How Insurgencies End

[Bob's World]

Definitions are a problem because we make them one. Particularly in the military where a focus on doctrine, and the poduction and employment of precise "terms of art" within the profession, promotes endless arguments when no firm, agreed-to-by-all definition exists. Look to the recent input here at SWJ by Daves Maxwell and Witty on UW. You'll never make everybody happy in defining such broad concepts as UW, COIN, Insurgency, etc.

I used to get right in there and argue with everyone else; but I realized one day just how silly it was to argue about fine nuances of concepts that are completely subjective and undefined.

So I think the best you can do is to state up front what definition you are applying, and then make your case based upon that definition. Then, for those receiving that input, to resist the urge to simply argue with the definition that the other party used, and to instead focus on the points that he is attempting to make in relation to the definition he based them on.

"Insurgency" is not some neat, precise operational task, like "screen" vs "guard"; or "block" vs "fix". To try to make it such is probably extremely counterproductive to achieving the understanding that one is seeking in the first place. Like I was telling the metrics guys the other day at a staff meeting. Too often we confuse "Precise" with "accurate"; and when you seek a set of metrics that you can measure very objectively and precisely to determine how well you are doing on something as fuzzy and messy as COIN, you probably are not going to be very accurate.

[William F. Owen]

Definitions are a problem because we make them one. Particularly in the military where a focus on doctrine, and the poduction and employment of precise "terms of art" within the profession, promotes endless arguments when no firm, agreed-to-by-all definition exists.

Hmmmm..... Sorry, but the real problem is that soldiers of today use language carelessly and without rigour.

This probably did not really exist until about the 1930s, when people like JFC Fuller tried to create "Military Science" - and after which we see a plethora of nonsensical terms.

You cannot have "Doctrine" without usefully precise meaning, because Doctrine is what is taught - that is what "Doctrine" means. You cannot have "practice" unless you have sound theory that explains it.

Unless you have a common language with common coherent meanings, you will soon have a pseudo-science like "COIN Theory" or "Operational Level of War."

Yes, the military does create problems for itself, basically by not studying it's own profession.

[Steve Blair]

This probably did not really exist until about the 1930s, when people like JFC Fuller tried to create "Military Science" - and after which we see a plethora of nonsensical terms.

This is an unnecessary simplification, IMO. Obviously there were (many) soldiers out there who failed to use language and concepts with rigor prior to the 1930s. Militaries prior to the 1930s certainly did study their own history, and many came away with amazingly wrong conclusions about that history. The root of all good and all evil did not come from the 1930s, and much of the thinking during that period was in direct reaction to World War I.

Most armies have some sort of defining period for their self-images. These obviously shift over time (with the most extreme example being the French with their shifts from [to over-simplify] "all offense" to "all defense" in the aftermath of World War I), but they tend to shape thinking (or lack thereof) within the army in question. The U.S. has had a couple of these (the Civil War and World War II), and both had a major warping effect on our thinking. The British may have found one of their more recent ones in the 1920s and 1930s. And in just about every case these periods came from the army in question studying its own profession and coming away with lessons that may not have been especially helpful or accurate. Armies (like other large institutions) have shown a great ability to shed those lessons that they don't like or don't fit into their own self-image or visualization.

Sorry to divert the thread, but it's important to understand that history is a continuum of sorts, and that any event has things that led up to it and will have consequences that we cannot accurately predict based on those leading events and the reaction to them by each individual involved.

[William F. Owen]

This is an unnecessary simplification, IMO. Obviously there were (many) soldiers out there who failed to use language and concepts with rigor prior to the 1930s.

....and allow me to reply!

Yes, there failures of thought prior to the 1930s, but based on the evidence to hand in terms of the written record, the language was generally simple, coherent and useful. They were far from perfect BUT they were much better than today's.

Some of what was written in the UK's 1909 Field Service Regulations, was utter rubbish, but it was simply and clearly written rubbish. It was not the arch-twaddle you find in "FM3 Design" for example.

[Ken White]

I agree with Steve Blair's post, particularly with his last paragraph. However, Wilf has a very valid point IMO in respect to military writing. After the 17th Centuryt it consistentlv became more concisely and directly oriented. Mellifluous prose gradually disappeared. Most writing during and immediately after WW I was an indicator of a trend reversal. Since WW II, it has gotten far worse each decade and now we;'re producing 300 page FIELD manuals that say little. Illustrations which can help, are part of that. So are arcane charts and 'matrices' that are not helpful.

So, IMO, you're both right (send checks to P,O Box 479... ).

[Steve Blair]

One thing I would point out, at least with respect to U.S. military writing, is that much of what was done officially between 1800 and 1900 was concerned with what was then called "tactics" but what we would now most likely call drill. There wasn't much official writing concerning military theory (aside from fortification theory, which could get pretty bloody exotic), and you really didn't see much of that until the expansions that took place in the build-up to World War I.

Why the change? There are, I think, a number of reasons. One may lie in the breakup of more or less static regiments and the increased reliance on a conscript army in time of war. It was then that you saw the confusing and jumbled field manuals (which oddly enough resemble some of the privately-published products pushed on unsuspecting State Volunteer units during the Civil War). And a great deal of the older stuff could be considered "arch-twaddle." Theory wasn't in vogue, and there was often some suspicion attached to an officer who wrote (again, I'm talking about the U.S. here in the period before World War I).

I would as an aside wonder how much the influence of the "business school" movement in the 1950s had to do with the twaddle that shows up in our manuals?

And now back to your regularly-scheduled thread....

[Outlaw 7]

This is actually a very interesting question for the simply reason if one asks the question when does an insurgency end one must equally ask--what is the exact ecosystem of the insurgency look like and or what is even the ecology of an insurgency.

All of the current intel analysis focuses on people, places, and things---not on how does the ecosystem function, hows does it communicate, what happens when it splits or a top leader is killed, how does it respond to the local population it survives in---all extremely valid questions.

This blog has totally ignored the the ecological based research released in Dec 2009 in Nature which actually would answer the question-when will it end as it would tell you how it even began and describe it's actual ecosystem.

Out of the article "How will it end?

From 'How Insurgencies End'

Government victories often cause the insurgency to splinter, leaving behind
small elements of irredeemables that may or may not represent an ongoing
threat. Tracking these splinter groups can provide tremendous
insight into the nature of the insurgency ending. We noted that, when the
government is winning and the insurgency is in its "tail" phase, often a
small group of insurgents splinters away from the cadre or leader-

In some cases, this splinter element is an irredeemable fringe unwilling to
negotiate or enter into an amnesty program. In others, the splinter is
formed from an irredeemable core leadership element. In both cases, the
splinter groups are intent on continuing the struggle against the government
in one form or another. They may
try to sustain or reignite the insurgency immediately, or they may be
willing to hibernate until they see an opportunity to reemerge.
Counterinsurgents should be able to tell a great deal about their long-term
prospects by observing how the general populace perceives this splinter
group.

This statement above begs the question from an ecology perspective, how do you track 'splinter groups' - are these a sign of weakening insurgency, or as a sign of evolution?

This was answered in the research:
Redistribute: When a group is broken the components are redistributed amongst the other groups in the system. The redistribution is biased towards the most successful remaining groups.

To understand the concept of ecology based research the following must be understood:
Ecology of an Insurgency:

The scientific study of the way that living “organisms” in this case “organism” is defined as an insurgency cell, group, or organization interact with their environment and predators (the counter insurgent).


Ecosystem of an Insurgency:

An insurgent ecosystem is a system whose members (members defined as being either an insurgent group or groups) benefit from each other's participation via symbiotic (mutually beneficial and self-sustaining) relationships.

The main goal of an insurgency ecosystem is to generate common ventures. It forms when many small and potentially diverse (origin, tribe, religious belief, etc.) insurgent groups join together to fight a common predator (the counter-insurgent or state).

Insurgent ecosystems attract and retain members (groups) due to network effects:

• The benefits of the ecosystem (shared ventures) are so great that groups won’t leave it (although temporary departures to avoid targeted pressure from counter-insurgents are possible).
• The ecosystem’s features (i.e. immediate access to shared resources) make it easy for new groups to form and participate.
• The growth of the ecosystem results in an exponential increase in benefits (i.e. more segmentation and specialization) for all of the member groups. IE Attacks by one group creates opportunities for other groups. The buying of resources (ie small arms, explosives) creates a market for groups to sell into and makes it easier for other groups to get access to the resources.
• An ecosystem can have groups directly fighting each other through direct battles - but it can also have indirect fighting (or competition) between groups for access to resources (people, money, strategy etc).


Once an ecosystem is established in a particular region/area, it becomes very difficult for the counter insurgent to eliminate it. The presence of multiple groups means that the counter insurgent must divide its efforts. Operationally, a focus on one group leaves other groups to operate freely and success against one group yields very little overall benefit. Removing leadership does not mean that the group will cease to exist. The leadership may be replaced by other parts from the same group or other groups. Or a new group will move into the space left open by old group. Strategically, the diversity of the groups in the ecosystem (different reasons for fighting) means that it isn’t possible to address a single set of issues or grievances at the national level that would reverse the insurgency (via negotiated settlement, repatriation, etc.).

So the answer to the question "when will it end" ---it will end WHEN the insurgent wants it to end based on his view of his own ecosystem.

It is up to the counter-insurgent to "shape that ecosystem" to the degree that the group in that ecosystem has no other option than to disengage.

[jmm99]

Looking back to the ancients is not a fruitless endeavor. Take Callwell's Small Wars: Their principles and practice (the 1903 edition is available from Google Books as a pdf download), chap 1, p.1:

Small war is a term which has come largely into use of late years, and which it is somewhat difficult to define. Practically it may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers, campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellious and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field. It thus obviously covers operations very varying in their scope and in their conditions.

The expression " small war " has in reality no particular connection with the scale on which any campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.
....
[JMM note: In the text, a brief digression where Callwell suggests that the 1894 Sino-Japanese War might "almost be described as a small war" since the Japanese were a "highly trained, armed, organized, and disciplined army" and the Chinese forces "could not possibly be described as regular troops in the proper sense of the word".]
....
Small wars include the partisan warfare which usually arises when trained soldiers are employed in the quelling of sedition and of insurrections in civilized countries; they include campaigns of conquest when a Great Power adds the territory of barbarous races to its possessions; and they include punitive expeditions against tribes bordering upon distant colonies.

Both small wars and "big wars", are conflicts (violence between armed forces) which still fall into the broad category of "armed conflicts" legally. Another continuing legal concept viable from Callwell's time to our own is the distinction between regular forces (read generally as the armed forces of a nation-state) and irregular forces (read generally as the armed forces of a non-state actor) in legal terms.

Callwell does not deal with the "political struggle" (read that generally as civil affairs, but it goes well beyond that as viewed by Mao and Giap, including low intensity violence). Presumbly, he relied on British colonial administrators to handle that in cases where it was needed.

A few years back, John Sulllivan wrote a thesis with the long winded title, The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual and Colonel C.E. Callwell’s Small Wars - Relevant to the Twenty-First Century or Irrelevant Anachronisms? (in SWC library), where he summed several definitions (I've switched the order to put Callwell, the oldest of the four, first):

Appendix C – Small Wars & Other Associated Definitions

small wars

Small Wars – Small wars include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. Small wars cover operations varying in their scope and in their conditions. Small wars denote operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.[99][99] Callwell, Small Wars, 21.

Small Wars Manual - Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.[98][98] U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 1-1.

military operations other than war (MOOTW)

DOD Dictionary of Military Terms - Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.[100][100] http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dod...a/m/index.html [JMM: no longer among the definitions "in force"]

low intensity conflict (LIC)

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20 - a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.[101][101] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_intensity_conflict [JMM: definition in 1990]

The trend in these definitions emphasize the shift away from a purely military definition (in Callwell's Small Wars), to inclusion of diplomatic concerns and the military in support thereof (in the 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual), to military operations short of war ("to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power"), and to LIC where the conflict is expressly defined in terms of a "a political-military confrontation", which "is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments."

Those examples illustrate no shocking changes in military doctrine qua the "military struggle", but they do present an illustration of the progressive inclusion of aspects of the "political struggle" in US military doctrine.

Dayuhan presented an example of the "political struggle"; timely because of an article in Foreign Affairs, And Justice for All, citing a UN estimate that 4 billion people are ruled under corrupt crimiinal and civil justice systems:

The areas of the Philippines where communist influence remains significant are generally fairly remote, and are generally ruled under what are effectively feudal dynasties. Land reform or reparation are less the issues than the corrupt and abusive character of local governance, and the immunity from legal process enjoyed by the politically influential families. I actually think this could be resolved in most of the affected areas, with sufficient political will, and that the impact on the insurgency would be substantial.

Obviously Steve presents a problem that can only be solved via the "political struggle". So, who is tasked to come up with the solution on the counter-revolutionary side - military or civilians ? The insurgents, if good ole Coms, will present Peoples Courts as the answer (the Taliban, Taliban Courts).

Thus, What is to be done; and who should do it ?

Part of the answer to those questions depends on whether a pollitical solution is needed to end the insurgency. A political solution could be a negotiated settlement, but it could also be the political solution of the dominant party being forced down the other party's throat.

Regards

Mike

[GI Zhou]

Back to the original idea of the thread, I will hopefully discuss this with the leaders of an insurgent group that had a negotiated settlement with their government, some more broad questions other than at the tactical and operational level.

The RAND study was interesting because of what it left out, as much as what it used as examples. The early post-war period presumerably as many of the the participants are either dead or unable to be contacted. Interestingly what wasn't mentioned about the Viet Minh was the HUGE amount of assistance they got from the People's Republic of China including sanctuaries and the Chinese artillery division that ringed Dien Bien Phu.

I believed the study over looked certain issues especially about the Malayan Emergency and Confrontation. The book, in my opinion, tried to look at too many insurgencies, and should ahve concentrated on more geographical area and see the links between groups emanating from these countries whether they be political, tribal or external.

My thoughts anyway. Of course, political sensitive issues may be in the classified version.

[Dayuhan]

Definitions are a problem because we make them one. Particularly in the military where a focus on doctrine, and the poduction and employment of precise "terms of art" within the profession, promotes endless arguments when no firm, agreed-to-by-all definition exists. Look to the recent input here at SWJ by Daves Maxwell and Witty on UW. You'll never make everybody happy in defining such broad concepts as UW, COIN, Insurgency, etc.

I’ve no special interest in making everyone happy, I just wonder if we’re all talking about the same thing. Specifically (and in a vain attempt to get back on topic) I’m wondering how applicable the conclusions drawn by Rand from study of conflicts that are almost entirely intra-state, between a government and a portion of its populace, are to an inter-state conflict where one state seeks to impose conditions on the governance of another.

That's another way to say forced arbitration on non-cooperative actors. It is a values call by the US to say their behavior was unacceptable.

I suppose you could have called Saddam and the Taliban “non-cooperative actors”, though of course they had no special obligation to cooperate with us. How does “arbitration” come into it? We wanted them out, we tossed them out. All well and good, I won’t be shedding any tears for either, though I thought then and think now that Iraq was peripheral to the core goal and represented an unnecessary dilution of resources and attention. Justifiable, yes; desirable, I’m less sure. Either way, my point is simply that these are not intra-state conflicts and should not be treated as such.

And if you are correct, then you have to determine how to win and build consensus within the Philippine gov't to enact your plan. That seems to be the crux of the dillemma.

That is the crux of the dilemma, and the short answer is that we cannot win and build consensus within the Philippine gov’t. They’ll have to come ‘round to it on their own. I’m not holding my breath. Fortunately the NPA are as inept as the local feudal rulers and are unlikely to effectively exploit their opportunities.

Obviously Steve presents a problem that can only be solved via the "political struggle". So, who is tasked to come up with the solution on the counter-revolutionary side - military or civilians ? The insurgents, if good ole Coms, will present Peoples Courts as the answer (the Taliban, Taliban Courts).

Thus, What is to be done; and who should do it ?

The short version of the answer is that the law needs to be enforced and the Government needs to do it. An even shorter version might be to simply say that the government needs to govern.

My long version of the answer to that question is here:

http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journ...5.4rogers.html

Don't think full text is available online; in the unlikely event that anyone wants to see it, I can e-mail a pdf. PM me...

[William F. Owen]

The expression " small war " has in reality no particular connection with the scale on which any campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.

I do so love the old words..... Proper British Officer writing like a proper chap should. I submit this holds good, in terms of usefulness, even today.