I have to say this has been one of the most stimulating threads I've followed in a while, and one of the reasons why I keep coming back here when I should be working. The references and explanatory notes have given me a better understanding of Boyd and his work - though I have to admit I have never been a fan.

I also have to note that, through no fault of his own, Boyd's influence has had an insidious effect on the US military. Like apes with loaded sidearms, some Boyd adapters with an imperfect grasp of his principles did positive harm. The OODA loop, for instance: you can draw a fairly direct line between it and some of the nonsense concepts we've had to deal with over the last decade or so, like accelerated-decision-making, recon-pull, and perfect SA. It has infected planning, acquisition, doctrine, and organization.

Not that that is a lick on Boyd, any more than I blame Clausewitz for trench warfare in WWI. It's just that some ideas can be dangerous in the hands of the dim.