The Emerging "Neocon" Alibi on Iraq

[Ken White]

We should always strive for an independent judgment when its neither absurd or pendantic to do so.

I'm unsure what pendantic means but I think I agree with all that...

Here's where we part ways, and perhaps this is because I was and still am restricted to declassified and otherwise open source literature on the subject. It was obvious to everyone that Iraq didn't have militarily significant quantities of chemical or biological weapons, and everyone agreed that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapon--yet. However, if it were obvious that Hussein didn't have any finished products, or was obviously opposed to working with radical Islamist groups like al Qaeda, there would have at least been one single open source analysis of the probabilities and variances. There wasn't. None. Even more telling, after five years of backbiting leaks not even the smell of a pre-war one has emerged from DoD, CIA or State. Not one.

No, we don't part ways -- I wasn't clear. I agree that the consensus was that there were in fact WMD -- what I should have said was that they were not an immediate threat to the US. Just saying""...threat and WMD was accurate..." and tying threat and WMD together wasn't adequate to infer what I meant.

In what way would the two analyses differ? Given the same evidence, the only way the skeptic could arrive at a different set of numbers is if he assumed the worst case away--that's about as dishonest as assuming the worst case as fact. Otherwise, both should end up with the same expected values and variances--they'd differ only in the principles they'd follow in issuing judgments based on those estimates. The neocon would argue "we can't afford to wait," while the critic would respond with "we don't have enough information to act."

Your kidding, right? Neocon, shmeocon -- those squirrels and all other policy wonks are dangerous and should be pretty much ignored. I certainly paid no attention to that foolishness -- and my prception is that Bush did not either; he merely took aspects of their ideas because they were the only ones aho offered any idea of merit. DoD and the JCS sure did not.

The analysis would differ based on the determined need to act versus risks and potential costs. For example, if the issue was removal of Saddam, my take would be not worth it. If it were the removal of Saddam and the introduction of democracy in the region, my response would be "Better, but still not worth it."

OTOH, if the issue were to be after 22 years of attacks and probes from the ME is a forceful response desirable, my response would be yes and the cost must be borne. If, in that case, Saddam is removed and a possibility (no matter how remote) of 'introducing democracy' in the region is included, that's just synergy and mildly beneficial icing for the cake; has little bearing on my goal.

[Presley Cannady]

I'm unsure what pendantic means but I think I agree with all that...

It's a type. Should be pedantic. I don't know how to the adverbial form of "smart aleck."

No, we don't part ways -- I wasn't clear. I agree that the consensus was that there were in fact WMD -- what I should have said was that they were not an immediate threat to the US. Just saying""...threat and WMD was accurate..." and tying threat and WMD together wasn't adequate to infer what I meant.

If by immediate you mean imminent, I don't think you'll find much disagreement at any point in the debate's history. The neocon argument for preventative war is only novel in that it addresses threats that are not imminent.

Your kidding, right? Neocon, shmeocon -- those squirrels and all other policy wonks are dangerous and should be pretty much ignored. I certainly paid no attention to that foolishness -- and my prception is that Bush did not either; he merely took aspects of their ideas because they were the only ones aho offered any idea of merit. DoD and the JCS sure did not.

The Bush Administration probably hasn't executed Middle East transformation as ambitiously as neoconservatives might've hoped, but if Kristol and friends aren't principally about primacy and rollback, what are they for?

The analysis would differ based on the determined need to act versus risks and potential costs. For example, if the issue was removal of Saddam, my take would be not worth it. If it were the removal of Saddam and the introduction of democracy in the region, my response would be "Better, but still not worth it."

OTOH, if the issue were to be after 22 years of attacks and probes from the ME is a forceful response desirable, my response would be yes and the cost must be borne. If, in that case, Saddam is removed and a possibility (no matter how remote) of 'introducing democracy' in the region is included, that's just synergy and mildly beneficial icing for the cake; has little bearing on my goal.

Enlarging the scope of the strategy aside, we're still going to come back to assessing risks and benefits. You're not going to find anyone try to argue against a God's honest gospel figure detailing the widely separated means with narrow variances, but if that were the case then why is that like the only juicy bit of scandal not being leaked by the President's critics in the national security interagency? It stands to reason that such an analysis either fails to offer clearly ranked options for policymakers or it simply doesn't exist.

[Ken White]

It's a type. Should be pedantic. I don't know how to the adverbial form of "smart aleck."

My wife and Kids will tell you that 'Ken' will often suffice...

If by immediate you mean imminent, I don't think you'll find much disagreement at any point in the debate's history. The neocon argument for preventative war is only novel in that it addresses threats that are not imminent.

They're simply the new kids on the block. We have engaged preemptively on many occasions and probably will in the future. Immediate versus imminent is a semantic argument of little import; for Iraq, perhaps 'real' or 'significant' would be better words.

The Bush Administration probably hasn't executed Middle East transformation as ambitiously as neoconservatives might've hoped, but if Kristol and friends aren't principally about primacy and rollback, what are they for?

Dunno. Don't care, don't pay much attention to them, personally. My universal attitude toward politicians and pundits, all types and breeds.

Enlarging the scope of the strategy aside, we're still going to come back to assessing risks and benefits...

No one is enlarging the scope of the strategy; the issue I raised is what was the trigger FOR the strategy.

...You're not going to find anyone try to argue against a God's honest gospel figure detailing the widely separated means with narrow variances, but if that were the case then why is that like the only juicy bit of scandal not being leaked by the President's critics in the national security interagency? It stands to reason that such an analysis either fails to offer clearly ranked options for policymakers or it simply doesn't exist.

Sorry, I have no idea what what you're trying to say there....