Army Doctrine Reengineering and the Loss of Any Historical Perspective

[Fuchs]

An irregular opponent is one that is not part of a regular army. Regular armies have a defined set of legal, social and organisational characteristics, generally lacking in irregulars.

Emphasis on "generally". Much of the weakness of your statement is in that single word.

Examples:
* East India Companies
* European 15th-17th century mercs.
* Japanese warrior monks.
* Boers

It's also difficult to use "irregular" in context of mixed opposition (VC/NVA, Mercs among soldiers in Iraq/AFG, Palestina campaign 1917).

By the way; what's a "regular" army and what not? That's another weak spot of your definition.
Some armies of the world include(d) militias and even partisans. The Russians would likely field many para-military, non-regular "army" troops in a future conflict (troops of ministry of interior, KGB successor troops, border patrol).
Germany gives combatant status to its border police (meant for WW3), while much of France's police is (para)military Gendarmerie. About 10% of the German Eastern front army in 1942-1945 were ex-Soviet troops ("Hilfswillige", people willing to help) who were employed with rudimentary markings and unarmed. They weren't officially subject to martial courts and such. Were these men irregulars?
What about Soviet Red Army troops who were overrun and turned to partisan warfare? Regulars or irregulars?

A 95% definition is no useful definition.


edit: I forgot to add Austrian-Hungarian border settlers, Russian Cossacks, letter of marque,

[William F. Owen]

A 95% definition is no useful definition.

Well I strongly disagree. 95% is certainly good enough. No definition in warfare can be perfect. EG:
What is a Tank? CV-120? CVR-T?
Define a mortar, bearing in mind there are breach loading, rifled, direct fire mortar systems.

Some definitions of regular and irregular are going to be very context specific, so yes the context will provide a dimension so....

Examples:
* East India Companies - Regular in the context of whom they are contracted to, and used against
* European 15th-17th century mercs.- same as above
* Japanese warrior monks. - Serving the Emperor and fighting against whom?
* Boers - very definitely irregular.

Native Americans fighting Native Americans, is State v State Warfare or Nation v Nation. - context.

My definition is not to serve a general theory of war, but to provide the basis for teaching/discussion for Western/NATO armies in the early 21st century.

[Fuchs]

The Japanese warrior monks had "a defined set of legal, social and organisational characteristics".
Yet, they didn't serve a state, army, emperor or whatsoever. They were essentially sects that reached the proficiency and degree of organization of regular armies, albeit differently.

Your 95% definition doesn't tell for sure in any case whether a crowd is a regular or irregular force. Your exception ("generally lacking") is too unspecific.

[Steve Blair]

I'd also take issue with the Native Americans example, but now we're down to splitting hairs....

[Ursus horribilis toklat]

Klugzilla noted earlier

As I mentioned before, I too hate to see this happening; however, the actual appearance of quotes, vignettes, etc. does not necessarily mean that history does not underpin doctrine. That train has left the station". Also, we have yet to settle on a format for the ATTP, which is where vignettes may have the most impact. I think this ties into the Bob's World post."

Its not to late. The train hasn't gathered much speed yet. I think that historical underpinnings ought to be part and parcel of each published Service doctrinal manual, and that these underpinnings, whether in-text references or separate quotes and vignettes, should be extensively footnoted and/or source-note referenced. Peer review/audit ought to be an integral part of the coordination process (required not just requested) for draft manuals prior to their publication and public release.

[Ursus horribilis toklat]

I suggest COMISAF's guidance for COIN is a good example of tight writing and appropriate use of vignettes to drive home a point. Alarmingly the current trend in draft revisions of Army doctrinal manuals is not to include such vignettes (see the posts on Army Doctrine Reengineering on the TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference thread). As you well know by now I think this is a mistake. In writing doctrine we should follow GEN McC's lead rather than sacrificing the inclusion of any historical perspective in doctrinal manuals on the altar of brevity (as we are apparently about to do).

[Sylvan]

The problem isn't the manuals or what is contained in them.
The problem is an officer corps that sees no reason to read professionally beyond what the immediate problem is.

We have lots of careerists, but professionals are hard to come by.