Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam

[JMA]

What is totally amazing is that ...

I will not continue the ###-for-tat response but rather restate my position.

The decision to proceed with the Son Tay raid despite confirmation that the camp was empty was gross incompetence. The fact that the CJCS failed to act sadly indicates that a person incapable of decision making at a critical moment had somehow managed to reach the pinnacle of the US military. If the decision to proceed was taken by or strongly recommended by the military the CJCS should have been dismissed (or worse). If, however, the decision to proceed was driven by the politicians then it exposed a lack of moral courage in the CJCS which again raises questions as to how he managed to reach that position. I say again any which way you try to spin it the man was worthy as a subject of a case study into the Peter Principle.

Fast forward to Operation Eagle Claw. Here we see more of the Keystone Cops incompetence at the highest level of the US military. I quote from Beckwith's book: - in conversation with Task Force Commander Major General James B. Vaught during the preliminary planning stage:

"What's the risk, Colonel Beckwith?"

"Oh, about 99.9 percent."

"What's the probability of success?"

"Zero."

"Well, we can't do it."

"You're right, Boss."

"I've got to buy time from the JCS."

Staggering isn't it?

A major-general and a colonel can't tell the JCS that the operation has a zero chance of success??????????????????????????????????

So what were the JCS thinking???????????????????????

Then from here:

The contradiction between the optimism of the flag-rank staff officers and the pessimism of field commanders like Beckwith indicates that the feedback of ground commanders had not been taken seriously by a civilian administration which was determined to execute what it perceived as a last resort.

It is simple.

Nobody (in their right mind) with question the physical courage of the US forces... but it is becoming increasingly clear that moral courage is in short supply in the upper echelons of the US military.

Sticks and stones and all that stuff Ken

[Fuchs]

(...)moral courage is in short supply in the upper echelons of the US military.

I see no good reason for spelling "US" here.
Moral courage in armed services is the exception, not the norm. Anecdotes.

That's the downside of the power that command authority bestows on superiors and the downside of having an organisation that demands obedience to the degree of overpowering survival instincts.

Military moral courage needs to be replaced by a careful selection of civilian leaders (and by civilian authority over the military). The civilians on top need to make sure that unpleasant news reach them by rewarding good reporting and punishing bad reporting (and non-reporting of important facts) whenever they can reveal it.

I don't think there's a reliable way how to make amilitary effective AND foster its moral courage at the same time.

[ganulv]

That's the downside of the power that command authority bestows on superiors and the downside of having an organisation that demands obedience to the degree of overpowering survival instincts.

It’s not limited to the military, that’s for sure.

The civilians on top need to make sure that unpleasant news reach them by rewarding good reporting and punishing bad reporting (and non-reporting of important facts) whenever they can reveal it.

[jcustis]

The decision to proceed with the Son Tay raid despite confirmation that the camp was empty was gross incompetence.

You contiinue to post in this thread, over and over, that there was confirmation the prisoners were moved.

A single source report from a HUMINT asset is not confirmation of anything, yet you continue to toss your hand in with the conspiracy theorist lot who believe that report sealed the deal.

Do you understand that your argument hinges on that weakness right now?

[JMA]

You contiinue to post in this thread, over and over, that there was confirmation the prisoners were moved.

A single source report from a HUMINT asset is not confirmation of anything, yet you continue to toss your hand in with the conspiracy theorist lot who believe that report sealed the deal.

Do you understand that your argument hinges on that weakness right now?

I nearly missed this.

Major, let me help you with a simple timeline:

* Air photography in May 1970 identified the presence of US POWs in Son Tay on the following basis:

At Son Tay, 23 miles from Hanoi, one photograph identified a large "K" - a code for "come get us" - drawn in the dirt.

* To study the feasibility of a raid, CJCS Wheeler authorized a 15-member planning group under the codename Polar Circle that convened on June 10. The study group, after a review of all available intelligence, concluded that Son Tay contained 61 POWs.

* July 14 POWs moved from Son Tay

* Finally, in late July 1970, a Joint Contingency Task Group was formed and the operation received the code name Ivory Coast. Moorer briefed Laird on Ivory Coast and Laird immediately approved formation, training, and support of the rescue group.

* 21 November 1970 the Raid on an 'empty' POW camp went ahead.

So what does that tell you?

It tells you that all of the 'stack' of evidence indicating that the POWs were at Son Tay they had dated after 14 July was nothing but dead wrong... or as they say in the classics, nothing but hot steaming horsesh*t.

Not only that, Adm Train is on record as follows:

In a 1993 book, Admiral Train admitted: “Twelve hours before the raid we had fairly high confidence that [Son Tay] was empty. The photography showed the grass had not been walked on in ten days. On the basis of the photographic evidence alone we knew that it was empty.”

(my emphasis)

So I suggest major instead of getting picky with me over the available intel why not question how the charade was able to continue after the camp emptied on 14 July up until the actual raid on 21 November.

Little wonder the following:

The intensity of the criticism, and leaks of information including reports of the operation, caused the Nixon Administration to reorganize both the military communications network and the government's intelligence apparatus.

I hope you are now able to see where the real weakness lies.

[JMA]

I see no good reason for spelling "US" here.
Moral courage in armed services is the exception, not the norm. Anecdotes.

You are probably correct in that one hears of very few commanders who are willing to make that final and irrevocable protest and resign rather than follow insane orders or risk soldiers lives unnecessarily.

That's the downside of the power that command authority bestows on superiors and the downside of having an organisation that demands obedience to the degree of overpowering survival instincts.

Of course in a situation (like that Beckwith found himself) where the operational commander who himself will be in harms way to refuse would invite the response "well if you are not up for the task then we will find someone who is," (incorporating the innuendo of cowardice).

When it is a situation where it is someone who will not be at risk like the cocooned JCS it is all about their pensions - in that how many lives can be gambled with (not risked mind you) before he/they are prepared to risk their pensions.

Military moral courage needs to be replaced by a careful selection of civilian leaders (and by civilian authority over the military). The civilians on top need to make sure that unpleasant news reach them by rewarding good reporting and punishing bad reporting (and non-reporting of important facts) whenever they can reveal it.

In the case of Son Tay you may be correct but in the case of Eagle Claw (where a desperate unpopular President was prepared to risk the lives of military men to save his own political ass) it was up to the CJCS and the JCS to tell the politicians to go take a hike. They didn't have the balls (moral courage in this case) to do it.

I don't think there's a reliable way how to make a military effective AND foster its moral courage at the same time.

You may be correct... but a step in the right direction will be to court-marshall those who it is proven have failed in their duty of care to the men under their command.

In the case of Son Tay and Moorer if he had known that either way he was going to end his career and lose his pension he may just have done the right thing especially if that was the honourable course of action.

[jmm99]

My initial reaction was to address this post to JMA; but upon reflection, I am simply going to followup Jon Custis' posts. So, we should address the material facts regarding, and who was involved in, the so-called "intelligence failure" (no POWs); and, more importantly, at what level, should we analyze the end goal of the mission.

In considering those questions, two online sources stand out for factual validation and reasoned policy analysis (fn 1):

Amidon, Mark. "Groupthink, Politics, and the Decision to Attempt the Son Tay Rescue". Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College 2005 (Winter) [cited as Amidon].

Mitchell, Major John, USMC (1997). "The Son Tay Raid: A Study in Presidential Policy". e-History: Vietnam War. The Ohio State University [cited as Mitchell]

1. Events of 19-20 November (the Material Facts)

Amidon's summary (pp.5-6 pdf) is the shorter of the two:

On 19 November, after the President approved the mission and one day before actual launch, word reached General Blackburn of the North Vietnamese HUMINT source who reported “no prisoners at Son Tay.” This HUMINT report triggered a massive reanalysis of available information and demands for an updated intelligence estimate.

For the next 12 hours, General Blackburn, DIA Director Lieutenant General Donald Bennett, Admiral Moorer, and Secretary Laird struggled with the significance of this news and what impact it should have on the mission. General Blackburn was certain that the mission should proceed; yet his confidence wavered as he expressed great frustration with the quality of the intelligence analysis. “One minute they were ‘sure’ the prisoners were gone, the next they were ‘suspicious’ that POWs had been moved back into Son Tay.”[31] General Bennett appeared before Admiral Moorer on the morning of 20 November with two stacks of “evidence,” one saying “they’ve moved,” and an equally large one saying “they’re still there.”[32] Despite this muddled intelligence picture, General Bennett eventually recommended that the mission proceed, primarily on the basis of the “95 percent assurance” that the raiders could safely complete their mission.[33] Armed with the concurrence of his three subordinates, Secretary of Defense Laird routinely notified the President that the mission would proceed as planned. The White House concurred with the Pentagon’s intentions. With the raid due to launch in hours, the Administration was not interested in doubts. As Admiral Harry D. Train, at that time the Executive Assistant to Admiral Moorer, later put it, “They didn’t want to know.”[34]

31. Schemmer, p. 180.
32. Vandenbroucke, p. 65.
33. Schemmer, p. 180.
34. Vandenbroucke, p. 66.

Mitchell's section on "Intelligence and the Decision: (page 6 & page 7) goes beyond Amidon (snips from 19-20 Nov):

....
[the meeting of Blackburn, Bennett and Moorer on 19 Nov] Having heard the opinions of both men, Moorer decided to brief Laird the following morning. Hopefully, the additional time would allow for reconsideration and/or confirmation regarding to the new information. If confirmed to be accurate, enough time would be available on the morning of 20 November to brief the NCA and deliver any changes to the raid force prior to their scheduled launch time.

The following morning [20 Nov], Moorer, Bennett, and Blackburn again met to discuss the new developments. As it turned out, Bennett had a change of opinion. He had reconsidered his position based on all the information collected to date on Son Tay. Bennett arrived at the same conclusion Blackburn did on the day before. Therefore, Bennett recommended a 'Go.' That recommendation was enough for Moorer to agree that the mission should be attempted, since he also believed that the POWs were still there. It was good that all three 'confirmed' what they wanted to believe because the raid force mission commander had given the final preparation and execution order to the raid force earlier that morning. It is apparent that Moorer's decision to wait had paid off because anything less than a unified recommendation from his office probably would have led to an abort by the NCA. However, there was still enough time to do just that with another 'Red Rocket' if Nixon or Laird deemed it necessary in light of the Hanoi source information. Therefore, with Bennett at his side, Moorer went to brief Laird on the recent developments.

Laird did not hesitate in agreeing with Moorer's recommendation to proceed despite the new developments. Laird was committed and fully understood Nixon's policy and to what extent the President would go to make his point once diplomatic efforts failed or produced insufficient results on a specific issue. Laird's resolve and conviction over the POW/MIA would be reconfirmed in his eyes because, within an hour of Moorer's departure, Richard Helms arrived to discuss the information obtained from the Hanoi source and also brought additional news concerning the POW issue. The CIA had intercepted recent "traffic" and confirmed that as many as 11 more POWs had died in captivity in addition to those reported on 13 November. Laird knew he must immediately inform the President of these developments. However, exactly what and how he told the President is an issue which is still debatable.
....
Research indicates, and it is the judgment of this author, that the President would not have aborted the mission in light of this information. Whether or not the President was briefed about the Hanoi source information is irrelevant. After all, the final decision to carry out the raid had been made. In other words, there was no political "smoking gun" (any Presidential "wrong doing" associated with the decision to execute or continue) to be found on this specific issue. However, if the Hanoi source information proved to be true, Laird would take all the blame if the mission turned out to be a total failure. Apparently Laird's decision not to brief Nixon would provide Presidential "plausible deniability" in case the mission met with tragic results. Having established Nixon's policy towards ending the war in Vietnam and what part the raid would play in that policy, let us review the leadership, execution, and reaction to the mission in order to understand the complexity and significance of the Son Tay Raid.

Why was the presence or absence of the POWs "irrelevant" to the decisions made at the National Command Authority level ?

cont. in part 2

[jmm99]

2. Strategic Analysis vs Tactical Analysis

Amidon succinctly sums up the "worm's eye" tactical view vs. the "big picture" strategic view (pp.10-11):

Same Mission, Different Goals

The most stunning aspect of the Son Tay raid is the wide and subtle goal divergence that existed between the Pentagon and the White House. In the minds of the Pentagon military planners, the Son Tay raid was a high-risk tactical mission undertaken to rescue American POWs being held captive under harsh conditions in North Vietnam. Colonel Simons summed this viewpoint in his pre-mission speech to the raiders: “We are going to rescue 70 American prisoners of war, maybe more, at a camp called Son Tay. This is something that American prisoners have a right to expect from their fellow soldiers.”[53] To the Pentagon planners, conflicting intelligence in the eleventh hour threatened the sole objective of the raid. No POWs, no raid.

President Nixon’s motives were far more complex and closely guarded. Although Nixon also sought to rescue POWs, the Son Tay raid provided an ideal vehicle to forward his emerging strategy of imposing pressure on the North Vietnamese and convincing them that the Administration was not to be trifled with. According to historian Jeffrey Kimball:

In his memoirs, Kissinger revealed the broader diplomatic and strategic reasons behind the November 1970 [Son Tay] air raids. Besides diverting North Vietnamese defenses from Son Tay, they were designed to retaliate for the abrupt rejection of our peace proposal; and to slow down the North Vietnamese dry-season supply effort in the South. Thus, besides its humanitarian and political purposes, the combined operation of rescue and bombing had military and psychological purposes - an adjective Nixon used in his memoirs. [Nixon] commented that “it revealed [to the North Vietnamese] their vulnerability to a kind of attack they had not experienced before. The rescue mission demonstrated that the US could get past North Vietnamese air defenses and operate in [their] rear. It was a true [rescue] activity but also designed to show” that Nixon’s threats should be taken seriously.[54]

Unlike those at the Pentagon who viewed the Son Tay raid as a POW rescue, President Nixon saw it as a combination of a rescue, a threat to the North Vietnamese, and a salvo against his domestic critics. At least one modern scholar has gone so far as to ask the question: “Was Son Tay a rescue mission or an attack on North Vietnam disguised as a rescue mission?”[55]

Numerous Pentagon officials expressed surprise at the White House’s indifference to the reports of decreased camp activity. Their concerns might have been far more muted had they understood the fundamentally different objectives of the White House and the Pentagon. Whereas the military’s launch decision hinged solely on rescuing POWs, the White House saw great opportunity in safely executing a raid into North Vietnam, even if no POWs were rescued. Those in the Pentagon believed they were recommending “go” on a tactical mission. The White House had long since approved a strategic mission.

53. Schemme, p. 198.
54. Kimball, p. 238.
55. eHistory, “The Son Tay Raid: A Study in Presidential Policy,” p. 6.

Mitchell (page 16) comes to the same conclusion:

IN CONCLUSION: A QUESTION TO CONSIDER

Having explored both the humanitarian and political origins of the raid, perhaps a final thought provoking question remains, was the Son Tay Raid a rescue mission or an attack? In the opinion of this researcher, it was both! A noble and honorable attempt had been made by a gallant force to relieve the suffering of their brothers-in-arms, but the raid also possessed the elements of a deliberate attack to carry out Presidential policy. Undoubtedly, had POWs been rescued at Son Tay, immediate success would have been acknowledged by all, perhaps even resulting in uniting a divided America. Yet, at the same time, but unfortunately out of public view, the raid was an immediate success because Hanoi quickly began direct negotiations and took rapid action to correct their past transgressions regarding the treatment of POWs. By linking military actions to strategic goals, as was demonstrated by the raid on Son Tay, it is evident that President Nixon emerged from the latest round of 'negotiations' as a winner, although not immediately recognized as such.

Perhaps there will always be speculation concerning the raid. For example: Prior to the mission, did the NCA or any other planner/decision maker know that there were 'in fact' no POWs at Son Tay? Perhaps some did, but for unknown reasons elected to remain silent on the issue. Additionally, did Colonel Simons' raid group land at the secondary school on purpose and if so, who ordered it and why? Furthermore, when were the POWs actually moved from Son Tay? And finally, why were the POWs moved? All of these questions call for additional research.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue with positive results like those which occurred after the raid. Hanoi's response was to break off official peace negotiations in Paris and publicly denounce the U.S. for escalating the war. Unofficially, Hanoi, China, and the Soviet Union were shaken by the raid. All tightened security at their military compounds and other sensitive locations. Additionally, previously classified White House documents revealed that Hanoi began responding to official requests concerning POW issues as early as 26 November 1970, something they had rarely done before. Hanoi was also concerned that American public opinion was now focused on the POW/MIA issue, especially since confirming that many POWs had died in captivity. Hanoi finally got the message and began to fear a change in international and American public support for the war since the raid had highlighted such a sensitive issue. In light of these and other developments, the raid was an overwhelming success as both a rescue mission and an extension of policy. The President's decision to support his policy through military activity directly resulted in forcing Hanoi to treat POWs more humanely and forced Hanoi back to Paris in a more humble negotiating position.

Without a doubt, Hanoi now knew it was dealing with a new Administration determined to see an end to the war, but only in an honorable manner. On two occasions the President had shown Hanoi his resolve and to what lengths he would go to ensure that his style of diplomacy should not be misinterpreted. Hanoi knew it had better pay attention lest it risk waking a lethargic giant with a new attitude.

As Mitchell points out, there are some interesting tactical issues that remain open - the full story of the Secondary School being one of them !

Frying Adm. Moorer is NOT justified by the facts. He acted in accord with the NCA policy setting the strategic basis for the mission. That NCA policy happened in this instance to be sound.

Regards

Mike

fn 1. The Wiki for Operation Ivory Coast provides a framework for discussion, including the two sources linked above. Consider also 1972 Linebacker I and II linked in my last post.

[Ken White]

As always your research skills, speed and thoroughness are amazing and laudable.

Thus I laud...

I agree with your conclusion re: Moorer with the added note that Moorer, like every other CJCS was NOT in the chain of command. The CJCS is an adviser, of course his recommendations have weight but in the end the Chain was and is President - SecDef - overseas commander. In this case, as your research shows, the decision was in essence political and was by the President. Counter recommendations by the CJCS may or may not have affected that -- with Nixon, my bet would be no. Every former Lieutenant Commander relishes a chance to overrule a four star...

[JMA]

As always your research skills, speed and thoroughness are amazing and laudable.

Thus I laud...

I agree with your conclusion re: Moorer with the added note that Moorer, like every other CJCS was NOT in the chain of command. The CJCS is an adviser, of course his recommendations have weight but in the end the Chain was and is President - SecDef - overseas commander. In this case, as your research shows, the decision was in essence political and was by the President. Counter recommendations by the CJCS may or may not have affected that -- with Nixon, my bet would be no. Every former Lieutenant Commander relishes a chance to overrule a four star...

Ken, you didn't bother to read that stuff did you?

[JMA]

[B]Frying Adm. Moorer is NOT justified by the facts. He acted in accord with the NCA policy setting the strategic basis for the mission. That NCA policy happened in this instance to be sound.

... and so the Moorer defense team rests it case.

(Those who want to believe that will do so without even bothering to read your sources. Blind loyalty can be taken for granted in many cases.)

Where in any of the quotes you provided did it prove that Moorer acted in accordance with the applicable NCA policy and if so how does absolve him from his duty as the top advisor to the White House and his duty of care towards his troops?

The key to the Amidon article was the confirmation from Admiral Train, Executive Assistant to Admiral Moorer:

In a 1993 book, Admiral Train admitted: “Twelve hours before the raid we had fairly high confidence that [Son Tay] was empty. The photography showed the grass had not been walked on in ten days. On the basis of the photographic evidence alone we knew that it was empty.”

Moorer, at the interface between the Pentagon and the White House, failed to display the moral courage to tell he White House that the camp was empty and to insist that the raid was called off. Moorer has no place to hide, the man was a moral coward.

I hope this matter is now settled (which it will be all other than for the blindly loyal).

Blackburn and Bennet should of course not be allowed to get off scott free either.

And as far as the White House one (sadly) expects no better from politicians.

Another very tragic aspect to this is that the very same Groupthink which had led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco was still alive and well in the US system.

The Son Tay Raid together with the Bay of Pigs and Operation Eagles Claw (and others) should be studied in detail at staff colleges around the world as case studies in command disfunction at the highest levels.

[Ken White]

Moorer has no place to hide, the man was a moral coward.

Misperception based sweeping judgements a specialty?

I hope this matter is now settled (which it will be all other than for the blindly loyal).

We knew it was settled in your mind before this sub thread gathered steam. No one had any idea of changing that. -- or any desire to do so.

The intent was merely to set the record straight for observers and not let ignorance, misperceptions and / or bias rule. That's been done.

Another very tragic aspect to this is that the very same Groupthink which had led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco was still alive and well in the US system.

Sadly, that factor still exists here and elsewhere in the world. Thank you for finally acknowledging that there is indeed such a politically induced and bureaucratic phenomenon and that it does significantly affect military operations. That principle is correct even if you did, as often occurs, get the specifics rather badly wrong on this particular incident.

[Ken White]

I will not continue the ###-for-tat response but rather restate my position.

He said as he again laid out a ###.

As for this:

It is simple.

Nobody (in their right mind) with question the physical courage of the US forces... but it is becoming increasingly clear that moral courage is in short supply in the upper echelons of the US military.

That certainly applies to some, fortunately, not to all even though such blanket condemnation may be perceptively merited in your view. Fortunately, you are not the arbiter. Also fortunately, reality -- and most others -- differ.

Sticks and stones and all that stuff Ken

No sticks or stones, just another response to your apparent once a month or so relatively pointless excessive negativity cycle. It's yet another plea for you to think about what you're posting rather than occasionally dashing off ill considered and quite uninformed vituperation for no apparent reason other than that you can...

It's too early for the Grinch...