Debating defense priorities and expenditures

[Galrahn]

Very interesting. I guess I have largely missed the perspective that Grand Strategy is a bridge too far for the US, or that peacetime strategy is even possible. The CDI paper was the first time I had seen this perspective, but it does appear to be more widely shared.

Are these views a concession to the industrial system, a failing in our politics, or due to inability of the services to articulate their vision?

I like to think the content on my blog is intended to promote thinking about maritime strategy from the perspective of war and peace. If I was to buy into either of your comments, it sounds as if they imply military strategy during times of peace and/or unthreatened prosperity simply isn't realistic.

I respectfully disagree.

[Ron Humphrey]

Very interesting. I guess I have largely missed the perspective that Grand Strategy is a bridge too far for the US, or that peacetime strategy is even possible. The CDI paper was the first time I had seen this perspective, but it does appear to be more widely shared.

Are these views a concession to the industrial system, a failing in our politics, or due to inability of the services to articulate their vision?

I like to think the content on my blog is intended to promote thinking about maritime strategy from the perspective of war and peace. If I was to buy into either of your comments, it sounds as if they imply military strategy during times of peace and/or unthreatened prosperity simply isn't realistic.

I respectfully disagree.

And I note you didn't get the opportunity to share your informed input on the subject. I'm sure you would probably be able to contribute quite a bit to help the the yungin's like myself develop a more holistic frame of the debate.

Realizing your time may be limited I still have provided the Link for your perusal.

[SethB]

It isn't really a surprise that the Defense budget is going to get smaller. I say Defense because DOE will probably see a cut in its nuclear weapons budget.

Gates was a supporter of building new warheads, but I doubt that that will happen now.

The downside is that saving money without spending some isn't really possible.

If it were a goal, using a relatively small amount of money to replace some key equipment could reduce personnel, operating and maintenance costs. In 1996 the DSB released a report in which they indicated that aging equipment was increasing costs. The lasting quote was that "the tail is eating the tooth." We may be entering a period that has similar consequences.

Just cutting the amount of money coming in and not adding any new equipment is a good way to ensure that you reduce possible savings while simultaneously decreasing readiness.

[Entropy]

Ken,

I agree with you to a point, but at least during the Cold War there was a focus. Many (not all, obviously) weapon systems were designed with specific Soviet threats in mind, so the capability we were buying was a bit clearer then, IMO, and spending on those systems was easier to justify.

The same thing for numbers. We could look at the Soviets and come up with a rational basis for how many fighters or destroyers we might need in the case of a war. Certainly there were a lot of politics involved, but I think our war-planning and strategy informed those decisions much more than today, where there is no focus.

That lack of focus along with vague QDR's result in system where anything can be justified. The COIN/HIC debate is, I think, partially about differing views on what our post-Soviet focus should be. I think the result is that procurement decisions are more political than they once were. I can live with that to an extent (another "feature" of our peculiar system of democracy), but I think there will have to major changes to fix or ameliorate the broken development and procurement processes which are not providing enough value for our money.

[Ken White]

I agree with you to a point, but at least during the Cold War there was a focus. Many (not all, obviously) weapon systems were designed with specific Soviet threats in mind, so the capability we were buying was a bit clearer then, IMO, and spending on those systems was easier to justify.

I'd submit most all weapons systems are designed with a clear vision of the potential threats so that was not unique to that period. We also bought a lot of dumb stuff that would not have lasted long in combat and was terribly difficult to maintain. I can name you a dozen birds that were bought that were a total waste of $$ -- start with the B-58, B-70, F-104 and F-105 or the A3D, A5, F11F. Where are the Nuke Cruisers today? Then there's my personal Army favorite:

""When the computer was activated, it immediately started aiming the guns at the review stands, causing several minor injuries as members of the group jumped for cover. Technicians worked on the problem, and the system was restarted. This time it started shooting towards the target, but fired into the ground 300 m in front of the tank. In spite of several attempts to get it working properly, the vehicle never successfully engaged the sample targets."" LINK.

The same thing for numbers. We could look at the Soviets and come up with a rational basis for how many fighters or destroyers we might need in the case of a war.

Ah, yes. Like our late 1980s ploy "We will put ten Divisions in Europe in ten days." Lot of people believed that; a lot knew better because the MSC Reserve Fleet couldn't be activated and manned in time and we didn't have the airlift. We never had enough tracked vehicles or pure troop strength to do our part in offsetting the USSR. Only after the Reagan buildup did we get even start to get close. During the period, the Navy certainly and the USAF mostly were in threat range -- the Army, not so much. Thus our perspectives differ a bit but the truth is things then weren't much better than they are today...

Certainly there were a lot of politics involved, but I think our war-planning and strategy informed those decisions much more than today, where there is no focus.

What strategy? War plans we had. However, I was talking to a Reserve unit Commander in 1988 or so; "Okay," said I, "you're not doing any field training because you know the warehouse in Antwerp from which your unit will operate. What are you going to do if the 141 lands in Torrejon because Antwerp and its Port were ground zero for a 50 KT warhead while you were flying cheerfully across the Atlantic?" He had no answer for that.

As I said, your recollection and mine differ...

That lack of focus along with vague QDR's result in system where anything can be justified. The COIN/HIC debate is, I think, partially about differing views on what our post-Soviet focus should be. I think the result is that procurement decisions are more political than they once were. I can live with that to an extent (another "feature" of our peculiar system of democracy), but I think there will have to major changes to fix or ameliorate the broken development and procurement processes which are not providing enough value for our money.

I agree on the need for changes in many thing -- not least the procurement system.

However, my recollections from Korea forward are of the same incoherence I see today. Some things got worse then better; others improved and then went downhill. We had good years and bad years but anyone who thinks there has been or was during the Cold War any real coherence in our defense budget is missing a few things.

The process is badly flawed and it will not change because in the absence of a major threat, Congress likes it that way. So do some in DoD because they can manipulate the system to get stuff in the POM. then a new CNo/CoS/Cmdt comes along and scrubs stuff and inserts HIS vision.

The reason for less than prescriptive QDRs (you do recall who insisted on those...) is that wiggle room factor I mentioned. DoD has to do what they can to prepare for an uncertain future in the absence of any finite political guidance on defense matters. Thus they opt for vague.

Congress would really like to give such guidance but that's not their job, so they try to do it by juggling funds and priorities. Administrations are reluctant to give such guidance because even though it emphatically is their job, they don't want to be wrong -- thus no guidance other than rarely.

I also know that the few times there has been such guidance, it was generally badly flawed. Reagan and Bush did not give finite guidance, they just said 'go shopping.' That's not a strategy, it's not even a plan, it is an invitation to waste and flawed procurement actions. My sensing is that if any finite guidance is received in the next few years, it also will be flawed.

[Galrahn]

Ron,

I need to read that thoroughly and come back to it, several interesting links in that thread.

Ken,

I think you and I agree in that we both see policy as the driver, not strategy. I think we disagree in that I believe that can change, where you do not. I agree with many of your observations though. You may appreciate this, 8 Minutes of DoD Acquisition History.

[Steve Blair]

I don't tend to think that strategy can drive much of our process for historical and cultural reasons. Ken and I both brought up a great deal of this in the thread Ron referenced, but the short version is that our political system simply isn't set up to cope with any sort of long-range planning. With an election cycle every two years, most politicians spend their time focusing on purely domestic/local concerns. It's been that way for the majority of our history. And when the military does try to drive strategy, they tend to focus on their favorite areas or pet projects and ignore factors that might be of policy importance because they're either "out of their lanes" or they don't understand them (and the same can be said for politicians who think the military can fix everything that happens beyond our borders). For the U.S. to actually develop and maintain a functional grand strategy would require a number of cultural shifts that I just don't see happening.

Does that mean that we should ignore it? No. But I'm in favor of realistic goals, to include a decent short-term strategy focusing on real threats and not mythical constructs intended to get programs funded. Given our collective history of wanting to fight imaginary foes, I'm not sure how successful even limited goals will be.

[Ken White]

I think you and I agree in that we both see policy as the driver, not strategy. I think we disagree in that I believe that can change, where you do not. I agree with many of your observations though. You may appreciate this, 8 Minutes of DoD Acquisition History.

while we agree that Policy is indeed the driver, I have to ask -- why would one want that to change so that, as you appear to suggest, strategy becomes the (or even 'a') driver?

Very serious question.

[Rob Thornton]

I have to ask -- why would one want that to change so that, as you appear to suggest, strategy becomes the (or even 'a') driver?

Ken - that may get into to if somebody wants to be more efficient or more effective in a given area.

I had a discussion with a buddy a couple of weeks ago about how hard it is to convince people that sometimes you become more efficient (not having to spend years adapting, re-doing, or re-learning and spending more blood and treasure while risking other objectives) through being more effective.

The cost may be more up front, but ultimately less than it would be if you went in with the idea that you can always increase effectiveness via efficiencies. This is not just about defense spending priorities, but about the closely held values you design your policies and programs to support.

Caveat 1- sometimes its going to be long and ugly just because long and ugly is what you bit into - buyer beware.

Caveat 2 - sometimes you may not intend to be effective at all, and your actions to become more efficient in one area are based on your priorities in others. Domestic programs cost allot of money (every policitian has them regardless of party) and like R&D engineering they often have cost overuns.

Best, Rob

[Galrahn]

while we agree that Policy is indeed the driver, I have to ask -- why would one want that to change so that, as you appear to suggest, strategy becomes the (or even 'a') driver?

Very serious question.

I will look at it from the Navy's perspective, but I would argue an Air Force example could apply as well. To operate at sea, or in the sky, you require equipment. We can field light infantry on land without major technologies, indeed low tech light infantry rules in many parts of the world.

This technology requires long lead times for development and often will be utilized for about 2/5s of a century, meaning every technology decision shapes several generations. Even the JOE doesn't look out far enough to cover the life of a new program.

So I would argue strategy is necessary for effective planning, and also necessary for avoiding mistakes that can take time to develop and even more time to overcome. Policy isn't enduring because it changes. However, strategy is driven by policy so it is constantly changing too, which tends to reinforce your point.

But even with that said, I would argue the Navy's Surface Combatant 21 program, the DDG-1000 and LCS, is a failure not of policy, but strategy. The Navy's littoral strategy is severely flawed in several ways.

The Navy believed:

1) 14,500 ton ships could somehow be stealthy in populated maritime littorals.
2) Unmanned systems can replace manpower in complex human terrains, like the littorals
3) Speed is protection, as if a ship will outrun a missile

Policy, economic in nature, will almost certainly cancel the DDG-1000, but only to save money. The same economic driven policy may mean we build the LCS, not because it actually makes any sense as a technology for the littorals, but because it is relatively cheap as navy ships go.

Then we will spend more money later because the LCS can't do what it needs to do against littoral challenges, because the unmanned systems we have all over the sea allows us to either "shoot" or "watch." The absence of sailors prevents alternatives like "inspect" or "arrest."

If RoE prevents shooting, we don't secure the maritime domain, we watch it. In the end, policy drives future naval capability because strategy failed, and as a result was ignored...

Make sense?