Putting Foot to Al Qaeda Ass Since 1993
NEFA Foundation - State of the Sunni Insurgency, Aug 2007 (pdf). A good summary of the development of AQI and its political wing, the Islamic State in Iraq, and its subsequent falling out with the Islamic Army in Iraq / Reform & Jihad Front.
The Myth of AQI - Andrew Tilghman, Washington Monthly. Our own Abu Buckwheat features prominently in this article. Raises some very interesting questions on the size and reach of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Some highlights:
and ......
Even if the manpower and number of attacks attributed to AQI have been exaggerated—and they have—many observers maintain that what is uniquely dangerous about the group is not its numbers, but the spectacular nature of its strikes ... He points, as do many inside the administration, to the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara, a revered Shiite shrine, as a paramount example of AQI's outsize influence. President Bush has laid unqualified blame for the Samara bombing on al-Qaeda, and described the infamous incident—and ensuing sectarian violence—as a fatal tipping point toward the current unrest.
But is this view of AQI's vanguard role in destabilizing Iraq really true?
...
it remains unclear whether the original Samara bombing was itself the work of AQI. The group never took credit for the attack, as it has many other high-profile incidents. The man who the military believe orchestrated the bombing, an Iraqi named Haitham al-Badri, was both a Samara native and a former high-ranking government official under Saddam Hussein. (His right-hand man, Hamed Jumaa Farid al-Saeedi, was also a former military intelligence officer in Saddam Hussein's army.) Key features of the bombing did not conform to the profile of an AQI attack. For example, the bombers did not target civilians, or even kill the Shiite Iraqi army soldiers guarding the mosque, both of which are trademark tactics of AQI. The planners also employed sophisticated explosive devices, suggesting formal military training common among former regime officers, rather than the more bluntly destructive tactics typical of AQI. Finally, Samara was the heart of Saddam's power base, where former regime fighters keep tight control over the insurgency. Frank "Greg" Ford, a retired counterintelligence agent for the Army Reserves, who worked with the Army in Samara before the 2006 bombing, says that the evidence points away from AQI and toward a different conclusion: "The Baathists directed that attack," says Ford.
... The first group that profits from an outsize focus on AQI are former regime elements, and the tribal chiefs with whom they are often allied. These forces are able to carry out attacks against Shiites and Americans, but also to shift the blame if it suits their purposes. While the U.S. military has recently touted "news" that Sunni insurgents have turned against the al-Qaeda terrorists in Anbar Province, there is little evidence of actual clashes between these two groups. Sunni insurgents in Anbar have largely ceased attacks on Americans, but some observers suggest that this development has less to do with vanquishing AQI than with the fact that U.S. troops now routinely deliver cash-filled duffle bags to tribal sheiks serving as "lead contractors" on "reconstruction projects." The excuse of fighting AQI comes in handy. "Remember, Iraq is an honor society," explains Juan Cole, an Iraq expert and professor of modern Middle Eastern studies at the University of Michigan. "But if you say it wasn't us—it was al-Qaeda—then you don't lose face ..."
hmmm that might indicate sectarian war and at the time, we were saying no civil war....it remains unclear whether the original Samara bombing was itself the work of AQI. The group never took credit for the attack, as it has many other high-profile incidents. The man who the military believe orchestrated the bombing, an Iraqi named Haitham al-Badri, was both a Samara native and a former high-ranking government official under Saddam Hussein. (His right-hand man, Hamed Jumaa Farid al-Saeedi, was also a former military intelligence officer in Saddam Hussein's army.) Key features of the bombing did not conform to the profile of an AQI attack. For example, the bombers did not target civilians, or even kill the Shiite Iraqi army soldiers guarding the mosque, both of which are trademark tactics of AQI. The planners also employed sophisticated explosive devices, suggesting formal military training common among former regime officers, rather than the more bluntly destructive tactics typical of AQI. Finally, Samara was the heart of Saddam's power base, where former regime fighters keep tight control over the insurgency. Frank "Greg" Ford, a retired counterintelligence agent for the Army Reserves, who worked with the Army in Samara before the 2006 bombing, says that the evidence points away from AQI and toward a different conclusion: "The Baathists directed that attack," says Ford.
Hat Tip, Tequilla and to you too, Abu Buckwheat!
Tom
I just finished reading "The Terrorists of Iraq" by Malcolm Nance, who I believe is also Abu Buckwheat. It was informative and the central arguement of the book, that Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) are the majority (80-83%) and driving force of the insurgency with Iraqi Islamic Extremists (15-17%) and AQI (2-5%) making up the rest, was very convincing.
With this and the recent "tribal revolt" phenomena some questions were raised in my mind.
These revolts are all described as being against AQI, which I will take to mean AQI and the Iraqi Islamic Extremists.
And, taking Ramadi as an example (I am depending here on Cavguy's long post about the events there), these "revolts" have involved hard fighting. The severity of the fighting seems to indicate that perhaps more than 20% of the insurgency is being revolted against. Again using Ramadi as an example, once the "revolt" succeeds, the insurgency mostly stops.
Considering these things, here are my questions:
1. Did AQI and the Iraqi Islamic Extremists grow in power to the extent they
displaced the FRLs as the driving force in the insurgency?
2. Are the "tribal revolts" against more than AQI, are they also against
parts of the FRL insurgency?
3. Are the FRLs still the relatively cohesive group Malcolm describes in his
book?
4. Have the FRLs, or some of them, given up pursuing the insurgency? If so, for how long and why?
I am not trying to express a back door opinion here. The only thing I know from personal experience about Iraq is how long some of the runways are. These questions truly puzzle me.
Carl, having served in a couple of different regions in Iraq, and having been in all, the dynamics of the conflict(s) are different in each, so I don't think even someone who is a so called expert on Iraq can answer your questions with more than educated speculation.
This is a great question, but it is also possible that the FRLs are funding any Sunni group that is anti-coalition. While they may fight one another in the future, or even fight one another now, I wonder is FRLs expats are funding AQI?1. Did AQI and the Iraqi Islamic Extremists grow in power to the extent they
displaced the FRLs as the driving force in the insurgency?
I have seen tribal revolts against JAM also (a Shi'a militia group).2. Are the "tribal revolts" against more than AQI, are they also against parts of the FRL insurgency?
3. Are the FRLs still the relatively cohesive group Malcolm describes in his
book?I don't know, but I wonder is the FRLs see the Shi'a as a greater threat to their objectives than the coalition forces?4. Have the FRLs, or some of them, given up pursuing the insurgency? If so, for how long and why?
Bookmarks