Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[Ken White]

That's a leadership issue...not a procurement one. It also is a branch and sub-branch perception issue.

No, it is a procurement issue. It is one because it is at the whim (yes, whim...) of people whose leadership is not focused on mission accomplishment other than minimally but on institutional survival, they are a product of that branch perception problem -- in short, it is a techno fix that is only peripherally aimed at the mission and it is a human foible issue that will induce more human foibles and arguably could lead to as many or more casualties.

Short sharp actions always have many casualties -- long drawn out actions invariably produce more casualties and more damage. Similarly, excessive efforts at self protection are generally counter productive and also lend to the stretching out, in time. of combat, thus arguably and possibly (but often...) entailing more casualties over time.

I'm sure mech and motorized infantry see armored troop carriers differently than light infantry, particularly if facing a major artillery threat...Those espousing helicopter employment instead of vehicles will face aircraft shortages, weather, high/hot, LZ, and fuel-logistics challenges, and vulnerability landing in obvious LZs/PZs.

That's called stating the obvious and it contributes little to this sub thread. Having been Mech, a Tanker, Cav and Airborne over the years, I certainly know it's true but suffice to say, METT-TC should be involved in all those issues.

On the other hand having multiple options of different infantry types...the enemy could not exclusively focus in any single area.

Again, the action and effort should be tailored to the situation; there is no one size fits all.

So there's no "shock value" in M-ATVs encircling a town or overwatch value in having crew-served weapons aboard?

Maybe, maybe not. Most likely the local warning net or the kids messed up any potential "shock value" -- plus, having done that few times, with and without vehicles, my assessment is that the "shock value" if it existed at all wore off very quickly.

All in all, that's again METT-TC -- there is NO single answer...

How can advantages in walking 50 miles to an LZ be superior to flying there and then patrolling 10-20 kilometers? Which offers greater surprise.

Depends on what you're trying to do, doesn't it? Perhaps the object is not to surprise but to loudly announce ones presence and to seek contact.

You constantly read that the Taliban is never surprised by our dismounted patrols and an ample system of early warning exists.

Don't believe everything you read. Talk to folks who are there or have been recently and you'll find that some units have problems like that while others do not -- and most will have such problems in the first few weeks after arrival until the experience factor builds up to compensate for our mediocre training. There's also the issue of not knowing the terrain because of tour lengths, stationing, etc. -- the opponent has a significant advantage there and that doesn't go away no matter how you move.

Does it? What about infantry in a Bradley or Stryker, or coming off an aircraft or C-130? If infantry only walks, it covers a very small area. If it does not use COPs and all it does is walk and dig, it has limited weapons, protection, and retains high logistical requirements difficult to support by walking alone.

In reverse order: Yes, that's why all that support structure and those aircraft AND vehicles (including Tanks) exist to let the three guys that survive in that rifle squad own that terrain or remove that opposition; It should do more than walk and dig, what is its purpose? If its limited weapons are as equal or surpass as the opponents, why have a lot of excess? What area do you want it to "cover" -- again the issue is what one is trying to do. Well, we aren't going to carry either vehicle in their current form on a 130, that means C5s or C17s and that means you aren't going to use an assault strip...

And if you need an airstrip where you don't have one, somebody has to get it or build it.

Yet 5.9 gals of water...

Can't -- or won't -- argue that. IMO, the Army wants a very excessive amount of water.

There was a helicopter/UAS shortage... supply transport and other issues for which the tactical C-o-C was blamed.

I cannot discuss Wanat sensibly because I wasn't there. As for resource allotments, that's a METT-TC issue which neither of us can address knowledgeably.

I researched it after posting and though flak vests were used, they would not stop 7.62mm while current ones with ceramic plates will. If the flak vest would not stop the primary direct fire threat and no cooling vest existed in very humid conditions, it is understandable that nobody wanted to wear them.

Um, yeah. What's the point? As a minor point, the old vests weren't designed to stop SA fire, they were to stop shell fragments as Artillery in WW II (and Korea) was theoretically the biggest killer on the battlefield. Viet Nam changed the rules because
Clyde didn't have much Arty, was not good with Mortars (in contrast to the Chinese in Korea) but was a good shot. Prep for last was and all that...

Come one Ken. You know that a primary justification for using bouncing Betty's and IEDs is to inflict casualties that distract Soldiers from their primary mission to a greater extent than combat deaths. They also have a psychological impact.

Come on, Ken? I'm here. Yes, I know that -- again, what's your point?

I also know that in good and /or experienced units the adverse psychological impact dissipates rapidly, in a matter of days of exposure and then increasingly becomes a negative for the planters and quite unfortunately, for the local populace. Did you know that?

If a Soldier can survive...he has ample tools for success. The sole thing he has little control over is getting blown up en route to the patrol location or objective, or during the patrol or maneuver while chasing Taliban firing from a distance.

We can disagree on that. I think, again, that if you talk to some folks, you'll find that as units gain theater experience, they do better at spotting, evading or destroying IEDS. Which lead me to wonder if your gripes are with the personnel system and policies or patrol methodologies.

If the enemy has effective artillery as many threats do... A Stryker, Bradey, or M-ATV/JLTV/uparmored HMMWV also protect against artillery and expedite escape from an area being pounded by an unseen forward observer.

No question about that. I totally agree.

Uh -- doesn't that take us back to METT-TC?