Pashtun / Pashtunwali / Pashtunistan (catch all)

[tequila]

The argument "oh but the Soviets lost" is hokum, because they might have won, if they had been prepared to invade all the safe-havens, and the Mujahadeen were in pretty dire straights till they got US funding.

This implies that the Soviet Union would have had to invade Pakistan in order to win the war, which means they had no chance to win at all. Somehow I doubt invading FATA and Baluchistan would have ended the insurgency --- instead it would have simply continued in even more intensified fashion from Punjab and Sindh, with all of Pakistan drawn in as opposed to just the ISI. The whole of Pakistan would likely have been radicalized as a result.

Never mind the diplomatic and Cold War implications of another Soviet invasion of a sovereign country after Afghanistan. The Kremlin chose wisely to avoid this.

[William F. Owen]

This implies that the Soviet Union would have had to invade Pakistan in order to win the war, which means they had no chance to win at all. Somehow I doubt invading FATA and Baluchistan would have ended the insurgency --- instead it would have simply continued in even more intensified fashion from Punjab and Sindh, with all of Pakistan drawn in as opposed to just the ISI. The whole of Pakistan would likely have been radicalized as a result.

Maybe. I'm not playing "what if" history here. What I am trying to point out is that the argument that the "Afghan Guerilla" is some how un-beatable, is simply not true. He only manages to survive because of the political context of Afghanistan being a basically worthless cross-roads in the middle of nowhere, which no one wants to risk their future over.

They can be beaten, but basically unless their is a valid strategic goal, there is no point in making the investment. Like the US and NATO, the Soviets wanted a friendly regime in Kabul. OK, assuming that is somehow a good idea, what do you want to pay politically and diplomatically?

[tequila]

What I am trying to point out is that the argument that the "Afghan Guerilla" is some how un-beatable, is simply not true. He only manages to survive because of the political context of Afghanistan being a basically worthless cross-roads in the middle of nowhere, which no one wants to risk their future over.

Yes. But I don't think anyone here buys any of that orientalist crap. Problem is, of course, that strategic conundrum exists for us as well, which means that we of course could lose in the same way as the Soviets and the British did.

[Cavguy]

Yes. But I don't think anyone here buys any of that orientalist crap. Problem is, of course, that strategic conundrum exists for us as well, which means that we of course could lose in the same way as the Soviets and the British did.

The issue isn't whether it is possible to subdue the insurgency in Afghanstan. Given enough resources and time it's possible. The question is whether it is worth it in the strategic calculus. I think that's the crux of the President's decision and why it is taking so long - I don't think he's deciding between 20,000 and 40,000 troops, but whether to do it at all, given all the other constraints on the nation, and whether such an effort would benefit national security in proportion to the lives and treasure invested to make it work.

[William F. Owen]

The issue isn't whether it is possible to subdue the insurgency in Afghanstan. Given enough resources and time it's possible. The question is whether it is worth it in the strategic calculus. I think that's the crux of the President's decision and why it is taking so long - I don't think he's deciding between 20,000 and 40,000 troops, but whether to do it at all, given all the other constraints on the nation, and whether such an effort would benefit national security in proportion to the lives and treasure invested to make it work.

Thanks Cav. Simple and coherent as ever! Good job!

[jcustis]

The idea that military force cannot defeat the insurgency is rubbish. It's just in this case it's politically pointless, because the cost cannot match the benefit

.

I did a bit of thinking about this statement while reading up on the "Night Letters" phenomena being employed by the Taliban, and in this day and age I don't think military force can defeat a very critical component: insurgent will. Their will/motivation is an important target that is very difficult to attack when his IO effort out-cycles yours, you're already considered an invader, and the government you are partnered with is not nearly as transparent as it should be.

For that effort, the full spectrum of resources need to be brought to the table, and frankly, force is probably about 20-25%.

[Ken White]

"The idea that military force cannot defeat the insurgency is rubbish. It's just in this case it's politically pointless, because the cost cannot match the benefit."

... I don't think military force can defeat a very critical component: insurgent will...For that effort, the full spectrum of resources need to be brought to the table, and frankly, force is probably about 20-25%.

Will cannot be defeated but it can be rendered only marginally if at all relevant. The determinant is simply how much force you are willing to use. If you use enough, their will won't be defeated but you will make it too costly for their will to be effective thus achieving a more acceptable result for yourself.

That, in essence, in this case, gets back to the cost not matching the benefit...

Which, in turn, creates a problem for the west in the current case because the west is unwilling to use enough force (or to be mean or brutal enough, to put it another way) and thus provides prospective opponents a very exploitable failure of political will. The Comintern and Socialist International did their jobs well.

The problem is thus lack of political will, not a failure of force. Applying minimal force -- up to your (and the COIN crowd's) probable level -- will doom us to a never ending conflict in which the opposition will ultimately gain the advantage due to western emotional exhaustion.

Turning the other cheek got us where we are...

[William F. Owen]

Yes. But I don't think anyone here buys any of that orientalist crap. Problem is, of course, that strategic conundrum exists for us as well, which means that we of course could lose in the same way as the Soviets and the British did.

Precisely my point. So what is the political objective in Afghanistan again? Why are NATO and US there?

a.) Is it important?
b.) How much will it cost?

The idea that military force cannot defeat the insurgency is rubbish. It's just in this case it's politically pointless, because the cost cannot match the benefit.

[omarali50]

We can take the very reasonable view that some responses to terrorism (Afghan war, Iraq war? not sure if that even counts as a "response to terrorism", but whatever) have actually led to even more terrorism and that these are not the best responses. Maybe we should be removing "root causes" (Israel? Oil?). Maybe we should be arresting people and bringing them to court and dealing with nations that harbor such criminals by imposing X or Y UN backed sanctions. Still, its hard to see how you can get out of Afghanistan, after having gone in, without that being a major defeat with serious consequences (not to have gone in at all may have been a good idea, but that toothpaste has long since been pushed out of the tube).

Afghanistan is a god-forsaken cross roads with little appeal, but there IS a strategic reason for making Afghanistan work and that reason is Pakistan. Pakistan is the center of the loosely networked Islamist fanatics that have launched major terrorist operations in many different parts of the world. The most spectacular being the 9-11 attack. Pakistan is practically the only way a worldwide jihadist effort can ever be something bigger than a particularly bothersome irritant. IF defeat in Afghanistan leads to jihadi-sponsoring Pakistan, then its a serious matter.

One reason for confusion on this issue that I have noticed is that some people are saying "pakistan is an ally now, so that job is done, why bother about afghanistan". Well, if this were totally true, then definitely, leave afghanistan to the afghans. The country is just Somalia X 3 with better organized contestants (northern alliance and taliban being the main ones) and if the world can live with Somalia (not sure about that, but lets assume we can) then the world can live with the taliban and northern alliance fighting on in afghanistan. In any case, its a headache for regional powers, not for the US and Europe. But is that statement about Pakistan really true and is it permanently true?

I think it is not. I think the Pakistani army still has a lot of people who think they can use the taliban to project power westwards and the jihadis as proxies against India and if they gain the upper hand, then Pakistan will be jihad central, not just locally, but with distant consequences. IF the US and NATO leave without securing Afghanistan (and I have said before that securing is a very loose term with very flexible meaning, but NOT infinitely flexible) then the Pakistani army is likely to revert to its Jihadist position. Not overnight, not even as part of some clever plan, but just as the path of least resistance.

I also think there is a real salafist terrorist movement in the world that will be emboldened by an American defeat in Afghanistan. But I personally dont think THAT justifies hundreds of billions in money and thousands of casualties. Because I dont think they are that big a threat IF the Pakistani and Saudi states were both determined to stay away from these people. They would then be little more than Baader-Meinhof and company. OK, substantially more than Baader Meinhoff, mainly because so many of them have already been trained and organized into cells and because salafi Islam is a bigger movement than radical Marxism ever was, but I still think that in the bigger scheme of things these kind of movements have no future. NO country is as penetrated by Salafi ideology as Saudi Arabia, yet when push comes to shove, the Saudi state can and does act against them. Not just recently, but as long ago as 1930 (battle of Sibillia).

Pakistan is not as well organized a state as modern Saudi Arabia, but even in Pakistan these people will eventually lose IF the state is determined to act against them. IF the Pakistani army sees that going back to the good old days of using taliban and jihadi proxies are not really an option anymore, then there will be an almightly mess in Pakistan for a few years, but I have no doubt about who would win. The state would win. The real reason there is any doubt is because the jihadist factions of the army can still convince their fellow officers to keep some "good taliban" and "good jihadis" in reserve for the day when America leaves (and Obama's prolonged decision dance has not helped in this matter).

I am not saying the US HAS to stay. Its possible that there is some strategy that allows leaving Afghanistan while making sure Pakistan does not backtrack. But that will have to be specifically planned and cannot be taken as a given just because "now they are our allies". IF that can be done...IF things are so arranged that leaving afghanistan does not lead to triumphant victory celebrations in Pakistan, then by all means, leave. Can that be done?

Btw, I dont think offering the Pak army "help with resolving issues with India" is as brilliant an idea as its sometimes projeted. India can help or hinder this process to some extent, but it is not the crucial link. If the nexus with the salafists is broken (as it can be, if America is smart about it) then Pakistan and India can manage affairs without war and terrorism and that will be enough. No more is needed in the medium term. Trade and other links will change the equation over time. No grand deal has to be made in the interim and putting one on the table just gives the jihadi element in the Pak army another chance to push their agenda and delay things.

sorry for repetitions and disorganized thoughts. this was written in between real work. Got to run..