Vietnam War Collection: books plus

[Cavguy]

Cavguy...you should be able to log into the article through the library there without giving up any information. If not, PM me.

COL Gentile and Shek both sent me copies - Share many of the same opinions of the article. There is some merit to the argument that development is impossible without baseline security, and security requires force. Therefore, the author's argument is that Westmorland was right to do 'search and destroy', and his 'search and destroy' ops enabled Abrams to focus on pacification.

He gets to it in the last paragraphs when he states the main takeaway:

Counterinsurgency is not only about good planning, it is also about numbers. Without sufficient forces to dominate the operational area on a constant basis, there is simply no way to disrupt the guerrillas and at the same time foster pacification programs. This is as true today as it was then.

I disagree with his conclusion here. My personal experience in Ramadi and Tal Afar suggest that it is not sequential but somewhat parallel, or at least intersecting curves - you have to do both LOO's (security and development) simultaneously. You never get real security without development/pacification and you can never do effective development without a minimum level of security that interdicts enemy freedom of movement.

What is the bio/background of the author?