The insurgency in eastern Ukraine will be the 11th conflict involving the Russian Federation since its formation in 1991. Notably, only one of these conflicts ended in clear defeat for Moscow (the First Chechen War) while one ended in a mediated settlement and another is still on going. That means seven (7) confirmed and two (2) possible victories for Russia out of 11 conflicts - not a bad track record. All of the conflicts involve territory to some extent and all involved a former Soviet republic or a political sub-unit. If using the accepted but admittedly arbitrary methodology of 1,000+ battle related military deaths in a year constituting a 'war', the Ukraine crisis has some ways to go.

Since 1991, the Russian Federation has not lost a single external conflict. Part of that is the deliberate decision to pursue limited, achieveable aims (centered on territory) and securing local military superiority against isolated adversaries (e.g. Georgia and Ukraine).

Other than all the issues brought up in the previous 80 pages, the major issue is that Russia is for the time being on the ascendent relative to the US, even if wide differences still exist in absolute economic capacity and absolute military capability. A string of local successes has given the Putin administration confidence and public legitimacy, moving Russia firmly past the chaos of the Yeltsin years. But the divergence between Russia's perception of its desired status and its ascribed status also signals that Moscow will continue to be assertive in the future, especially in the application of armed force to close that gap in its international position.

What does that mean for a Washington mired in bitter political infighting, degrading military capacity, and a self-imposed fiscal crisis?