Studies on radicalization & comments

[Spud]

Hi guys

haven't been on for a while but thought this might add to the discussion if you can find it.

I recently used a paper from American Psychologist to expand on a concept I had about public diplomacy/influence. Found the paper really useful and quite easy to understand.

Reference is: Moghaddam, Fathali M, 2005. “The Staircase to Terrorism,” American Psychologist, Vol 60, No 2.

Bit from my paper

Psychologist Fathali Moghaddam sought to develop better understanding of the cognitive reasoning and psychological processes that lead to terrorism in a 2005 paper. Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism model focuses on the perceptions of the individual at each stage and utilises a staircase metaphor to highlight the options open to the affected individual. His work is particularly important in that through the use of the model it clearly identifies points of intervention at which an individual can be persuaded from ascending to the next level. While worldview is the predominant manifestation of perception throughout the staircase model, it is not until an individual ascends to the third floor that that they develop a moral complicity with terrorism. Moghaddam believes that entry to the third floor of his model is last point at which intervention will prevent ascendency to the conduct of a terrorist act. Whether a person reaches the fifth floor and commits to destructive acts of terrorism is still open to external influences. By entering the third floor of the terrorism staircase a person’s worldview statement transforms from one of perceived grievances towards one of fundamentalist reality – the person becomes morally engaged with the narrative that underpins the cause. Importantly it is also at this point that increased isolationism to external factors becomes the norm and through this action the potential terrorist gains greater cultural consensus for their thoughts by excluding competing ideals. Widening the cultural information basis may prevent the limiting of group consensus. However once a potential terrorist enter the fourth floor and enters the secret world of an active terrorist organisation Moghaddam argues that “there is little or no opportunity to exit alive.” At this point the impact of any influence strategy is negligible and the focus shifts to law enforcement or counter-terrorism solutions. In the “war of ideas” focussing on root causes, often as Moghaddam identifies “perceptions of fairness,” may offer a key element of a Strategic Communications program. Moghaddam expands the communication requirement further by highlighting that ascension from the first to second floor is often precipitated by a lack of participation or engagement in decision making on justice issues. He also argues the importance of cultural understanding during this early stage of terrorism. He found that “when local cultural interpretations lead to a view that the in-group is being treated fairly, there is greater likelihood of support for central authorities.” Maintaining linkages with the widest possible cultural group then seems a pertinent course of action.

Another decent read was:

Halverschied, Susanne & Witte, Erich H, 2008. “Justification of War and Terrorism: A Comparative Case Study Analyzing Ethical Positions Based on Prescriptive Attribution Theory,” Social Psychology, Hogrefe & Huber Publishers. Vol 39(1). p 26-36.

[Bob's World]

"In the “war of ideas” focussing on root causes, often as Moghaddam identifies “perceptions of fairness,” may offer a key element of a Strategic Communications program."

This ia an area where we are in complete agreement.

[Global Scout]

Posted by Bob's World

The problem with legitimate is that it implies "free from outside influence and manipulation." Big problem there for the good Cold Warriors, as "containment" was rooted in controlling the periphery; so we have become used to sacrificing legitimacy in favor of official all in the name of containment.

B.W. I think you tend to conflate issues at times. This particular thread was focused on counter radicalization. While the term radicalization is problematic to say the least, the practice of undoing the harmful effects of brainwashing have been practiced throughout history with mixed results. If you look at the process that is used to convince people to become suicide bombers it is a very skillful approach (often enhanced with the use of drugs) to get a subject to commit suicide (thus become a useful idiot to some group).

I guess you can call this individual choice, or more accurately you could label it as maligned outside influence (actors from outside his/her previous social circles) that are hunting the psychologically vulnerable. Is it really self choice? Maybe as much as it is for a kid to join a gang, start taking meth, etc., but that sure as hell doesn't make it legitimate.

Our ability to describe the problem is weak to say the least, and I largely blame SOCOM for coming up with crap ways to define the problem. Take the hard thinking role away from the military and let the political anthropologists take a whack at defining the problem we're trying to solve. Preventing brain washing by sects is one approach, as is "attempting" to heal those who been brainwashed (what SOCOM calls VEO members). However, there is a big difference between a kid who has been isolated, drugged, and feed Islamic dogma to prepare hiim for a sucide mission, and an insurgent. SOCOM lumps them all conveniently into the VEO category.

[marct]

Hi GS,

Our ability to describe the problem is weak to say the least, and I largely blame SOCOM for coming up with crap ways to define the problem. Take the hard thinking role away from the military and let the political anthropologists take a whack at defining the problem we're trying to solve. Preventing brain washing by sects is one approach, as is "attempting" to heal those who been brainwashed (what SOCOM calls VEO members). However, there is a big difference between a kid who has been isolated, drugged, and feed Islamic dogma to prepare hiim for a sucide mission, and an insurgent. SOCOM lumps them all conveniently into the VEO category.

Most political Anthropologists don't know bupkiss about the cult / deprogramming literature (that's us symbolic and/or ritual Anthropologists). And, honestly, "preventing brainwashing by sects" just isn't on (BTW, the literature always refers to these groups as "cults" 'cause sects have too much political power ).

[Global Scout]

Marc, agreed, but my focus is on accurately defining the problem. This is something Kilcullen took a pretty good stab at. We now simply call all those that fight us extremists, which is not helpful.

[marct]

Hi GS,

Marc, agreed, but my focus is on accurately defining the problem. This is something Kilcullen took a pretty good stab at. We now simply call all those that fight us extremists, which is not helpful.

Totally agree with that ! While I disagree with some of Bob's World's definitions, I actually think he has a workable model. That said, the entire term "radicalization" is a problem, and, IMHO, we need to concentrate on one tiny, and very specific, component of it - the likelihood that people will shoot at us. Bob (and Dave K.) is, however, quite right that that is actually a balancing act between the restrictions we put on and the interpretations that people put on those restrictions (okay, I'll admit, I'm rather liberally interpolating here...).

That said, maybe the question to ask is by what process, in what manner and under what conditions do people come to believe that it is "right and proper" to shoot other people?

[Bob's World]

Posted by Bob's World

B.W. I think you tend to conflate issues at times. This particular thread was focused on counter radicalization. While the term radicalization is problematic to say the least, the practice of undoing the harmful effects of brainwashing have been practiced throughout history with mixed results. If you look at the process that is used to convince people to become suicide bombers it is a very skillful approach (often enhanced with the use of drugs) to get a subject to commit suicide (thus become a useful idiot to some group).

I guess you can call this individual choice, or more accurately you could label it as maligned outside influence (actors from outside his/her previous social circles) that are hunting the psychologically vulnerable. Is it really self choice? Maybe as much as it is for a kid to join a gang, start taking meth, etc., but that sure as hell doesn't make it legitimate.

Our ability to describe the problem is weak to say the least, and I largely blame SOCOM for coming up with crap ways to define the problem. Take the hard thinking role away from the military and let the political anthropologists take a whack at defining the problem we're trying to solve. Preventing brain washing by sects is one approach, as is "attempting" to heal those who been brainwashed (what SOCOM calls VEO members). However, there is a big difference between a kid who has been isolated, drugged, and feed Islamic dogma to prepare hiim for a sucide mission, and an insurgent. SOCOM lumps them all conveniently into the VEO category.

I'll save my constructive comments on what SOCOM does well or poorly for when I have those conversations with the leadership there. They know they can count on me for a candid, thoughtful assessment.

As to the quote you posted here; the point that was getting to is my belief that what I call the "Pied Piper Theory of Insurgency," that some dynamic leader with a powerful ideology can engage a well governed populace and lead them into insurgency is a Fairy Tale. Certain individuals like our own nut job "Jihad Jane"? Sure. But not the populace in a way sufficiently to create insurgency.

So, if not the Pied Piper, then why these growing insurgencies? Why do members of these many separate growing insurgencies travel to be foreign fighters to counter US efforts; why do members of these insurgencies conduct acts of terror on US and US interests? Why is the US threatened far more today by the populaces of our allies than by any other source?????

To my analysis it is a reaction to the retention of a very controlling family of foreign policy developed and employed for the Cold War, but retained for convenience and because we could long past its expiration date. Some great metrics that people tend to ignore:

1. The previously stated point about the greatest threat to the US coming from the populaces of our allies.

2. The fact that we have been deploying our military at an every growing rate to enforce our foreign policy among the same "allied" states that these populaces come from.

To me the problem is not that someone is "radicalizing" these populaces; the problem is that our obsolete foreign policy contributes so directly to creating conditions that creates a populace that is easily motivated to attack the US as a solution to their domestic concerns.

Is this conflating? I don't think so. I think it is looking past the spin to try to see what is making it spin.

[Dayuhan]

As to the quote you posted here; the point that was getting to is my belief that what I call the "Pied Piper Theory of Insurgency," that some dynamic leader with a powerful ideology can engage a well governed populace and lead them into insurgency is a Fairy Tale. Certain individuals like our own nut job "Jihad Jane"? Sure. But not the populace in a way sufficiently to create insurgency..

Agreed; no "pied piper" is going to generate the depth and breadth of resentment and hostility needed to initiate or sustain an insurgency. Generating enough to sustain a terrorist movement that requires only a relatively small base of intensely radicalized individuals is another matter altogether.

Why do members of these many separate growing insurgencies travel to be foreign fighters to counter US efforts; why do members of these insurgencies conduct acts of terror on US and US interests? Why is the US threatened far more today by the populaces of our allies than by any other source?????

I have yet to see any evidence that either foreign fighters or AQ terrorists act as "members of insurgencies", unless we are to embrace the "global insurgency" notion, which I personally find insupportable.

I do not agree that the US is threatened by the populaces of our allies. I don't think the US is threatened by any populace at all, but by a group of radicalized individuals recruited from many populaces (including our own) but neither representing nor acting on behalf of any of them.

Some great metrics that people tend to ignore:

1. The previously stated point about the greatest threat to the US coming from the populaces of our allies.

2. The fact that we have been deploying our military at an every growing rate to enforce our foreign policy among the same "allied" states that these populaces come from.

If we're going to use these as metrics, we need to quantify them, or at least to verify them. What indication do we have that we are being threatened by a populace... any populace?

Where have we been "deploying our military at an every growing rate to enforce our foreign policy" among allied states? I've seen us deploying our military to remove governments we disliked and to try to manage the power vacuums left by these removals... but where are we deploying forces at an increasing rate to enforce our policies among allies?

[Ken White]

They know they can count on me for a candid, thoughtful assessment.

As an aside, I hope you'll point out that DA is ruining SF for lasting harm...

Is this conflating? I don't think so. I think it is looking past the spin to try to see what is making it spin.

That's the "differ."

Seems to me that you are spinning a simplistic solution to a complex problem (and one that elides the reality of US domestic politics, as I've often said). I'm not at all sure there's as much Cold War thinking today as you seem to believe -- nor am I convinced there ever was such channeled thinking as you also seem to believe. My perceptions of that period apparently differ significantly from yours...

You have some really good ideas. Like Global Scout, I believe you tend to conflate many diverse things into one overarching mantra that is at least arguable. That obsession unfortunately obscures some of those good ideas.

[Global Scout]

Ken,

Want to 2nd your call for a review of SF's focus on DA and the harm it has done to the force. Some SF junior officer recently insulted one of our Canadian brothers by telling him he wasn't capable of understanding tribal engagement because he wasn't SOF. I feel off by chair because I was laughing so hard. While SF has been doing DA the conventional forces were focused on the popualce. SF so called tribal engagement is a late show to the fight, yet a couple of junior MAJs think they have a brand new idea and thet won't want to hear any criticism from non- SF types.

Besides being comical, and a flawed approach the arrogance demonstrated is simply sad. He sounds more like an 18 y/o Marine who just completed basic than a seasoned professional. Our DA forces are very good at what they do, now if we could only get SF to be good at what they should do we could actually give the enemy hell.

[Bob's World]

As an aside, I hope you'll point out that DA is ruining SF for lasting harm... That's the "differ."

Seems to me that you are spinning a simplistic solution to a complex problem (and one that elides the reality of US domestic politics, as I've often said). I'm not at all sure there's as much Cold War thinking today as you seem to believe -- nor am I convinced there ever was such channeled thinking as you also seem to believe. My perceptions of that period apparently differ significantly from yours...

You have some really good ideas. Like Global Scout, I believe you tend to conflate many diverse things into one overarching mantra that is at least arguable. That obsession unfortunately obscures some of those good ideas.

Equally fair though is to point out that "containment" was very simple in concept, yet very complex and evolving in execution. Same applies to thories that I offer up as being more relevant to today's security environment.

Also equally fair is to note that most "good Cold Warriors" are skeptical of my theories. It shakes the foundation that their entire professional lives have been built upon a bit harder than they are comfortable with. Easier to just assume you are right and that others attack you in growing frequency for reasons completely disconnected from one's own actions. Personally, I know it is a pet peeve, so I may be biased, but I just hate victim mentalities that draw comfort through rationalizing the sources of major challenges off onto others. Responsibility and blame are very different things, and yes, I confess, that I do believe that it will only be once the US takes greater responsibility for the higher order effects of our actions that we will begin to get a better handle on our current security challenges.

I just can't join the group think that rationalizes such things away as "terrorism", or "Islamism" or "radicalization." I believe in all of those things, just not that they are all directed at us for things that we do not have to take responsibility for.

As to DA, there is plenty of that thinking going around. SF jumped in the pool, but it was crowded when they got in, and it will be crowded when they get out. Change is hard. Read LTC Petit's article in the current Special Warfare magazine on thinking COIN but executing FID. He has the SOTF here in the South now, and more than any other leader, other than perhaps MG Carter and GEN McChrystal himself, gets it.

Tribal engagement is certainly a growing area, but is defensive only, essentially a reinforcing of the self-governance that is the essence of governance in Afghanistan. I do get nervous at what I hear from senior leaders inside the beltway who appear to be grasping at this grassroots approach as a magic exit strategy; they misunderstand both the program and the nature of the conflict here. Its a good program, it is not the magic easy button that wins the day. Infanteer, who is a regular poster here is not SOF, but gets this very well and from all accounts is doing great things in a very tough neighborhood. He is, however, an exception. No the problem and the solution to this and every insurgency is at the top, not the bottom. If you build an "NFA" around the top, you are in for a long, hard road.

Threat-Centric, Population-Centric, Government Centric. Can make your head hurt. Truth is the lines blur considerably. One can't get at the populace without dealing with the threat. Typically (in good Cold Warrior fashion...though learned from our "Great Game" predecessors) whether one says they are focused on the threat or the populace, we end up way too often actually being focused on establishing and sustaining some particular government.

So, yes, this will remain my steady drumbeat: Legitimacy, Legitimacy, Legitimacy are the three most important things in COIN. If the top doesn't have it in the eyes of THAT populace, you will probably not be able to bail that leaky boat out fast enough to keep up.

[Bob's World]

"I have yet to see any evidence that either foreign fighters or AQ terrorists act as "members of insurgencies", unless we are to embrace the "global insurgency" notion, which I personally find insupportable.

I do not agree that the US is threatened by the populaces of our allies. I don't think the US is threatened by any populace at all, but by a group of radicalized individuals recruited from many populaces (including our own) but neither representing nor acting on behalf of any of them."


One merely needs to look past the cover story of "Terrorism" and "Counterterrorism."

And, for the record, no one is a bigger critic of the "Global Insurgency" theory than I am. Does AQ use a common cause to get support from many diverse insurgencies to put effort against common objectives? Absolutely. Does that make it a "Global Insurgency"? NO. The effects may be massed, but the solutions remain diverse. The US must trace each line of foreign fighters back to their homelands, and then honestly assess our relationships with the governments there. Not just from our biased perspectives, but from the biased perspectives of that populace as well. At the end of the day it is the perception of the affected populace that controls.

So, just a couple examples from a couple of articles I googled. I don't agree with these articles, but there are good facts to pull from them.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-A...g=en&id=108612

From this article: "top five foreign fighter producing cities for that cohort of individuals per capita were: Darnah, Libya; Mecca, Saudi Arabia; Jawf, Saudi Arabia; Dayr al zur, Syria; and Sanaa, Yemen, respectively."

Pay attention to those locations, they will come up again.

US-Saudi Cooperation in War on Terrorism Lauded in State Department Annual Report; 30 April, 2004
http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/ne...est-04-30.html

This second article is full of interesting facts. It praises the Saudis for their tremendous efforts in Combating Terrorism, and even for pushing for governmental reforms at home (This was 6 years ago, it would be interesting to see if any real action on these reforms took place).

Take this paragraph for example:

"Since May, Riyadh has arrested more than 600 individuals during counterterrorism operations and continues investigating the Riyadh attacks. Saudi security forces have suffered significant casualties while conducting counterterrorism operations and raids. Raids in Mecca, Riyadh, and Medina led to arrests and document seizures and netted large quantities of explosives and a variety of weapons. In July alone, security services seized more than 20 tons of explosive-making materials in Qassim. In November, the authorities seized a truck bomb at a reported al-Qaida safehouse in Riyadh. Meanwhile, Saudi officials met several times with their Yemeni counterparts in an effort to stanch the flow of weapons into Saudi Arabia from Yemen."


Ok, news flash, this isn't CT, this is COIN. The Saudis have been in nearly continuous LVL 1 insurgency for at least since FDR gave them his blessing of US Legitimacy. The beauty of doing COIN with in a despotic monarchy is that you can simply label your citizens who dare to challenge your benevolent rule as "Terrorists" and crush them, so it never really begins to look like a classic insurgency. This will however train your insurgents to look for more indirect means to achieve their goals. This is where Bin Laden comes in. He offered an indirect approach. Take down the Western protectors first, and then redirect your energies at home.


I could be totally wrong, but what I see (and there are thousands of articles out there, these are just two that popped up at the top of one search) are restless populaces, joined and energized by the modern information age, drawing strength from each other to rise up to resist their own separate conditions of poor governance. Many of these countries, like Saudi Arabia and Yemen, were US allies from the start. Some, like Libya, came to the US late to gain our blessing as an ally in the War on Terrorism and get a US sanction to ruthlessly attack their own insurgent populace in the name of "counterterrorism." And they all send fighters to work under the AQ flag to nick away at the US where ever we might be.

Global Insurgency? No. Global War on Terrorism? Equally no. Global friction to a US foreign policy in dire need of a fresh approach that is more populace focused and less rooted in sustaining "friendly dictators"? Yeah, I really do think so. But that is just my assessment. I toss it out here not to "radicalize" anyone, but just to gain other perspectives to help shape my own.

[William F. Owen]

So, yes, this will remain my steady drumbeat: Legitimacy, Legitimacy, Legitimacy are the three most important things in COIN. If the top doesn't have it in the eyes of THAT populace, you will probably not be able to bail that leaky boat out fast enough to keep up.

OK, but in War you assert your legitimacy by killing those who seek to dispute by force of arms. Once the bad guys are dead, you can have the political process decide the legitimacy.

In Irregular Warfare, you do not win by being the better government. You win by being the only government.

[bourbon]

haven't been on for a while but thought this might add to the discussion if you can find it.

I recently used a paper from American Psychologist to expand on a concept I had about public diplomacy/influence. Found the paper really useful and quite easy to understand.

Reference is: Moghaddam, Fathali M, 2005. “The Staircase to Terrorism,” American Psychologist, Vol 60, No 2.

PDF of the article and additional work available on the Professors webpage.