Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
Jury is out as to what happens when the state choses the more non-violent path in the face of a resistance that has chosen violence.
Doesn't the very identity, ideology and purpose of AQ demand violence, though? Establishing the caliphate is, from my limited readings, a necessarily violent process according to the fundamentalist Islamic view of the world.

Further, I would suggest that a non-violent fundamentalist Islamic movement would be exactly what we are after - in a war of ideas and words, we have nothing to fear. Fundamentalism will inevitably lose to modernity.

Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
Jury is out as to what happens when the state choses the more non-violent path in the face of a resistance that has chosen violence.
Is this even possible? I can't think of any historical situations where the ruling power has the ability to choice non-violence to a violent opposition, probably for good reason. Your concept of 'good governance' specifically states that legitimacy is required. How can a government be legitimate if it allows violent opposition to it to go unchecked? Perhaps I'm being overly classical and old-fashioned in my views here, but a government that loses it's ability to protect it's own people and interests is on the brink if not the very definition of a failed government. Of course this term (good governance) is relative, as has been pointed out before, however failing to provide the accepted or expected level of security, both tangible (physical security from violence) and intangible (economic security, amongst others) loses crucial amounts of legitimacy with it's polis. I would argue that, by accepting non-violence in the face of violence, a government would surrender it's mandate to monopolise force in the interests of the people and thus lose any right to govern immediately.

Wilf, you no doubt agree that the vast majority of us/them out there have differing and incorrect views of both military employment and the meaning of the CoG. However, would you agree that an inefficient strategy pursued with great vigor and resolve immediately is better than constant strategic re-orientation and indecision?

I ask this as I agree with you in every point you make, but once I try and frame the course of action I would follow were I king I keep compromising the lofty visions of a military specialising in force-on-force solutions. Sure, pop-centric COIN may be horribly inefficient and ineffective, but if the US and her allies have a strong, developed pop-COIN capability inclusive of people, doctrine and equipment, is it not better to throw support onto this course than find as-of-now-elusive alternatives?

Also, have you considered the fact that pop-centric COIN is quite possible the most reliable method we have of finding insurgents in the Afghan environment? There is no point throwing a military capability against an enemy if they cannot complete the first core function of 'find'. Even though COIN-specific forces are horribly inefficient in the job of destroying and deterring, is it possible that the COIN focus is absolutely necessary to identify those we want to employ force against?