Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[CrowBat]

There are two assumptions in your argument, one is flat out wrong. First you're logic implies the U.S. not doing anything (wrong, we did things, so you obviously meant not enough) is why Syria ended up the way it is...

Bill,
I'm the first to say that, a) 'no, the USA is no centre of the World'; b) 'no, the USA would not go killing Assad' even if WH decided to 'do something' about Syria; and c) there is no certainty about the outcome of a possible US intervention in that country.

BUT...

- A matter of fact is that this 'war on terror' against specific extremists is de-facto one of priorities in the foreign policy of the USA. It doesn't matter whether you like this fact or not, or whether you want to fight that war or not: you're 'Target No.1' on targeting lists of extremists in question.

- This results in conclusion that

a) whenever the USA fails to act, and especially when the USA fails to act preventively, extremists are going to exploit the situation to their advantage;

b) whenever the USA fails to act, majority (if not all) of the West is failing to act too;

c) whenever the USA fails to act and drags the West with it, most of pro-West actors around the World fail to act too, and

d) this is precisely what happened in Syria.

So, perhaps doing nothing in Syria was in 'best interest of the USA' - supposedly because 'getting USA involved in a regional quagmire is not in interest of the USA'. Fine. But, it resulted in nobody else - except extremists and their supporters, of course - doing anything at all. And that has made space for extremists. Worse yet: doing nothing in Syria resulted in massive frustrations for various of US friends in the Middle East, because it resulted in a direct threat for their security and simultaneous 'success' of their enemies.

Therefore: in this case, lack of US action resulted in an outright catastrophe - in Syria, and in Iraq.

If you think that's 'bolstering US interests in the Middle East'... well, perhaps you should go back to checking that with 2+2=4, too.

Furthermore:

This argument assumes that getting the U.S. involved in a regional quagmire would somehow be in our interest?

You - the USA - are eyebrows-deep in that quagmire since at least 1942 (start of cooperation with Sauds and thus Wahhabists), indirectly since 1919 (King-Crane Comission), and very directly ever since, so where is the problem?

On the contrary, if you argument/think in this fashion, then the question is rather: why everywhere else (in the Middle East) but only not in Syria? Where's the logic in that?

Why isn't it in our interest to see both of our adversaries (Sunni extremists and Iran and their proxies) fight one another, and for once strain their economies instead of ours?

Because whichever of them 'wins' (all provided that conflict is 'winnable' for one of involved belligerents) they remain your (US) enemies.

Means: whichever party wins there, it's only going to be reinforced by success.

Is this in US interest?

Why can't we wait until there is an opportunity to actually achieve something that is in our interests?

Oh, no problem. You can repeat the exercise from the 1990s, and wait until another airplane crashes into some skyscraper - or something else of that kind happens.

It's your choice, really. You can ignore the fact that, in military terms, the ISIS is far more sophisticated than the AQ ever was. You can further prefer to offer them more time so they can get even better, too. No problem: just wait and see.

Removing Malaki would be one example, the situation was managed to great effect in that aspect, but who knows what the new government will do.

That was near-pointless, and came much too late.

But, don't let yourself get disturbed by such observations....

Since I'm not sure of the extent of support we're providing and to whom, I can't make an argument on whether we need to increase it our not, but I haven't see a good argument yet on why we should intervene, or should have, intervened, militarily in Syria.

In essence, official USA are not providing any kind of serious help to anybody (in Syria). There is simply no trace of evidence for that.

The WH is meddling (in particularly idiotic fashion) through attempting to condition provision of aid by third parties (Saudi Arabia, Turkey etc.) to specific groups of genuine Syrian insurgents, and/but - foremost - through attempting to steer specific groups of (genuine) Syrian insurgents (not Jihadists) from 'operational rooms' in Jordan and Turkey. This meddling is usually to be seen in stoppage of all flow of aid provided by other players whenever this is needed the most (like when the regime is on offensive). Which in turn is usually resulting in Syrian insurgents getting only more frustrated by the lack of US support, then in defections of the same to the side of Islamists etc., etc., etc.

Except for this, the WH has only permitted specific private, US-based organizations to provide non-lethal aid (cars, food, clothes etc.) to hand-picked groups of Syrian insurgents.

Is that of any help?

Everyone is making a lot of wild guesses made on sensational news reporting instead of facts, because the facts are not available the public.

That depends on what facts do you want to get, and especially: what do you prefer to hear (or ignore), I would say.

From my POV, 'sensational news' were all those declaring the uprising and insurgency in Syria for 'al-Qaida' right from the start, which was a mountain of nonsense and BS. Tragically enough, that had the 'desired' effect - between others of keeping the USA (and West) out of this affair - and now a group worse than AQ advancing there too.

In the end those clamoring for U.S. military involvement should provide a theory of change and identify a condition that we can feasibly obtain.

While I'm not 'pro-US intervention', I offered plenty of 'theories' that have proven to 'work' over the time. For example, an 'investment' of little more than 50, perhaps 100 million into right groups, back in summer 2012, could have prevented Syria from going down the sink. Various people high above circles you or me are frequenting have suggested very much the same.

So, perhaps some (re-)reading (?) of older posts might be of help here.

While yes, it's terribly frustrating to see what became of the country and people (who were quite effectively frustrated away from the West by the lack of support), it's really not my fault if you (and quite a few of others) prefer to look the other way and consider this for, 'just background noise from frustrated people'.

[Dayuhan]

It's your choice, really. You can ignore the fact that, in military terms, the ISIS is far more sophisticated than the AQ ever was. You can further prefer to offer them more time so they can get even better, too. No problem: just wait and see.

That's probably true, but since the threat from AQ was never military action, it's also of limited relevance.

While I'm not 'pro-US intervention', I offered plenty of 'theories' that have proven to 'work' over the time. For example, an 'investment' of little more than 50, perhaps 100 million into right groups, back in summer 2012, could have prevented Syria from going down the sink. Various people high above circles you or me are frequenting have suggested very much the same.

Yes, I recall these theories. They were quite extraordinarily theoretical, and based on sweeping assumptions with little evidence presented to substantiate them. They dealt with possibilities that were extensively evaluated, and for excellent reasons rejected, back in the day.

[Bill Moore]

Crowbat

A matter of fact is that this 'war on terror' against specific extremists is de-facto one of priorities in the foreign policy of the USA. It doesn't matter whether you like this fact or not, or whether you want to fight that war or not: you're 'Target No.1' on targeting lists of extremists in question.

While I don't agree with many of our leaders' decisions, it is dead wrong to assume we don't recognize the threat from terrorists and we're not acting upon those threats. Just because you didn't see it in the media doesn't mean we're not disrupting this threat. Approaches can be argued, and I don't think it is the U.S. approved approach, but I see an advantage when our adversaries are killing each other. They're expending limited resources and exposing to the world what they represent, and I think the world needed a reminder to stiffen their resolve.

As for spending a few million dollars, we have certainly done that. Furthermore, several Arab nations have provided millions in support to different groups. While money is important, it is of relative importance since others are providing it. If we want a specific group or groups to win I think we would have to provide direct military assistance like we did in Libya, but I don't think those groups would be able to stabilize the country after Assad fell if we did that. Do you? If you do, how do you see that happening?

[CrowBat]

..As for spending a few million dollars, we have certainly done that.

I'm sorry, but I haven't seen a single dollar of any kind of official US aid (except relief supplies for refugees) reaching insurgents.

All I've seen is plenty of babbling in the media, sure, but there are no bucks, and thus no 'Buck Rogers'.

Yes, the WH is telling Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Qataris, Turks and whoever else, 'do it yourself' - but then meddling through 'interventions from highest points' (WH) whenever things develop the way 'USA' (WH, again) don't like them.

Furthermore, several Arab nations have provided millions in support to different groups. While money is important, it is of relative importance since others are providing it.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, it's rather something like few billions - most of it meanwhile squandered because of Qatari 'interventions' (usually either ignored, or wholeheartedly supported by the WH).

If we want a specific group or groups to win I think we would have to provide direct military assistance like we did in Libya, but I don't think those groups would be able to stabilize the country after Assad fell if we did that. Do you? If you do, how do you see that happening?

Sigh... again: Syria is so piss-poor, that any money is making difference. Saudis had it easy to build up the IF: sure, from the US standpoint, that organization has 'wrong' religion, and seems not the least curious to make any promises about 'peace with Israel'; but hell, one can't really expect the Syrian Sunnis to convert to Christianity as 'thanks', can one? And expecting anybody in Syria to make promises about some sort of future peace with Israel... come on... that's fantasy.

Anyway, even few Syrian private businessmen found it relatively easy to build up the SF and SRF, which are presently major recipients of Saudi aid.

The problem in all these cases is always the same: lack of management skills, which results in plenty of money (and other 'stuff') ending in wrong hands and being squandered for no profit in return. And even more so: Qatari interventions through 'direct donations' to specific commanders (usually those that eventually sided with the JAN or the ISIS), which in turn caused quarrels and then loss of influence of major politico-military alliances, like the FSyA and then the SNC.

A strict control and relatively simple disciplinary measures - plus a 'muzzle' over Qatari noses, of course - could've been imposed. One could've followed the Pakistani example from dealing with 'seven parties' of Mujaheddin in Afghanistan of the 1980s and say, 'bring me a video showing you've used what I've provided; no video, no beans, bullets and gas'.

Not only ironically, but 'idiotically', the US-run 'control rooms' never acted in that fashion. If they moved at all, then to stop the flow of supplies to insurgent groups during specific of regime's offensives. Obviously, this did little to 'bolster' Saudi or Emirati influence.

So, investing into 2-3 groups (the Farouq Brigade and various of its franchises that began emerging in 2012 and 2013 would be one of good examples; ever since, the once powerful and influential Farouq was largely destroyed by a combination of regime's and ISIS' attacks), and thus provoking a 'snowball' effect in sense of 'others' seeing that these 2-3 groups are 'flourishing' and 'well-supplied', was one of very promising ideas.

For those who are now going to say, 'But Tom, you can't possibly predict the future or know what would have happened', all I can say is 'shut up, that's precisely how the Islamists and then the ISIS did it too'.

Namely, when one asks them, major reason why various insurgent groups began joining Islamists, and then even Jihadists, was a) disappointment over lack of support from the West, and especially b) they saw that these (Islamists and Jihadists) are better supplied and thus better organized too.

They had the money, beans and bullets; moderates not. And so, gradually, after 'winning' enough people to their side - or killing anybody opposing them (or letting the regime kill the people in question) - the ISIS was left to spread in Syria.

Guess, that's 'evidence' that my ideas in this case wouldn't work, right?

[Bill Moore]

Guess, that's 'evidence' that my ideas in this case wouldn't work, right?

My evidence to support my assumptions is that there are over 100 different groups (probably way more than that) in Syria. No leader is able to consolidate power through his ideology and vision.

While no group has the winning narrative, the Islamists have narrative that resonates more with young men because the Islamists demonstrate both military capability and a vision that appeals to young men who don't have the capacity yet to use history to inform their thinking to anticipate what the repercussions will be if the Islamists actually win.

If we removed Assad, and we probably should have after he used chemical weapons, it would be a free for all for king of the hill that would result in continued bloodshed, perhaps worse than it is now, with no foreseeable end. The most likely winner in the long run would be the Islamists unless external powers intervene, but the Islamists wouldn't be able to control the entire country, so the war would continue and it would destabilize the region as a whole.

I'll now argue against myself, the region is becoming destabilized anyway, neither Assad, al-Nusra, ISIS, or the minority moderates can win at this point, so to bring this to a head the region needs to intervene militarily to either:

A. Greatly reduce the strength of ISIS, which in turn empowers al-Nusra (AQ) and Assad.

B. Remove Assad, which may free up al-Nusra and other groups to direct their power towards ISIS.

C. Put LH and Iran in checkmate, but I don't know how we would.

D. Support Assad and return the status quo which is morally reprehensible after he gassed his people.

Of course morality changes with time. We certainly had no qualms deliberately attacking civilians in WWII in both Germany and Japan with fire bombs to compel the nation to stop fighting and surrender non-conditionally. Assad is doing the same, but in 2014 we don't find that acceptable. I agree it isn't acceptable, but it isn't entirely irrational either.

[CrowBat]

My evidence to support my assumptions is that there are over 100 different groups (probably way more than that) in Syria. No leader is able to consolidate power through his ideology and vision.

So what? Why is it 'always' necessary to have 'one' leader and unity?

There are no 100, but about 1000 different Syrian insurgent groups. Yes, some work together excellently in the north of the country, and fight each other in the south etc. But, generally, most of them are working together rather well. Foremost: main reason for quarrels between them - and the main reason for all of their 'lost battles' are supplies. So, if one provides supplies, there's no reason to fight.

On the contrary, and as you can read in these two very detailed articles by another chap from ACIG, describing some of recent insurgent ops (note: made by two French authors, so English is a lil' bit 'jumpy'), whenever there are supplies, they come together and fight joint battles against the regime:

- Rebels attack the military base of Hamadiyah (Idlib province), July 2014

- Lift the blockade of Mleha (August 3, 2014)

While no group has the winning narrative, the Islamists have narrative that resonates more with young men...

What Islamists there have such a narrative?

None. Get yourself some contacts in Syria, ask whoever you like. It's not about narratives but about food, ammo and organization.

... because the Islamists...

You ought to define 'Islamists' here too: do you mean the IF, which is friendly to the JAN, but at odds with the ISIS? Or the JAN, which is friendly to the IF and often cooperating with moderates in one part of the country, while fighting both of these in other part of the country, and is generally at odds with the ISIS?

Or do you mean the ISIS - which is neither Syrian, nor 'rebels/insurgents', nor can be can be considered 'Islamic', but only 'mental illness'?

Or any other of so many 'Islamist' groups there?

And generally: only the IF and the ISIS are demonstrating any kind of military skills. The JAN was so much weakened by the ISIS, that is meanwhile primarily used to provide suicide bombers for delivering coup de main at the start of specific attacks.

If we removed Assad, and we probably should have after he used chemical weapons, it would be a free for all for king of the hill that would result in continued bloodshed, perhaps worse than it is now, with no foreseeable end.

...but there was none of that so far and an end to this conflict is foreseeable now?

On the contrary, removal of Assad would've:
- removed the credence of 'legal' regime in Damascus;
- thrown ranks of Alawites into disarray (traditionally, Alawites were seldom a solid block, and there are all the time minor uprisings and unrests against the regime between already since October 2012)
- removed the credence of Iranian involvement, which weakened native insurgency to a degree where this became unable to fight the ISIS and lost all of NE Syria to it.

With other words: such an action could've at least limited the spread of the ISIS inside Syria (if not prevented it), in turn denying it a base from which it launched the offensive into Iraq.

While, as the situation is right now, the regime is not only responsible for helping the ISIS establish itself in Syria, but reporting about its 'fight' against the ISIS and flying air strikes against their bases for PR purposes, while actually buying nearly 50% of its fuel from them (i.e. de-facto financing the ISIS); and Iranians - who were near bankrupt just two months ago - are now yielding immense political and monetary profits from the ISIS, because they're now 'good' and 'useful' - for their support for that failed government in Baghdad, and for their support for Kurds too. And that's not to talk about the Hezbollah and other, similar 'factors'...

Sorry, but if the policy of even considering cooperation with all of these jerks is not failed to doom.... then I don't know what else is.

The most likely winner in the long run would be the Islamists unless external powers intervene, but the Islamists wouldn't be able to control the entire country, so the war would continue and it would destabilize the region as a whole.

'Islamists' are going to win this war, sooner or later. We all have to cope and live with that. That's so because dominant majority of the Syrian population are Sunni Moslems. Question is just: what 'Islamists'.

Here is a point where I can only conclude: as usually, the longer the war goes on, the more extremist sort of Islamists.

Therefore: the policy of protracting the war - which is what the WH is pursuing since 2012 - is an idiotic one.

[davidbfpo]

http://www.economist.com/news/middle...f-hot-here-mum

Within this long article - with many points made - is this table:

[Dayuhan]

A strict control and relatively simple disciplinary measures - plus a 'muzzle' over Qatari noses, of course - could've been imposed.

How exactly would you have proposed to "muzzle" the Qataris? They do not take instructions from the US.

So, investing into 2-3 groups (the Farouq Brigade and various of its franchises that began emerging in 2012 and 2013 would be one of good examples; ever since, the once powerful and influential Farouq was largely destroyed by a combination of regime's and ISIS' attacks), and thus provoking a 'snowball' effect in sense of 'others' seeing that these 2-3 groups are 'flourishing' and 'well-supplied', was one of very promising ideas.

Promising if you assume that money is the only variable, but we all know that money is not the only variable.

What you're not acknowledging is that choosing a proxy, especially in a fight with no clear and realistic desired end state and no compelling US interest at stake, is a blind two-footed jump onto the mother of all slippery slopes. What do you do when your proxy doesn't win? Do you write it off, or double down, or triple down, a course that inexorably points toward direct involvement?

Of course it's easy to say that the proxy would win if only the US did whatever you suggest, but in all of these fights there's always a pack of people claiming that it'll all be right if only a few tens of millions get thrown at whoever they like. What they say and what happens are two very different things.