Steve Metz has published a valuable article.

[Ken White]

for your consideration?

My view is that the requirement for expeditionary whole of government responses are not going away...

Debatable -- certainly some wish to see that. The question I ask, in view of history, is there a better way? Can those 'expeditions' be avoided. I submit they can be. Why do we insist on playing to our opponents strengths? Repeatedly...

We will eventually find the appropriate balance and it will include a more robust whole of government COIN capability. That painful lesson has been purchased at a cost of too many lives and too much treasure to ignore.

I hope you're wrong and that we do not find that balance simply because the price paid thus far for the results obtained indicate that we really do not do this well.

I also believe based on my experience and observation of recent efforts that we are getting worse instead of better...

[Surferbeetle]

...looking before we leap is very important. Our current and future military is duty bound to provide solid advice to our leaders as to the anticipated costs of proposed actions.

The question I ask, in view of history, is there a better way? Can those 'expeditions' be avoided. I submit they can be. Why do we insist on playing to our opponents strengths? Repeatedly...I hope you're wrong and that we do not find that balance simply because the price paid thus far for the results obtained indicate that we really do not do this well.

I see fundamental changes in USG attitudes and many are searching for a better way.

I don't have all the answers my friend but I know in my marrow that exclusively focusing upon a single variable to the exclusion of all others does not solve a multivariate equation. We could also consider the similarities between a Mixed Martial Arts match and Full Spectrum War; limiting oneself to only boxing skills ups the risk factor. IMHO DOD must consistently provide first responder capabilities in lines of action other than security, while remaining the subject matter experts on security, in order to be able to contain and properly focus the destruction that accompanies war. IMHO the rest of the USG too must have expeditionary elements to be able to contain and properly focus the destruction that accompanies war.

I also believe based on my experience and observation of recent efforts that we are getting worse instead of better...

It is my personal observation that there are massive differences between a light security footprint and a heavy security footprint. As to quality more first hand observations of our current operations are needed in order to provide a current impression...

[Ken White]

...Our current and future military is duty bound to provide solid advice to our leaders as to the anticipated costs of proposed actions.

We don't do that very well, either, quoth the Curmudgeon...

I see fundamental changes in USG attitudes and many are searching for a better way.

As do I and hopefully we'll find it. There may be times when commitment to FID is not an option and we must be prepared for those. However, they can be few and far between and it is in our interest as a nation that be so.

We could also consider the similarities between a Mixed Martial Arts match and Full Spectrum War; limiting oneself to only boxing skills ups the risk factor. IMHO DOD must consistently provide first responder capabilities in lines of action other than security, while remaining the subject matter experts on security, in order to be able to contain and properly focus the destruction that accompanies war. IMHO the rest of the USG too must have expeditionary elements to be able to contain and properly focus the destruction that accompanies war.

I agree. My point is that, simply, we do not do that FID thing well and are never likely to do so; the national psyche and, more importantly, the national political milieu and the US Army personnel system do not lend themselves to that kind of effort -- as we repeatedly prove. So prepare, yes -- but avoid large force efforts if possible. The cost far exceeds the results. Always.

It is my personal observation that there are massive differences between a light security footprint and a heavy security footprint. As to quality more first hand observations of our current operations are needed in order to provide a current impression...

Mmmm. Perhaps -- I'm inclined to day that quality is far and away more important than quantity and currently serving folks I'm in contact with seem to corroborate that. I also think Nathan Bedford Forrest was on to something with "Get there firstest with the mostest" idea. Mostest being the right force, not the whole force...

[William F. Owen]

Sorry, but this is all missing the point.

As far as I can see the "New COIN" and the Stabilisation strategy in general backs you into a place where you want to act Colonial, but not actually be Colonial.

Let's be honest. This is all about forcing countries to adopt policies acceptable to the Government of the US. - I have no problem with that, if that is what you want to do, but it does require behaviour that means your civilians tell their civilians what to do, - and if they do not do it, then there are definite consequences.

You cannot have a strategy that cannot be implemented by force, if required.

[marct]

As far as I can see the "New COIN" and the Stabilisation strategy in general backs you into a place where you want to act Colonial, but not actually be Colonial.

Couldn't have said it better myself, Wilf! This is actually explicit in some of the "New COIN" work but, and it is a big "but", it isn't politically salable to the folks back home.

Let's be honest. This is all about forcing countries to adopt policies acceptable to the Government of the US. - I have no problem with that, if that is what you want to do, but it does require behaviour that means your civilians tell their civilians what to do, - and if they do not do it, then there are definite consequences.

Exactly. It also has some serious consequences when it comes to allies and neutrals as well; the concept of "national interest" doesn't apply only to the US, and US actions in that area are watched very closely.

Cheers,

Marc

[Entropy]

As far as I can see the "New COIN" and the Stabilisation strategy in general backs you into a place where you want to act Colonial, but not actually be Colonial.

Wow, that's great Wilf, I like it!

[Hacksaw]

I read Wilf's post and went yeah that's what we're talking about...

then I saw two affirmations before I could type...

Well said, too true, over-reach???

So the big question...

Do we need a colonial-like approach in order to achieve our strategic goals? (what ever they may be, but for the sake of argument... a place to sell our goods, relative freedom from domestic attack... do we need more??)

[davidbfpo]

Hacksaw asked:

Do we need a colonial-like approach in order to achieve our strategic goals?

As a general rule no and so places like Afghanistan today are excluded.

Are there places where it could apply? Yes, at places of vital interest and probably shared by local partners. I would suggest Oman is a classic case; a place a Whitehall speaker said 'The UK will never leave, it is too vital". Sadly there are cases where it has failed, e.g. Ivory Coast.

Temporary applications? Maybe, altough I'd hesitate to use all UN missions as evidence; some UN missions have been valuable e.g. UNTAG in Namibia.

The recent Detterence thread travelled over some of this ground, especially over the threat from terrorism.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

Sorry, but this is all missing the point.

As far as I can see the "New COIN" and the Stabilisation strategy in general backs you into a place where you want to act Colonial, but not actually be Colonial.

Let's be honest. This is all about forcing countries to adopt policies acceptable to the Government of the US. - I have no problem with that, if that is what you want to do, but it does require behaviour that means your civilians tell their civilians what to do, - and if they do not do it, then there are definite consequences.

You cannot have a strategy that cannot be implemented by force, if required.

So if we just do like the USMC Small Wars Manual says and kill/clear out the bad guys and establish a Military Government we want have to print anymore manuals for awhile.

[MikeF]

Good job Steve Metz. Lots of common-sense packed into a quick read.

As far as I can see the "New COIN" and the Stabilisation strategy in general backs you into a place where you want to act Colonial, but not actually be Colonial.

Naw, Wilf. The American Empire just practices a unique brand that I'll call politically-correct colonialism. We really shouldn't be in the Empire business. We're much better off when we don't meddle into others affairs.

Ken said:

As do I and hopefully we'll find it. There may be times when commitment to FID is not an option and we must be prepared for those. However, they can be few and far between and it is in our interest as a nation that be so. I agree. My point is that, simply, we do not do that FID thing well and are never likely to do so; the national psyche and, more importantly, the national political milieu and the US Army personnel system do not lend themselves to that kind of effort -- as we repeatedly prove. So prepare, yes -- but avoid large force efforts if possible. The cost far exceeds the results. Always.

I'll add some important notes to expound this comment.

Discretion and discernment should be taking into deep,thoughtful consideration before we "invest" our treasure and resources into another country. Indeed, we should look at any foreign investment as a loan. Every loan comes with a payment schedule that must be met. It's not free money. In this case, we are loaning our military, money, time, and our resources to another government. Think about it, if I went to BOA and asked for a loan while I have a crappy credit score, the bank is not going to give me money based on the fact that I'm a good dude, my kids need eat, and they fear me rising up in armed rebellion. They're going to look at credit history, my earning potential, and determine my risks verses their return on investment. We should do the same. Below are some considerations.

1. Did the host nation ask for our help? If not, then we're on a slippery slope to begin with.

2. What is the skill level (competence) of the host nation's governance and military apparatuses? In other words, our they capable of doing COIN without us? Is it worth the investment?

3. What is the will of the host nation? Are they looking to us for a handout, or are they going to be actively involved in solving their problems?

4. In the case where the host nation is sorely incompetent and incapable of governing, but their actions interfere with our national security, then we have many diplomatic options to deter. If those fail, then we have counter-terrorism and unconventional warfare as a last resort. However, I will submit that we should think like a bank. If someone forecloses on a mortgage and the bank reposses the house, the bank feels no moral obligation to find another home for the defaulter. In the same sense, if we conduct regime change, we should feel no obligation to follow up with nation-building. The "you break it, you buy it" theory is incorrect.

We gotta take these things much more seriously and start acting as an arbitrator and creditor not as a marraige counselor or Oprah. We CAN make investments to help others that are worthy of a loan help themselves. We CANNOT solve their problems for them b/c we feel bad about their circumstances.

v/r

Mike

[slapout9]

4. In the case where the host nation is sorely incompetent and incapable of governing, but their actions interfere with our national security, then we have many diplomatic options to deter. If those fail, then we have counter-terrorism and unconventional warfare as a last resort. However, I will submit that we should think like a bank. If someone forecloses on a mortgage and the bank reposses the house, the bank feels no moral obligation to find another home for the defaulter. In the same sense, if we conduct regime change, we should feel no obligation to follow up with nation-building. The "you break it, you buy it" theory is incorrect.


v/r

Mike

Mike, I should have known you would have figured it out I thought Entropy or Schmedlap or Tom Odom was going to but what you just proposed is the heart of SBW. And I stole that from history, there was a guy named Hammehead Charles or Charles the Hammerhead or something like that???(maybe someone here knows who I mean) that just flat out whooped ass on the Muslims and made a bunch of money to boot. To me that is the key. A system should become STRONGER because of actions not weaker!

[Rob Thornton]

Originally Posted by MikeF

4. In the case where the host nation is sorely incompetent and incapable of governing, but their actions interfere with our national security, then we have many diplomatic options to deter. If those fail, then we have counter-terrorism and unconventional warfare as a last resort. However, I will submit that we should think like a bank. If someone forecloses on a mortgage and the bank reposses the house, the bank feels no moral obligation to find another home for the defaulter. In the same sense, if we conduct regime change, we should feel no obligation to follow up with nation-building. The "you break it, you buy it" theory is incorrect.


v/r

Mike

There may be cases where the abscence of an authority (after we've disposed of an authority / predecessor) or governance may be tolerable, even preferable given the cost of replacing it- but in the same vein - we also may also live with the consequences of leaving a vacuum - sometimes, it may result in a bigger mess down the road.

That said, I'm not sure logic and pragmatism are even listed as immediate family, let alone next of kin to politics.

[Fuchs]

The "you break it, you buy it" theory is incorrect

True.

The real rule reads:
"You committed not to break anything by signing the UN Charter that btw gives you huge privileges, so don't break anything!"


Another rule reads:
"You may break things and not buy them. All shop owners are free to treat you accordingly."

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf's comment holds the key:

"As far as I can see the "New COIN" and the Stabilisation strategy in general backs you into a place where you want to act Colonial, but not actually be Colonial.

Let's be honest. This is all about forcing countries to adopt policies acceptable to the Government of the US. - I have no problem with that, if that is what you want to do, but it does require behaviour that means your civilians tell their civilians what to do, - and if they do not do it, then there are definite consequences.

First, we are dancing around the issue of control: Are we there to sieze power and direct/redirect it to some purpose, and if so, how?

What exactly is our civilian purpose, basis, theory beyond military dominance? Is it just "expeditionary" in nature? Is it intentionally suppressive? Is it just to provide post-conflict stabilization, and minimal reconstruction, or to tinker with or expressly and substantively change the society and it's structures, operations and organizational principles

Second, do we have the resources and capability to sieze civilian power and direct/redirect it? Based on our history and effectiveness in Iraq and Afghanistan (to date), there is no evidence that we do, or that, at best, once we get the ball, we flub it..

Third, what are we directing/redirecting it to? In both countries, our big thrust was to create a new constitution, push for elections, then deal with the aftermath of those elections. Note that the Iraqi election are, due to list questions and Kurdish issues, on path to be, perhaps as contentious as the 2005 elections. If Iraq's ability to organize and complete a democratic election is still a "work in progress," what to make of Afghanistan's abilities?

If our purpose, once in occupation, was to actually effect a colonial administration, or dominate the civilian sector, we needed to provide civilian administartive and operational resources of a totally different type than we have.

By definition, an "expeditionary" civilian force is temporary, short-term, and, if staffed only by loaners from US national agencies, could not be expected to have the KSA's adequate for Colonial administration of an actual country, let alone a district.

Foreign service officers are trained for specific tasks, and administration/operation of civilian governments is not one of them. Diplomacy's limits do not reach into public administration, infrastructure repair and management, or the operation of essential services. Nor, in my view, should/could they.

The civilian resources needed for that are completely different, and are not contained within any permanent military or civilian framework we have applied to date.

I wholeheartedly agree with Ofthetroops recommendation that if troops in the field are going to be tasked for civilian missions (as they are), they should be provided with a framework and training to do a decent job off it.

But, right now, we have the worst of all worlds, and the results are inevitable. Foreign service officers without expertise in civilian administration being pressed into the mission of civilian administration and serious reconstruction and essential service problems, but only on a year-to-year assignment basis (next year, they will be stamping passports in Paris). Soldiers left on the ground to develop ad hoc solutions for immediate and serious problems they see on the ground, but with no training or support framework.

No offense, but what Steve Metz wrote was:

The problem, though, is bigger than Afghanistan. Much bigger. The foundation of current American security policy is stabilizing countries where extremists can use insurgency and other forms of violence to create terrorist sanctuaries. To be effective, this requires extensive assistance and large numbers of advisers with expertise in infrastructure development, financial and economic planning, education, governance, the cultivation of civil society, and law enforcement. Yet, after five years of speeches, workshops, and reports, we are no closer to having what we need.

The infrastructure development, financial and economic planning, education, etc... resources in Iraq's "civilian surge" were all temporary appointees on one-year assignments. They came, they went---and not to Afghanistan. And they were never properly integrated into the program to maximize their potential effectiveness.

If the US was serious about the civilian side, it would abandon the "expeditionary" and temporary staffing models for these folks, and create a structure that was, first, built around the credible expertise, and second, able to engage the situation and resources (even if soldiers on the ground), to achieve short, medium and long-term goals based on some reasoned expectations of what could be achieved in the civilian world.

Military or foreign policy folks set the civilian objectives, but implementation requires a completely different structure, staffing and resources than exists today. That dream team is just a dream.

My two cents.

Steve

[Rob Thornton]

... but implementation requires a completely different structure, staffing and resources ....

Kind of reminds me of that addage - "How bad do you want it?"

[Fuchs]

...

First, ...

Second, ...

Third, ...

Fourth (actually, First, but the forum knows no strike text):
IS IT WORTH IT?


Be prepared to see me hammering this into your heads in 2009-2010.
Resistance is futile. All strategic thought needs to keep the nation's welfare at top priority. Soldiers are merely paid servants to the nation (and usually at the same time citizens, of course).

Resources and capabilities are fine - it's not fine to release them just because you can.



@Steve; don't be offended, please. I know #4 may have been part of your #1 behind two or three corners. It just deserves to be in the spotlight imo.