Deterrence of Irregular Threats

[William F. Owen]

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.

Sorry Bob, but all this "Complexity" and "Empowered Actors" you are just ignoring 3,000 years of History. How is any of this different from the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand, the "Gun Powder Plot" hatched in in 1605.

Look at Europe in the 14th Century. Greatly more dangerous and disordered than anything we can possibly imagine today. I just don't get all the confusion here. What is it you find so complicated?

[Bob's World]

Sorry Bob, but all this "Complexity" and "Empowered Actors" you are just ignoring 3,000 years of History. How is any of this different from the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand, the "Gun Powder Plot" hatched in in 1605.

Look at Europe in the 14th Century. Greatly more dangerous and disordered than anything we can possibly imagine today. I just don't get all the confusion here. What is it you find so complicated?

Every generation talks about the challenges of raising teenagers....I get it. Some things don't change much.

However; anyone who thinks that the new tools of communication have not had a powerful effect on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been applied to such timeless acts and motivations to act is whistling past the cemetary.

[William F. Owen]

However; anyone who thinks that the new tools of communication have not had a powerful effect on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been applied to such timeless acts and motivations to act is whistling past the cemetary.

With respect, I think that statement needs to be held to rigour.
The basics of the Platoon attack have not changed since 1919, but yes a Platoon Commander can now call and adjust Corps level artillery fires - but that's really a "so what" issue. It's not hard to understand.
The same man can use a hand thrown or ground crawling UAV to do the same - so what?
The tactical level is not and has not become more complex. If so how?

The biggest problem I have is teaching people the limitations of all the new toys. EG: 28 knot surface wind, and most hand thrown UAV's will fly, etc etc etc.

[Bob's World]

With respect, I think that statement needs to be held to rigour.
The basics of the Platoon attack have not changed since 1919, but yes a Platoon Commander can now call and adjust Corps level artillery fires - but that's really a "so what" issue. It's not hard to understand.
The same man can use a hand thrown or ground crawling UAV to do the same - so what?
The tactical level is not and has not become more complex. If so how?

The biggest problem I have is teaching people the limitations of all the new toys. EG: 28 knot surface wind, and most hand thrown UAV's will fly, etc etc etc.

No argument that most tactics produce very similar results at the tactical level; though just as the rifled musket forced modification of tactics to take into account a formation receiving 6-10 aimed volleys as it closed with the enemy vice the 1-2 they had received over the few hundred years preceding; so to do many advances like UAVs, guided munitions, etc; shape tactics today. But that is not what I am talking about at all.

What i am talking about is the strategic effect expected based on historical experience from COIN tactics simply is far less likely to be achieved due to the enhanced communications tools available to populaces (and therefore insurgents) everywhere.

This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.

The strategic environment has changed incredibly; both because the artificial construct of the Cold War polarity that all of our policies and international organizations are based upon no longer exists; because that in it self also served as a catalyst for those oppressed by it to seek the opportunity to achieve change; and because the information tools that are fueling globalization have empowered these organizations to be more effective, more resilient, and longer reaching, than ever before.

The fact that it still only takes one bullet to kill one man is immaterial and moot to this discussion.

[Bob's World]

Here are some concepts that I believe demand fresh attention and new perspectives if we are to have a holistic family of deterrence across the range of all actors that facilitates the peace we seek:

Balance
Balancing the relative deterrent and provocative effects of actions across a complex span of actors.

Sanctuary
(God save us from the cliche' "sanctuary of ungoverned spaces")
We must understand and address organizations that have "sanctuary" currently from the traditional elements of national power.

Glib cliche's parroted without thought just don't cut it. True sanctuary does not come from a "space"; but from a favorable terrain/veg that also is protected by some legal status (often a sovereign border) and the support of a poorly governed populace. Focus on the legal status's that bind us and the elements of poor governance that shape a populaces motivations. Many of these new actors are taking advantage of new forms of sanctuary, and those sanctuaries are primarily a function of laws that we follow but they can ignore; and poorly governed populaces that we have ignored in favor of the governments that in many cases, we have imposed or sustained over them. Both of these can be addressed if recognized as important, and then understood for their true nature.

Empowered Populaces
Deterrence of people is fundamentally different than deterrence of states.

Legitimacy
When an insurgent populace perceives that an outside power has an inappropriate degree of legitimacy over the government they are dissatisfied with, they will target that inappropriate source of legitimacy in the pursuit of their aims. This is the central component to AQ's strategy to conduct UW to get these many diverse, nationalist efforts to support their cause. They make the case that the US is the obstacle to achieving good governance, and due to that widely held perception, it works. Address the legitimacy and you both disempower Bin Laden's message; and you also get these nationalist insurgencies to focus on the home front as the obstacle has been removed. (This is why the vast majority of foreign fighters and "terrorists" come from the populaces of our friends, rather than the populaces of our foes - No Iranian believes that the US is responsible for the poor governance they suffer under. Many Saudis do.

Holistic Approaches
We have a mono-focus on deterrence. Cost/benefit analysis aimed at states; differentiated primarily by only if they have, or don't have, nukes. Anyone else we criminalize by labeling them "terrorist". We look through two tubes and neither tube is particularly focused for the realities of today's environment.

What I suggest is that we look at the entire span of actors holistically, and then with that broader perspective look at the deterrence problem with fresh eyes and fresh thinking to address the whole more effectively, by more effectively addressing the individuals.

[Dayuhan]

True sanctuary does not come from a "space"; but from a favorable terrain/veg that also is protected by some legal status (often a sovereign border) and the support of a poorly governed populace. Focus on the legal status's that bind us and the elements of poor governance that shape a populaces motivations. Many of these new actors are taking advantage of new forms of sanctuary, and those sanctuaries are primarily a function of laws that we follow but they can ignore; and poorly governed populaces that we have ignored in favor of the governments that in many cases, we have imposed or sustained over them.

That definition of "true sanctuary" may need to be opened up a bit, to include disaffected sectors of a generally well-governed populace. I'm thinking particularly here of the foothold radical Islam has gained in Western Europe... many of us may have criticisms of European governments, but as a rule it would be hard to classify the European populace as poorly governed. Radical movements have still managed to gain a significant presence there, often using the very rights and privileges that we associate with good governance as protection. It's a different form of sanctuary, one that poses a different set of challenges.

I suspect that the use of the term "deterrence" is becoming a bit of an obstacle to the discussion. There seem to be two different definitions floating around: some use "deterrence" in the broad sense of "any action or policy intended to prevent or discourage an attack", others see it in the more limited sense of "using the threat of retaliation to discourage an attack" (off-the-cuff definitions). I personally think the first is more appropriate, especially since massive retaliation against the type of amorphous organization that typically presents an irregular threat may not be possible. We need the entire toolbox, and terminology that tends - by design or by reflex - to emphasize one tool can distort the discussion from the start. Perhaps it would be better to speak of "confronting irregular threats", "neutralizing irregular threats", or something similar?

The question of whether the security environment presented by "irregular" threats is more or less complex than that presented by "regular" threats seems irrelevant to me. It may or may not be more complex, but it's certainly different. Is the threat presented by a nuclear warhead delivered by a ballistic missile more or less complex than the threat presented by a nuclear warhead smuggled into the country in a cargo container? I don't know or care: the point is not to decide which is more complex, the point is to prepare for both possibilities, and for possibilities we have yet to consider. Bob's effort seems a useful step toward that goal, and I'll be interested to see what comes of it.

[Bob's World]

That definition of "true sanctuary" may need to be opened up a bit, to include disaffected sectors of a generally well-governed populace. I'm thinking particularly here of the foothold radical Islam has gained in Western Europe... many of us may have criticisms of European governments, but as a rule it would be hard to classify the European populace as poorly governed. Radical movements have still managed to gain a significant presence there, often using the very rights and privileges that we associate with good governance as protection. It's a different form of sanctuary, one that poses a different set of challenges.

I suspect that the use of the term "deterrence" is becoming a bit of an obstacle to the discussion. There seem to be two different definitions floating around: some use "deterrence" in the broad sense of "any action or policy intended to prevent or discourage an attack", others see it in the more limited sense of "using the threat of retaliation to discourage an attack" (off-the-cuff definitions). I personally think the first is more appropriate, especially since massive retaliation against the type of amorphous organization that typically presents an irregular threat may not be possible. We need the entire toolbox, and terminology that tends - by design or by reflex - to emphasize one tool can distort the discussion from the start. Perhaps it would be better to speak of "confronting irregular threats", "neutralizing irregular threats", or something similar?

The question of whether the security environment presented by "irregular" threats is more or less complex than that presented by "regular" threats seems irrelevant to me. It may or may not be more complex, but it's certainly different. Is the threat presented by a nuclear warhead delivered by a ballistic missile more or less complex than the threat presented by a nuclear warhead smuggled into the country in a cargo container? I don't know or care: the point is not to decide which is more complex, the point is to prepare for both possibilities, and for possibilities we have yet to consider. Bob's effort seems a useful step toward that goal, and I'll be interested to see what comes of it.

It never has to be the entire populace to do anything, and certainly not to provide sanctuary. There is very little that could be described as "ungoverned space" in Western Europe, but you are very correct that there appears to be growing sanctuary within pockets of populaces who feel excluded from the full benefits of that governance. This is exactly what I mean by "sanctuary within a poorly governed populace."

As to the complexity issue, it is the combination of "regular" and the newer "irregular" aspects that I have laid out on the slide I provided that make the new complexity. We need new ways to deal with the new actors, reformed ways to deal with the old; and then an overall review and synch of the entire system in a holistic manner that recognizes that nothing happens in isolation. Pull this here and something moves there. Deter this guy, provoke that guy. We can absolutely do this.

[William F. Owen]

This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.

The strategic environment has changed incredibly; both because the artificial construct of the Cold War polarity that all of our policies and international organizations are based upon no longer exists; because that in it self also served as a catalyst for those oppressed by it to seek the opportunity to achieve change; and because the information tools that are fueling globalization have empowered these organizations to be more effective, more resilient, and longer reaching, than ever before.

So are you actually just telling me that you think things have changed and you are having difficulty understanding what and how, or are you excusing successive US/NATO Administrations for strategic dissonance, and corporate stupidity?

Sorry Bob, I just don't see the big deal. I was far more worried when I faced 3 Shock Army and 48 nukes targeted on the 1 BR Corps area. The world is a lot safer today, and I understand it a lot better. In many ways, today military action is far less decisive and thus the world is more predictable.

Maybe there is merit in finding all sorts of new problems, but it's not a path I wish to walk.

[Bob's World]

So are you actually just telling me that you think things have changed and you are having difficulty understanding what and how, or are you excusing successive US/NATO Administrations for strategic dissonance, and corporate stupidity?

Sorry Bob, I just don't see the big deal. I was far more worried when I faced 3 Shock Army and 48 nukes targeted on the 1 BR Corps area. The world is a lot safer today, and I understand it a lot better. In many ways, today military action is far less decisive and thus the world is more predictable.

Maybe there is merit in finding all sorts of new problems, but it's not a path I wish to walk.

So all positions are welcome and helpful. Seriously. I'd far rather debate a wise man with whom I disagree, than to talk to a sycophant who nods dutifully at my every syllable.

However, I will say that while your position is both quite rationale and widely held among those who shape policy; I also believe such thinking is dangerous and will ultimately facilitate the very things we fear the most.

But I have no path to take, as there have not been that many who have gone before me to make one on this particular journey. That's ok, I enjoy a little intellectual exploration and am happy to provide the sweat and bear the scars that come with breaking new trail...

Like most explorers, I may not find what I seek, but in the course of the journey I will learn much of value.

[William F. Owen]

I also believe such thinking is dangerous and will ultimately facilitate the very things we fear the most.

OK, so what is that? What does this tragedy look like?