The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

[J Wolfsberger]

Media is only relevant in terms of it's political effect - so Clausewitz applies. Martin Luther had no modern media, and the Nazis only had radio and print - all of which was used to "political" not Military effect.

Precisely. And since war is the continuation of politics by other means, if one side can use media to break the political will of their opponent, they win without firing a shot. (Or at any rate firing fewer.)

As an example, in Iraq the media was using the war as a cudgel to beat on a president of whom they disapproved. The result (intended or not) was to encourage our opponents while sapping public support. Even worse, the steady drum beat caused the administration to view ALL criticism of any aspect of the war as nothing more than domestic partisanship.

Add to that the difficulty partisan media hostility created in the area of Information Operations/Psychological Operations. Several attempts by the military to release favorable information, both domestically and in theater, were outed and (successfully) discredited - without regard to the impact on strategic objectives, let alone the verity of the information.

I took one of your points to be that commanders in the field can't conduct mission planning around media impact - and I agree. However, military and political leadership at national, strategic and possibly even operational levels must.

[marct]

I'm doing a line-by-line on it right now, but I think the point about communications really needs to be covered better. I also agree with a lot of the concerns Ken expressed over potential "misunderstandings" of words. I'm stuck in a rehearsal all day tomorrow, so I probably won't post my comments until Sunday or Monday.

Cheers

Marc

[William F. Owen]

I took one of your points to be that commanders in the field can't conduct mission planning around media impact - and I agree. However, military and political leadership at national, strategic and possibly even operational levels must.

OK, so if we say, military and political leadership at national, strategic and possibly even operational levels must consider the overall politcal aim then I am in total agreement.

If they say "consider the impact of the media," they are totally wrong, because the "effect" depends on the action, and you cannot predict 2nd and 3rd order effects reliably or even how the media will see them. - you cannot tell the future.

[slapout9]

If they say "consider the impact of the media," they are totally wrong, because the "effect" depends on the action, and you cannot predict 2nd and 3rd order effects reliably or even how the media will see them. - you cannot tell the future.

Wilf, if it dosen't matter then how come our enemies are so good at using the media to affect the audience to achieve a desired effect?

[MikeF]

Wilf, if it dosen't matter then how come our enemies are so good at using the media to affect the audience to achieve a desired effect?

Slap, there is much contention amoungst AQ central over UBL's media exploits. He is accused of being a showboat, and his actions caused much division in the ranks.

Captured Email from Abu Khalid al-Suri (aka Muhammad Bahayah) and Abu
Mus’ab al-Suri to Bin Ladin

The strangest thing I have heard so far is Abu Abdullah’s saying that he wouldn't listen to the Leader of the Faithful when he asked him to stop giving interviews….I think our brother [Bin Ladin] has caught the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause…. Abu Abdullah should go to the Leader of the Faithful with some of his brothers and tell them that … the Leader of the Faithful was right when he asked you to refrain from interviews, announcements, and media encounters, and that you will help the Taliban as much as you can in their battle, until they achieve control over Afghanistan.… You should apologize for any inconvenience or pressure you have caused … and commit to the wishes and orders of the Leader of the Faithful on matters that concern his circumstances here

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, if it dosen't matter then how come our enemies are so good at using the media to affect the audience to achieve a desired effect?

Cos folks do stupid things? Dunno. Al Quieda thing 4GW is insightful. That they do, does not give it any credence. - in fact, as I suggested to TX Hammes, the opposite may be true.

Any AQ broadcast ever weakened US will to fight?
Can the Taliban force the US to withdraw using any operation, not related to military effect?

So called "Media" is used as part of effecting the Political dimension. As concerns "Enemy" use of media, all you see and read is essentially a "party political broadcast." Political will is far more fragile than military.
Yes, military action must not undermine the political will to use force. That is both obvious and enduring.
Given that we all understand that, how does "media operations" take any form of primacy over traditional Political-military dynamics, in any way we have not seen before?

[marct]

Okay, here are my comments on it. There are a couple of general comments I want to make as well that I thought I'd toss out for discussion rather than leave hidden in the pdf (which I know you will all read ).

1. Personally, I think that the perception of cyberspace in the document is paranoid and, at the same time, schizophrenic. More importantly, i think that it does not capture the current uses of cyberspace as a "realm of conflict" well at all. IMO, cyberspace needs to be treated as if it were any other type of terrain in which and through which conflict and co-operation may take place.

2. In a fair number of comments, I make some pretty disparaging remarks about the underlying epistemology and, specifically, about the implications of word choice. In many cases, I haven't bothered to make comments because I happen to agree with most of what Ken wrote in the area. There are, however, a few areas where I believe the wording is artificially restrictive at the conceptual level and, since this is a concept piece, I find that disturbing. In almost all cases, the comments and suggestions revolve around shifting the language from a static "X is" to a dynamic form.

Final comment: I am really glad to see that the ACC has been put put for discussion and comments before it is officially released. I believe that this shows a real understanding of one of the positive aspects of cyberspace which, BTW, is not listed in the ACC .

Cheers,

Marc

[Ken White]

There's a joke in there somewhere about Baroque typeface but it's too early on a balmy Sunday...

[Backwards Observer]

LN349-352 Currently reads: “ Consequently, the U.S. Army must develop the capability to think in terms of friendly (partners and allies), the enemy, and the people, and possess the flexibility to secure populations while simultaneously attacking or defending to defeat and destroy enemy forces and organizations.”

Suggested change: “ Consequently, the U.S. Army must develop the capability to think in terms of supportive (partners and allies), oppositional (the enemy) and neutral (the “population”, NGOs, etc.) groups, and possess the flexibility to secure populations while simultaneously attacking or defending to defeat and destroy or neutralize (convert) oppositional forces, organizations and ideologies.”

Rationale: (I) The current wording maintains current military taxonomies (“the enemy”, “the people”) that have
caused significant problems in current conflicts. A much more flexible version of this taxonomy is based on situational motivational attitudes of groups as “oppositional”, “neutral” and/or “supportive”, a taxonomy that not only allows for but, also, is conducive of thinking that would encourage groups to shift their stance in ongoing conflicts (e.g. The Anbar Councils).

(II) Simplistic taxonomies of enemy, friendly and neutral encourage thinking by US Army forces that is contrary to the lived reality of the actual populations, sometimes producing associated “perceptions” that are completely erroneous (e.g. Of the “if they are friendly, then they will do X, Y and Z. If the don't, they must be the enemy.”).

This was the first change I was gonna suggest, but didn't have the cojones. Also Marc puts it more elegantly than I could've done.

[J Wolfsberger]

...More importantly, i think that it does not capture the current uses of cyberspace as a "realm of conflict" well at all. IMO, cyberspace needs to be treated as if it were any other type of terrain in which and through which conflict and co-operation may take place.

Absolutely, 100%, dead nuts on correct.

And adding to it, the entire media is part of the military landscape.

[slapout9]

Absolutely, 100%, dead nuts on correct.

And adding to it, the entire media is part of the military landscape.

Double no, triple dead on it. Warden was of the first people to mention that in the future whole wars could be won or lost in the Cyber-Phere as he called it.

[William F. Owen]

And adding to it, the entire media is part of the military landscape.

So we need to think about "Media" like Logistics, and Intelligence?
If military operations are being conducted in line with legal guidance, why consider the media?

Where does media have it's greatest effect? On the political dimension or the military dimension?
Military action sets forth policy. I submit that media is part of the political landscape. - more over, how is media different from "public opinion?"

It would be a very great mistake to assume all our "enemies" are "Skilled media operators" or that it matters as much as some think, because the Russian and Chinese have very different ideas.