cabinet and fourth in line of presidential succession, is the President's principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for representing the United States abroad.

Recommended reading

http://americasotherarmy.com/

[CrowBat]

The Department of State is the principal producer of most foreign policies, many of which are rubber stamped. Not all foreign policies are rubber stamped and there will be a number of actors involved.

...but crucial ones - like Syria - are, and that's what eventually matters.

If, for example, Obama convinces himself 'Syrian insurgents are a bunch of doctors, farmers etc., with whom one can't cooperate', then that's it and the DOS could turn upside down and walk on its hair - but it's not going to change his opinion.

[Dayuhan]

...but crucial ones - like Syria - are, and that's what eventually matters.

If, for example, Obama convinces himself 'Syrian insurgents are a bunch of doctors, farmers etc., with whom one can't cooperate', then that's it and the DOS could turn upside down and walk on its hair - but it's not going to change his opinion.

More likley CIA, DoD, DoS and a few others did a detailed breakdown on the opposition groups, what might be done to help them, and what the probable and possible consequences would be, and the conclusion at the end of the process was that there were no suitable candidates for proxy war and that the risk/reward balance on a proxy war was not attractive.

Believe it or not, they aren't stupid... and your disagreement with their decision doesn't make it wrong.

[AmericanPride]

Bill,

This article discusses in some more detail the problem that Crowbat and I raised.

What does this mean for the progressive forces in the Arab World? It seems to me that the current dynamic will only serve to sideline those demanding genuine change. The security narrative of the conservative regimes is overpowering the demand for greater freedoms as the call for democracy is becoming smothered under the need to “combat terrorism”. There is also deliberate mixing of moderate and radical forms of Islamism. In other words, in the minds of many Arabs the Muslim Brotherhood has become synonymous with ISIS, and the opposition to the current regimes has become equivalent to the support of terrorism. This naturally feeds into the hands of Islamists, who are becoming radicalised due to severe repression.

But as living conditions deteriorate and the level of suppression increases, radicalism is becoming more attractive to the millions of disenfranchised Arab youth, leading to a cycle of suppression and radicalism that seems to have no end in sight. It seems that this cycle can only come to an end in the long term, when the failures of both parties leave space for a well-organised, ideologically motivated revolutionary movement capable of exploiting both forces, namely Islamism and conservatism.

The illusion that we can settle another countrys internal disputes or persuade people to accept a government they detest just by spreading aid money around may be attractive, but it's illusory. The idea that we can persuade or compel bitter enemies to sit down and accept "inclusive government" because we want them to is attractive, but illusory.

It's not an either/or proposition. Depending on the context (the country, the U.S. relationship with said country, the principal actors involved on both sides, the issue, etc) the U.S. exercises a range of influence over other countries. The American ability to influence regime decisions in North Korea, in Mexico, and in Saudi Arabia are unique to the conditions around those relationships. The U.S. has and will influence countries on behalf of priviate commercial interests, strategic political aims, and other reasons - some substantial, some trivial. The U.S. simply does not prioritize developing and exercising this kind of influence for the purposes of facilitating pluralist government.

That's true, and I think it often comes down to taking on goals that we have no realistic or practical means to accomplish ("nation building", among others), then dumping them on the military for want of other options. Hopefully we've learned a thing or two about that.

Pluralist reform and "nation-building" are two distinct activities. The U.S. had no problems in 'facilitating' changes in 'communist' regimes for 50 years - why is the U.S. suddenly powerless in influencing positive reform in authoritarian regimes? I don't think it's a question of what's possible; it's one of preference and willingness.

The world is a much more multipolar place than it once was, and whatever another country needs, be it arms, technology, or credit, the US is not the only place to get it. That limits the carrots, just as domestic politics limits the sticks: using threats to force others to do our will is always an appealing prospect to those fond of bluster, but there's no assurance at all that it will work, especially when the electorate is in no mood to back the threats up.

This is true, but only to an extent - and we witnessed that during the Cold War when the national liberation movements flocked to the 'communist' banner after the U.S. refused to support their bids for independence and in many cases, democracy. When the U.S. does not strengthen democratic governance, what and who remains in power? It's not helped by the total absence of any long-term strategy for U.S. foreign policy. An interesting case study is Yemen's Saleh's exploitation of U.S. desperation for Arab counter-terrorism allies to fund and arm his government - which ended with predictable results when his regime imploded, leaving the Yemen terrorism problem unresolved. Ditto Somalia since 2001.

[Dayuhan]

This going well off topic and probably should be moved elsewhere, but I'll leave that to David...

It's not an either/or proposition. Depending on the context (the country, the U.S. relationship with said country, the principal actors involved on both sides, the issue, etc) the U.S. exercises a range of influence over other countries. The American ability to influence regime decisions in North Korea, in Mexico, and in Saudi Arabia are unique to the conditions around those relationships. The U.S. has and will influence countries on behalf of priviate commercial interests, strategic political aims, and other reasons - some substantial, some trivial.

Influence in any given case depends on the extent and credibility of the incentives and penalties that the influencing power can deploy, and extent of resistance in the target of the influence. The second factor is key. Commercial concessions are generally not difficult, especially if there's something in it for those who rule. When we start talking about applying influence to force reforms that many ruling elites will see as immediate threats to their own positions, prerogatives, and even survival, resistance is very high. The response may be an outright refusal or an attempt to feign compliance with a charade of pseudo-reforms, but ruling elites in other countries are not going to simply surrender their power and perks because we want them to.

The U.S. simply does not prioritize developing and exercising this kind of influence for the purposes of facilitating pluralist government.

What's the basis for that statement? I think the US has placed a fairly high priority on efforts like "democracy promotion", reducing corruption, etc. The efforts just haven't been very productive, largely because nobody has any clear or convincing idea of how to do it.

The U.S. had no problems in 'facilitating' changes in 'communist' regimes for 50 years - why is the U.S. suddenly powerless in influencing positive reform in authoritarian regimes? I don't think it's a question of what's possible; it's one of preference and willingness.

When did the US ever effectively facilitate reform in Communist countries, up until the point where Communism collapsed from the inside? To put it simply, the US is generally powerless to force reform in authoritarian regimes because the penalties and incentives we are effectively able to deploy are not sufficient to overcome the very high level of resistance to reform in the target countries.

This is true, but only to an extent - and we witnessed that during the Cold War when the national liberation movements flocked to the 'communist' banner after the U.S. refused to support their bids for independence and in many cases, democracy.

I agree that this was a huge mistake and one that greatly strengthened our opponents in the Cold War. The extent to which that's analogous to current circumstances is very debatable.

When the U.S. does not strengthen democratic governance, what and who remains in power?

You can't strengthen something that isn't there, and outside attempts to create democratic governance have generally not been very successful.

It's not helped by the total absence of any long-term strategy for U.S. foreign policy. An interesting case study is Yemen's Saleh's exploitation of U.S. desperation for Arab counter-terrorism allies to fund and arm his government - which ended with predictable results when his regime imploded, leaving the Yemen terrorism problem unresolved. Ditto Somalia since 2001.

What were the alternatives in Yemen or Somalia? Certainly strengthening democratic governance wasn't an option, as there wasn't any to strengthen.

A better example might be the US effort to get Bahrain to respond to its Arab Spring with accommodation and reform, which clearly demonstrates the limits of US influence.

This debate tends to come back to the debate between realism and idealism: do you deal with what exists and try to make the most of it, or do you try to replace it, with a huge variety of potential unintended consequences, many of them very unattractive?

Since the unspoken focus of these generic discussions is so often Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, it might be useful to look specifically at the elephant in the drawing room. What specific policy reforms would we want to promote, what means could we adopt to promote them, and what would the probable outcomes be?

[CrowBat]

Further to following post by AP:

...
This article discusses in some more detail the problem that Crowbat and I raised.

...

...In other words, in the minds of many Arabs the Muslim Brotherhood has become synonymous with ISIS, and the opposition to the current regimes has become equivalent to the support of terrorism. This naturally feeds into the hands of Islamists, who are becoming radicalised due to severe repression.
...

The same can be said for a mass of observers in the West, who are liberally bunching all Syrian insurgents, no matter what group, under 'extremist Islamists' and 'ISIS' - which they are not. ISIS is not 'Syrian', and except in Dayr az-Zawr area where it forced all of insurgents into submission through cutting off their supply links and connections to the outside world and sandwiching them between itself and regime-held areas, it contains actually very few Syrians (and most of these were forced into submission too).

Another extremist group, the JAN - and which is predominantly Salafist, not Wahabist - ended at the list of terrorist organizations because it declared itself allied with AQ, and some of its bosses are maintaining corresponding ties (no doubt about this), but despite clearly stating it does not intend to launch a 'Jihad' against anybody outside Syria (i.e. against anybody except the regime).

...and the entire conflict is seen completely through the prism of 'that's an uprising of Islamist extremists', and 'if it's interesting then only because of the ISIS' - which is why that topic is discussed most of the time on this forum, and why this thread is going off topic.

Anyway, against better advice from its IRGC-QF advisers, and against increasing resistance from within its own military, instead of rushing it to support its counteroffensive against the IF and FSyA north of Hama, or into counterattacks on insurgents advancing in southern Syria, the regime is dispatching the SyAAF (it's air force) into more show attacks on Raqqa, Tabqa and Dayr az-Zawr. It's claiming scores of ISIS as KIA and hundreds of its vehicles as destroyed. Even one of 'Scuds' paraded by the ISIS through Raqqa recently should have been destroyed.

Nothing of this can be independently verified, except the following:

- even MiG-21s are deployed for this purpose, although they are hopelessly useless for this purpose and operating at the very edge of their endurance when flying missions against targets in Raqqa area, as can be seen from this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iHWMDrJkcpQ

- and they get shot down by the ISIS, then this has better air defences than most of insurgents, as can be seen from this video and the still attached below (the MiG in question was hit earlier today and crashed into a house, killing eight civilians in Raqqa, fate of pilot remains unknown):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWcon4di26s

So, it seems the regime is very eager to catch as much attention as possible in performing the role of 'good' one in the anti-ISIS campaign...

The photo below is showing the upper side of the left stabilizer of the MiG-21 shot down by the ISIS over Raqqa today.