Basra transition

[Rank amateur]

I've been assaulted by thousands of Shiite militia. It didn't work out well for them. They haven't been able to overrun anybody, or even inflict serious casualties. Our PUC for the Sadr Rebellion credits my unit with over 1500 militiamen killed. We lost seven soldiers. They didn't even knock out one of our M1's. .

I'd be interested in your take on the recent fighting. It's not our armor or our guys, but it seems as though the militias may have learned a few things during their cease fire.

A closely held U.S. military intelligence analysis of the fighting in Basra shows that Iraqi security forces control less than a quarter of the city, according to officials in both the United States and Iraq, and Basra's police units are deeply infiltrated by members of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army.

"This is going to go on for a while," one U.S. military official said.

[Cavguy]

I'd be interested in your take on the recent fighting. It's not our armor or our guys, but it seems as though the militias may have learned a few things during their cease fire.

No doubt. Despite my earlier, never underestimate an enemy's ability to learn, just as we have. Sadr fighters introdouced the deadly EFP's into theater with help from Iran, and pulled off the murder/kidnapping against the CA team in Kerbala with similar support.

Where they suffer is in the rank and file, the average Sadr fighter is a 13-20 year old male, uneducated, and with no formal military training. Case in point was the number of RPG's shot at us - most didn't detonate because the kids firing them had never been trained to remove the safety pin, just handed an RPG and told to shoot an American.

I've watched Sadr fighters charge right at a tank with nothing but an AK. They're brave, but lack tactical acumen or even good sense. That's in contrast to my experiences fighting Sunnis, who tend to be relatively savvy tactically. In any mass uprising, that's going to hurt the Sadrists. It will be interesting to see how much organization and training their cells have done for the masses.

The issue with the Iraqi Army facing them is twofold - most of the Iraqi Jundis are Shia, and Sadr supporters. (not the officers, but the joes). They also generally lack armored vehicles (they have some T-72's in Baghdad), and indirect fire support. Their attached TT's can bring in coalition airpower. But they've never had to employ combined arms before, especially in urban. Will be an interesting test on how far they've come. Some IA units are better than others, with the former Peshmerga units being the best. Overall, at BN and below level, they're pretty good tactically.

Just my observations.

[MattC86]

The issue with the Iraqi Army facing them is twofold - most of the Iraqi Jundis are Shia, and Sadr supporters. (not the officers, but the joes). They also generally lack armored vehicles (they have some T-72's in Baghdad), and indirect fire support. Their attached TT's can bring in coalition airpower. But they've never had to employ combined arms before, especially in urban. Will be an interesting test on how far they've come. Some IA units are better than others, with the former Peshmerga units being the best. Overall, at BN and below level, they're pretty good tactically.

Just my observations.

I'm wondering if in anyway the current Basrah fighting can be compared to ARVN operations in Laos in 1971-72. Additionally, the first day's reports were that IA was doing alright, but most of what's come out in the last 24 hours has made the situation seem worse than originally presented. At least from what I've seen.

Anyway, in regards to the Lind bit, I agree that it's got a high degree of absurdity. However, going along with the mantra of never underestimate your enemy; if it gives a few commanders pause and makes them think a little bit harder about what Iran might try to achieve in such a "nightmare" scenario, and improves our readiness, preparation, and alertness, then I think the piece accomplished something.

And it was kind of fun to read, goofy as it was.

Regards,

Matt

[PhilR]

The problem in Basra City is that we don't know exactly what is going on in there. Its a black hole (to give the Brits their due, they may not be in the city, but they are not sitting out at the airport--they are doing ops along the border and in other areas).
Also, the Mahdi Army (JAM) is not a monolith. In fact JAM in Basra is probably only tenuously linked to the larger JAM (Sadr's powerbase is more up in Sadr City). I would not assume that events in Basra are linked to the current up-tick in Sadr City in any real planned manner. I have not heard or read anything about the Sadr ceasefire writ large. This could be an actual extention of the "cleansing" that Sadr wanted to effect through the ceasefire in order to bring his movement more under control. The snippets of news reporting are always misleading.
Basra is a place that the Government must control if it is to control Iraq. This fight probably had to come at some time. The government may assess that they want to have it while the Coalition Forces are still here in some strenght and holding the Sunni threat at bay (which the Government interprets as the Concerned Local Citizens or Sons of Iraq). For the past few months, the Iraqi leadership has been trying clean up the Army units (moving non-locals in) and the Police in Basra. Arguably, they have probably been more successful in the former than the latter. It would also be interesting to see where the Governor of the Province is in all of this (Fadhila Party-neither Sadrist nor associated with the ruling coalition). If you remember news reports from last year, Maliki tried to get him removed, but failed. There was tentative coming to terms between the two. Also not reported is whether the oil flow has been greatly affected. I'm guessing not. The pipelines don't run through the city and the unsaid "Prime Directive" of competing groups in Basra Province has been to not stop the oil flow--too many people from all sides are making money on it.

[Ken White]

I'm wondering if in anyway the current Basrah fighting can be compared to ARVN operations in Laos in 1971-72...

shooting at each other.

[Rob Thornton]

Matt - you'll have to put some meat on that (tell us what is on your mind) if you want folks to weigh in on that.
Best, Rob

[Rank amateur]

Here's a look inside Sadr City from the Washington Post. It seems as though Cav Guy was right on the mark.

Some people over at Abu Muqawama seem to think that Iran is squeezing Sadr.

and to make things confusing, a Washington Post columnist is reporting the exact opposite:

"Sadr wants to fight, but he also wants to talk. I'm told that he sent a verbal message through an Iraqi intermediary last month to Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq. The gist of the message was that the Mahdi Army in the Baghdad area was no longer under Sadr's control but Iran's. The United States apparently didn't answer this message, but at some point, through some channel, America will need to talk with Sadr and the forces he represents."

[MattC86]

shooting at each other.

Rob and Ken, you are both correct, obviously.

Perhaps my history or my perceptions are wacky, but essentially, the IA and Iraqi Police are conducting the ground operation in Basra on their own, albeit with support from US warplanes, advisors, etc. Similar to the ARVN invasion of Laos in 1971 - an "independent" operation with US support but not direct assault-echelon participation, that was a test of the government's strength and legitimacy as well as the actual abilities of the army itself.

The attempt to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail was a pretty big failure, and the Vietnamization was shown to not be progressing as well as Americans would like.

In that sense, I see a comparison to Basra. Not only is the operation providing a major test of the indigenous security forces, but if they are shown to be extremely wanting (as the ARVN was) it will have further impact on US domestic support, as well as the legitimacy of the Maliki government.

That was my intent. If I'd been going for the people-shooting-at-other-people comparison, I would have picked a less obscure example

Regards,

Matt

[Ken White]

the few corollaries. Urban vs. jungle; Two moderately trained and competent Armed forces vs. one less well trained against a group of semi-trained irregulars; Armor and air mobile ops vs. mostly dismounted urban combat; massive US air and artillery support vs. a little; two (sort of nations) in a fight in a third nation vs. a civil disagreement in one; we probably didn't push this on the HN vs. one that the HN didn't really want to do; and so on...

More difference than similarities.

In that sense, I see a comparison to Basra. Not only is the operation providing a major test of the indigenous security forces, but if they are shown to be extremely wanting (as the ARVN was) it will have further impact on US domestic support, as well as the legitimacy of the Maliki government.

If is a big word; "extremely" wanting is likely to be in the eye of the beholder; impact on US domestic support will have little real effect on much of anything; and the legitimacy of the Maliki government is determined by how it got in power, not by events that occur after it is in power -- though such events can affect its durability and / or survivability, different things.

With respect to the Laos incursion, the real object lesson was not the progress or lack of it of "Vietnamization," it was the failure of the US Army to properly train the Viet Namese or to assist them with detailed planning that was far beyond their capability. In fairness to MACV, XXIV Corps and ARVN, undue and quite wrong pressure by the Bobsey twins of Kissinger and his idiot Mini-Me, Alexander Haig caused a major rush and arguably contributed significantly to the failure just as much as the fact that the south VN fought in Battalions and had NO experience in even Brigade ops, much less multi Division. Dumb political battle and essentially a US fomented effort as opposed to a real local desire...

The fact that the high vis units, Ranger Bns, Airborne Bns and Marine Bns were used was a political failing by both US and VN cdrs.